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Abstract 
 
The majority of established legal systems are predisposed to the express recognition of 
good faith in contract. The apparent pressure for harmonisation of contract law arising 
from globalisation and political union will necessitate the Anglo-Commonwealth 
common law countries addressing their historical resistance to the observance of a 
general obligation of good faith. Accordingly this thesis appraises whether there is a 
requirement for a universal doctrine of good faith in New Zealand contractual 
relationships. The manuscript focuses on a prospective common law doctrine operating 
primarily as a rule of construction. It identifies the limits of such a judicial doctrine 
including its probable lack of application to non-contractual dealings and the likely need 
for a legislative duty if contracting parties are to be precluded from excluding the 
obligation. The characteristics of the subject doctrine are explored including the 
potential definition and uses of good faith. Whilst it is shown that good faith serves an 
important role in contract law, the analysis reveals that there is no current requirement 
for an express doctrine within New Zealand. The entrenched ‘piecemeal’ approach 
synonymous with Anglo-New Zealand contract law is not demonstrably deficient when 
gauged against the reasonable expectations of contracting parties. The current 
methodology is preferred to a general, unfamiliar and uncertain good faith principle 
which is likely to be reduced to equate with the existing New Zealand law in any event. 
Further, duties consonant with good faith may enhance economic efficiency but not in 
some instances. Good faith is therefore best imposed in specific circumstances rather 
than as a universal doctrine. Likewise, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that New 
Zealand is impaired in the international arena due to a lack of good faith despite 
pressure for New Zealand to accord with widespread overseas practice. The principle is 
of minimal utility in international trade where commercial certitude is paramount. 
Although an imperfect exemplar, the unresolved issues pertaining to contractual good 
faith in domestic American law confirms the identified reservations associated with the 
subject doctrine.   
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 1 
Introduction 
 
The concept of good faith is one of the most important contractual issues of this era.
1
 The 
goal of any established system of contract law must be to promote elements of good faith 
and fair dealing in the making and performance of contracts.
2
 Accordingly: 
 
This thesis will appraise whether there is a requirement for a universal doctrine of good 
faith in New Zealand contractual relationships. 
 
New Zealand does not currently recognise an explicit general obligation of good faith in 
the formation, performance, enforcement and discharge of contracts. However, there has 
been some judicial
3
 and academic
4
 support for such an obligation within New Zealand. 
Others view obligations of contractual good faith with skepticism
5
 and some with 
                                                     
1
 Sir Thomas Bingham in the foreword to Reziya Harrison, Good Faith in Sales (1997), at vi. 
2
 Justice Johan Steyn, ‘The Role of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Contract Law: A Hair-Shirt Philosophy’ 
in Lord Steyn, Democracy Through the Law (2004), at 213. 
3
 See the comments of Thomas J in Livingstone v Roskilly [1992] 3 NZLR 230. See also the observations of 
Master Kennedy-Grant in Allen v Southland Building and Investment Society (High Court, Auckland, CP 
556/94, 28 July 1995). 
4
 See generally C J Walshaw, ‘Good Faith and Fair Dealing’ Department of Accountancy and Business Law 
Discussion Paper Series 189 (1999); Matthew Conaglen, ‘Duress, Undue Influence, and Unconscionable 
Bargains – The Theoretical Mesh’ (1999) 18 New Zealand Universities Law Review 509, at 539; Justice 
Edward Thomas, ‘Good Faith in Contract: A Non-Sceptical Commentary’ (2005) 11 New Zealand Business 
Law Quarterly 391; David McLauchlan, ‘The Agreement to Negotiate in Good Faith: A Non-Justiciable 
Contract?’ (2005) 11 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 454; Paula Baron, ‘Resistance: A 
Consideration of the Opposition to a Duty of Good Faith in Australian Commercial Contracts’ (2005) 11 
New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 408; Justin Smith, ‘Good Faith’ in, The Law of Obligations – 
“Contract in Context” (New Zealand Law Society Intensive, 2007). 
5
 See generally Savelio v New Zealand Post Ltd (High Court, Wellington, CP 143/02, 18 July 2002, 
Hammond J), at [19]; Ideal Garages Ltd v The Independent Construction Company Ltd (High Court, 
Auckland, CIV 2004-404-2685, 18 November 2004, Heath J), at [205]; Walton Mountain Ltd v Apple New 
Zealand Ltd (2004) 5 NZCPR 241, at [67] per O’Regan J; Taylor Marine Ltd v Taylor Marine Brokers 
(2005) Ltd (High Court, Auckland, CIV 2005-404-6115, 16 May 2007, Cooper J), at [71]; Maree Chetwin, 
‘Relational Contract Theory and the Good Faith Debate’ (2003) 9 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 
 2 
distain.
6
 Notably, there is considerably less academic comment on the issue within New 
Zealand than in other comparable common law countries.
7
 
                                                                                                                                                              
211; Rick Bigwood, ‘Symposium Introduction: Confessions of a “Good Faith” Agnostic’ (2005) 11 New 
Zealand Business Law Quarterly 371; John Burrows, Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd, Law of Contract in 
New Zealand (3
rd
 ed, 2007), at 20. 
6
 See James Davies, ‘Why a Common Law Duty of Contractual Good Faith is Not Required’ (2002) 8 
Canterbury Law Review 529.  
7
 For recent English comment see Vanessa Sims, ‘Good Faith in English Contract Law: Of Triggers and 
Concentric Circles’ (2004) 1 Ankara Law Review 213; Justice Steyn, above n 2; Christian Twigg-Flesner, 
‘A Good Faith Requirement for English Contract Law?’ (2000) 9 Nottingham Law Journal 80; Gunther 
Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences’ 
(1998) 61 Modern Law Review 11; Roger Brownsword, ‘Good Faith in Contracts Revisited’ (1996) 49 
Current Legal Problems 112; Malcolm Clarke, ‘The Common Law of Contract in 1993: Is there a General 
Doctrine of Good Faith?’ (1993) 23 Hong Kong Law Journal 318. For recent Australian comment see Bill 
Dixon, ‘Can the Common Law Obligation of Good Faith be Contractually Excluded?’ (2007) 35 Australian 
Business Law Review 110; Marcel Gordon, ‘Discreet Digression: The Recent Evolution of the Implied 
Duty of Good Faith’ (2007) 19 Bond Law Review 26; Geoffrey Kuehne, ‘Implied Obligations of Good 
Faith and Reasonableness in the Performance of Contracts: Old Wine in New Bottles?’ (2006) 33 
University of Western Australia Law Review 63; Justice Robert McDougall, ‘The Implied Duty of Good 
Faith in Australian Contract Law’ (2006) 108 Australian Construction Law Newsletter 28; Brigid 
Harradine, ‘Implied Duty of Good Faith: A Fetter on Powers Under Australian Construction Contracts’ 
(2006) 1 Construction Law International 31; Angelo Capuano, ‘Not Keeping the Faith: A Critique of Good 
Faith in Contract Law in Australia and the United States’ (2005) 17 Bond Law Review 29; Bill Dixon, 
‘Common Law Obligations of Good Faith in Australian Commercial Contracts – A Relational Recipe’ 
(2005) 33 Australian Business Law Review 87; Bill Dixon, ‘What is the Content of the Common Law 
Obligation of Good Faith in Commercial Franchises?’ (2005) 33 Australian Business Law Review 207; 
John Carter and Elizabeth Peden, ‘Good Faith in Australian Contract Law’ (2003) 19 Journal of Contract 
Law 155; Bruno Zeller, ‘Good Faith – Is it a Contractual Obligation?’ (2003) 15 Bond Law Review 215; 
Elizabeth Peden, ‘The Meaning of Contractual ‘Good Faith’’ (2002) 22 Australian Bar Review 235; John 
Carter and Andrew Stewart, ‘Interpretation, Good Faith and the “True Meaning” of Contracts: The Royal 
Botanic Decision’ (2002) 18 Journal of Contract Law 1; Tyrone Carlin, ‘The Rise (and Fall) of Implied 
Duties of Good Faith in Contractual Performance in Australia’ (2002) 25 University of New South Wales 
Law Journal 99; Adrian Baron, ‘“Good Faith” and Construction Contracts – From Small Acorns Large 
Oaks Grow’ (2002) 22 Australian Bar Review 54; Jeannie Paterson, ‘Good Faith in Commercial Contracts? 
A Franchising Case Study’ (2001) 29 Australian Business Law Review 270; Eileen Webb, ‘The Scope of 
the Implied Duty of Good Faith- Lessons from Commercial Retail Tenancy Cases’ (2001) 9 Australian 
 3 
 
Common arguments in favour of a doctrine of good faith are that it would allow bad faith 
conduct to be addressed in a coherent and direct manner, permit the law to protect the 
reasonable expectations of men and women and promote a culture of contractual 
cooperation leading to economic efficiency.
8
 Pitted against those views is the concern 
that good faith is a vague concept. It is not clear whether good faith requires honest 
conduct, cooperative conduct, reasonable conduct or a combination thereof. Conceivably, 
a general doctrine may convey an uncertain discretion on the judiciary. Further, it may 
lead to the demise of contractual autonomy and competitive dealing. These arguments, 
and others, will be examined and developed throughout the course of this thesis. An 
appraisal of whether a contractual good faith doctrine is desirable in New Zealand is 
necessarily a balancing exercise. The various arguments for and against will be weighed 
and a conclusion will ultimately be drawn. 
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis is entitled ‘setting the scene.’ It provides a brief historical 
overview of good faith and summarises the current position in New Zealand and other 
jurisdictions in relation to the reception of the concept of contractual good faith. Chapter 
2 considers the subject doctrine. It endeavours to identify how a doctrine of good faith 
could be incorporated into New Zealand law, the extent to which it might apply to the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Property Law Journal 1; Elizabeth Peden, ‘Incorporating Terms of Good Faith in Contract Law in 
Australia’ (2001) 23 Sydney Law Review 222.  For recent Canadian comment see Shannon O’Byrne, ‘The 
Implied Term of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: Recent Developments’ (2007) 86 Canadian Bar Review 
193; John McCamus, ‘Abuse of Discretion, Failure to Cooperate and Evasion of Duty: Unpacking the 
Common Law Duty of Contractual Good Faith Performance’ (2004) 29 Advocates’ Quarterly 72; William 
Tetley, ‘Good Faith in Contract: Particularly in the Contracts of Arbitration and Chartering’ (2004) 35 
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 561; Joel Richler, ‘Good Faith & Construction Contracts’ (2004) 
34 Construction Law Reports (3d) 163; David Stack, ‘The Two Standards of Good Faith in Canadian 
Contract Law’ (1999) 62 Saskatchewan Law Review 201; Shannon O’Byrne, ‘Good Faith in Contractual 
Performance: Recent Developments’ (1995) 74 Canadian Bar Review 70; S M Waddams, ‘Good Faith, 
Unconscionability and Reasonable Expectations’ (1995) 9 Journal of Contract Law 54. 
8
 See generally Roger Brownsword, ‘Positive, Negative, Neutral: the Reception of Good Faith in English 
Contract Law’ in Roger Brownsword, Norma Hird and Geraint Howells (eds), Good Faith in Contract 
(1999), at 32. 
 4 
contracting process and whether it may be possible to contract out of the doctrine. 
Chapter 3 discusses how good faith under the subject doctrine could be defined and 
applied in practice. Chapter 4 considers the relationship between a prospective good faith 
doctrine and existing legal and equitable rules regulating contractual dealings. Chapter 5 
applies a law and economics analysis to the subject doctrine. It appraises contractual 
good faith in terms of economic efficiency. Chapter 6 considers certain international 
factors which are relevant to the good faith debate within New Zealand. From the 
foregoing analysis, a conclusion will be drawn as to the desirability of a doctrine of good 
faith in New Zealand contractual relationships. This will be achieved by weighing up the 
competing arguments. 
 5 
Chapter 1 
 
Setting the Scene 
 
1.1 Chapter Introduction:  
 
This chapter describes the evolution of the good faith issue in contract law. It provides a 
background to the progression of the concept of good faith within various legal 
jurisdictions. Part 1.2 gives a concise historical overview of the development of good 
faith from Ancient Roman times to the modern English setting. Part 1.3 summarises the 
current position in New Zealand in relation to the proposal for a good faith doctrine. Part 
1.4 identifies the state of the law relating to contractual obligations of good faith within 
certain other jurisdictions. Part 1.5 summarises the discussion.  
 
1.2 Historical Overview of Good Faith – From Roman Times to Modern English 
Law: 
 
1.2.1 Bona Fides in Roman Law: 
 
The origins of good faith can be traced to Roman law. Much like equity in English law, 
the restrictions of formal procedure in Roman law were surmounted by measures taken 
by those charged with administering justice. Roman law offers the first example of a legal 
system adapting under the influence of equitable concepts.
1
 
 
The oldest known procedure in Roman law was subsequently named legis actio (act or 
sue according to the law).
2
 The ritual procedure was conducted orally and divided into 
two parts. The first phase originally proceeded before a pontiff who determined whether 
                                                     
1
 Martin Schermaier, ‘Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law’ in Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker 
(eds), Good Faith in European Contract Law (2000), at 65. 
2
 George Mousourakis, A Legal History of Rome (2007), at 28 and 32. 
 6 
the plaintiff could bring an action and its required form. This task was later entrusted to 
the praetor (elected magistrate) consequent on the enactment of the leges Liciniae Sextiae 
in 367 BC.
3
 Within this stage of the proceedings the plaintiff had to frame his claim in set 
words which were required to be repeated by the defendant. This formed the legis actio. 
The claim would be rejected if the plaintiff departed from the set form. In the second 
stage of the procedure the iudex (private judge) considered the evidence and decided the 
case within the frame set by the praetor. The praetor had no authority to permit actions to 
proceed which were not provided for by legislation. The stipulated actions constituted the 
old ius civile (civil law).  
 
The legis actiones were later supplemented by the formulary system. These developments 
are thought to have occurred during the third century BC.
4
 Certainly the formulary 
system featured in the second century BC to the third century AD.
5
 The formulary system 
was more flexible than the legis actio. It permitted litigants to freely state the facts. The 
praetor would then issue the procedural formula which would describe the facts, appoint 
the judge, set out the programme of litigation and identify the claims and defences.  
 
The arrangement of the formulae was required to be publicly announced each year by the 
new praetor. This edict provided an opportunity to expand the list of enforceable actions 
and develop the ius honorarium (praetorian law). The ius honorarium was built up by the 
praetors over a number of centuries and was eventually codified under Emperor 
Hadrian.
6
 The ius honorarium supplemented and corrected the ius civile and may 
arguably be seen as an equivalent to equity in English law.
7
 Both systems sought to 
overcome the strictures of form and doctrine which tended to give rise to a contradiction 
                                                     
3
 Ibid, at 28. 
4
 Schermaier, above n 1, at 72. 
5
 Mousourakis, above n 2, at 32. 
6
 Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1992), at 
680. 
7
 See William Buckland, Equity in Roman Law: Lectures Delivered in the University of London, at the 
Request of the Faculty of Laws (1911), at 5; Fritz Pringsheim, ‘The Inner Relationship Between English 
and Roman Law’ (1933) 5 Cambridge Law Journal 347, at 357. 
 7 
between positive law and justice. That contradiction was embodied by the Ancient 
Romans in the phrase summum ius, summa iniuria.
8
 The function of the praetor therefore 
bears strong analogy to the function of the Chancellor under English law.
9
  
 
The ius honorarium permitted the praetor to refuse to grant an action which would 
otherwise be valid under the ius civile. This process was known as denegatio actionis. 
Alternatively, the praetor could authorise the insertion of an exceptio into the procedural 
formula.
10
 The praetor did not create new legal rights per se. A legal right was only 
recognised in legislation in Roman law. However, the praetor did create new de facto 
rights by introducing novel remedies within the formula.
11
  
 
It is not clear at what time bona fides became an operative element of Roman law. 
However, it has been demonstrated that bona fides was incorporated into the ius 
honorarium during the second century BC at the latest.
12
  
 
The concept of bona fides can be translated to mean in accordance with good faith. Fides 
was originally understood to mean that a man should remain faithful to his word and 
should honour his undertakings.
13
 Bona fides on the other hand was utilised to ascertain 
the content of a concluded contract. It required the parties to act honestly and therefore 
influenced the manner in which a contract was performed. The qualification of fides as 
bona fides therefore emphasises the specificity of the standard of behaviour that was 
required.
14
 
 
                                                     
8
 M T Cicero, De officiis 1, at 33. 
9
 Roscoe Dorsey, ‘Roman Sources of Some English Principles of Equity and Common Law Rules’ (1938) 8 
American Law School Review 1233, at 1235. 
10
 Zimmermann, above n 6, at 680. 
11
 See Mousourakis, above n 2, at 65. 
12
 See Schermaier, above n 1, at 74. 
13
 C C Turpin, ‘Bonae Fidei Iudicia’ [1965] Cambridge Law Journal 260, at 262. 
14
 Schermaier, above n 1, at 82. 
 8 
Bona fides was central to the restructuring of Roman law. The notion of bona fides 
developed at a time when the Republic was very much aware of the division between the 
old claims under the ius civile and those more modern claims under the ius honorarium.
15
 
A claim based on bona fides could not be brought under the ius civile. Bona fides had no 
statutory basis. It was referred to as iudicia sine lege.
16
 Thus, the formulary process was 
essential to the development of the bonae fidei iudicia.  
 
Historical catalogues show that certain categories of contract were subject to bona fides 
whereas others were stricti iuris.
17
 Contracts of tutela (guardianship), mandatum 
(mandate), emptio venditio (sale), and locatio conductio (hire of goods or services) all 
involved bona fide obligations.
18
 Unilateral contracts such as the stipulatio (where the 
promisor was bound to the precise object promised) were considered stricti iuris.
19
  
 
Actiones stricti iuris required the relevant formula to be strictly construed. The iudex was 
only permitted to consider the matters contained within the formula.
20
 Actiones bonae 
fidei on the other hand permitted the iudex discretion. He could take into account all the 
facts of the case whether or not they were stipulated in the formula. This power was 
granted by the praetor by appending the clause ex fide bona to the formula. As a result, 
the judge was permitted to scrutinise the true intention of the parties and could consider 
equitable defences even if they were not expressly contained within the formula.
21
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A case example of the role bona fides played in the development of Roman law is found 
in the writings of Cicero.
22
 T Claudius Centumalus owned a house on the Caelian hill. 
The augurs had planned to take an augury on the citadel. The house owned by Claudius 
was high enough to obstruct their observation of the flight of birds. Accordingly, the 
augurs required that Claudius demolish part of the house. Instead, Claudius sold the 
house to Publius Calpurnius Lanarius. Claudius did not advise Calpurnius of the demand 
that had been made by the augurs. Calpurnius was required to demolish part of the house 
shortly after acquiring it. Thereafter, Calpurnius compelled Claudius to go before the 
arbitrator, Marcus Porcius Cato. Calpurnius demanded compensation for his loss. The 
claim could not be brought under the ius civile. A vendor of land could only be liable 
under that system if he had expressly denied the existence of any defects. Calpurnius 
therefore initiated the claim not under the ius civile but instead as bona fide iudicium. 
Cato duly awarded compensation for the loss which Calpurnius had suffered as a result of 
the silence of Claudius. The judgment was passed around 100 BC. Neither the action nor 
the result was new at the time. The decision certainly emphasises how the bonae fidei 
iudicia could lead to a departure away from the principle of caveat emptor.
23
   
 
The fundamental effect which bona fides had on Roman law is aptly described by Martin 
Schermaier: 
 
The expansion of the judicial discretion in assessing the merits of a case lay at the 
heart of the brilliant development of Roman contract law from the time of the late 
Republic until the end of the classical period. Before the introduction of the bonae 
fidei iudicia the judge was confined to determining whether the claim asserted 
under the procedural formula did or did not exist. The bona fide clause enabled 
him to consider the parties’ relationship [in its origin and all its effects, within the 
framework of all surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the parties].
24
   
 
Bona fides slowly lost importance from the end of the classical period. The final 
codification of the praetorian edict by Iulianus occurred around 130 AD. This halted the 
                                                     
22
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creative activity of the praetors and the ius honorarium lost its flexibility.
25
 The ius civile 
and the ius honorarium were eventually merged. The formulary procedure was also 
replaced by the imperial cognitio extra ordinem.
26
 This was the favoured procedure by 
the end of the third century AD.
27
 In consequence, the flexible and general concepts of 
aequitas, humanitas and benignitas synonymous with the latter system began to be 
favoured over bona fides.  
 
Nonetheless, a general body of rules had crystallised out of the numerous decisions based 
on bona fides. This collection of principles played an important role in the translation of 
Roman law into modern legal systems.
28
 Thus, there can be no doubt that the historical 
origin of bona fides within Roman law has played a vital part in the acceptance of good 
faith within contemporary contract law.   
 
1.2.2 Good Faith in the Medieval Ius Commune: 
 
The ius commune had consolidated its position as part of a common Christian culture of 
Europe by the 14
th
 century. This unity resulted in law and religion being closely related in 
late medieval writing.
29
 The medieval jurists who studied Roman and canon law 
expressly recognised good faith and equity in contract.
30
 According to the writers before 
Baldus, good faith and equity described three types of conduct expected of contracting 
parties.  
 
Firstly, a party was required to keep his word. This was a matter of faith and equity and it 
applied under the ius gentium (a law binding upon all peoples).
31
 This obligation did not 
                                                     
25
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easily reconcile with Roman law under which only some contracts were consensu 
(binding by consent). The canonists generally adopted the approach that agreements were 
enforceable without regard to the Roman distinction between contracts consensu and 
contracts re.
32
 The justification was that every promise was binding on the conscience of 
the promisor and a failure to keep the promise was a breach of duty to God.
33
  
 
Secondly, good faith meant that neither party should mislead or take advantage of the 
other. Accordingly, the victim of dolus (deceit or fraud) should have a remedy. Dolus was 
classified as causal or incidental. Causal fraud led a man to contract who would not have 
done so otherwise. Incidental fraud resulted in a man contracting on less favourable 
terms. The victim of causal fraud was entitled to escape the contract entirely. Incidental 
fraud only gave rise to a remedy in damages.
34
  
 
Thirdly, good faith required a party to do whatever could be expected of an honest person 
engaged in a given type of transaction.
35
 This reflected the belief of medieval jurists that 
every kind of contract has natural terms which a party must observe as a matter of good 
faith and equity in accordance with the ius gentium. 
 
The 14
th
 century Italian jurist Baldus has been said to have developed a more coherent 
conceptualisation of good faith and equity. Baldus drew on the works of Aristotle and 
Thomas Aquinas in order to do so. Aristotle recognised that distributive justice secured 
for each citizen an appropriate share of wealth that society had to divide. Commutative 
justice preserved that share.
36
 As a corollary, the virtue of liberality dictated that a person 
disposing of his money would give the right people the right amounts at the right time.
37
 
Thomas Aquinas hypothesised that contracts could be classified as acts of liberality or 
                                                     
32
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33
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commutative justice. For example, a donation would fall within the former category 
whereas sale and lease would fall within the latter.
38
 
 
Baldus utilised the philosophy of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas to postulate that good 
faith and equity required that no person should be permitted to enrich himself at the 
expense of another. This principle of equality was the foundation of commutative justice. 
Baldus’ principle of natural equity and good faith would therefore permit a remedy where 
a person received an unjust price.
39
 It also explained why parties would be subject to 
certain obligations even if they were not expressly assumed. Baldus reasoned that every 
contract must have a causa. The causa could either be liberality or the receipt of 
something in return for what was given.
40
 An act of commutative justice could not enrich 
one party at the expense of the other and an act of liberality would only lead to a sensible 
enrichment. Baldus thus concluded that a contract without a causa should not be 
enforceable under any law, including canon law.
41
  
 
The theories of Baldus dominated the late 14
th
 century scholarship.
42
 Baldus’ views were 
adopted by a school of jurists based in Spain in the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries who have 
become known as the Late Scholastics. They discussed the duties which were thought to 
arise from equity and good faith. Unlike Baldus however, they were not concerned with 
tying their conclusions to Roman texts.
43
  
 
Although notions of equality of exchange have somewhat fallen out of fashion in recent 
times, Baldus made an important contribution to the historical development of good faith 
in contract. His definition was capable of providing some assistance in resolving 
individual cases rather than describing discrete situations in which good faith was 
                                                     
38
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required.
44
 His theories and those produced by his medieval successors have inevitably 
enhanced the understanding of the concepts of good faith and equity within contemporary 
contract law.   
 
1.2.3 The Historical Development of Good Faith in English Law: 
 
It is fundamental that the development of good faith within England is primarily 
attributable to the Court of Chancery. This is a natural consequence of the fact that the 
principles of good faith inherent in canon law were imported by the early ecclesiastical 
chancellors into the Court of Conscience.
45
 Good faith and conscience inevitably lie 
deepest in the foundations of equity. W T Barbour recognises: 
 
The chancellor was an ecclesiastic, and probably carried with him into chancery 
the principles and theories of the ecclesiastical court. It is notorious that the 
ecclesiastical court did assume jurisdiction over laesio fidei. What more natural 
than that the chancellor should have proceeded upon the ground of breach of 
faith?...I do not think it necessary to base the chancellor’s jurisdiction on breach 
of faith alone; but that he did enforce gratuitous promises cannot be doubted.
46
 
 
However, the Court of Chancery was not the first or the only court in England to embrace 
concepts of good faith. Henry II was infamous for his quarrelling with the whole mass of 
bishops and clergy. It is therefore somewhat surprising that his greatest and most lasting 
act in the legal field was to make justices of the prelates of his church.
47
 Although the 
clerical justices would have had only a limited acquaintance with canon law, the decision 
of Henry II 
 
                                                     
44
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was the decisive event in the history of the development of good faith in the 
common law because it ensured the institutionalisation of the Roman canon law 
concept of bona fides in that system. Even the most superficial acquaintance with 
canon law would include some knowledge of that system’s assimilation of the 
Roman law bona fides with the notion of Christian conscience.
48
 
 
The churchmen presiding as judges in the royal courts were thus able to apply their 
knowledge of the relatively coherent rules of canon law to the vague and conflicting mass 
of custom, tribal and feudal rules which comprised English law.
49
 The canonist influence 
brought Roman concepts of aequitas and bona fides to bear on the early common law. 
 
Notwithstanding, there is little evidence that conscience and good faith were matters 
which were relevant to decision making by the time of the reign of Edward II. Canon law 
and civil law had ceased to directly influence English law by the end of the 13
th
 century.
50
 
The traces of equitable notions that had existed in the common law had been 
extinguished. That was manifest in Le Walays v Melsamby where Bereford, the Chief 
Justice, was reminded by counsel that he must not allow conscience to prevent the giving 
effect to the law.
51
 The hitherto weak attempts of the Bereford Bench to introduce some 
element of good faith into the ius strictum were abated. The common law judges 
therefore assumed that every man entering into a contract would protect his own interests 
and ‘if he were outwitted or even defrauded, he was without redress.’
52
 This conclusion 
reflected the common law fears that notions of conscience and good faith were a matter 
of whim and caprice which would open the door to wanton interference with the law of 
the land.
53
 
 
The rigours of English common law contrasted markedly with the recognition of aequitas 
within Continental Europe. Aequitas was perceived as a means of remedying the 
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injustices of the ius strictum. In consequence, bona fides dominated relations between 
merchants during the 11
th
 and 12
th
 centuries. Good faith therefore became an essential 
strand of the medieval and early modern lex mercatoria.
54
 Plucknett observed the effect 
of the contrast between the common law and lex mercatoria within England: 
 
[I]t is not without significance that the Merchant has a more scrupulous 
conscience than the generality of landowners, for the law merchant gave a large 
place to conscience and good faith and introduced a considerable element of 
equity in the law of the city courts.
55
 
 
The inflexibility of the rules of the common law within England had significant effects. 
The ecclesiastical jurisdiction began to encroach on the common law of contract. The 
ecclesiastical courts would entertain suits to enforce a contract provided that a sworn 
promise could be derived from the agreement. Words to the effect of ‘by my faith’ were 
sufficient.
56
 Contracting parties were therefore increasingly exposed to the principles of 
canon law. 
 
However, the most important consequence of the rigidity of the common law was the 
development of an equitable jurisdiction during the 14
th
 century. Initially the equitable 
jurisdiction was administered through the Court of Requests. There is no evidence of 
Chancery as a separate Court of Equity before 1340.
57
 Thereafter, equitable ideas 
formerly noticeable in the common law courts began to flow through the Chancellor and 
Chancery during the 14
th
 and 15
th
 centuries.
58
  
 
The Court of Chancery was perceived more as a Court of Conscience rather than a Court 
of Equity during the 15
th
 and early 16
th
 centuries. Petitions during that time would allege 
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persons to have acted ‘agens faithe and good conscience’
59
 and would appeal to the 
Chancellor to do as ‘gude faith and conscens requyer.’
60
 Raphael Powell appropriately 
observed: 
 
In the fifteenth century [ ] the use of the words ‘good faith and conscience’ was 
probably necessary, not only to catch the eye of the Chancellor but also to put in 
his hands the key with which he could without qualms open his court to the 
petitioner. When the Chancellor dealt with the petition, he in turn emphasised the 
duties of good faith and conscience– especially conscience.
61
 
 
The Court of Chancery had progressed and developed from a Court of Conscience to 
being a Court of Equity by the late 16
th
 century. This led to the emergence of good faith 
as a distinct concept from conscience.
62
 Good faith began to be applied in the form of 
more specific rules. References were then made to good faith and equity rather than good 
faith and conscience.
63
   
 
From the late 18
th
 century, the Court of Chancery was in decline following the growth of 
formalism.
64
 Equity had hardened into rigid principles. Old equitable rules relating to 
penalties, forfeitures, mortgages and unconscionable contracts were ignored or 
forgotten.
65
  Notwithstanding, there were signs of an emerging principle of good faith in 
contract law in the latter half of the 18
th
 century.
66
 This was a consequence of the desire 
for the law of contract to ensure a fair exchange. The idea of good faith was therefore 
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congruent with the prevailing sense of morality.
67
 In 1766 Lord Mansfield CJ suggested 
that good faith had a general application to all contracts: 
 
The governing principle is applicable to all contracts and dealings. Good faith 
forbids either party by concealing what he privately knows, to draw the other into 
a bargain, from his ignorance of those facts, and his believing to the contrary. But 
either party may be innocently silent, as to grounds open to both, to exercise their 
judgment upon.
68
 
 
Lord Mansfield was therefore prepared to restrict the operation of the doctrine of caveat 
emptor by referring to a general principle of good faith.
69
 The sentiments of Mansfield 
were shared by Lord Kenyon in Mellish v Motteux where he opined that in ‘contracts of 
all kinds, it is of the highest importance that courts of law should compel the observance 
of honesty and good faith.’
70
 Similar views were endorsed during the early 19
th
 century. 
In Lumley v Wagner Lord St Leonards LC, sitting in the Lord Chancellor’s Court, 
observed:  
 
Wherever this court has not proper jurisdiction to enforce specific performance, it 
operates to bind men's consciences, as far as they can be bound, to a true and 
literal performance of their agreements, and it will not suffer them to depart from 
their contracts at their pleasure, leaving the party with whom they have contracted 
to the mere chance of any damages which a jury may give. The exercise of this 
jurisdiction has, I believe, had a wholesome tendency towards the maintenance of 
that good faith which exists in this country to a much greater degree perhaps than 
in any other…
71
 
 
However, from the mid to late 19
th
 century the notion of good faith as a governing 
principle was overridden by the development of law which reflected laissez faire 
economics and propounded contractual autonomy.
72
 This was a corollary of the new 
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political economy which had its heyday in the 1820s and 1830s.
73
 The libertarian 
tradition recognised the economic and social efficiency of permitting competent parties to 
freely strike their own bargains.
74
 In consequence the common law idea that parties 
negotiating a contract are dealing at arms length won the day.
75
 The principle of caveat 
emptor prevailed. The scales had tipped strongly against general standards of fairness in 
favour of predictability.
76
 Incrementalism was favoured over high principle and this was 
fatal to a paternalistic general doctrine of good faith.
77
 Such moralistic ideals were 
perceived as outmoded.
78
 
 
The merger of the common law and equitable jurisdictions under the Judicature Act 1873 
may have also provided a further catalyst for these developments.
79
 The majority of 
common law judges might have found it difficult to understand and apply equitable 
notions of good faith. They could have therefore simply elected to ignore them. Indeed, 
equity had been severely crippled by around 100 years of decline by the time the 
Judicature Act 1873 was passed.
80
 
 
Good faith became a matter of mere marginal interest in England as a result of the 
prevailing school of thought.
81
 It has been recognised that 
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[w]ith the exception of Raphael Powell’s inaugural lecture in 1956, good faith in 
contract was not a topic addressed by academics or textbook writers; nor was a 
violation of the principle of good faith a matter openly pleaded or addressed in 
litigation…
82
 
 
It was not until the late 20
th
 century that the good faith debate matured. This development 
was principally brought about by the judgments of Steyn J in Banque Keyser Ullmann SA 
v Skandia (UK) Insurance Co Ltd
83
 and Bingham LJ in Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v 
Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd.
84
  
 
In Banque Keyser Steyn J considered a claim for a breach of good faith in the context of 
an insurance contract. His Honour, when discussing the long-recognised principle that a 
contract for insurance is a particular category of contract for which an obligation of good 
faith disclosure applies, recognised: 
 
That principle, Lord Mansfield CJ said, is applicable to all contracts. To that 
extent Lord Mansfield CJ's generalised statement has not prevailed. Admittedly, 
there are other contracts which are sometimes described as contracts of the utmost 
good faith, such as contracts of suretyship, partnership and salvage, but the 
principles of disclosure applicable to those contracts cannot be equated with those 
applicable to contracts of insurance.
85
 
 
Critically, Steyn J went on to hold that the remedy for an insured for a breach of utmost 
good faith was not confined to avoidance of the contract and a return of the premium. It 
could extend to a claim for damages provided that the insured could show that the non-
disclosure induced him or her to enter into the contract and that damages was the only 
effective remedy.
86
 Although this point was overturned by the House of Lords
87
, it led to 
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an increased interest in the idea that the principle of good faith could be used as a positive 
cause of action to obtain a remedy analogous to contractual damages.  
 
In Interfoto the English Court of Appeal was required to rule on the enforceability of a 
particularly onerous clause which required a customer of a photo library to pay an 
extortionate
88
 holding fee for photographs returned after the due date. The photo library 
had omitted to draw the attention of the customer to the clause. Bingham LJ alluded to 
obligations of good faith in the course of the judgment: 
 
In many civil law systems, and perhaps in most legal systems outside the common 
law world, the law of obligations recognises and enforces an overriding principle 
that in making and carrying out contracts parties should act in good faith. This 
does not simply mean that they should not deceive each other, a principle which 
any legal system must recognise its effect is perhaps most aptly conveyed by such 
metaphorical colloquialisms as 'playing fair', 'coming clean' or 'putting one's cards 
face upwards on the table'…English law has, characteristically, committed itself 
to no such overriding principle but has developed piecemeal solutions in response 
to demonstrated problems of unfairness. Many examples could be given. Thus 
equity has intervened to strike down unconscionable bargains. Parliament has 
stepped in to regulate the imposition of exemption clauses and the form of certain 
hire-purchase agreements. The common law also has made its contribution, by 
holding that certain classes of contract require the utmost good faith, by treating 
as irrecoverable what purport to be agreed estimates of damage but are in truth a 
disguised penalty for breach, and in many other ways.
89
 
 
Bingham LJ considered that a legal system incorporating good faith would require the 
photo library to specifically draw the attention of the customer to the high price 
payable.
90
 English law instead looked to the nature of the transaction in question and the 
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character of the parties to consider what notice was given to the particular party alleged to 
be bound and whether it would be fair in all the circumstances to hold him or her to the 
bargain. However, Bingham LJ considered that the English analysis would not yield a 
very different result from the civil law principle of good faith.
91
 In fact, this bore out. The 
Court distinguished the case from a simple analysis of whether an offer had been made 
and accepted. Although there was clearly a contract, the photo library had not done what 
was reasonably necessary to draw the attention of the customer to the condition in 
question. Accordingly, the particular clause could not be said to have become part of the 
contract.
92
 It was unenforceable. 
 
As a result of these decisions the debate was opened in England as to whether the 
common law should move away from its piecemeal approach to a unifying obligation of 
good faith. The libertarians stood on one side advocating freedom of contract and the 
classical law of contract.
93
 That stance was best encapsulated by the famous comments of 
Lord Ackner in Walford v Miles where it was suggested that an obligation to negotiate in 
good faith is inherently repugnant to the adversarial position of parties engaged in 
contractual negotiations.
94
 Natural lawyers opposed this position, favouring wider judicial 
responsibility and propounding the importance of fairness as a concept in the negotiation, 
interpretation and enforcement of a contractual bargain.  
 
In consequence, there can be no doubt that good faith is an ideal whose time has now 
come.
95
 It has been contended, albeit without any empirical proof, that more articles, 
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commentaries and books are now being written on the good faith debate than any other 
subject in the law of contract.
96
 
 
1.3 The Current Position in New Zealand: 
 
Case law in New Zealand supporting a doctrine of good faith is currently sparse.
97
 The 
main judicial proponent of the doctrine was Thomas J. In Livingstone v Roskilly his 
Honour asserted, in obiter dicta, that ‘I would not exclude from our common law the 
concept that, in general, the parties to a contract must act in good faith in making and 
carrying out the contract.’
98
  
 
However, in Isis (Europe) Ltd v Lateral Nominees Ltd Tompkins J suggested that the 
trend of current authority does not support the comments of Thomas J in Livingstone.
99
 
The idea of a general obligation arising out of any contract to act fairly and in good faith 
could not be supported. 
 
Notwithstanding, Thomas J did not waiver from his position. Having then been elevated 
to the Court of Appeal, his Honour delivered a dissenting judgment in Bobux Marketing 
Ltd v Raynor Marketing Ltd.
100
 The contract in question was described as a relational 
contract. The agreement stipulated that it would continue for an indefinite period. The 
majority held that there was no ability to imply a right to terminate the agreement on 
reasonable notice. Thomas J would have implied such a right. His Honour described the 
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majority decision as a finding that carried the weight of orthodoxy but the interpretation 
did not make commercial sense.
101
  
 
Thomas J engaged in a comprehensive discussion of the academic and judicial comment 
relating to good faith in contract law in the course of the dissenting judgment. His 
Honour continued to display a preparedness to recognise a duty to exercise good faith in 
the performance of a contractual obligation and particularly in the case of relational 
contracts. The good faith obligation in the latter class of contacts would supposedly hold 
the parties to the promise implicit in a continuing, relational commercial transaction.
102
  
 
Once more, these observations have not received support. In Archibald Barr Motor 
Company Ltd v ATECO Automotive New Zealand Ltd Allan J suggested that New 
Zealand courts are unlikely to incorporate an obligation of good faith into all contracts 
generally. This conclusion was particularly applicable to those commercial contracts 
where the parties have extensively spelt out their obligations and where a good faith 
requirement would not fit comfortably with those detailed express terms.
103
   
 
As Thomas J approached retirement from the Supreme Court he again touched on the 
good faith subject in the case of Gibbons Holdings Ltd v Wholesale Distributors Ltd.
104
 
The attempts of the appellant to propound a contractual interpretation contrary to its 
actual intention at the time of contracting were criticised. His Honour contended that a 
doctrine of good faith would likely have prevented such attempts. It was asserted that: 
 
Notwithstanding its widespread acceptance in most common law and civil 
jurisdictions in the world and growing judicial support, the courts have not yet 
incorporated the doctrine of good faith into our law. There is a widespread belief 
that existing doctrines or judicial devices already encompass a requirement of 
good faith. It would, it is said, add nothing to the existing tools and principles of 
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the common law, such as estoppel and implied terms. This case serves to 
demonstrate that this belief is misplaced.
105
 
 
Few lawyers in New Zealand would dispute that the legal views and approach of Thomas 
J in exercising his judicial function were controversial.
106
 His Honour developed 
notoriety amongst the legal fraternity for the frequency of his dissenting judgments when 
sitting as an appellate judge. In respect of his Honour’s first instance decisions, it has 
been suggested that he all too frequently engaged in legal analysis on matters which 
should have properly been left to the Privy Council.
107
 His appointment to the Court of 
Appeal was therefore supported by some on the basis that he could be outvoted by his 
judicial brethren where necessary.
108
 
 
However, it has been observed that the introduction of good faith in New Zealand may be 
inevitable. The future of good faith will depend on legal, cultural and attitudinal shifts 
that are bound to occur.
109
 The seemingly ever-increasing need for internationalisation of 
commercial and contract law may well be a catalyst for these developments. The obiter 
dicta comments and controversial judgments of Thomas J in respect of good faith may be 
regarded as forward thinking in light of this pressure for change. It has been noted that: 
 
A dissenting judgment anchored in the circumstances of today sometimes appeals 
to the judges of tomorrow. In that way a dissenting judgment sometimes 
contributes to the continuing development of the law.
110
  
 
                                                     
105
 Ibid, at 316-317. 
106
 Thomas has described his own perception on the role of judges in the legal system: Justice Edward 
Thomas, The Judicial Process: Realism, Pragmatism, Practical Reasoning, and Principles (2005). See also 
Bevan Marten, ‘Book Review: The Judicial Process: Realism, Pragmatism, Practical Reasoning and 
Principles’ (2006) 37 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 153.   
107
 See Don Dugdale, ‘An Impolite Response to Mr Thomas’ [2005] New Zealand Law Journal 372. 
108
 Ibid. 
109
 See generally Rick Bigwood, ‘Symposium Introduction: Confessions of a “Good Faith” Agnostic’ 
(2005) 11 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 371, at 374. 
110
 Lord Steyn, ‘The Value of Dissenting Judgments: Fisher v Minister of Public Safety and Immigration’ 
in Lord Steyn, Democracy Through the Law (2004), at 85. 
 25 
Thomas J’s views have not been entirely rejected in New Zealand. In Allen v Southland 
Building and Investment Society
111
 Master Kennedy-Grant considered a submission to the 
effect that New Zealand law should recognise a legally implied term requiring good faith 
and fair dealing by the parties to a contract. It was held that the existence of such an 
obligation was, at least, arguable.
112
 His Honour cited the views of Thomas J in 
Livingstone in support of this assertion. It was also noted that there is no New Zealand 
authority which precludes the argument that such a legally implied duty exists.
113
 
 
In Stanley v Fuji Xerox New Zealand Ltd Elias J was prepared to imply an obligation of 
good faith wherever a contract is predicated on mutual trust and confidence.
114
 The 
reasoning is arguably somewhat circular. Duties of good faith and loyalty are inevitably 
implicit in contracts embodying mutual trust and confidence. The case does not therefore 
necessarily support a duty of good faith applicable to all contracts. Nonetheless, Elias J 
considered that a term of good faith and fair dealing was required in the particular 
circumstances. The parties had substituted an employment agreement for an agency 
agreement. Similar duties of good faith would be owed under the agency agreement as 
were owed under the employment agreement because the agent performed a similar 
function as he had performed as an employee.
115
 The implied term would give effect to 
the expectations of the parties to the agreement as objectively ascertained from the 
contract and the context.
116
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Further, Hammond J was prepared to recognise an obligation to negotiate in good faith as 
being legally enforceable in New Zealand Licensed Rest Homes Associated Inc v Midland 
Regional Health Authority.
117
 The contract was for the provision of rest home services. It 
expressly required the parties to negotiate in good faith for a new agreement prior to the 
termination date of the existing contract. Hammond J considered that the clause imposed 
some restriction on the raw and undiluted pursuit of individual self-interest.
118
 The 
substantive findings of his Honour were upheld on appeal in Residential Care (New 
Zealand) Inc v Health Funding Authority.
119
 
 
The Rest Homes case must however be compared with the decision of the Court of 
Appeal in Wellington City Council v Body Corporate 51702 (Wellington).
120
 The 
appellant Council was a lessor of premises. It undertook to negotiate in good faith for the 
sale of its leasehold interests to existing lessees at not less than the current market value 
of those interests. The respondent lessee claimed that there was a valid process contract 
which was breached by the Council. In particular, the Council was alleged to have failed 
to respond to offers made by the lessee and sold the relevant leasehold interest to a third 
party on substantially the same terms offered by the lessee. Tipping J, delivering the 
judgment of the Court, recognised that a process contract will be enforceable if it 
specifies the way in which negotiations are to be conducted with enough precision to 
determine what the parties are required to do.
121
 In the present context it was said that 
good faith was a subjective criterion. The Court had no objective means of determining 
whether the parties were negotiating in good faith and accordingly the matter was not 
justiciable.
122
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Tipping J did not address the Rest Homes case in Wellington City Council. The decisions 
are difficult to reconcile. However, in the course of the judgment Tipping J did recognise 
Canadian authority
123
 upholding a contractual clause within an already concluded 
contract which required the parties to negotiate implicitly in good faith for a specific 
contract outside the existing contract.
124
 The Rest Homes case might conceivably fall 
within this line of authority given that there was a pre-existing negotiation clause within 
the original contract. Nonetheless, certain commentators have argued that the Rest Homes 
case has been impliedly overruled or ‘trumped’ by Wellington City Council.
125
 
 
Preliminary agreements to negotiate in good faith will be considered in more detail in 
Chapter 2. However, it could be reasoned from Wellington City Council that if the 
judiciary is generally unwilling to give effect to the concept of good faith when parties 
have expressly agreed to negotiate in good faith, it is unlikely that it will receive more 
favourable treatment when attempts are made to imply or import an obligation of good 
faith into a contract.
126
  
 
That said, it is evident that good faith is not foreign to New Zealand law. Clearly however 
the above authorities which have been referred to in support of Thomas J’s views often 
fall short of a preparedness to recognise a general doctrine of good faith in New Zealand. 
There currently remains a distinction between a universally applicable doctrine of good 
faith and an implied term of good faith depending on the nature of the contract or the 
relationship between the contracting parties. Whilst the New Zealand courts are prepared 
to recognise the latter, the former has not yet been accepted.  
 
However, there is no authority expressly rejecting such a universal doctrine. It remains to 
be substantively tested. Accordingly, in Vero Insurance New Zealand Ltd v Fleet 
Insurance & Risk Management Ltd Asher J observed: 
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Although a number of New Zealand cases have considered the circumstances in 
which a term of good faith will be implied [ ], the application and meaning of 
good faith in contracts has not as yet been thoroughly considered in New 
Zealand.
127
 
 
Seemingly there is a very real possibility that the issue of a good faith doctrine in New 
Zealand will soon need to be addressed by the appellate courts. In Prime Commercial Ltd 
v Wool Board Disestablishment Company Ltd the Supreme Court, although declining 
leave to appeal on the basis that the substantive case was unlikely to succeed, considered 
that the issue of contractual good faith in New Zealand was a matter of general 
importance capable of qualifying for a grant of leave.
128
 Based on these comments it 
appears that the Supreme Court may be willing to entertain the issue of whether a 
universal doctrine of good faith may be required in New Zealand. 
 
1.4 Other Jurisdictions: 
 
1.4.1 Australia: 
 
Australia is currently in a similar position to New Zealand in relation to contractual good 
faith. It is only quite recently that there has been discussion of the extent to which 
Australian law does, or should, endorse a universal doctrine of contractual good faith.
129
  
 
In Service Station Association Ltd v Berg Bennett & Associates Pty Ltd Gummow J 
recognised that there is no Australian authority for the proposition that there is a general 
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obligation of good faith and fair dealing in the performance and enforcement of a 
contract.
130
  
 
However, there have been judicial murmurings favouring an obligation of good faith. In 
Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public Works Priestly JA suggested 
that good faith is implicit in many of the orthodox techniques for solving contractual 
disputes despite the fact that notions of good faith prevailing within the civil law systems 
of Europe and the United States have not yet been overtly accepted in Australia. His 
Honour contended that there are a number of indications that the time is fast approaching 
when the idea of good faith will take on more explicit recognition in Australia.
131
 
 
These observations have been supported. In Hughes Aircraft Systems International v 
Airservices Australia
132
 Finn J considered a pre-award tender contract. The plaintiff 
tenderer claimed that the selection of the successful tenderer was not in accordance with a 
fair process and defined procedures. Finn J held that a term would be implied in fact into 
the process contact to the effect that the inviting public body defendant would consider 
the tenders fairly so as to ensure equal opportunity between the two remaining 
tenderers.
133
 It was also held that a term of fair dealing would be implied in law into the 
contract.
134
 The classification of the contract and the fact that a public body was a 
contracting party gave rise to the implication in law.
135
 During the course of the 
judgment, his Honour made obiter dicta comments to the effect that obligations of fair 
dealing and good faith could have application in all contracts. It was opined that good 
faith is a fundamental principle and that its more open recognition in Australian contract 
law is now warranted.
136
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Despite these broad observations, Finn J was forced to concede in South Sydney District 
Rugby League Football Club Ltd v News Ltd that Australian law has not yet committed 
itself unqualifiedly to a principle that every contract requires of each party a duty of good 
faith and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement.
137
 
 
Nonetheless, in Garry Rogers Motors (Aust) Pty Ltd v Subaru (Aust) Pty Ltd Finkelstein J 
sought to expand the positive views of Finn J. It was contended that recent cases make it 
clear that a term of good faith will ordinarily be implied in an appropriate contract and 
perhaps even in all commercial contracts.
138
 
 
However, to date there is no clear decision from the High Court of Australia on the issue. 
In Royal Botanic Gardens & Domain Trust v South Sydney City Council the High Court 
made mention of the debate concerning the existence and content of an implied obligation 
or duty of good faith and fair dealing in contracts and particularly in the exercise of 
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contractual rights and powers.
139
 Ultimately it was determined that the case was 
inappropriate for a discussion of the existence and scope of a good faith doctrine. 
Nonetheless, the importance of these issues was recognised.
140
 Indeed, there were subtle 
indications from Kirby J as to his stance on a doctrine of good faith. It was suggested that 
such a doctrine appears to conflict with the fundamental notion of caveat emptor and 
economic freedom.
141
 Further reluctance was expressed in respect of implying terms 
which contractual parties have omitted to include.
142
  
 
Notwithstanding, the question of whether a doctrine might be introduced has been left 
open in Australia. This has fueled a considerable amount of academic writing on the 
issue. It certainly appears that Australian commentators are leading the way in the good 
faith debate in Australasia in terms of the sheer quantity of literature.  
 
1.4.2 Canada: 
 
Canada is also in a similar position to New Zealand and Australia. The Supreme Court of 
Canada has recognised specific categories of contract for which a duty of good faith may 
apply, for example, employment agreements.
143
 However, there is no acceptance of a 
generalised common law duty of good faith applying to all contracts as yet.
144
 In Mesa 
Operating Ltd Partnership v Amoco Canada Resources Ltd the Alberta Court of Appeal 
observed that a general obligation of good faith is not an obvious part of contract law 
either in England or Canada.
145
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However, art 1375 of the Quebec Civil Code, Code Civil du Québec, imposes an 
obligation of good faith on parties to all qualifying contracts in the following terms: 
 
The Parties shall conduct themselves in good faith both at the time the obligation 
is created and at the time it is performed or extinguished. 
 
Some proponents have argued that such codification supports the argument for a general 
common law doctrine of good faith within Canada.
146
 Nonetheless, caution is required 
when comparing the civil law in Quebec with the Canadian common law of contract. The 
drafters of the Civil Code in Quebec were guided largely by French civil law.
147
 Despite 
Quebec law being influenced by the common law doctrines of sister law provinces
148
, it 
does not follow that those common law provinces would be more willing to adopt good 
faith merely to achieve consistency with Quebec. The fact that the civil law in Canada 
utilises good faith is therefore unlikely to be a compelling argument for Canadian 
common law jurists and lawyers. 
 
A general duty of good faith has been supported in trial decisions in Canada. In Gateway 
Realty Ltd v Arton Holdings Ltd (No 3) Kelly J opined: 
 
The insistence of a good faith requirement in discretionary conduct in contractual 
formation, performance and enforcement is only the fulfillment of the obligation 
of the courts to do justice in the resolution of disputes between contracting 
parties.
149
 
 
Likewise, in Elite Specialty Nursing Services Inc v Ontario Meehan J said: 
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[E]xplicitly recognizing the doctrine of good faith makes the law more certain, 
more understandable and, of course, more fair…Rather than having to go through 
various interpretive contortions to get the desired result, a judge could [ ] simply 
state that a discretion under a contract must be exercised in good faith, and if it is 
not so exercised, find that the contract has been breached.
150
 
 
These observations have attracted criticism. They are seen as a loose application of 
notions of good faith to restrict contractual behaviour.
151
 Much of the support at trial 
court level for good faith emanates from obiter dicta comments or in cases involving 
particular contracts where an implied obligation of good faith is recognised under the 
existing law.
152
  
 
However, there also appears to be a degree of extra-judicial support for good faith in 
Canadian contract law. The Ontario Law Reform Commission has observed: 
 
While good faith is not yet an openly recognised contract law doctrine, it is very 
much a factor in everyday contractual transactions. To the extent that the common 
law of contracts, as interpreted and developed by our courts, reflects this reality, it 
is accurate to state that good faith is a part of our law of contracts.
153
 
 
Whilst it may be correct to say that obligations of good faith are implicit in Canadian 
contract law, the case for explicit recognition is not particularly strong. Certainly there 
does not yet appear to be any robust judicial support for a doctrine of good faith from the 
appellate level. The position was appropriately summarised by the Ontario Court of 
Appeal in Transamerica Life Inc v ING Canada Inc where it was noted: 
 
…Canadian courts have not recognized a stand-alone duty of good faith that is 
independent of the terms expressed in a contract or from the objectives that 
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emerge from those provisions. The implication of a duty of good faith has not 
gone so far as to create new, unbargained-for, rights and obligations.
154
  
 
The current Canadian approach is therefore similar to the New Zealand position. 
Obligations of good faith may be implied where required in the particular circumstances, 
but as yet there is no general overarching doctrine. Nonetheless, one notable Canadian 
contract text suggests that there is undoubtedly some momentum in the direction of 
embracing a universal doctrine.
155
 
 
1.4.3 United States: 
 
Unlike the majority of the common law countries, the Unites States has accepted a 
doctrine of contractual good faith. The doctrine derives from three principal sources.
156
 
The first is the Uniform Commercial Code. It stipulates obligations of good faith in 60 of 
its 400 sections and provides a general good faith definition and definitions specific to 
particular sections. Secondly, s 205 of the American Law Institute’s Restatement (2d) of 
Contracts 1981 provides that every contract imposes on each party a duty of good faith 
and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement. Thirdly, art 7(1) of the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, which the United 
States has ratified, suggests the observance of good faith in international trade.  
 
Reliance on codification may not be required in some cases. There is evidence to suggest 
that the United States courts have restricted the exercise of contractual discretion by 
imposing a common law obligation of good faith applying to contractual performance in 
circumstances where the Uniform Commercial Code clearly does not apply.
157
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The doctrine operates on a number of levels. Good faith is treated as an implied provision 
in the contract. It imposes obligations on the contracting parties that are perceived to be 
in the interests of justice. The obligation of good faith ensures that the intent of the 
contracting parties is not frustrated.
158
 The good faith obligation does not only proscribe 
conduct. It may also mandate or require affirmative action.
159
  
 
It is important to note that the doctrine is generally perceived as a default standard in the 
United States. It cannot be used to effect ‘an end-run around the unequivocal and express 
terms of the contract.’
160
 However, it is not possible to completely contract out of the 
doctrine in most cases.
161
 
 
The United States experience relating to the doctrine of good faith is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 6.  
 
1.4.4 Europe: 
 
The civil law systems within Europe are familiar with a doctrine of good faith. The 
majority of the Continental Civil Codes incorporate the concept of good faith.
162
 For 
example, art 1134 of the French Code, Code Civil, provides that agreements must be 
performed in good faith. Similarly § 242 of the German Civil Code, Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch, requires observance of treu und glauben (fidelity and faith). The Italian Civil 
Code, Codice Civile, refers to good faith and fair dealing in contractual negotiation (art 
1337), interpretation (art 1366) and performance (art 1375). 
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As a result of the establishment of the European Community, the Commission on 
European Contract Law has, since 1982, been preparing the Principles of European 
Contract Law (“PECL”). The PECL are intended to apply as general rules of contract law 
within the European Union.
163
 They have been developed as a possible first step towards 
a generalised European Civil Code.
164
 Article 1:102 of the 1999 text provides: 
 
(1)  Parties are free to enter into a contract and to determine its contents, 
subject to the requirements of good faith and fair dealing, and the 
mandatory rules established by these Principles. 
 
Further, art 1:201 states: 
 
(1)  Each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing. 
 
(2)  The parties may not exclude or limit this duty. 
 
The obligation to act according to good faith extends to negotiations as well as 
performance of the contract. Article 2:301 stipulates: 
 
(1)  A party is free to negotiate and is not liable for failure to reach an 
agreement. 
 
(2)  However, a party who has negotiated or broken off negotiations contrary 
to good faith and fair dealing is liable for the losses caused to the other 
party. 
 
(3)  It is contrary to good faith and fair dealing, in particular, for a party to 
enter into or continue negotiations with no real intention of reaching an 
agreement with the other party. 
 
The express recognition of a good faith principle within Continental Europe is reflective 
of jurisprudential preferences. Anglo-Antipodean common law favours specific doctrines 
to give effect to good faith. Jurists within civil law systems are more at home with the 
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express recognition of general principles. European lawyers apparently trust their judges 
to know how far to go in their law making.
165
  Civil lawyers therefore accept that the 
express recognition of good faith does not necessarily require a particular result. Instead, 
it allows the possibility of a particular result by giving the Court the discretion to decide 
whether or not it should be brought about.
166
 
 
In light of this partiality for general principles, the concept of good faith is regarded in 
many European legal systems as a vitally important ingredient for the modern law of 
contract.
167
 A substantial body of case law relating to contractual good faith has 
developed in various European countries.
168
 Unlike common law countries, the civil law 
jurisdictions of Europe appear to be more settled on the intended functions of a doctrine 
of good faith. However, the fact remains that the application of the doctrine within the 
civil law is not without its uncertainties.
169
 
 
1.4.5 Scotland: 
 
Scots law is a mixed legal system. It has both common law and civil law origins.
170
 
Scotland is therefore apparently in a unique position in light of the contrast between the 
common law and civil law attitudes to contractual good faith. It might naturally be 
assumed that contractual good faith would be an ongoing issue within Scots law having 
regard to the competing jurisprudential pressures and influences emanating from England 
and Continental Europe. 
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Nonetheless, contractual good faith in Scotland passed largely unnoticed until the 
decision in Smith v Bank of Scotland.
171
 The judgment of the House of Lords in Smith had 
the effect of extending the principle laid down in the English case of Barclays Bank plc v 
O’Brien.
172
  
 
The decision in Smith focused on duties owed by a creditor to disclose to an intending 
cautionary and to recommend that the prospective cautioner take independent advice. The 
duties arose in the context of an inter-spousal transaction where the debtor husband 
sought to compel his wife to provide security over their family home in order to obtain a 
business loan from the defendant bank. Lord Clyde suggested that a basic element of 
good faith underpinned the obligations of the creditor to take steps in the interest of the 
cautioner.
173
 His Lordship thought that a principle of good faith was the better means of 
justifying the obligation under Scots law than the principle of constructive notice which 
was the basis of the English decision in O’Brien.
174
 Little authority was advanced or 
relied upon to support these views.
175
 Whilst the observations of his Lordship were 
focused on the contract of cautionry, it appears that he did not consider that the 
requirement was limited to that particular context.
176
  
 
The speech of Lord Clyde has certainly fueled debate as to whether a doctrine of 
contractual good faith should be recognised in Scots law. General notions of good faith 
have been latent and inarticulate to date.
177
 Authority for a duty of good faith 
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performance is limited.
178
 It is therefore apparent that the common law ideology has 
greatly outweighed the approach that emanates from Roman and civilian roots.
179
 
Although many Scots lawyers would accept that good faith plays an interstitial role in 
contract, the recognition of a general doctrine is less likely to be supported.
180
  
 
Some opponents have challenged the reliance by supporters of good faith on the 
judgment of Lord Clyde. Notably, in Braithwaite v Bank of Scotland Lord Hamilton 
considered that the obligation on the creditor arose only if it was apparent that the wife 
was suffering from undue influence or was the victim of misrepresentation occasioned by 
her husband.
181
 Accordingly, it has been argued that the concept of good faith endorsed 
by Lord Clyde is unlikely to extend beyond inter-spousal security transactions.
182
 
Opponents therefore contend that the speech of Lord Clyde cannot support a general 
principle of good faith contracting in Scots law. The extent of the doctrine certainly 
remains to be tested.
183
 
 
Nonetheless, there is increasing support for recognition of a universal good faith doctrine 
within Scots law.
184
 A recurring argument in support of good faith in Scots law is the 
need to achieve comity with other jurisdictions and harmonisation of commercial law. 
The case for good faith is strongly expressed by Angelo Forte: 
 
As we move into the next millennium, perhaps the greatest challenge to be faced, 
whether in a devolved or independent Scotland, will be to adapt our domestic law 
to models of commercial contract law which are not exclusively indigenous and in 
which good faith will play a central role. And so we now face a simple choice of 
action. We can bury our heads in the sand and hope that good faith will go away, 
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which it will not, or we can acknowledge its operation and [ ] make a start on a 
systematic analysis and statement of its application. If arguments of principle do 
not appeal as motivating factors, utilitarian ones must.
185
   
 
Contractual good faith is undoubtedly a real issue in Scots law. Arguments for unity with 
Continental Europe now apply throughout the United Kingdom and particularly with the 
advent of the European Union. It might however be reasoned that Scotland is more prone 
to succumb to the European influence than England due to its civil law roots.
186
  
 
1.5 Summary: 
 
The concept of good faith can be traced back to Ancient Rome. It is universally 
recognised as a fundamental principle. Good faith has informed the development of the 
modern system of law now prevailing in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia 
and Canada. However, whilst a doctrine of good faith is expressly recognised in 
European civil law and in the United States, contractual good faith is not an explicit and 
established doctrine in New Zealand. Clearly there is an increasing recognition within 
New Zealand and her larger Commonwealth counterparts of the arguments for and 
against a universal doctrine of contractual good faith. The appraisal within this thesis of a 
requirement for a doctrine of good faith in New Zealand contractual relationships is 
therefore a current and highly relevant issue.  
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Chapter 2 
 
The Subject Doctrine  
 
 
2.1 Chapter Introduction: 
 
This chapter examines how an obligation of good faith could be incorporated into New 
Zealand law and the extent to which it might apply to the process of contractual 
formation and execution. Attention will also be drawn to the likely practical limitations of 
the proposed doctrine.  
 
Parts 2.2 and 2.3 examine the potential mechanisms under which a universal doctrine of 
good faith may be introduced by the New Zealand courts into contract law. Part 2.2 
considers whether good faith should become part of New Zealand contracts by way of an 
implied term. Part 2.3 evaluates an alternative approach, namely that the doctrine of good 
faith should be incorporated not necessarily as an implied term but instead as an element 
of construction of the contract. The distinction between the two methods and the 
preferable approach is appraised. Part 2.4 discusses whether, and how, the subject 
doctrine might extend to pre-contractual negotiations. That analysis necessarily involves 
a consideration of whether the doctrine would be confined to the common law of contract 
or whether it may also assume equitable characteristics. Similarly, in the context of pre-
contractual negotiations, the relationship between good faith and agreements to negotiate 
and process contracts is considered. Part 2.5 addresses the issue of whether contracting 
parties could be able to limit or exclude the application of the subject doctrine. The 
potential need for the legislature to implement contractual good faith rather than the 
courts in order to avoid contractual exclusion is briefly explored. Part 2.6 summarises the 
findings, giving an overview of the subject doctrine and the arguments for and against an 
obligation of good faith advanced within the chapter. 
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2.2 An Implied Term of Good Faith? 
 
There is a common perception, particularly amongst Australian judges and 
commentators, that a general doctrine of good faith would be incorporated into the law of 
contract by way of an implied term.
1
  
 
There are essentially two ways in which a term may be implied into a contract by the 
courts. These methods are ordinarily described as a term implied by way of law or a term 
implied by way of fact.
2
  
 
2.2.1 Term Implied in Law: 
 
A term implied in law is one which is implied as a matter of course into all contracts of a 
particular class.
3
 It is implied because it is needed to give efficacy to that specific class of 
contracts.
4
 The term should ensure that the rights conferred by the contract are not 
rendered nugatory or worthless.
5
 Traditionally, there are two fundamental requirements 
for the implication of a term in law. Firstly, the contract in question must be of a defined 
type. Secondly, the implication of the term must be necessary.
6
 
 
                                                     
1
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 Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) CLR 410, at 450 per McHugh and Gummow JJ. 
6
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Contracts of a defined type or class will encompass relationships which are of common 
occurrence.
7
 For example, qualifying relationships include vendor and purchaser
8
, owner 
and hirer
9
, master and servant
10
, landlord and tenant
11
 and solicitor and client.
12
 
 
Whether a term is deemed necessary is not a question which is solely linked to the 
essential functioning of the contract.
13
 The test may encompass broader considerations 
such as those of justice and social policy.
14
 
 
Critically, a term implied in law is not dependent on the actual or presumed intention of 
the parties.
15
 Instead the question is one of status.
16
 It involves more general 
considerations than the intention to be derived from the wording of the particular 
contract.
17
 
 
2.2.2 Term Implied in Fact: 
 
A term implied in fact differs from a term implied in law. The Court is concerned with 
the particular contract rather than what is reasonable and necessary in a class of 
contracts.
18
 The task of the Court is to ascertain the presumed intention of the parties 
                                                     
7
 Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd [1977] 1 All ER 481, at 487 per Lord Denning MR. 
8
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9
 Fowler v Lock (1872) LR 7 CP 272; Southland Harbour Board v Vella [1974] 1 NZLR 526. 
10
 Hivac Ltd v Park Royal Scientific Instruments Ltd [1946] 1 All ER 350; Lister v Romford Ice and Cold 
Storage Co Ltd [1957] 1 All ER 125; Matthews v Kuwait Bechtel Corp [1959] 2 All ER 345. 
11
 Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1976] 2 All ER 39. 
12
 Clark v Kirby-Smith [1964] 2 All ER 835. 
13
 See Andrew Grubb and Michael Furmston (eds), The Law of Contract (1999), at 465. 
14
 The Star Texas [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 445, at 526 per Slade LJ. See also Elizabeth Peden, ‘Policy 
Concerns in Terms Implied in Law’ (2000) 117 Law Quarterly Review 459. 
15
 Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd [1977] 1 All ER 481, at 487 per Lord Denning MR. 
16
 Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555, at 576 per Simonds VC. 
17
 Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v Cooper [1941] 1 All ER 33, at 52 per Lord Wright. 
18
 Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd [1977] 1 All ER 481, at 488 per Lord Denning MR. 
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from the words of the agreement and the surrounding circumstances.
19
 In BP Refinery 
(Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings the Privy Council said that a term will be 
implied in fact if the following conditions (which may overlap) are satisfied: 
 
(1) it must be reasonable and equitable; (2) it must be necessary to give business 
efficacy to the contract so that no term will be implied if the contract is effective 
without it; (3) it must be so obvious that “it goes without saying”; (4) it must be 
capable of clear expression; (5) it must not contradict any express term of the 
contract.
20
  
 
It was previously thought that a term implied in fact should satisfy all of the criteria set 
out in BP Refinery.
21
 Ultimately however, the criteria set down are only guidelines. They 
are not classifications of art.
22
 In Vickery v Waitaki International Ltd Cooke P opined that 
implied terms are ‘categories or shades in a continuous spectrum’ and that ‘it may be 
doubted whether tabulated legalism will ever produce an exhaustive or rigidly discrete 
classification.’
23
  
 
More recent authority suggests that a term may be implied in fact simply where it is 
needed to give business efficacy to the contract or where the term to be implied 
represents the obvious, but unexpressed, intention of the parties.
24
 Notwithstanding, the 
BP Refinery test has been followed on so many occasions within New Zealand that it is 
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likely to continue to be employed where the agreement in question is a detailed written 
contract.
25
 
 
2.2.3 Good Faith Implied in Law or Good Faith Implied in Fact? 
 
If a doctrine of good faith were to be incorporated into contract law by utilising implied 
terms, it is debatable whether this should be achieved by way of a term implied in law or, 
alternatively, a term implied in fact.  
 
Prima facie, the obligation of good faith would appear to be more suited to a term implied 
in law if it is a term to be implied into all contracts.
26
 The rationale justifying this 
assertion is that a term implied in fact can never be a matter of universal application. The 
doctrine would rarely be invoked unless the obligation of good faith was implied in law.  
 
Notwithstanding, it has been suggested that the implication of good faith is more 
analogous to the implication of a term in fact because the conduct required of the parties 
under a duty of good faith is likely to differ depending on the circumstances of the case.
27
 
The implication in law methodology would not be as sensitive to the particular 
circumstances of the contracting individuals or the wording utilised within the contract 
itself because it is not dependent on the intention of the parties.
28
 In the result, the 
individual mechanisms within the contract could not be assessed to determine whether an 
obligation of good faith would be appropriate for the particular contract at hand. The duty 
of good faith would be unconfined. Without regard to the circumstances of the parties or 
the wording of the contract, there would be little context in which to determine the 
                                                     
25
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content of the obligation.
29
 A doctrine of good faith incorporated into contract law by 
way of a term implied in fact would allow judges to examine the factual matrix and 
determine the appropriate conduct required to discharge the good faith obligation as the 
particular case requires.
30
 Good faith would take shape from the circumstances and 
contractual terms in question instead of deriving some abstract and vague principle. 
 
However, there are limits to the merits of this argument. Whilst terms implied into 
contracts of a particular class may be relatively generic, the conduct required of the 
parties in relation to the implied term may be highly dependent on the particular context. 
So, for example, the conduct required to discharge an implied term of reasonable care and 
skill on the job in a contract of employment
31
 or in a contract of architectural 
supervision
32
 will inevitably depend on the particular circumstances of the case. The 
contractual obligations arising from a term implied in law are not therefore divorced from 
the facts of the case. A term of good faith implied in law could still require different 
conduct in different circumstances.  
 
Nonetheless, it is clear that either implied term category presents certain benefits and 
flaws in relation to the other. However, it is submitted that incorporating a doctrine of 
good faith into New Zealand law either by way of a term implied in law or a term implied 
in fact presents serious impediments. Those difficulties may inhibit the ability of the 
courts to utilise the implied term methodology as the vehicle for the potential 
introduction of a doctrine of contractual good faith. These observations are explored 
below. 
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2.2.4 Problems Applicable to Both Implied Term Methodologies: 
 
Some proponents of good faith assert that the ability to contract out of a doctrine of good 
faith should be limited or precluded. This objective could not be achieved within the 
bounds of the existing law relating to implied terms. It is a logical and well-established 
rule that parties are ordinarily free to exclude terms which would otherwise be implied by 
law by using express words within their contract.
33
 Similarly, a term will not be implied 
in fact if it is inconsistent with the express terms of the contract, let alone if the parties 
have expressly excluded it. The BP Refinery criterion would not be satisfied.  
 
The extent to which contracting parties should be free to contract out of or limit an 
obligation of good faith is contentious. The issue is discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter. However, if there is to be any fetter on that right under a general doctrine then 
there would exist a clear inconsistency with the right to contract out of an implied term if 
the subject doctrine were to be incorporated into New Zealand law using that 
methodology. 
 
Another significant concern is that the doctrine of good faith would be considerably 
limited in scope if it were only to be treated as an implied term of the contract. 
Conceivably the obligation of good faith under the doctrine might extend to pre-
contractual negotiations. Again this issue is extensively considered further below. Suffice 
to say, a term implied ex-post may not be capable of extending to dealings between the 
parties prior to contracting. 
 
2.2.5 Problems Applicable to the Term Implied in Fact Methodology: 
 
It was noted above that the primary problem with the term implied in fact methodology is 
that an obligation of good faith would not be of universal application. An introduction of 
the doctrine by way of a term implied in fact would not satisfy the BP Refinery criterion 
in the majority of cases. It will be open to one of the contracting parties to argue that 
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good faith is not necessary to give business efficacy to the contract and that the 
agreement could be effective without the term.  
 
It is evident under the current law that the courts take the position that the majority of 
contracts can operate without the need for an obligation of good faith. In Saxby Bridge 
Mortgages Pty Ltd v Saxby Bridge Pty Ltd Simos J declined to imply a term of good faith 
into a contract to incorporate a new company because the alleged term was neither 
necessary nor obvious.
34
 Likewise in Chan v Lun NG Associate Judge Doogue rejected 
the implication in fact of a term of good faith into an agreement for the sale and purchase 
of land.
35
 The contract was transactional rather than relational. As such there was no basis 
on which it might be thought necessary to imply an obligation to carry out the exchange 
in good faith. According to the Associate Judge, the posited duty would be unlikely to 
meet any of the hurdles in BP Refinery except, perhaps, the fifth.  
 
Additionally it may be reasoned that a term of good faith is not capable of clear 
expression. This is a necessity under the fourth BP Refinery criterion. In Dovey v Bank of 
New Zealand Tipping J suggested that the term must not only be capable of clear 
expression but also uncontroversial expression in order to satisfy the test.
36
 Few would 
contend that the meaning of good faith is uncontroversial. In Hungry Jack’s Pty Ltd v 
Burger King Corp
37
 Rolfe J was asked to imply a term of reasonableness into the 
contract. It was observed that meaning and content could only be given to a concept of 
reasonableness by judicial assessment. That would not necessarily match what the 
contracting parties would consider to be reasonable. Accordingly, his Honour contended 
that reasonableness may not be capable of clear expression in the context of implied 
terms.
38
 If the courts are unwilling to deem reasonableness as capable of clear expression 
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then it is likely that good faith, which is less familiar to the common law, will receive 
similar treatment. 
 
It is therefore submitted that to incorporate a doctrine of good faith by way of a term 
implied in fact would be to disregard the prevailing legal rules of implication. The 
implication in fact of a general obligation of good faith would be inconsistent with the 
existing law of contract.
39
  
 
2.2.6 Problems Applicable to the Term Implied in Law Methodology: 
 
The current law relating to implied terms dictates that the implication of a term in law 
depends on the nature of the particular contract in question. This does not accord with the 
desire for a general good faith doctrine to apply to all contracts, irrespective of the 
category or characteristics of the particular contract. It has been correctly recognised that: 
 
[T]erms implied by law are, supposedly at least, limited to implied obligations 
that inhere in a class of contracts. This would preclude an implication of 
universal application.
40
 
 
Some commentators and judges, particularly in Australia, have suggested that a term 
could potentially be implied into every contract. Supposedly the law aspires to formulate 
terms which may be implied into all contracts in addition to implying terms into 
particular classes of contracts.
41
 Indeed, one notable Australian contract text devotes an 
entire subsection under implied terms to ‘universal terms.’
42
 Popular candidates for a 
universally implied term in law are the duty to cooperate and the duty of good faith.
43
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However, within New Zealand and England the obligation to cooperate is not universal. 
It will only be implied where necessary to make the contract workable.
44
 There is no 
current authority within New Zealand suggesting that an implied term can apply to all 
contracts. The contention that a term may be generally implied in every contract does not 
therefore reflect the law in New Zealand.  
 
Further, in Australia there is not widespread acceptance of the notion of a universally 
implied term. In Vodafone Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovations Ltd Giles JA rejected the 
contention that commercial contracts were a class of contracts capable of justifying a 
term of good faith implied in law.
45
 Seemingly the breadth and indeterminacy of that 
class would militate against the courts taking such a drastic step. 
 
Peden is perhaps the most prominent opponent of the introduction of a universal good 
faith doctrine through implied terms. She concludes: 
 
No terms are implied into all contracts. If the courts want the notion of good faith 
to apply in all situations, what they should be looking to do is use good faith as a 
principle or tool of construction. That is, to construe all contracts on the basis that 
there is an expectancy of good faith in all terms…Unlike terms implied in fact or 
law, which apply specifically to a contract or class of contracts, rules of 
construction apply generally to all contracts.
46
 
 
These observations are consistent with the views of proponents of the good faith doctrine 
who advocate that it should serve a wider purpose than simply being treated as an implied 
term of the contract. For example, good faith might be used as a conceptual basis for the 
construction and interpretation of the contract.
47
 It is therefore appropriate to examine 
what has been labeled the ‘constructivist’ approach.
48
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2.3 Good Faith as a Rule of Construction? 
 
It has been suggested that an obligation of contractual good faith cannot be introduced by 
the common law courts unless it is implemented through an implied term. In GEC 
Marconi Systems Pty Ltd v BHP Information Technology Pty Ltd Finn J opined: 
 
There is not yet agreement in this country as to the province of good faith in 
contract law...Part of our difficulty arises from the fact that, express or implied 
term apart, we have no other available common law device for imposing 
obligations on parties that are contractual in character. We do not have the 
facility, for example, to treat the duty as simply a mandatory rule of contract law 
as do many European legal systems.
49
 
 
It is submitted that this rationale is too limited. It is arguable that the courts do have the 
ability to incorporate a universal doctrine of good faith into contract law without 
necessarily having to resort to the restrictive implied terms approach. It is within the 
bounds of conventional judicial methodology to articulate the concept of good faith as a 
general principle of law applicable to all contracts.
50
 
 
One of the means of departing from the implied term methodology and achieving a 
general principle of law would be to adopt a doctrine of good faith as a rule of 
construction. All contracts could be construed to require good faith under the 
constructivist approach.
51
  
 
There are already a number of well-known rules of construction within contract law. For 
example, words will generally be given their natural and ordinary meaning
52
, the contract 
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 52 
will be construed as a whole
53
, the Court will avoid an unreasonable construction that 
flouts business common sense
54
 and the Court will look to the matrix of fact to achieve an 
appropriate construction.
55
 Further, rules of construction are not necessarily limited to the 
interpretation of the words of the contractual document. Such principles can be used to 
determine the intention of the parties, complete and save contracts, contextualise 
contracts and apply contracts to particular factual situations.
56
   
 
There does not appear to be any compelling reason why a doctrine of good faith could not 
be treated as a principle of construction. It is not against permitted judicial reasoning to 
introduce a rule of law as a matter of construction. For example, the doctrine of 
frustration was once thought to be based on an implied term but is now viewed as an 
instance of construction.
57
 In Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council 
Lord Reid suggested that frustration depends on a true construction of the contract rather 
than adding any implied term.
58
 The Court should examine the wording of the terms, the 
nature of the contract and the relevant surrounding circumstances when the contract was 
made to determine whether it is frustrated. 
 
Accordingly, frustration has evolved from implication to become an integral and 
independent rule of the common law.
59
 Conceivably good faith could undergo the same 
development. Indeed, there are other examples to support the introduction of good faith 
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as a general principle of contract law. The requirement for a reasonable time for 
performance and the doctrine of repudiation have been cited as illustrations.
60
  
 
Under the constructivist approach it is envisaged that good faith would become a term of 
the contract in the event that it were to be used to create a positive obligation requiring 
affirmative action.
61
 The constructivist approach could therefore potentially subsume the 
implied term methodology.   
 
In Vodafone Giles JA criticised this reasoning. His Honour suggested that a process of 
construction is only capable of placing a gloss on an express term. It cannot be used to 
create a free-standing obligation which exists independently of the existing contractual 
terms.
62
  
 
With respect, these concerns are overstated. The implication of a term in fact is itself a 
process of construction.
63
 Accordingly, if a contract was construed under the doctrine of 
good faith to require a stand-alone term of good faith there should be no reason why such 
a term could not be incorporated into the contract as a natural incidence of that 
construction. The rationale is logically stated by Peden:  
 
Construction, in the interpretation sense, most simply provides the meaning of 
words. If taken even further, construction can be used to imply terms. This is 
‘implication by construction’, and it is suggested that all these processes are 
informed by the general principle of good faith…[T]he principle of good faith can 
be applied in construction that results in implying a new term. There is no need to 
imply in fact or in law a term that the parties should cooperate or act in good 
faith.
64
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It is therefore submitted that the constructivist approach could be utilised to create a free-
standing obligation of good faith if the circumstances so require. Clearly however this 
would not render good faith a matter of universal application in all contracts. Some 
contracts would not necessitate a separate term of good faith.  
 
Universality would be achieved under the constructivist approach by interpreting the 
express terms of all contracts with reference to good faith.
65
 For example, contractual 
powers could be construed to require their exercise in good faith. That outcome would 
serve as a restriction on the destruction of positive obligations under the contract.
66
 
Consistent with the notion that good faith is most often encountered in the field of 
contractual performance
67
, a construction based on good faith would endeavour to align 
contractual performance with the mutual intention of the parties. In essence, the doctrine 
of good faith would apply to matters of contractual substance, procedure and process.  
 
An obvious benefit of the constructivist approach is that it could permit the incorporation 
of good faith into a contract either by way of a free-standing obligation or as a method of 
construing express terms. The former would be case dependent and the latter would be of 
universal application. The manner in which good faith is incorporated into a contract 
might therefore be more sensitive to the content and nature of the obligation required in 
the particular circumstances of the case. 
 
The constructivist approach is susceptible to similar criticisms of the implied term 
methodology. For example, it may be possible to avoid the application of a rule of 
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construction by express agreement just as an implied term can be contractually excluded. 
Likewise, a rule of construction is unlikely to have any influence on pre-contractual 
conduct.  
 
Another problem with the constructivist approach is that it may only be of meaningful 
application to written contracts. It might be of little effect in contracts which are wholly 
oral or partly oral and partly written. The implied term methodology may be preferred in 
these circumstances.
68
 
 
The distinction between incorporating a good faith doctrine in New Zealand as a process 
of construction rather than incorporation by way of an implied term is also somewhat 
elusive.
69
 Some suggest that favouring a technique of construction over the implied term 
methodology is simply a re-branding exercise. It only perpetuates a false dichotomy.
70
 
Certainly the subject doctrine may have limited or no practical effect on contracts in 
which an obligation of good faith is already implied under the current law. The 
constructivist approach would not have any benefit over the implied term methodology in 
this scenario. 
 
One of the primary criticisms of the constructivist approach is that it requires an 
unrealistic derivation of the intention of the parties. In Vodafone Giles JA suggested that 
implication is a preferable use of language to construction because implication denotes 
that an obligation of good faith is being imposed by the law.
71
 Unlike the constructivist 
approach, the term implied in law methodology does not proceed on a fiction that the 
intention of the parties is being found by a process of construction. Indeed, in most cases 
a manifest intention of good faith is not likely to be evident. Thus, if the good faith 
                                                     
68
 There is no reason why an obligation of good faith could not be implied into an oral agreement. Terms 
have sought to be implied in wholly oral agreements. See for example Condon v Parkinson (High Court, 
Christchurch, CIV 2007-409-832, 22 September 2008, French J), at [51] and [52]. 
69
 See Sir Anthony Mason in the foreword to Peden, above n 56, at 3. 
70
 See Gordon, above n 1, at 39. 
71
 [2004] NSWCA 15, at [206]. 
 56 
doctrine is to be of general application, the courts would be obliged to construe a contract 
to require an obligation of good faith where the contract does not overtly reveal such an 
intention. For example, commercial parties may, in practice, intend that an express right 
is to be exercised according to the unrestrained volition of one or other of the parties.
72
 
The implication approach may therefore be preferable to the constructivist approach 
because it indicates that it is the common law which considers the good faith obligation 
necessary rather than the contracting parties.
73
 
 
These criticisms, although valid, may be overestimated. It is true that the objective in 
construing any contract is to ascertain the mutual intentions of the parties at the time of 
contracting.
74
 However, there is no reason why the law cannot, as a rule of construction, 
determine that the parties intend to perform their contract in good faith in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary. Admittedly this approach might alter the existing understanding 
of the function of contractual construction. Notwithstanding, it is generally accepted that 
a substantial part of contract law derives from ex lege principles which contracting parties 
may only deviate from if they can show a different contractual intention.
75
 The challenge 
to the autonomy of the parties is minimised so long as the good faith rule of construction 
is based on a default position.
76
 
 
On balance it is submitted that a universal doctrine of contractual good faith would be 
better implemented through a rule of construction rather than by way of an implied term 
if it is to be incorporated within New Zealand law. The subject doctrine of good faith 
does not fit neatly into either methodology. However, the constructivist approach accords 
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better with the notion of a rule of universal application. Critically, the existing law 
relating to the implication of terms would remain unaffected. It was recognised above 
that the prevailing law within New Zealand relating to implication would be contradicted 
if good faith were to be introduced as a universally implied term. That contradiction 
would inevitably have significant consequences. It would facilitate the implication of 
terms in contracts more aggressively than the traditional doctrines on implied terms 
currently permit.
77
 The existing law relating to implied terms may lose impetus. Terms 
may be implied in an ad hoc and unprincipled fashion. Further, the instances in which 
implied terms are pleaded in undeserving cases is liable to increase if litigants perceive 
the courts as being prepared to relax the rules relating to implication.  
 
It is conceded that the constructivist approach has certain drawbacks. However, these are 
not insurmountable and certainly are not as fundamental as those relating to implied 
terms. Ultimately, the method of incorporation of good faith may not result in significant 
practical consequences for litigants pleading a breach of the obligation. Notwithstanding, 
if good faith is to become a universal doctrine, its manner of incorporation into New 
Zealand contract law should be clearly articulated as a matter of principle.  
 
Whilst the constructivist approach is supported as the proper rationale under which a 
doctrine of good faith could be introduced into contract law, it may not necessarily 
address the rights of the parties engaged in pre-contractual negotiations and particularly 
where no contract comes into existence. The application of the good faith doctrine to pre-
contractual negotiations requires further consideration. 
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2.4 Pre-Contractual Negotiations: 
 
2.4.1 Where no Contract is Formed: 
 
In advancing the case for a universal doctrine of good faith in New Zealand law, Thomas 
suggests that good faith requires that a party to contractual negotiations is genuinely 
seeking a contract.
78
 A negotiating party may not therefore withdraw from the bargaining 
for reasons which are capricious or arbitrary. However, this reasoning overlooks how a 
principle of good faith would aid the victim of such conduct in the event that no contract 
comes into existence. The doctrine could only apply subsequent to contractual formation 
if it were to be introduced as a principle of construction. Clearly a wronged party in 
terminated negotiations would have no cause of action in contract on which to found a 
claim for a breach of good faith. 
 
A broad principle of good faith conduct tends to blur the distinction between contractual 
and non-contractual obligations.
79
 The idea that a doctrine of good faith would 
encompass a pre-contractual duty to bargain in good faith whose breach may, at a 
minimum, justify an award of reliance damages, seemingly compromises the dividing 
line between contractual and non-contractual obligations previously thought to be 
axiomatic in New Zealand jurisprudence.
80
 
 
Therefore, a critical issue for consideration is whether the subject doctrine can 
appropriately extend to regulate pre-contractual negotiations. Traditional reasoning 
would suggest that a distinction must be made between where there is an enforceable 
agreement and where there is no enforceable agreement. In the latter situation instances 
of bad faith conduct may give rise to remedies in tort, equity and statute, but not in 
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contract. The liability arises from an extra-contractual obligation.
81
 Indeed, if a plaintiff 
complains that he or she believed that a contract would ensue and relied on that belief to 
his or her detriment, the claim is, in reality, one relating solely to detrimental reliance 
rather than expectation loss. The action would fall more naturally within a tortious action 
for deceit rather than any cause of action associated with contract. The equitable doctrine 
of promissory estoppel may also provide a measure of protection in relation to pre-
contractual promises and representations. The doctrine in New Zealand is not limited to 
dealings between parties who have prior contractual rights inter se.
82
 Conceivably s 9 of 
the Fair Trading Act 1986 (“FTA”) might also be relied upon by a victim of misleading 
and deceptive conduct in pre-contractual bargaining where the defendant is engaged in 
trade. The most obvious way for New Zealand lawyers to frame pleadings which seek to 
impose liability for bad faith discontinuation of negotiations may be to allege misleading 
and deceptive behaviour under s 9 of the FTA.
83
 
 
The fact that a good faith doctrine may not extend to regulate pre-contractual conduct 
may not be a satisfactory outcome for proponents of good faith. It appears that the law of 
tort is unlikely to serve as an adequate substitute for good faith in the negotiation of 
contracts. A somewhat restrictive approach has been adopted in tort jurisprudence in 
                                                     
81
 William Tetley, ‘Good Faith in Contract: Particularly in the Contracts of Arbitration and Chartering’ 
(2004) 35 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 561, at 565. See also Nadia E Nedzel, ‘A Comparative 
Study of Good Faith, Fair Dealing, and Precontractual Liability’ (1997) 12 Tulane European and Civil Law 
Forum 97, at 155. 
82
 Burbery Mortgage Finance and Savings Ltd v Hindsbank Holdings Ltd [1989] 1 NZLR 356, at 359 per 
Cooke P. See also Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 76 ALR 513.  
83
 A similar situation is encountered by Australian lawyers. See generally John Carter and Michael 
Furmston, ‘Good Faith and Fairness in the Negotiation of Contracts: Part II’ (1995) 8 Journal of Contract 
Law 93, at 99. The damages that might be awardable for a bad faith discontinuation of negotiations under 
the Fair Trading Act 1986 may be limited. Conceivably damages might be claimed for wasted expenditure 
falling under the head of reliance loss. It is however contentious whether damages for loss of a chance to 
enter into a substantive contract could be sought as this may fall within the head of expectation loss which, 
it is generally accepted, cannot be claimed under the Fair Trading Act 1986. See Cox & Coxon Ltd v Leipst 
[1999] 2 NZLR 15. See below for a further discussion of the distinction between reliance and expectation 
loss in the context of pre-contractual negotiations.  
 60 
relation to claims for pure economic loss.
84
 There is also a general reluctance to extend 
the duty of care principle in pre-contractual dealings because of the potential to subvert 
the law of offer and acceptance under classical contract law theory.
85
 In applying tort law, 
the courts will be cautious not to override the freedom not to contract. Indeed, there 
appears to be a general reluctance for the principles of tort law to interfere with the well-
established rules of contract. Ordinarily there is no duty of care between business parties 
negotiating at arms length.
86
  
 
This rationale was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Martel Building Ltd v 
Canada.
87
 The plaintiff was led to believe that the defendant would renew a lease at a 
specific rental but the defendant ultimately awarded the lease to a competitor. The 
plaintiff sued alleging, inter alia, breach of a duty of care in negotiations. The Supreme 
Court of Canada held that policy reasons militated against such a duty of care. The Court 
recognised that the very purpose of contractual negotiations is to ensure the most 
advantageous bargain. This is often at the expense of the other negotiating party. To 
impose a duty would hobble the marketplace and dissipate commercial advantage derived 
from privately acquired information. The retention of self-vigilance was said to be a 
necessary ingredient of commerce. The Court also considered that there are sufficient 
other causes of action in the pre-contractual forum without the need for a duty of care. To 
impose the duty would lead to wasted litigation.
88
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Accordingly, it cannot be said that a party to negotiations assumes responsibility for the 
other. It is not usually reasonable for one party engaged in bargaining to depend on the 
other. Each negotiating party must rely on his or her own judgment or a third party 
opinion. Tort lawyers generally take the view that parties to pre-contractual negotiations 
will primarily worry about their own interests rather than those of the counterparty.  
 
Notably however, the Court in Martel recognised that its reasons were restricted to 
whether a tortious duty of care should be extended to contractual negotiations. The notion 
of a duty of good faith in negotiations was a matter that was expressly left open.
89
 
 
Like tort law, it is also evident that the doctrine of estoppel and the FTA may not 
necessarily coincide with a doctrine of contractual good faith. For example, those 
remedies may not give rise to positive obligations to disclose certain matters in pre-
contractual negotiations which an obligation of good faith may be understood to 
require.
90
 Further, the existing equitable and statutory remedies do not necessarily 
prevent a party from withdrawing from negotiations without regard to the interests of the 
other negotiating party. Therefore, whilst the application of the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel may be tantamount to a judicial declaration that negotiating parties must not 
bargain in bad faith, there is no evidence to substantiate the development or existence of a 
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duty to negotiate in good faith under the current law.
91
 It may be wrong to rationalise the 
existing equitable doctrines and statutory provisions as necessarily requiring good faith 
behaviour in contractual negotiations. 
 
The existing law within New Zealand can be contrasted with the civil law codifications in 
Europe. The latter clearly provide a remedy for an aggrieved party where negotiations are 
unjustifiably terminated.
92
 The obligation of good faith would be diluted to some extent if 
a good faith doctrine were introduced in New Zealand that did not accommodate a similar 
right. As a result, proponents of good faith are liable to suggest that the envisaged 
doctrine should extend to pre-contractual negotiations even where no contract is formed. 
This is the inference that can be drawn from the views of Thomas. Conceivably it would 
be necessary for the doctrine to assume equitable characteristics in addition to a 
foundation in the common law of contract if the ambit of the doctrine were to extend that 
far. The jurisprudential implications of this potential outcome require scrutiny. 
 
The relationship between equity and the common law is a contentious issue. Under the 
Supreme Court Act 1860, the New Zealand Supreme Court had, since its inception, the 
jurisdiction to recognise actions at law and suits in equity. Legal and equitable remedies 
could also be granted in the same set of proceedings.
93
 However, it was unclear, as it was 
in England under the Judicature Act 1873, whether there had simply been a merger of the 
administration of equity and the common law or whether there had been a fusion of the 
substantive principles, rules and doctrines of equity and the common law.
94
 The latter 
phenomenon might support a doctrine of good faith which comprises both legal and 
equitable elements. 
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In United Scientific Holdings Ltd v Burnley Borough Council Lord Diplock, one of the 
most forceful exponents of fusion
95
, opined that: 
 
[T]o perpetuate a dichotomy between rules of equity and rules of common law 
which it was a major purpose of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 to do 
away with, is, in my view, conducive to erroneous conclusions as to the ways in 
which the law of England has developed in the last 100 years…[T]he waters of 
the confluent streams of law and equity have surely mingled now.
96
  
 
In Aquaculture Corporation v New Zealand Green Mussel Co Ltd Cooke P, when 
considering whether a monetary compensation could be awarded for a breach of the duty 
of confidence, suggested that equity and the common law are mingled or merged.
97
 As a 
result a full range of remedies could be available whether they originated in common law, 
equity or statute. Likewise, in Elders Pastoral Ltd v BNZ Somers J suggested that neither 
the common law nor equity is stifled by its origin.
98
 Because the two strands of law have 
been administered by one Court in New Zealand, each has borrowed from the other and 
that outcome has furthered the harmonious development of the law as a whole. 
 
It is clear in New Zealand that breach of a legal obligation may give rise to an equitable 
remedy and vice versa in appropriate cases. However, the granting of remedies such as an 
injunction to restrain a tort or an order of specific performance of a contract is simply an 
exercise of the concurrent jurisdiction of the common law and equity rather than evidence 
of fusion.
99
 It is still debatable whether the distinction between legal and equitable causes 
of action and legal and equitable duties continues to exist or remains relevant. This is the 
critical issue pertaining to the good faith doctrine. 
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The learned authors of Equity and Trusts in New Zealand have suggested that there is 
enough evidence of fusion to show that there have been moves towards an overarching 
law of obligations within New Zealand.
100
 A law of obligations implies that the law 
should be applied by focusing on the substance of legal obligations rather than on their 
historical origins, be it common law or equity.
101
 The process is essentially one of legal 
ecumenicism.
102
 Conceivably a plaintiff may have a cause of action and a potential 
remedy regardless of whether a contract has come into existence if the doctrine of good 
faith were to be informed under a law of obligations which could subsume equitable 
elements. 
 
However, there are strong reasons against the courts introducing a doctrine of good faith 
which assumes both legal and equitable characteristics under the guise of a general law of 
obligations. Arguably the point has not yet been reached in New Zealand law where it is 
immaterial whether a breach of duty is of a common law or an equitable duty.
103
 
Equitable doctrines supplement common law doctrines
104
 but the traditionally distinct 
causes of action have not been merged. It would be dangerous to substantively modify 
principles under one branch of the New Zealand legal jurisdiction by foreign concepts 
that are imported from another branch.
105
 Accordingly, Meagher, Heydon and Leeming 
oppose a law of obligations: 
 
Those who commit the fusion fallacy announce or assume the creation by the 
Judicature system of a new body of law containing elements of law and equity but 
in character quite different from its components. The fallacy is committed 
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explicitly, covertly and on occasion with apparent inadvertence. But the state of 
mind of the culprit cannot lessen the evil of the offence.
106
 
 
There are definite risks associated with the introduction of a good faith doctrine under a 
law of obligations. The courts must be hesitant to prevent quasi-contract rules being 
utilised as a means of bypassing contractual principles.
107
 There would be a serious risk 
that the doctrine could be used to undermine traditional common law contractual rules if 
good faith could apply independently of the common law of contract. The requirement 
for offer, acceptance and consideration is a prime example.  
 
Similarly, the remedies for a breach of a non-contractual obligation generally are, and 
should remain, distinct from a breach of a contractual obligation. A good faith obligation 
extending to pre-contractual conduct may undermine the distinction between reliance loss 
and expectation loss. Undoubtedly there is an overlap between the two measures of 
damage. However, in Cox & Coxon Ltd v Leipst the majority of the Court of Appeal 
recognised that expectation loss may only be claimed where there is an obligation to 
perform.
108
 Thus, expectation loss is perceived as peculiar to contract law.
109
 It would be 
dangerous to permit a plaintiff to recover on the basis that he or she lost the benefit of a 
contractual bargain as a result of a breach of good faith where there is no pre-existing 
bargain.
110
 Pre-contractual damages do not therefore readily fit into a regime of gain 
based damages.
111
 To award contractual damages where there is an incomplete contract 
would ignore the risks of the negotiation process.
112
 This suggests that contractual good 
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faith should remain distinguishable from notions of pre-contractual good faith. Each 
attracts distinct relief. 
 
Further, if pre-contractual equitable duties and common law contract principles are to be 
subsumed into a general law of obligations
113
 under the rubric of good faith it may be 
necessary for that to occur through legislative codification rather than judicial 
pronouncement. For example, in New Zealand the common law and equitable rules 
relating to contractual mistakes were integrated not by the judiciary but instead by the 
legislature under the Contractual Mistakes Act 1977.
114
 It has also been recognised that 
the assimilation of the common law doctrine of duress and the equitable doctrines of 
undue influence and unconscionability is essentially a legislative task.
115
 Accordingly, the 
merger of legal and equitable duties in the field of contract law is arguably a matter that 
should properly be left to Parliament. The courts simply may not be competent to 
introduce a general and unifying doctrine of good faith which can give rise to contractual 
and non-contractual liability. 
 
Therefore, the scope of the doctrine being appraised within this thesis should, and will, be 
kept within the bounds of conventional methodology. The subject doctrine is to be 
perceived as grounded in the common law of contract. It is not the function of this thesis 
to consider an equitable doctrine of good faith. The latter could well have application in 
areas of the law in addition to contractual negotiation and enforcement. However, whilst 
the subject doctrine will be recognisable as legal, it is entirely possible and acceptable 
that its development may be informed with reference to existing equitable principles. The 
development of legal rules within New Zealand has, on occasion, been influenced by 
established equitable doctrine. This should be welcomed provided it occurs on a 
principled basis and the distinction between the common law and equity is maintained.
116
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Indeed, when formulating a doctrine of contractual good faith it is logical that cognisance 
should be taken of existing equitable rules. 
 
Ultimately, the fact that the doctrine of good faith would be grounded in the common law 
may not necessarily prevent it from applying to pre-contractual conduct. However, a 
cause of action for breach of good faith will only exist in respect of pre-contractual 
conduct where a binding contract has come into force. Further, the loss which the 
plaintiff claims must relate to the contract itself and cannot arise independently of the 
contract. For example, a claim for breach of good faith based on non-disclosure during 
contractual negotiations must logically have affected the ultimate agreement reached 
between the parties. That outcome is consistent with the law of misrepresentation which 
requires that the pre-contractual misconduct induce the contract. The breach is essentially 
treated as a breach of a term of the contract itself.
117
 More will be said on this issue in 
Chapter 4. Suffice to say that the circumstances in which a doctrine of contractual good 
faith will sanction pre-contractual conduct will be limited. 
 
Whilst many contracts within New Zealand will not involve any extensive element of 
pre-contractual negotiation, the foregoing findings suggest that a doctrine of good faith 
may not have the wide ranging effect that proponents envisage and desire should it be 
introduced by the New Zealand courts. Again, this result may suggest that good faith 
would be better incorporated into New Zealand law through the legislature rather than by 
the judiciary under a common law doctrine if the obligation is required to fully extend to 
pre-contractual and non-contractual dealings. The analysis serves to demonstrate that the 
subject common law doctrine of good faith may be restricted in its scope and application. 
 
2.4.2 Agreements to Negotiate and the Good Faith Doctrine: 
 
It is conceivable that a doctrine of good faith may apply to pre-contractual negotiations 
where no final or substantive agreement eventuates provided there is some legally 
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binding contract governing the negotiations between the parties. The legal enforceability 
of an agreement to negotiate is in itself the subject of much debate. In Hillas & Co Ltd v 
Arcos Ltd Lord Wright contended that:  
 
[I]n strict theory, there [can be] a contract (if there is good consideration) to 
negotiate, though in the event of repudiation by one party the damages may be 
nominal, unless a jury think that the opportunity to negotiate was of some 
appreciable value to the injured party.
118
 
 
However, the dictum of Lord Wright was disapproved by the English Court of Appeal in 
Courtney and Fairbairn Ltd v Tolaini Brothers (Hotels) Ltd.
119
 Lord Diplock suggested 
that the statements, although an attractive theory, had to be rejected as bad law.
120
 The 
rationale was explained by Lord Denning MR: 
 
If the law does not recognise a contract to enter into a contract (when there is a 
fundamental term yet to be agreed) it seems to me it cannot recognise a contract 
to negotiate. The reason is because it is too uncertain to have any binding force. 
No court could estimate the damages because no one can tell whether the 
negotiations would be successful or would fall through; or if successful, what the 
result would be. It seems to me that a contract to negotiate, like a contract to enter 
into a contract, is not a contract known to the law.
121
 
 
That position was confirmed by the House of Lords in Walford v Miles.
122
 Lord Ackner 
asserted that an agreement to negotiate lacks the necessary certainty. The Court cannot be 
expected to determine on a subjective basis whether a proper reason exists for the 
termination of negotiations.
123
 Accordingly, a party would be able to withdraw from 
negotiations at any time for any reason. A bare agreement to negotiate simply has no 
legal content. 
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In Wellington City Council v Body Corporate 51702 (Wellington)
124
 the Court of Appeal 
adopted Walford. It was noted in Chapter 1 that the Court did not completely reject the 
notion of an agreement to negotiate. It was conceded that an agreement could be 
enforceable as a contract if it specifies the way in which the negotiations are to be 
conducted with enough precision for the Court to be able to determine what the parties 
are obliged to do.
125
 However, it was suggested that an agreement to negotiate essential 
terms in good faith does not give rise to a sufficiently certain objective criterion under 
which the Court can decide whether there has been a breach.
126
 Accordingly, the matter 
could not be justiciable.  
 
That reasoning does not however appear to accord with the general willingness of the 
courts to give effect to the obvious intention of the parties. In Carter Holt Harvey Ltd v 
Carroll Logging Ltd the Court of Appeal suggested that the parties would not have 
included the words ‘fair dealing’ (which might be seen as analogous to good faith) in 
their contract unless the parties intended them to have some meaning.
127
 Further, the 
comments of Tipping J do not appear to be consistent with the observations of the Privy 
Council in Queensland Electricity Generating Board v New Hope Collieries Pty Ltd.
128
 
In that case Sir Robin Cooke recognised that arguments involving the alleged uncertainty 
or inadequacy in the machinery available to the Court for making contractual rights 
enforceable and effective exert minimal attraction.
129
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Thus, the courts are quite willing to recognise an agreement to mediate.
130
 The 
justification for deeming an agreement to mediate enforceable but an agreement to 
negotiate unenforceable is susceptible to scrutiny.
131
 Indeed, it is difficult to draw a 
pragmatic distinction between an agreement to mediate and an agreement to negotiate. 
Certainly, an agreement to mediate may impose some specific and definitive obligations 
such as the requirement to appoint a mediator and attend the meditation. But the courts 
have apparently been willing to recognise significantly less certain duties under an 
agreement to mediate. These obligations could equally apply to a contractual negotiation 
process. For example, in Haines v Carter
132
 the Privy Council accepted that the parties 
were under a duty to act in good faith during the course of a mediation involving the 
division of relationship property. Lord Rodger considered that the obligation meant that 
the parties could not conceal the existence of relationship property, exaggerate its worth 
or fail to reveal some factor affecting its value.
133
 The good faith duty therefore 
influenced the tactics which the parties were permitted to employ during the mediation. 
 
Further, in Hooper Bailie Associated Ltd v Natcon Group Pty Ltd Giles J suggested that 
an agreement to negotiate and an agreement to mediate were both distinct from an 
agreement to agree.
134
 An agreement to mediate and an agreement to negotiate could 
require the parties to participate in the negotiation process in a manner that could be 
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defined with sufficient certainty to justify the legal recognition of the agreement.
135
 This 
depended upon the express terms and any terms that might be implied into the agreement. 
 
Having denounced the justiciability of an agreement to negotiate in good faith, the Court 
in Wellington City Council paradoxically went on to say that even if the agreement was 
enforceable there could be no lack of good faith. The Council was entitled to seek the 
highest possible price and was free to engage in negotiations with other potential 
purchasers. The Court did not appreciate that it completely undermined its earlier 
reasoning by advancing this alternative ground. The Court should not have been able to 
embark upon the question of whether the Council had negotiated in good faith, let alone 
make a definitive conclusion, if the issue truly was not justiciable.
136
 Arguably the logical 
reasons which the Court advanced as to why good faith had not been breached may have 
been a better justification for the decision than the non-justiciability supposition. 
 
Indeed, the restrictive approach adopted to date by the courts has received significant 
criticism. The reasoning in Walford apparently contradicts rather than protects the 
principle of freedom of contract. It seems irrational that negotiating parties are not free to 
bargain away their right to withdraw from negotiations if they so choose.
137
 It is 
extremely difficult to comprehend how commercial parties do not intend to create a legal 
relationship where they have made a serious promise to negotiate and have provided 
good consideration.
138
 Accordingly the Court should be hesitant to override the obvious 
intention of the parties.  
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Despite the current views of the judiciary, agreements to negotiate and, more particularly, 
agreements to negotiate in good faith, are commonplace in commercial dealings within 
New Zealand.
139
 Commercial parties and their advisors are demonstrating a reluctance to 
yield to the view of the courts. This result is to be expected in light of the commercial 
importance of contractual negotiations. A number of modern studies have indicated that 
the negotiation period cannot be dismissed as insignificant.
140
 Negotiations may take 
place in stages over a considerable period of time in large-scale or complex commercial 
transactions. There is an increasing time and expense commitment as the parties move 
more towards a formal agreement. The economic investment in contractual negotiations 
arguably justifies a measure of protection and surety.   
 
It therefore appears somewhat irrational and unfair that the courts often deny commercial 
parties the effect of an agreement to negotiate when plainly the commercial world values 
such agreements. The striking down of bargains solely to preserve legal niceties divorces 
the law from the realities of commerce and the ability of the law to move in parallel with 
the development of commercial life.
141
 In Homburg Houtimport BV v Agrosin Private Ltd 
Lord Steyn endorsed the extra-judicial comments of Lord Goff opining: 
 
We are there to help businessmen, not to hinder them: we are there to give effect 
to their transactions, not to frustrate them: we are there to oil the wheels of 
commerce, not to put a spanner in the works, or even grit in the oil.
142
 
 
Accordingly, it is submitted that an increased preparedness by the judiciary to uphold 
agreements to negotiate is required. Relevant to this thesis, a doctrine of good faith may 
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assist in achieving this objective by contributing legally binding content to an agreement 
to negotiate.
143
  
 
A doctrine of good faith would be unable to act as consideration for an agreement to 
negotiate. It would be inconsistent with the doctrine of consideration to determine that a 
promise to negotiate in good faith amounts to consideration on the basis that the parties 
forgo certain rights in making the promise.
144
  Further, the envisaged doctrine of good 
faith should only apply to promises which are capable of having the force of contracts. 
The subject doctrine of good faith is unlikely to save a promise to negotiate that is 
unsupported by good consideration. Provided however there is some recognisable 
consideration for the promise, good faith could potentially be read into an agreement to 
negotiate as a further term which alone makes it effective.
145
 This result would seemingly 
be consistent with the primary duty of the Court to uphold the contract between the 
parties.
146
 The courts should strive to reduce any uncertainty to an acceptable level 
provided contractual intention can be established.
147
 Conceivably a general duty of good 
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faith would permit the courts to enforce a bare agreement to negotiate because it would 
enable judges to more readily spell out the content of any contractual obligation.
148
 Good 
faith would require that the parties renounce the purely adversarial position that they 
would otherwise be entitled to adopt if their negotiations were not the subject of an 
agreement.
149
 
 
In Wellington City Council one of the primary problems Tipping J perceived in respect of 
a good faith obligation giving content to an agreement to negotiate was that, in his 
Honour’s view, the meaning of good faith was subjective honesty. Such a standard of 
conduct apparently could not be appraised and applied by the courts. In this respect, 
Tipping J suggested that an obligation to negotiate in good faith was distinct from an 
obligation to negotiate reasonably. Apparently the latter might embody a sufficiently 
objective and enforceable criterion.
150
  
 
The reasoning of Tipping J breaks down if it is accepted that good faith can assume an 
objective standard of conduct. Indeed, it will be contended in Chapter 3 that good faith 
may embody an objective definition and may conceivably include requirements of 
reasonable behaviour. Thus, there is no reason why the subject doctrine could not be used 
by the courts to give contractual meaning and enforceability to an agreement to negotiate 
to the extent that the meaning of good faith subsumes an objective standard of conduct.  
 
There is no doubt that it would be difficult to develop an adequate characterisation of 
good faith conduct in contract negotiations in order to give content to a contract to 
negotiate.
151
 However, the difficulty in prescribing a standard of good faith conduct in 
negotiations is no different than formulating an appropriate measure of good faith 
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conduct under a substantive contract. Certain types of conduct may amount to a failure to 
negotiate in good faith depending on the circumstances of the case. Such conduct may 
include a bare refusal to negotiate
152
, or complete inflexibility (as distinct from legitimate 
hard bargaining)
153
 and obstructing or delaying negotiations. In some cases the doctrine 
of good faith might preclude a party to a negotiation agreement from engaging in parallel 
or alternate negotiations. Logically the good faith doctrine could not require the parties to 
reach a concluded contract. However, conceivably there should be some reasonable 
justification for the termination of negotiations. Such genuine circumstances may include 
impasse, a change in market conditions or a more favourable offer by a third party.  
 
On balance it is submitted that in appropriate cases the subject doctrine may be utilised to 
give legally enforceable content and contractual force to an agreement to negotiate which 
is supported by valid consideration. The doctrine may therefore result in an increased 
recognition of agreements to negotiate. This is a desirable development such that the law 
becomes better aligned with the expectations of the commercial community in New 
Zealand. It is appropriate however to reemphasise that the subject doctrine would have no 
application to negotiations which are not the subject of a purported agreement. The 
doctrine is contractual in origin.   
 
2.4.3 Preliminary or Process Contracts and the Good Faith Doctrine: 
 
In certain circumstances the common law has regulated contractual negotiations by 
adopting a two contract methodology. This approach is based on the theory that a 
secondary or procedural contract may arise governing the way in which the parties 
conduct their dealings in pursuit of the prospective primary contract.
154
 Thus, in Barry v 
Davies it was held that there was a secondary contract between an auctioneer and the 
highest bidder in an auction without reserve. The contract was constituted by an offer by 
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the auctioneer to sell to the highest bidder which was accepted when the bid was made.
155
 
The vendor breached the secondary contract by failing to sell to the highest bidder. The 
bidder was therefore entitled to recover the difference between the market value of the 
auctioned goods and the amount of the bid.  
 
Similarly, in Markholm Construction Co Ltd v Wellington City Council
156
 a process 
contract came into existence where the Council sought purchase bids for sections of land. 
The Council had promised to hold a ballot if more than one bid was received for a 
particular section. Jeffries J held that there was a contract between the conforming 
bidders, including the plaintiffs, and the Council. The contract required the Council to 
hold the ballot.
157
 Accordingly, the Council had breached the process contract by 
declining to conduct the ballot. The plaintiffs were unable to establish that they would 
have won the substantive contract but for the breach. Damages were therefore confined to 
loss of a chance and inconvenience.  
 
The two contract methodology is arguably evidence of the courts showing much 
ingenuity to promote good faith and fair dealing in the negotiation of primary 
contracts.
158
 Moreover, the increasing judicial endorsement of the process contract 
rationale may conceivably provide greater scope for a doctrine of good faith to regulate 
negotiations for a substantive contract. The subject doctrine could be applicable to a 
preliminary process contract as a matter of construction.  
 
Indeed, obligations of good faith under a process contract have already received some 
support in the context of public tendering. In R v Ron Engineering & Construction 
(Eastern) Ltd the Supreme Court of Canada propounded a contractual model based on the 
formation of preliminary and final contracts in the tender process.
159
 A request for tenders 
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is an offer by the invitor. The submission of a conforming bid amounts to an acceptance 
leading to a process contract on the terms specified in the call for tenders.
160
  
 
The principle is illustrated in the case of Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club Ltd v Blackpool 
Borough Council.
161
 The Council sent invitations to tender to the Aero Club and six other 
parties. The tender related to concessions to operate pleasure flights from an airport. The 
invitation stated that tenders submitted after a certain time would not be considered. The 
Aero Club submitted a tender within the prescribed time. However, the Council staff 
made an error and recorded the tender as being submitted late. In consequence, the tender 
was not considered and the concessions were awarded to another party. The Aero Club 
sued for breach of contract. Bingham LJ held that an invitee who conformed to the terms 
of the invitation was entitled to some protection. This protection extended past a mere 
expectation. The invitee enjoyed a contractual right to have his or her tender considered 
in conjunction with the other conforming tenders.
162
 The obligation incumbent on the 
Council did not preclude it from declining to award the tender. However, the decision had 
to be bona fide and honest.
163
    
 
Thus, the terms of the tender invitation are the foundation for the terms of the preliminary 
contract. The process contract governs the manner in which the invitor is to consider the 
submissions. It gives rise to an expectation that the substantive contract will be awarded 
by following the prescribed procedure. The courts have endeavoured to ensure that this 
expectation is realised by implying terms of good faith into the process contract. 
 
For example, in Pratt Contractors Ltd v Transit New Zealand the Privy Council accepted 
that the invitor was subject to an implied obligation under the preliminary contract to deal 
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with the tenderers in fairness and in good faith.
164
 These duties meant that the invitor was 
obliged to treat each of the tenderers equally. However, there was no obligation on the 
part of the invitor to act judicially.
165
 
 
The majority of cases involving good faith obligations in the context of tendering have 
hitherto involved public bodies.
166
 It remains to be substantively tested in New Zealand 
whether obligations of good faith would be implied into a preliminary contract in a 
wholly private tender process. In Lab Tests Auckland Ltd v Auckland District Health 
Board the Court of Appeal recognised that a public body engaged in a tender process 
must exercise its contracting power in accordance with its enabling statute.
167
 Principles 
of natural justice therefore apply. Arguably this is one of the reasons justifying an 
implied duty of good faith. A private individual is not subject to such public law 
obligations. It is therefore debatable whether a private tender process will warrant an 
implied duty of good faith.  
 
Nonetheless, obligations of good faith would apply to all process contracts regardless of 
whether public bodies or private individuals are involved if a universal doctrine of good 
faith were to be introduced. Accordingly, the two contract methodology in conjunction 
with a doctrine of contractual good faith is a means by which negotiations may be 
regulated and contractual liability imposed in cases of bad faith conduct. 
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2.5 Contracting Out of the Doctrine of Good Faith: 
 
The extent to which contracting parties could limit or exclude a duty of good faith is 
fundamental to the jurisprudential foundation of the subject doctrine. The issue is 
complicated by the lack of consensus as to whether a doctrine of good faith should be 
incorporated into contract law as an implied term or as a principle of construction. 
 
2.5.1 Contracting Out of an Implied Term: 
 
Those who subscribe to the idea that the doctrine of good faith would be a term implied 
in law generally take the view that the parties should be free to exclude its application by 
express agreement. It was noted above that the ability to contractually exclude the 
implication of a term is a well-established rule. In Lynch v Thorne the English Court of 
Appeal declined to imply a term which would create an inconsistency with the express 
language of the agreement.
168
 Implied terms are therefore of their nature incapable of 
rising above express terms.
169
 
 
Some good faith supporters seek to displace this rule. In Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia Ltd v Spira Gzell J suggested that public policy considerations should result in 
the law refusing to countenance any exclusion of a term implied as a matter of general 
policy in all contracts of a particular class.
170
 His Honour did however acknowledge that 
higher authority bound him to hold to the contrary. Others have also contended that there 
would be no scope to exclude a duty of good faith created by an appellate court applying 
to all contracts and requiring each party to do that which is necessary for the performance 
of the contract.
171
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Minimal rationale is advanced to support these opinions. Apparently some exception to 
the rules relating to implied terms is justified on the basis of the sheer importance of a 
universally implied obligation of good faith. The essentiality of an implied term of good 
faith has been emphasised by arguing that such an obligation cannot be excluded without 
rendering an agreement a hollow shell, devoid of legally significant content.
172
 These 
contentions can be readily countenanced by observing that the majority of contracts 
within New Zealand currently function without the need for an implied term of good 
faith. 
 
2.5.2 Contracting Out of a Rule of Construction: 
 
The foregoing analysis within this chapter advocated the incorporation of a doctrine of 
good faith into contract law primarily as a rule of construction rather than as an implied 
term. Accordingly it is necessary to consider whether a principle of construction can be 
contractually limited or excluded.  
 
A comparison was previously drawn between the doctrine of frustration and the 
envisaged doctrine of good faith. The doctrine of frustration is a principle of construction 
and can be modified by the express agreement of the parties. This can occur where the 
parties specifically provide for the frustrating event.
173
 This analogy implies that 
contracting parties might also be free to expressly limit or negate an obligation of good 
faith. Because construction is dependent on the nature of the contract and the surrounding 
circumstances, contracting parties could avoid duties of good faith by making their 
contracts sufficiently clear.
174
 
 
However, some have argued that a principle of good faith incorporated as a rule of 
construction may not be so readily excluded. Baron has adopted this rationale. She 
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further asserts that this may render the constructivist approach preferable to the implied 
term methodology: 
 
[T]here seems to be little difference in the two competing approaches that have 
characterised much of the good faith debate in Australia: the constructivist and the 
implication approach…Despite the similarities in outcome, a technical advantage, 
perhaps, of the constructivist approach relates to the exclusion of good faith 
obligations. As Justice Finn acknowledged in Marconi, on the law as it currently 
stands [ ], parties can expressly exclude an obligation of good faith. However, on 
a constructivist approach, and keeping in mind the central ideas of the notion of 
contract as a mutual endeavour and contract as a process, it seems likely that core 
good faith obligations could not be excluded because to do so would render the 
contract illusory.
175
 
 
With respect, the argument is not convincing. It was noted above that the fundamental 
importance of good faith has also been advanced as a reason for precluding the right to 
contract out of an implied term of good faith. The distinction between construction and 
implication that Baron seeks to draw is not clear. In any event contracts can function 
without a good faith rule of construction under the existing law. It is not therefore a 
tenable argument to suggest that the contractual exclusion of a construction based on 
good faith would destroy the foundation of the contract. 
 
Ultimately, rules of construction are the means by which the courts determine the mutual 
objective intention of contracting parties. Accordingly, it is logical that the parties could 
prevent a contract from being construed to require good faith by demonstrating an 
intention to the contrary. Prima facie, the doctrine of good faith could be limited or 
negated by contracting parties if it were to be introduced as a rule of construction. 
 
2.5.3 How Would a Good Faith Doctrine be Limited or Negated? 
 
It is necessary to consider the practical means by which the operation of a doctrine of 
good faith would be contractually limited or excluded. It has been reasoned that exclusion 
would be difficult to achieve. No doubt alarm bells are likely to ring if a term expressly 
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 Baron, above n 48, at 424. 
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mandating bad faith or dishonest conduct were sought to be included by a party to a 
contract.
176
 In practical terms it is difficult to conceive an attractively drafted term which 
overtly seeks to exclude an obligation of good faith and fair dealing.
177
  
 
Nonetheless, exclusion may seemingly be achieved by more subtle means. For example, 
contractual clauses may be expressed to permit a party to exercise powers at ‘its sole 
discretion’ or ‘for any reason whatsoever.’ Such clauses may prevent the Court from 
scrutinising the motive and reasonableness of the exercise of a contractual power which it 
might have otherwise done if a breach of good faith were alleged.
178
 To deem that 
contracting parties intended a sole discretion clause to be subject to good faith obligations 
may be a strained construction. An absolute discretion clause may at least serve to dilute 
the standard of conduct required to discharge a good faith obligation. 
 
In Vero Insurance New Zealand Ltd v Fleet Insurance & Risk Management Ltd Asher J 
considered a contractual clause which permitted a joint venture party to withhold consent 
to a change in shareholding of the other joint venture party at its absolute discretion.  His 
Honour held that the absolute discretion element did not necessarily exclude the 
application of the obligation of good faith which the parties were subject to pursuant to 
another term of the contract.
179
 Likewise, in Hungry Jack’s the New South Wales Court 
of Appeal examined a clause which gave a franchisor the sole discretion to grant consent 
to the recruitment of third party franchisees and concluded that: 
 
If full force is given to [the sole discretion] concept, it would allow [the 
franchisor] to give or to withhold relevant approval "at its whim" including 
capriciously, or with the sole intent of engineering a default of the Development 
Agreement, giving rise to a right to terminate.
180
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 See Finn, above n 40, at 385. 
177
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178
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Apparently the Court considered that the parties did not intend a sole discretion clause to 
mandate an arbitrary exercise of the discretion. Such observations may suggest that 
although it may be possible to specifically exclude an obligation of good faith, an attempt 
to impliedly do so by virtue of a sole discretion clause and other similarly wide 
contractual provisions is unlikely to find judicial favour.
181
 
 
Certainly there is no consistency in judicial approach. In Vero Asher J suggested, in 
obiter dicta, that it would be most surprising if an unfettered right to cancel or terminate 
could be subject to the qualification that it must be exercised in good faith.
182
 A system of 
contract requiring an examination of the motives for the exercise of contractual rights 
could be subject to chaos and uncertainty. On this rationale a clause permitting 
termination at one’s sole discretion is unlikely to be subject to good faith considerations. 
Seemingly an absolute discretion clause may therefore be sufficient to negate or limit the 
application of a good faith doctrine in certain circumstances. 
 
Conceivably the doctrine of good faith might also be excluded by an ‘entire agreement’ 
clause. These clauses frequently appear in commercial agreements. The wording usually 
adopted is to the effect that the written agreement constitutes the entire agreement 
between the parties or that or that the document sets out all the express terms and 
conditions of the bargain. Often entire agreement clauses serve to exclude the operation 
of the common law. Accordingly such a clause could preclude the application of good 
faith as a principle of construction. There exists authority for the proposition that an 
entire agreement clause may effectively preclude the imposition and application of an 
implied term.
183
 By analogy, that result could also apply to a rule of construction. 
                                                     
181
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 Hope v RCA Photophone of Australia Pty Ltd (1937) 59 CLR 348; Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd v 
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Quantum Timber Products (NZ) Ltd (In Receivership and in Liquidation) v Koppers Arch Wood Protection 
(NZ) Ltd (High Court, Auckland, CIV 2003-404-50, 8 September 2003, Master Lang), at [13]; Exxonmobil 
Salesand Supply Corp v Taxaco Ltd [2004] 1 All ER (Comm) 435, at [27] per Teare QC; Filter Solutions 
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However, others take a contrary view and argue that an entire agreement clause could not 
preclude the operation of an implied term of good faith. The rationale presented is that an 
entire agreement clause would not be sufficiently precise to constitute an express 
exclusion of a duty of good faith and fair dealing that would otherwise be implied in 
law.
184
 A further justification is that every implication of a term which the law deems 
necessary is embodied in the contract as if it were expressly written into the agreement.
185
 
An entire agreement clause does not serve to exclude the operation of terms deemed to be 
within the contract. 
 
However, this reasoning is dubious. An entire agreement clause may expressly exclude 
the common law rules of implication and construction.
186
 It is submitted that such a 
clause should be effective in precluding any good faith obligations being incorporated 
into the contract either by construction or implication.  
 
No doubt the courts may need to resort to the rule of contra proferentum to resolve 
whether a specific clause, including an entire agreement clause or a sole discretion 
                                                                                                                                                              
Ltd v Donaldson Australasia Pty Ltd (High Court, Auckland, CIV 2005-404-1095, 4 July 2006, Associate 
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733 of 1997, 12 February 2003), at [922] per Finn J. 
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 Hart v MacDonald (1910) 10 CLR 417, at 427 per O’Connor J. 
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184 ALR 481; Vodafone Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovations Ltd [2004] NSWCA 15, at [200] per Giles JA. In 
Stanley v Fuji Xerox New Zealand Ltd (High Court, Auckland, CP 479/96, 5 November 1997) Elias J 
observed (at 24) that a ‘term is not to be implied merely because it is sensible or reasonable unless in all the 
circumstances the term must have been intended by the parties at the time of entering into the 
contract…The contract itself purports by clause 11 to embody the entire understanding of the parties and 
exclude the implication of any other terms. While that provision is not conclusive it prompts caution. It 
indicates that the parties themselves intended to express their obligations in the written agreement with 
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provision, is clearly worded enough to exclude the subject good faith doctrine.
187
 Those 
legal issues are however somewhat distinct from the good faith debate. Prima facie, an 
appropriately drafted clause could exclude or limit the doctrine.  
 
Traditionally the common law has prevented the contractual exclusion of certain 
obligations on the grounds of public policy. It is necessary to consider whether public 
policy considerations could be invoked to displace the above finding that the subject 
doctrine could be contractually limited or negated. These public policy issues are 
explored below. 
 
2.5.4 Public Policy Considerations: 
 
The fact that it may be possible to contract out of an obligation of good faith is an 
outcome which is not universally endorsed by proponents of the doctrine. The ability to 
contract out of good faith would tend to dilute the potency and frequency of application 
of the doctrine. This can be contrasted against the European codifications. These often 
preclude the exclusion or limitation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
188
  
 
It is highly conceivable that if contracting parties were permitted to contract out of the 
doctrine then this would frequently occur within New Zealand. The use of standard form 
contracts is increasing.
189
 It is not difficult to envisage well-drafted exclusion and entire 
agreement clauses within standard consumer contracts preventing the application of a 
good faith doctrine. Accordingly, the utility of the good faith doctrine as a means of 
redressing inequality of bargaining power may be weakened. Similarly, commercial 
parties may seek to exclude a doctrine of good faith taking the view that it need not be 
relied upon provided both parties perform the contract as expected. Corporate parties 
operating at arms length may make a commercial election to avoid the uncertainties 
                                                     
187
 The onus is on the person seeking the protection of the exclusion clause to show that the contingency 
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 See Burrows, Finn and Todd, above n 2, at 16. 
 86 
associated with good faith. In particular, they may seek to avoid challenges to their 
motives for exercising contractual powers. It is therefore plausible that the doctrine 
would be unlikely to have any meaningful impact on commercial contracts if contracting 
parties were permitted to completely exclude it.
190
 Moreover, it is even conceivable that 
if a good faith doctrine were introduced, thereby increasing the awareness of the need to 
achieve contractual exclusion, obligations of good faith in classes of contract under 
which such obligations are currently implied are more likely to be excluded either 
deliberately or inadvertently. Paradoxically, the introduction of a good faith doctrine may 
diminish the application of good faith obligations in New Zealand contractual 
relationships. 
 
Consequently, public policy may prevent contractual exclusion of good faith. There are 
some standards and obligations which are not suitable for contractual variation despite 
the insistence on party autonomy in the field of contract law.
191
 Fraud is an obvious 
example. It has been recognised that ‘no subtlety of language, no craft or machinery in 
the form of contract, can estop a person who complains that he has been defrauded.’
192
 In 
HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v Chase Manhattan Bank
193
 the House of 
Lords identified the policy justifications for the rule. Lord Scott noted that a party to a 
contract should not be permitted to benefit from his or her own fraud.
194
 Lord Hobhouse 
also observed that a contractual exclusion may be meaningless where a contract has been 
procured by material fraud because the party deceived has not given a true consent to be 
bound by the contract.
195
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Conceivably the doctrine of good faith may also fall within this public policy exception 
category. Certainly a term expressly permitting bad faith conduct may approach the 
threshold to be unenforceable as against public policy.
196
 It is notable that in HIH Lord 
Bingham opined that each party to a contract will assume the honesty and good faith of 
the other and the parties would not enter into a contract absent such an assumption.
197
 
 
Nonetheless, it is dubious whether a doctrine of good faith invokes correspondingly 
strong policy considerations to those justifying the necessity to provide a victim of fraud 
with some legal recourse. Whilst fraud would be an obvious example of a breach of good 
faith, conduct falling well short of common law fraud is also likely to contravene the 
good faith standard. Indeed, if the law permits exclusion of liability for negligence
198
 
there is no evident justification for preventing contracting parties from excluding liability 
for breach of good faith.  
 
Accordingly, there does not appear to be any outstanding policy consideration or element 
of illegality which would preclude contracting parties from specifically limiting or 
excluding the doctrine of good faith. On the contrary, to suggest that good faith cannot be 
excluded on the basis of some abstract notion of community standards is likely to work 
against the interests of contracting parties and commercial parties in particular.
199
 
Arguments based on illegality and public policy are unlikely to hold sway in respect of an 
exclusion of good faith. The courts will be reluctant to read down freedom of contract. 
An appropriate exclusion clause should therefore embarrass the judiciary into 
submission.
200
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Accordingly it is concluded that the common law would not be capable of preventing 
contracting parties from excluding or limiting the doctrine of good faith. Although the 
right to contract out of the doctrine would be subject to existing legal and equitable 
controls, such as the rule of contra proferentum, the doctrine could not be utilised to 
rewrite the agreed terms of a contract.
201
 The courts should not be permitted to override a 
clear contractual intention to negate or avoid good faith obligations.  
 
2.5.5 A Matter for the Legislature? 
 
The foregoing conclusion that the courts would be unlikely to prevent contracting parties 
from excluding the doctrine may suggest to ardent good faith proponents that the doctrine 
should be introduced by the legislature rather than the judiciary. 
 
For example, the United States, via the Uniform Commercial Code, has adopted an 
approach which appears to strike a balance between contractual autonomy and the desire 
for a mandatory rule of good faith. Section 1-102(3) provides: 
 
The obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by 
this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement but the parties may by agreement 
determine the standards by which performance of such obligations is to be 
measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable. 
 
Thus, although the duty of good faith cannot be excluded, its application may be 
modified via an express contractual provision referring to the standard of care expected 
of the parties. It has been recognised that the interpretation of the section within the 
United States has been varied.
202
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 Finn, above n 40, at 384. 
202
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Clearly it is not within the power of the New Zealand judiciary to impose a rule of 
exclusion analogous to that within the Uniform Commercial Code. Thus, it may be 
necessary for the subject doctrine to be introduced through legislation which could 
contain a similar rule to that relating to exclusion in the Uniform Commercial Code. This 
could ensure that the good faith duty would have the potency and wide ranging effects 
envisaged by proponents. Parliament has displayed a willingness to restrict the freedom 
of contracting parties to contract out of certain statutory obligations where it deems those 
obligations to be fundamental. For example, it is not possible to contract out of the 
Consumer Guarantees Act 1993
203
, or the Credit Contracts and Consumer Finance Act 
2003.
204
 Should a doctrine of good faith receive statutory codification then conceivably 
similar restrictions may be placed on the contracting parties. 
 
It is outside the scope of this thesis to extensively consider a statutory obligation of 
contractual good faith. The subject doctrine appraised within this thesis is one which 
would be judicially introduced. Nonetheless, the prospective limits of a judicial doctrine 
of contractual good faith relative to a legislative rule are recognised. 
 
2.6 Summary: 
 
This chapter has sought to explain the general aspects of the doctrine of good faith being 
appraised within this thesis. In considering the two primary means by which good faith 
may be incorporated by the courts into New Zealand law, the constructivist methodology 
was preferred over the implied term methodology. On this rationale a contract could be 
construed to require good faith. This construction may suggest that contractual 
discretions, powers and rights must be exercised in good faith. Further, a free-standing 
obligation of good faith might be created in appropriate circumstances as an incidence of 
construction. 
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It has been shown that the subject doctrine may be of potential benefit in the context of 
agreements to negotiate. Conceivably, the doctrine could be invoked by the courts to give 
effect to agreements to negotiate which have hitherto been deemed unenforceable. The 
beneficial outcome would be to better align contract law with the expectations of 
commercial parties in New Zealand.  
 
However, the analysis has also served to demonstrate that the subject doctrine would be 
considerably more limited in scope than proponents of good faith may desire. The 
doctrine would be grounded in the common law of contract. It would not assume 
equitable characteristics. Accordingly good faith would have little application to pre-
contractual negotiations in the absence of a preliminary agreement. Certainly it would 
have no application where a binding contract does not come into force. Moreover, the 
application of the common law doctrine could be fettered or excluded by agreement. In 
the result, the frequency of application and the potency of the subject doctrine is likely to 
be restricted to some extent. Opponents of good faith are liable to suggest that these 
outcomes are a minimum requirement for the preservation of classical contract theory and 
contractual autonomy. On the other hand, ardent good faith proponents should logically 
favour the introduction of obligations of good faith by way of legislation to ensure its 
wide ranging and universal effect. Based on either viewpoint, these results militate 
against the judicial introduction of good faith in New Zealand law by means of the 
subject doctrine. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Definition and Application of Good Faith 
 
3.1 Chapter Introduction: 
 
Good faith is a nebulous idea. When the context in which it is sought to be applied 
changes, it is capable of taking on expanded or altogether new meanings.
1
 Often an 
attempt to explain the concept of good faith renders an explanation of the explanation 
necessary.
2
 
 
One of the principal objections to the introduction of a universal doctrine of good faith is 
that the meaning of good faith is too uncertain. It cannot be appropriately defined or 
applied in practice with sufficient precision. Good faith is an amorphous principle with 
indeterminate parameters.
3
 For example, whilst it is agreed that a doctrine of good faith 
would impose some restriction on the pursuit of self-interest, the extent of that restriction 
is not apparent.
4
 Further, the meaning of good faith is liable to vary between different 
people, in different moods, at different times, and in different places.
5
  Accordingly, a 
doctrine of good faith would be the subject of too much judicial discretion if it were to 
become part of New Zealand contract law. 
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In light of this fundamental objection, the purpose of this chapter is to explore the 
meaning of contractual good faith. It will further evaluate whether the good faith concept 
could be applied with sufficient certainty to allow for the introduction of a universal 
contractual doctrine within New Zealand. Part 3.2 considers the purpose of a good faith 
doctrine, recognising that its envisaged function should play a role in informing the 
prospective conceptualisation of good faith. Part 3.3 evaluates whether a characterisation 
of good faith based on bad faith conduct is appropriate. Part 3.4 advances a definition of 
good faith based on cooperation, honesty and reasonableness. Part 3.5 highlights the 
various meanings and applications of good faith in specific classes of contracts under 
which such obligations currently apply in New Zealand. This analysis is used to 
determine whether those meanings might be of any utility in formulating a potential 
definition of good faith in the context of the subject doctrine. Part 3.6 provides an 
appraisal of whether the definition of good faith, and therefore the conduct required of 
the parties to discharge an obligation of good faith, can be sufficiently determined in 
order to permit the introduction of a universal doctrine within New Zealand. Part 3.7 
draws conclusions as to the findings. 
 
3.2 The Purpose of Good Faith: 
 
The meaning of good faith should comprise both content and purpose.
6
 Thus, in 
evaluating an appropriate meaning of good faith in the context of a general doctrine, any 
proposed definition ought to be informed by the purpose of the doctrine. The adequacy of 
any legal conceptualisation is measured, in part, by whether it sufficiently serves the 
function of the legal obligation being formulated.
7
 Lord Steyn, speaking extra-judicially, 
has suggested: 
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[I]t is right that academic lawyers, practitioners and judges should constantly 
consider whether rules of law under consideration serve the purpose which led to 
their formation. Or, putting it more simply, we must never lose sight of Lord 
Reid’s observation in Cartledge v E Jopling & Sons Ltd that “The common law 
ought never to produce a wholly unreasonable result…”
8
 
 
Therefore, it is necessary to briefly identify the envisaged purposes of the subject 
doctrine before embarking on a discussion of the meaning and content of good faith.  
 
The most fundamental goal of a doctrine of good faith is to render the law of contract in 
New Zealand more responsive to the needs of commerce and the reasonable expectations 
of contracting parties and the commercial community.
9
 Reference to ‘reasonable 
expectations’ derives from the observations of Steyn J who, in First Energy (UK) Ltd v 
Hungarian International Bank Ltd, opined: 
 
A theme that runs through our law of contract is that the reasonable expectations 
of honest men must be protected. It is not a rule or principle of law. It is the 
objective which has been and still is the principal moulding force of our law of 
contract...[I]f the prima facie solution to a problem runs counter to the reasonable 
expectations of honest men, this criterion sometimes requires a rigorous 
examination of the problem to ascertain whether the law does indeed compel 
demonstrable unfairness.
10
  
  
The idea of reasonable expectations in the field of contract law has attained much 
popularity. New Zealand contract law is based on an objective theory of contract. This 
involves the observance of an objective external standard. As a result it is possible that 
reasonable expectations may be contravened where a contracting party adheres to the 
letter of a contract but acts in a manner not within the reasonable contemplation of the 
parties. Accordingly, Lord Steyn recognises that in order to ensure that reasonable 
expectations are upheld, ‘it occasionally requires that the law should treat contractual 
                                                     
8
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Philosophy?’ in Lord Steyn, Democracy Through the Law (2004), at 223. 
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obligations as defeasible or that a discretionary remedy should be denied.’
11
 Conceivably 
contractual good faith is a means by which reasonable expectations can be protected and 
enforced. The introduction of a doctrine of good faith may allow the law to better give 
effect to the spirit of contracts in a way which appropriately prioritises the reasonable 
expectations of contracting parties.
12
 Proponents envisage that a good faith requirement 
would thwart any misconception that the free market and traditional contract theory 
condones dishonest and unscrupulous behaviour.
13
 
 
The concept of reasonable expectations must however be qualified to some extent. The 
law of contract cannot set its sights too high.
14
 The notion of reasonable expectations 
should not reflect the viewpoint of a moral philosopher.
15
 Instead the focus should be on 
the outlook of ordinary right thinking people. This rings true particularly in the context of 
commercial expectations where the interests of proper commerce should prevail over 
vague standards of morality. The function of good faith should be to satisfy the 
reasonable expectations of the parties rather than to punish moral wrongdoing.
16
 
Reasonable expectations are liable to be contravened in a contractual setting where a 
party seeks to recapture the opportunities that he or she forwent upon entering the 
agreement.
17
 A proposed definition and application of good faith should prevent a 
contracting party from achieving this windfall. It follows that good faith should operate to 
restrict a contracting party from exercising a discretion in a way that falls outside the 
justified expectations of the parties at the time of contract formation.
18
 Further, good faith 
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could require the parties to behave in an objectively reasonable manner in the event that 
an unforeseen contingency arises. The notion of reasonable expectations therefore has 
relevance to the apportionment of unanticipated contractual gains or losses.  
 
A law of contract which gives effect to reasonable expectations is also likely to promote a 
culture of trust and cooperation as a corollary.
19
 This outcome may conceivably enhance 
economic efficiency.
20
 The need for the law to promote cooperation has been recognised 
from a commercial standpoint.
21
 Business could not be carried on smoothly without 
contractual cooperation. A contracting party could not rely on realising the full benefit of 
his or her contract.
22
 
 
The protection of reasonable expectations and the promotion of contractual cooperation 
subsume a number of more specific objectives. Four such objectives are identified by 
Thompson.
23
 Firstly, a doctrine of good faith may serve to prevent dishonesty. This may 
require negotiating parties to disclose material information. Similarly, good faith may 
imply that contractual rights and powers must be exercised for a proper purpose. A 
dishonest motive might not be tolerated. These applications are analysed further in 
Chapter 4. Secondly, good faith may ensure that a person keeps his or her word. Good 
faith may more readily require a promisor to be held to his or her word than existing 
contractual doctrine would allow. Good faith may therefore bear similarities to the notion 
of promissory estoppel. Again, this contention is discussed in Chapter 4. Thirdly, good 
faith may prevent a contracting party from, as a result of his or her behaviour, making the 
position of the other contracting party worse. For example, it was noted in Chapter 2 that 
a good faith doctrine may preclude a party to an agreement to negotiate from terminating 
negotiations for reasons which are capricious or arbitrary. Finally, good faith may relieve 
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contracting parties from absurd consequences which flow from their agreement. Like the 
doctrine of frustration, good faith might be utilised by the courts to construe a contract in 
a manner which produces a reasonable and substantively fair result. Conceivably this 
objective might best attained by incorporating good faith into contract law as a principle 
of construction.   
 
The subject doctrine of good faith may also perform a basic pragmatic purpose in respect 
of the management of the law of contract in addition to the more idealistic aspirations 
identified above. Essentially good faith may act as a unifying principle. It could address 
bad faith conduct through a rational, direct and open method. This may be preferable to 
the existing piecemeal and back door approach currently prevailing within the common 
law in New Zealand and other Commonwealth countries.
24
 Conceivably a more unified 
approach may result in greater efficiency in the administration of the law of contract. The 
judiciary would not be forced to covertly stretch and manipulate existing doctrine. There 
would be no necessity for sub rosa adjudication.
25
 The judiciary would be armed with a 
flexible remedy to justify its decision making. The perceived benefits of a general 
principle of good faith as compared to the current approach in New Zealand are 
extensively explored in Chapter 4.  
 
The purpose of good faith, as envisaged by proponents of the doctrine, can therefore be 
summarised by three fundamental goals namely, the protection of the reasonable 
expectations of contracting parties, the promotion of cooperation and trust, and the 
unification of existing legal and equitable principles into a more coherent and positive 
doctrine. The following discussion of the meaning and application of good faith is 
undertaken with these purposes in mind. 
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3.3 Defining Good Faith as the Absence of Bad Faith Conduct – Excluder 
Analysis: 
 
Good faith has been famously defined by Summers as the absence of bad faith conduct.
26
 
This exclusionist definition has an attractive simplicity. Apparently actions taken in bad 
faith can be readily identified. Bad faith supposedly has an identifiable meaning.
27
 Thus it 
is relatively straightforward to distinguish between good faith and bad faith conduct. 
Summers observes that if good faith had an unambiguous meaning of its own then there 
would be no need to derive a definition from its opposite but  
 
…good faith is not that kind of doctrine. In contract law, taken as a whole, good 
faith is an “excluder.” It is a phrase without general meaning (or meanings of its 
own) and serves to exclude a wide range of heterogeneous forms of bad 
faith…Aristotle was one of the first to recognize that the function of some words 
and phrases is not to convey general, extractable meanings of their own, but rather 
to exclude one or more of a variety of things.
28
 
 
Summers therefore contends that it is only possible to formulate positive meanings for 
particular uses of good faith by ruling out forms of bad faith. It is unlikely that these 
meanings may be generalised into a single, positive and unifying definition of good 
faith.
29
 Judges should not attempt to formulate restrictive definitions of good faith. 
Instead the judiciary should carefully characterise the particular forms of bad faith which 
justifies a legal remedy. Ultimately, ‘bad faith rather than good faith wears the pants in 
this dichotomy.’
30
 
 
It is submitted that a definition of good faith based on the conceptualisation advanced by 
Summers is not appropriate if a doctrine of contractual good faith were to be introduced 
                                                     
26
 Robert S Summers, ‘“Good faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform 
Commercial Code’ (1968) 54 Virginia Law Review 195. 
27
 See Michael Bridge, ‘Doubting Good Faith’ (2005) 11 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 426, at 429. 
28
 Summers, above n 26, at 201. 
29
 Summers, above n 7, at 820. 
30
 Summers, above n 26, at 207. 
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within New Zealand. The definition is incompatible with the envisaged purposes of the 
doctrine. The justification for this inference is explored below. 
 
Arguably a definition of good faith based on bad faith could not positively contribute to 
the existing law of contract within New Zealand. The regulation of bad faith conduct in 
relation to contracts is already encapsulated, in whole or in part, within existing legal and 
equitable principles such as misrepresentation, duress, undue influence and 
unconscionability. Thus it is not clear what the benefit is of shifting from a 
conceptualisation of bad faith conduct to instead focus on a symmetrical and mutually 
dependent definition of good faith.
31
 Indeed, the subject doctrine would not produce any 
different legal outcomes within New Zealand if good faith is merely defined with 
reference to existing rules. There would be no enhancement of the protection of 
reasonable expectations or improved trust and cooperation within contractual 
relationships. At best, good faith might serve some limited benefit as a unifying principle. 
More likely, the doctrine would assume a reductionist character. It would add nothing to 
the existing tools of contract law in New Zealand.
32
 The application of contract principles 
under the guise of good faith would merely be a rebadging of what the courts already 
do.
33
 The result is liable to be unnecessary confusion. Good faith would not have any 
positive pragmatic effect on the law within New Zealand.  
 
This outcome is inconsistent with the views of good faith proponents who suggest that 
the doctrine would create new obligations to provide a remedy in situations where the 
existing rules of contract cannot reach or appear unable to reach.
34
 Good faith could fill 
any space that may exist between the current doctrines.
35
 Ipso facto, the breadth of the 
                                                     
31
 See Marietta Auer, ‘“Good Faith” and its German Sources: A Structural Framework for the “Good Faith” 
Debate in General Contract Law and Under the Uniform Commercial Code’ (2001), at 104 
<http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/ graduate/publications/papers/auer.pdf9>, at 26 February 2008. 
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 Bridge, above n 27, at 428. 
33
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34
 See Thomas, above n 9, at 394. See also Hector MacQueen, ‘Good Faith in the Scot’s Law of Contract’ 
in Forte (ed), above n 3, at 37. 
35
 Brownsword, above n 4, at 27. 
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law regulating bad faith conduct must be expanded if this result is to be achieved under 
Summers’ definition. Conceivably this would be attained through the incremental 
development and broadening of existing legal and equitable doctrines. Arguably this was 
what Summers was effectively advocating by suggesting that the judiciary must focus on 
bad faith rather than good faith. However, there are two obvious problems with this 
approach.   
 
Firstly, Summers’ definition fails to articulate clearly what bad faith conduct is, if it is to 
be understood as distinct from, or wider than, conduct already attracting a remedy under 
the existing law. Accordingly, there is no guidance for the judiciary in cases involving 
novel allegations of bad faith which do not fit within existing doctrinal categories.
36
 The 
excluder definition is no more certain than a positive definition of good faith. 
 
Secondly, it was noted above that proponents of a good faith doctrine argue that whereas 
the existing law requires judges to deal with good faith in an unclear and roundabout 
fashion, an introduction of the subject doctrine would permit judges to directly and 
openly confront breaches of good faith. That argument loses impetus if the definition of 
good faith is to be founded on a more stringent regulation of bad faith conduct under the 
existing back door methods.  
 
Additional criticisms can be leveled at the excluder definition. Good faith and bad faith 
are not necessarily symmetrical. Bad faith may set a minimal standard which contracting 
parties must meet whilst good faith may be more a standard of aspiration.
37
 Good faith is 
likely to require positive action such as cooperation, support and assistance.
38
 Bad faith 
conduct, as understood within the existing law, is focused on negative requirements such 
                                                     
36
 It has been recognised that Summers’ approach ‘provides absolutely no guidance to the disposition of 
future cases, except to the extent that they may be on all fours with a decided case.’: Bridge, above n 5, at 
398. 
37
 Brownsword, above n 4, at 17, citing Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law (revised ed, 1969). 
38
 Ibid. 
 100 
as non-victimisation, non-exploitation and non-opportunism.
39
 There is a void between 
those positive and negative requirements which a definition based on bad faith cannot 
subsume. Thus, a definition focused on bad faith conduct might be unable to deal with 
instances where the defendant adopts a passive role.
40
 To take a hypothetical example, a 
prospective purchaser of land may know that it is rich in oil and also that the vendor is 
ignorant of this fact. The purchaser may acquire the land at a deflated price by omitting to 
disclose the information to the vendor.
41
 In such a case the purchaser has not actively 
engaged in bad faith conduct. Arguably however his or her non-disclosure may amount to 
a breach of good faith.
42
 A good faith doctrine might compel the purchaser to warn the 
vendor. The excluder definition may be inadequate in this scenario.   
 
Accordingly, the definition advanced by Summers would be inappropriate if a general 
doctrine of good faith were to be introduced within New Zealand law. Such a definition 
would not achieve the desired purposes of the good faith obligation. An affirmative 
definition is required to justify support for the subject doctrine. Thus, the excluder 
definition must be abandoned in favour of a positive conceptualisation of good faith. 
 
3.4 Cooperation, Honesty and Reasonableness: 
 
In light of the foregoing findings, a positive definition of good faith is required to allow 
for the introduction of a doctrine of good faith in New Zealand. In an oft-cited article, Sir 
Anthony Mason suggests that good faith embraces no less than three related notions: 
 
                                                     
39
 Ibid. 
40
 See Bridge, above n 27, at 429.  
41
 For a further discussion of the hypothetical example see Bridge, above n 27, at 429-430.   
42
 It is debatable whether good faith would be contravened in this scenario. It has been noted that ‘people 
disagree whether it is dishonest consciously to remain silent where one’s intervention (say, by disclosure of 
information) would rescue another from the risk of making a harmful mistake.’: Jane Stapleton, ‘Good 
Faith in Private Law’ (1999) 52 Current Legal Problems 1, at 9. The example is further explored in 
Chapter 5. 
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(1) an obligation on the parties to co-operate in achieving the contractual objects 
(loyalty to the promise itself); (2) compliance with honest standards of conduct; 
and (3) compliance with standards of conduct which are reasonable having 
regard to the interests of the parties.
43
 
 
To summarise, good faith encapsulates cooperative, honest and reasonable conduct. This 
conceptualisation has received judicial and academic support.
44
  
 
An important implication of the definition advanced by Mason is that it does not 
absolutely preclude a party from acting in his or her self-interest.
45
 Thus in Topline 
International Ltd v Cellular Improvements Ltd Venning J observed that an obligation of 
good faith does not require contracting parties to act only in their common interests.
46
 
Each party is entitled to both protect and advance his or her own commercial position. 
That outcome must be preserved to facilitate competition and efficiency. Accordingly, 
good faith is not synonymous with a fiduciary duty. It does not require a contracting party 
to subordinate his or her own interest to the interests of the other.
47
 Nonetheless, a duty of 
good faith requires that a party must have regard to the reasonable expectations of the 
other party to the relationship. It exacts a degree of neighbourhood responsibility.
48
 Good 
faith may curtail the use of power over another. In this respect, a contracting party may 
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be obliged to consider the legitimate interests of the other party when pursuing self-
interested ends.
49
  
 
The elements of the definition proffered by Mason, namely cooperation, honesty and 
reasonableness will each be discussed in turn below. 
 
3.4.1 Cooperation: 
 
It was identified above that one of the purposes of good faith is to promote cooperation 
and trust amongst contracting parties. Obligations of cooperation already exist within the 
common law to some extent. In Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments 
Pty Ltd Callinan J noted that it is a well-settled rule of construction of contracts within 
Australia that each party owes the other a duty to cooperate.
50
 This duty requires that 
contracting parties must carry out those acts which are necessary for the performance of 
the contract. 
 
So, for example, in Mackay v Dick
51
 it was held that a contracting party must cooperate 
by not preventing the fulfillment of a condition by the other contracting party. The 
contract is taken to be satisfied where a party engages in such preventative and 
uncooperative conduct.  
 
Broadly, a duty of cooperation has been taken to mean an obligation not to prevent the 
fulfilment of the contractual purpose of the other contracting party.
52
 This means that 
performance by the other party to the contract must not be hindered.
53
 Perhaps a more 
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50
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51
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52
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stringent and positive application of a duty of cooperation is that each party owes an 
obligation to the other to do all that is reasonably necessary to secure the intended 
performance of the contract.
54
 Overall, the essence of the duty is that contracting parties 
should facilitate the performance and fulfilment of the contract. 
  
Unlike the approach taken in Australia, the New Zealand courts have not accepted that 
there is a general duty to cooperate which applies to every contract. Instead, a term 
requiring cooperation will be implied if the circumstances so warrant. In Devonport 
Borough Council v Robbins Cooke J recognised that the question is one of construction 
based on the particular contract.
55
 The circumstances of the case will determine in what 
respects and the extent to which a contracting party is obliged to cooperate with the other. 
Duties of cooperation are often implied into joint venture arrangements within New 
Zealand. In Prophecy Mining No Liability v Kiwi Gold No Liability Thomas J held that 
parties to a joint venture agreement were obliged to cooperate and assist each other in 
order to implement their joint enterprise.
56
 This is a logical outcome. Joint venture 
arrangements and other types of correspondingly relational contracts are predicated on 
collaborative conduct between the parties.  
 
It is therefore evident that an obligation of cooperation in contracts is neither foreign to 
the common law nor manifestly uncertain. Moreover, obligations of cooperation like 
                                                                                                                                                              
Loreburn LC. Notably, the obligation not to derogate from the grant is a separate and independent 
obligation and applies even if the contractual agreement excludes the application of implied terms. See 
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those found in relational contracts bears analogy to a duty of good faith.
57
 Often 
cooperation is seen as equivalent to good faith.
58
 Indeed, judicially imposed requirements 
of cooperation may be perceived as attempts to introduce obligations of good faith within 
the common law. 
 
Accordingly it is submitted that an obligation of cooperation can be taken to be an 
element of the definition of good faith. Cooperative behaviour is a norm of conduct 
required for the observance of contractual good faith. 
 
3.4.2 Honesty: 
 
In the context of good faith under the subject doctrine, it is contentious whether the 
honesty element means only subjective honesty or whether it incorporates objective 
honesty. Some favour the former.
59
 Subjective honesty implies honesty in the sense of a 
clear conscience or lack of a guilty mind.
60
 In order for there to be a breach of good faith 
the plaintiff would, for example, have to establish that the defendant intended to deceive 
the plaintiff, or knowingly exercised a contractual discretion for an ulterior motive.  
 
The judiciary will be faced with the difficult task of determining the actual intentions of 
the contracting parties if good faith is to be characterised by honesty in the subjective 
sense. In the dissenting opinion of Bingham LJ in Walford v Miles it was suggested that 
subjective intentions could be hard to decide, but no more difficult than certain other 
matters which regularly require judicial determination.
61
 For example, judges may often 
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be charged with making factual findings as to subjective intention in criminal 
proceedings.  
 
However, the view of Bingham LJ was not endorsed by the House of Lords.
62
 In 
Wellington City Council v Body Corporate 51702 (Wellington) the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal went so far as to suggest that the determination of subjective good faith not only 
gives rises to an evidential difficulty but is so indeterminate as to not be capable of 
judicial consideration.
63
 
 
Arguably the Court of Appeal took the argument too far. Nonetheless, the perceived 
problems can be remedied by recognising that any reference to honesty when defining 
good faith should incorporate an objective element. In no part of commercial law is 
honesty determined by a purely subjective ‘Robin Hood’ standard.
64
 Dishonesty in a civil 
liability sense is quite distinct from dishonesty in a criminal liability sense.
65
 Thus, a 
person may be regarded as dishonest even if he or she does not contravene his or her own 
standard of honesty. In legal terms, good faith is not always to be measured by what a 
contracting party believes to be right or wrong.
66
 Instead honest good faith conduct must 
be gauged by that standard which the law deems appropriate to be observed between all 
contracting parties in their dealings with one another. 
 
Guidance may perhaps be drawn from equity in determining an appropriate measure of 
honesty for good faith contractual conduct. In Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley
67
 the House of 
Lords considered the meaning of honesty in the context of liability for the assistance of a 
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breach of trust. Such liability often arises in the circumstance of commercial and 
professional relationships.
68
 The majority advocated a mixed subjective and objective test 
for dishonesty. In order to be found dishonest, the defendant would have to have 
breached the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people but also he or she would 
have to appreciate that by those standards the conduct was dishonest.
69
 Lord Millett 
(dissenting) omitted the last requirement. A defendant would not have to appreciate that 
he or she was acting dishonestly; it would be sufficient that he or she was.
70
 His Lordship 
cogently justified his conclusion on the basis that civil liability is predicated on the 
conduct of the defendant rather than his or her state of mind.
71
 Culpability results from 
unreasonable or negligent behaviour. Accordingly, neither an honest motive nor an 
innocent conscience can absolve a defendant who is objectively dishonest.  
 
The test propounded by Lord Millett should be preferred in the context of honesty as a 
conceptualisation of good faith under the subject doctrine.
72
 The envisaged purpose of a 
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 107 
good faith doctrine is to protect the reasonable expectations of contracting parties. It 
would be anomalous if those reasonable expectations were subject to, or qualified by, the 
subjective viewpoints of a contracting counterparty. In keeping with traditional notions of 
civil liability, contractual good faith should be defined predominantly with regard to the 
objective nature of the impugned conduct and its effect on the rights of others. A 
requirement for the transgressor to act with a guilty state of mind should not enter into the 
equation.  
 
This outcome is pragmatic. It avoids the necessity to prove subjective intentions. Further, 
in many instances those defending allegations of a breach of contractual good faith will 
be corporations. It is far more logical to evaluate the conduct of a company from an 
objective perspective. Imputation of the guilty knowledge of corporate controllers to a 
fictitious legal entity can be an attenuated process, which is best avoided.
73
   
 
Despite having determined that good faith may be characterised by objective honesty, it 
is recognised that a conceptualisation of good faith cannot be limited solely to honesty. 
For instance, a contractual power may be exercised in a capricious manner with an 
improper motive but the transgressor may openly disclose that motive to the contacting 
counterparty. Although the defendant has not acted in an objectively dishonest manner 
per se, conceivably he or she has still acted in breach of good faith.  
                                                                                                                                                              
intelligence and experience. See Barlow Clowes International Ltd (in liquidation) v Eurotrust International 
Ltd [2006] 1 All ER 333. For a comprehensive discussion see Jessica Palmer, ‘The Privy Council on Being 
(Dis)Honest About Dishonest Assistance’ (2005) 24 University of Queensland Law Journal 539. It is 
conceded that divorcing the state of mind of the defendant from the inquiry may produce severe outcomes 
in some instances. Take, for example, ‘a man who comes from a country where public transport is free. On 
his first day here he travels on a bus. He gets off without paying. He never had any intention of paying. His 
mind is clearly honest; but his conduct, judged objectively by what he has done, is dishonest.’: R v Ghosh 
[1982] 2 All ER 689, at 696 per Lord Lane CJ. Nonetheless, whilst the more stringent test for dishonesty 
may not be warranted in the criminal law, it is submitted that it is appropriate for the determination of civil 
liability. 
73
 It has been suggested that attributing the knowledge of corporate controllers to a corporation seriously 
distorts the principle of mens rea. See Rebecca Rose, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability: A Paradox of Hope’ 
(2006) 14 Waikato Law Review 52, at 61. 
 108 
 
For example, in The Atlantic Baron
74
 a firm of shipbuilders agreed to build a tanker for 
the plaintiff. Payment was to be made in five instalments. There was a currency decline 
after the first instalment was paid. In consequence, the shipbuilders demanded a 10 per 
cent increase in the price. They threatened not to perform if the additional payment was 
not forthcoming. Both parties were well aware that the reason for the threat was the 
exchange rate change. In fact, the plaintiff had made the shipbuilders aware that its 
business was also adversely affected by the currency devaluation.
75
 Mocatta J held that 
the threat amounted to economic duress.
76
 At no time did the shipbuilders act dishonestly. 
The reason for the undue pressure was made clear. Nonetheless, the conduct displayed by 
the shipbuilders arguably contravened standards of good faith. The shipbuilders were 
endeavouring to recover opportunities forgone upon contracting. They sought to 
recapture the opportunity to include provision for currency alterations which opportunity 
they had relinquished upon contracting by assuming the risks of currency fluctuations. 
The case clearly evidences that a definition of good faith based only on honesty is not 
sufficient. In some instances a different, and perhaps more stringent, measure of conduct 
may be required. 
 
A definition of good faith which requires an element of reasonableness may overcome 
the limitations of the honesty element. Certainly, reasonableness may impose a more 
stringent standard than honesty. A person who acts reasonably must be acting honestly 
but it is possible that a person acting honestly may be acting unreasonably.
77
 Some 
believe any concept of reasonableness within the meaning of good faith must be seen as 
limited to an element of honesty.
78
 The scenario presented by The Atlantic Baron case 
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shows this should not necessarily be the case. It is therefore necessary to determine 
whether reasonableness is an appropriate element of the definition of good faith. This is 
explored below.  
 
3.4.3 Reasonableness:  
 
There is little consensus as to whether contractual good faith includes a duty of 
reasonableness.
79
 Plainly there is a close association between good faith and 
reasonableness. This is evidenced by the overlap of content in many applications of the 
concepts of reasonableness and good faith.
80
 
 
Judicial opinion on the relationship between reasonableness and good faith is varied. In 
Minster Trust Ltd v Traps Tractors Ltd Devlin J suggested that conduct may be 
unreasonable notwithstanding that it may be conceived in good faith.
81
 Likewise, in Vero 
Insurance New Zealand Ltd v Fleet Insurance & Risk Management Ltd Asher J said that 
a requirement for good faith conduct is not commensurate with a requirement for 
reasonableness.
82
  
 
However, there is an evolving tendency to equate an obligation of good faith with a 
requirement to act reasonably. This is an incidence of the acceptance that good faith 
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incorporates an objective standard of conduct.
83
 In Telecom Corporation of New Zealand 
Ltd v Business Associates Ltd Richardson J recognised that good faith incorporates some 
objective element of reasonableness: 
 
The content of any duty of good faith turns on the circumstances of the 
relationship in question. It requires consideration of what a reasonable person in 
the shoes of the parties will consider ought to be done by one to protect the 
interests of the other in the particular circumstances.
84
 
 
In Burger King Corp v Hungry Jack’s Pty Ltd the New South Wales Court of Appeal 
went so far as to suggest that there is no distinction of substance between an implied term 
of reasonableness and one of good faith.
85
 
 
Those who oppose a requirement of reasonableness within the good faith definition argue 
that reasonableness, the related concept of fair dealing, and good faith, do not assume 
homogenous meaning and content.
86
 A definition of good faith which incorporated these 
distinct concepts would produce a broad and vague conceptualisation.
87
 In consequence, 
the application of good faith would be subject to an unnecessarily wide and potentially 
dangerous judicial discretion.
88
 Judges would be permitted to pursue a normative agenda 
under the semblance of good faith.
89
 This would be further exacerbated because the 
imposition of a requirement for every contracting party to act reasonably would open up 
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virtually every aspect of contractual performance, enforcement and termination to 
challenge and judicial scrutiny.
90
   
 
No doubt it would be a significant step for the courts to impose a contractual obligation 
of reasonableness on commercial parties interacting at arms length.
91
 Stapleton suggests 
that such a duty is both too stringent and inconsistent with good faith: 
 
A requirement to satisfy a standard of reasonable behaviour is more demanding 
than the requirement of good faith. Certainly, acting in good faith is necessary for 
reasonable conduct: to be dishonest, deliberately contradictory, or exploitative is 
always unreasonable. But acting in good faith is not sufficient to satisfy a 
reasonableness standard: as most inadvertent negligence cases show, a person 
may act in good faith but nevertheless have acted unreasonably as judged by an 
objective standard.
92
 
 
Support for the idea that good faith does not require reasonable conduct has been sourced 
from other areas of the law. In First City Corporation Ltd v Downsview Nominees Ltd 
Gault J recognised that a receiver who acts in good faith and honestly may still be found 
to have acted negligently and therefore unreasonably.
93
 Certain statutory provisions 
defining good faith also appear to require more than mere negligence and 
unreasonableness. For example, s (1)(2) Sale of Goods Act 1908 provides: 
 
A thing is deemed to be done in good faith within the meaning of this Act when it 
is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not.
94
 
 
Despite these concerns it is submitted that some element of reasonable conduct must be 
imported into a potential definition of contractual good faith under the subject doctrine. 
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In addition to the rationale provided above in respect of The Atlantic Baron example, 
various other reasons may be advanced to support this finding. 
 
Firstly, the sources relied on to justify the exclusion of reasonableness from a good faith 
definition under a general contractual doctrine are often taken out of context. The concept 
of good faith is often utilised in a wide range of legal circumstances and can therefore 
assume vastly different content depending on the context.
95
 This is particularly evident in 
the varying applications of good faith under statute. Thus the meaning of good faith 
under contract law may be very different in meaning from good faith when it is used in 
the context of a person claiming to be entitled to possession of a child
96
, or making a 
complaint about a solicitor
97
, or purchasing goods where the seller has a voidable title.
98
  
 
Indeed, some statutory applications of good faith do embody elements of reasonableness. 
For example, in Sojourner v Robb Fogarty J held that the obligation of good faith on 
directors under s 131 Companies Act 1993 comprises an amalgam of objective and 
subjective standards.
99
 In terms of the reasonableness standard, a consideration of how 
people of business might be expected to act is required.
100
 Further, a directorial decision 
could not be justified if it is based on an inappropriate understanding of the interests of 
the company.
101
  
 
Because of the varying meanings and applications of good faith under statute, it is 
submitted that legislation dealing with good faith will be of marginal or no use in 
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determining an appropriate meaning of good faith under a contractual doctrine.
102
 
Certainly, the fact that some specific legislative applications of good faith do not require 
an element of reasonableness is not justification for excluding it from a potential 
definition of good faith in the context of contract.  
 
A requirement for reasonableness would ensure not only honest conduct but also fair 
conduct. It is noteworthy that codifications in Continental Europe pertaining to 
contractual good faith require fair dealing.
103
 The necessity for fair dealing in the 
conclusion and performance of the transaction may be regarded as a critical requirement 
of good faith.
104
 Fair dealing denotes that a party should act reasonably when making a 
contractual decision. This implies that the position of the other party should be 
considered.
105
  
 
Ultimately the issue as to whether good faith should incorporate a reasonableness 
standard can be resolved by looking to the envisaged purposes of the subject doctrine. 
Protection of reasonable expectations is paramount. Whilst attempts have been made to 
downgrade the notion to an expectation of mere honesty and sincerity
106
, the desirable 
means by which reasonable expectations are to be protected is by insisting on objectively 
reasonable and fair conduct. A definition of good faith which omits elements of 
reasonableness and the composite concept of fair dealing would simply be too divorced 
from the envisaged purposes of the subject doctrine. 
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Acceptance of reasonableness as a facet of good faith might also countenance concerns 
about the indeterminate application of the subject doctrine. Regardless of what may be 
written about reasonableness within the common law, the concept does not attract the 
same fears and criticisms about uncertainty which are directed towards good faith.
107
 The 
common law endorses reasonableness as an appropriate and sufficiently clear test. The 
courts are frequently required to determine what conduct is reasonable in negligence 
cases. Because reasonableness is a familiar and universally accepted concept within the 
common law, its incorporation into a definition of good faith may appease concerns 
relating to the functioning of the subject doctrine to some extent. 
 
Accordingly it is concluded that an obligation to act in an objectively reasonable and fair 
manner should be included as an aspect of a prospective definition of good faith. This 
requirement is necessary to give effect to the envisaged purpose of the subject doctrine.  
 
It has been determined that good faith requires cooperation, honesty and reasonable 
conduct. The following discussion analyses the meaning of good faith as it currently 
applies to specific classes of contracts. It will be determined whether those specific 
applications are of any benefit in shaping and applying the core definition which has been 
proffered. 
 
3.5 Specific Applications of Good Faith: 
 
3.5.1 Employment Relationships: 
 
The Employment Relations Act 2000 (“ER Act”) applies to every employment 
relationship within New Zealand. The ER Act expressly recognises a duty of good faith. 
                                                     
107
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This obligation is the cornerstone of the legislative framework.
108
 The requirement for 
good faith extends not only to a concluded individual or collective employment 
agreement, but also the bargaining process.
109
 
 
The ER Act does not provide an exhaustive definition of good faith. However, s 4 does 
contain some definitional elements:  
 
(1) The parties to an employment relationship specified in subsection (2)— 
     (a) must deal with each other in good faith; and 
(b) without limiting paragraph (a), must not, whether directly or 
indirectly, do anything— 
      (i) to mislead or deceive each other; or 
      (ii) that is likely to mislead or deceive each other. 
 
(1A)  The duty of good faith in subsection (1)— 
 
(a)  is wider in scope than the implied mutual obligations of trust and 
confidence; and 
(b)  requires the parties to an employment relationship to be active and 
constructive in establishing and maintaining a productive 
employment relationship in which the parties are, among other 
things, responsive and communicative; and 
(c)  without limiting paragraph (b), requires an employer who is 
proposing to make a decision that will, or is likely to, have an 
adverse effect on the continuation of employment of 1 or more of 
his or her employees to provide to the employees affected— 
(i)  access to information, relevant to the continuation of the 
employees' employment, about the decision; and 
(ii)  an opportunity to comment on the information to their 
employer before the decision is made. 
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The obligations under s 4(1A) requiring open dialogue and consultation engender a 
requirement of contractual cooperation.  
 
The prohibition against misleading or deceiving the other party under s 4(1)(b) is founded 
on the policy that the contracting parties must be honest with each other.
110
 However, it 
seems that an obligation not to mislead or deceive can extend past subjective honesty and 
perhaps even objective honesty in some cases. The wording under the ER Act is based on 
the terminology within ss 9 and 12 of the Fair Trading Act 1986 (“FTA”).
111
 It is not 
necessary for a person engaging in misleading or deceptive conduct to intend to mislead 
or deceive under the FTA.
112
 There is no element of culpability.
113
 This would at least 
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suggest that the good faith obligations under the ER Act are not confined to subjective 
honesty. 
 
In Auckland City Council v New Zealand Public Service Assn Inc the Court of Appeal 
suggested that the obligation of good faith under the ER Act does not mandate a wholly 
objective definition of good faith because: 
 
That would be to exclude consideration of honesty or lack of it which can be an 
important element in the concept of good faith. To suggest that conduct, 
undertaken honestly, that has an adverse effect for reasons completely unforeseen, 
is to be held to have been undertaken other than in good faith would be a 
significant departure from the natural meaning of those words. To judge conduct 
solely by reference to effect in this way would be to invoke hindsight and to 
disregard the influence of the circumstances in which conduct is undertaken. We 
think a broader and more balanced approach is called for...
114
 
 
Clearly the Court of Appeal is correct in noting that good faith cannot be defined solely 
by reference to the effect of the conduct. However, to use the example given by the 
Court, it is difficult to conceive of situations where a contracting party who engages in 
honest conduct, whose adverse consequences are reasonably unforeseeable, would be 
deemed to have acted inappropriately even on a strict objective standard. Further, too 
much concentration on subjective intention and motives could lead to a narrow focus on 
bad faith behaviour rather than the positive good faith behaviour the ER Act is designed 
to promote.
115
 Conceivably a more objective test for breach of good faith by an industrial 
participant might be appropriate where there is no evidence of subjective intent.
116
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In the context of employment contracts it has been noted that it ‘not possible to lay down 
rules or protocols defining what may or may not constitute dealing in good faith.’
117
 As a 
result of the lack of an exhaustive definition under s 4, the Court is obliged to assess good 
faith on a case by case basis.
118
 Such comments bear a close resemblance to observations 
often made in the debate concerning a universal contractual doctrine of good faith. 
 
The circumstances in which the ER Act obligation of good faith may be breached are 
vast. An analysis of the recent case law reveals the wide ranging application of good 
faith. For example, an employer will breach the obligation when it fails to provide the 
grounds for dismissal of an employee
119
, or it pre-determines that it will effect 
redundancies and merely purports to consult with employees
120
, or it communicates with 
unionised employees without reference to the union.
121
 An employee may be found to 
have breached good faith where he or she uses the confidential information of the 
employer to set up in competition against the employer.
122
 Likewise, a union might 
breach the obligation by failing to discuss alternative working arrangements with an 
employer during a proposed strike
123
, or failing to comply with an undertaking to re-enter 
negotiations.
124
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It is evident that the diverse application of the statutory duty of good faith is heavily 
dependent on the particular nature of the employer and employee or employer and union 
relationship. Accordingly, the utility of drawing on the various applications of good faith 
within the context of employment contracts for the purposes of defining a general 
contractual doctrine must be doubted.  In Wellington City Council the Court of Appeal 
said it would be a mistake to equate the good faith reasoning in the employment relations 
arena with ordinary contract cases.
125
 Tipping J contended that: 
 
The employment relationship itself immediately provides a degree of contextual 
objectivity…The problematic element of subjectivity attaching to good faith 
negotiations in the law of contract is therefore significantly reduced in the case of 
the good faith obligations referred to in s 4 of the Employment Relations Act.
126
  
 
An additional hindrance to comparing good faith under employment law with a 
conceptualisation under the subject doctrine is that, within industrial contracts, good faith 
is broader than the obligation of trust and confidence. Section 4(1A)(a) of the ER Act 
expressly recognises this to be the case.
127
 Every employment agreement is subject to an 
implied duty of trust and confidence under common law
128
 and the statutory provisions 
clearly impose wider obligations. It would be an illogical step to determine that every 
contracting party in any arms length transaction is entitled to repose trust and confidence 
in the other contracting party. The duty of good faith under the ER Act is likely to impose 
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standards of conduct which are far more stringent than those that would be expected in a 
non-relational contract. Accordingly, the understanding of good faith in employment 
contracts, which extends even further than a duty of trust and confidence, is likely to be 
an inappropriate comparator for a definition of good faith under a general contractual 
doctrine.  
 
3.5.2 Partnership Agreements: 
 
The law imposes on a partner a duty of complete good faith towards his or her co-
partners in respect of all partnership dealings and transactions.
129
 Obligations of good 
faith applicable to partners within New Zealand derive from the common law, equity and 
the Partnership Act 1908. In the context of a partnership, good faith means that a partner 
must, inter alia, act honestly
130
, disclose relevant information
131
, and he or she must not 
personally generate profits at the expense of the firm without accounting for those 
profits
132
, or use partnership property for an improper purpose
133
, or compete with the 
partnership.
134
  
 
The duty of good faith owed by partners extends to intending partners. Accordingly there 
is an obligation on existing partners to disclose material information to persons 
negotiating their entry into a partnership.
135
 Although obligations of good faith may exist 
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prior to contracting, good faith obligations do not subsist after the dissolution of a 
partnership.
136
 
 
A partnership arrangement is characterised as being fiduciary in nature. The 
distinguishing obligation of any fiduciary is the duty of loyalty.
137
 Partners act as agents 
for each other. A partner must subject his or her interests to that of the partnership. The 
fiduciary relationship between partners is derived from the existence of obligations of a 
fiduciary nature, not the other way around.
138
 In Thompson’s Trustee in Bankruptcy v 
Heaton Pennycuick VC therefore recognised that the fiduciary relationship arises from 
the duties of good faith which are owed by partners, rather than any trust of property.
139
  
 
It is submitted that the application of good faith in partnership agreements is unlikely to 
be of any utility to informing a universal doctrine of contractual good faith. It is evident 
that there is no prescribed definition of good faith within partnership law. Instead the 
duty of good faith is a general label used to group together the specific obligations and 
duties owed by partners. It is unlikely that those obligations, which are particular to a 
partnership context, can have application to a general contractual doctrine. The 
contractual relationship between partners is unique. It is at the upper extremity of the 
relational contract scale. The majority of the specific obligations of good faith owed by 
partners have limited relevance to transactional and arms length contracts.  
 
Further, the understanding of good faith within the partnership arena is coloured by the 
existence of a fiduciary relationship. It was noted above that it is almost universally 
accepted that good faith in the context of contract law should not be equated with a 
requirement for the observance of fiduciary duties.
140
 Many of the duties owed by 
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partners coined as being good faith obligations are manifestations of fiduciary duties. 
These duties may derive from equity and can exist outside of the wording of a partnership 
contract.  The obligations are not consonant with contractual duties. 
 
As a result it is concluded that partnership law is exceptional and should not be confused 
with the development and conceptualisation of contractual good faith.
141
 The meaning 
and application of good faith within partnership law cannot be adequately divorced from 
the fiduciary nature of the relationship to be of any benefit in the context of a universal 
contractual doctrine. 
 
3.5.3 Joint Venture Arrangements: 
 
There have been a number of recent cases considering an obligation of good faith in the 
context of joint venture arrangements.
142
 Unlike a partnership, a joint venture may not 
necessarily give rise to a fiduciary relationship. Notwithstanding, parties to a joint 
venture may still be subject to an obligation of good faith by virtue of a term implied in 
law.
143
 Thus, in Paper Reclaim Ltd v Aotearoa International Ltd Chambers J suggested 
that there is no need for equitable intervention in the form of a fiduciary relationship 
where the joint venture contract itself contains an implied term to act reasonably and in 
good faith.
144
 Even where parties have expressly excluded a fiduciary relationship under 
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the contract, it is possible that the parties must still act towards each other in good faith in 
carrying out the obligations which they have assumed under the joint venture 
agreement.
145
 An obligation of good faith will be implied provided the specific contract 
can be characterised as requiring mutual trust and confidence.
146
   
 
In Petroleum Resources Ltd v Greymouth Petroleum Acquisition Co Ltd Heath J 
suggested that obligations of good faith found within joint venture agreements can be 
utilised to interpret the express terms of the contract.
147
 It is envisaged that the subject 
doctrine would assume a similar function under all contracts.  
 
Obligations of good faith within New Zealand have been held to require a joint venture 
party to appropriately account to the joint venture for profits made
148
 and to make an 
informed and open-minded decision when exercising a voting power under a joint 
venture agreement.
149
 In this respect a duty of good faith may impose positive 
obligations. However, there are limits on the concept of good faith. The duty will not be 
breached where one party to a joint venture arrangement makes a commercial decision to 
further its interests, provided it does not destroy the fruits of the contract for the other 
party.
150
 Similarly, a joint venture party is entitled to utilise the services of a competitor 
of the other joint venture party where the joint venture contract does not provide any 
relevant restriction.
151
 As is intended under a general doctrine, joint venture parties are 
not totally precluded from acting in a self-interested manner. 
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The leading case in respect of obligations owed by joint venture parties is the decision of 
the Supreme Court in Chirnside v Fay. Perhaps contrary to prior understanding, it was 
asserted that the majority of joint venture arrangements will give rise to a fiduciary 
relationship.
152
 The Court sought to justify its conclusion on the analogy between a joint 
venture relationship and a partnership.
153
 Both types of arrangement not only give rise to 
duties of good faith but also an obligation of loyalty.
154
 These duties required that neither 
of the joint venture parties is permitted to put himself or herself in a position of conflict 
with the joint venture and each party is obliged to account for any unauthorised profits 
obtained by an opportunity arising through the venture.
155
   
 
Based on the Chirnside decision, it is evident that the majority of joint venture parties 
will owe each other equitable fiduciary obligations unless such obligations have been 
expressly excluded within the contract. Conceivably any definition or application of good 
faith which may emanate from a joint venture arrangement will give rise to similar 
problems to that which is encountered in the partnership arena when attempting to apply 
the definition to a general contractual doctrine. Whilst joint ventures may provide some 
guidance as to contractual cooperation, the fact that obligations of good faith on joint 
venture parties are generally equitable in nature suggests that the type and standard of 
conduct required is liable to be too stringent to have any meaningful application to the 
subject contract doctrine. 
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3.5.4 Insurance Contracts: 
 
Insurance contracts are distinct from most other contracts in that they are said to be 
contracts of good faith. This good faith characteristic unique to insurance contracts has 
been recognised for more than 200 years.
156
 The obligation of good faith exists outside of 
the contract. It is not an implied term arising from the particular terms of the insurance 
contract. Instead, it is a general principle imposed ab extra by the law.
157
  
 
Mere good faith usually is not sufficient in the insurance arena. Utmost good faith is 
required. This is reflected in the Latin term uberrima fides. Either party may avoid the 
contract if utmost good faith is not observed.
158
 
 
The application of good faith within insurance law is predominantly focused on the 
disclosure of information. The utmost good faith obligation represents a significant 
departure from the principle of caveat emptor. The duty of disclosure exists prior to 
entering into the contract and during the currency of the coverage. The good faith 
principle is expressed to apply to both insurer and insured. However, in practice the rule 
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is first and foremost relevant to the insured.
159
 Ordinarily the insurer will have no 
relevant information to disclose. Accordingly, the good faith obligation is often only 
applicable to the insured in many cases.
160
  
 
The insured must disclose all material facts within his or her actual or presumed 
knowledge prior to entering into the contract.
161
 Facts are deemed to be material if the 
mind of a prudent insurer would be affected by knowledge of a particular fact, either in 
deciding whether to take the risk at all or in fixing the premium.
162
 The actual or 
presumed knowledge of the insured includes facts which he or she ought to have 
known.
163
 This suggests an objective standard. Accordingly, an obligation of reasonable 
conduct may be perceived as an element of the duty of utmost good faith. The insurer 
may avoid the contract ab initio
164
 in the event of non-disclosure provided that the non-
disclosure induced the insurer to enter into the contract.
165
 
 
Certain duties of good faith exist post-formation of the insurance contract. Full disclosure 
must be made in the same manner as is required under the pre-formation duty where the 
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insured seeks an extension of coverage under a held-coverage clause
166
 or a variation of 
the insurance contract.
167
 Obligations of good faith may also be placed on the insurer in 
controlling the defence of the insured.
168
 However, in Gan Insurance Co Ltd v Tai Ping 
Insurance Co Ltd it was suggested by Mance LJ that such a good faith requirement 
imposed on the insurer does not necessarily arise from any principles or considerations 
unique to the law of insurance.
169
 Instead it arises from the nature and purpose of the 
contractual provisions. 
 
A further good faith duty of disclosure exists where an insured makes a claim under a 
policy. In Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co Ltd the House of Lords 
recognised that this requirement is simply a continuation of the pre-contract formation 
good faith principle.
170
 However, the obligation of good faith will only be broken if the 
insured dishonestly conceals information from the insurer.
171
 Thus, the objective element 
of the good faith obligation becomes diluted to some extent. The obligation to disclose 
when making a claim extends only to information that the insured actually knows. Error 
or carelessness on the part of the insured is not enough.
172
 Accordingly, within the field 
of insurance law, the nature of the duty of good faith and the standard of conduct required 
under it fluctuates depending on the stage of the contractual process.
173
 
 
It is debatable whether the conceptualisation of good faith within the context of contracts 
uberrimae fide can be of any utility in formulating the prospective definition of good 
faith under a general doctrine applicable to all contracts. However, the analogy raises the 
important issue of whether good faith conduct under a universal doctrine should 
incorporate an obligation to disclose information.  
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An obligation of disclosure applicable to all contracts has found support with some by 
making comparison with insurance law. Forte contends: 
 
There is no good reason to believe [ ] that good faith should only apply to 
contracts of insurance and caution, that its role is exclusively interstitial rather 
than pervasively fundamental. Indeed, once the role of good faith is 
acknowledged in the particular, there is a logical imperative that its relevance to 
contracts generally should be accepted…[I]n certain circumstances, a positive 
duty of disclosure (as an aspect of the observance of good faith) is incumbent on 
parties to all contracts.
174
 
 
Others would extend an obligation to disclose information to apply to pre-contractual 
negotiations. Eggers and Foss, prominent insurance commentators, observe: 
 
[A] party negotiating a contract is obliged only not to deceive, as opposed 
positively to make plain all the vices, and possibly virtues, of his own position. 
However, that does not mean that the common law could not reform itself in cases 
of positive injustice arising where good faith has been ignored or abused.
175
 
 
Such an obligation is liable to be opposed by classical contract theorists. A requirement 
for disclosure represents a significant challenge to the principle of caveat emptor. In the 
majority of negotiations parties are free to keep their cards near to their chests.
176
 In 
Banque Financière de la Cité SA v Westgate Insurance Co Ltd Slade LJ recognised that it 
frequently appears with hindsight that one contracting party had knowledge of facts 
which, if communicated to the other contracting party, would have protected him or her 
from loss.
177
 In such instances the law refuses to reopen the transaction to reapportion 
loss between the contracting parties. To require otherwise would be policing fairness by 
reference to moral principles. 
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More will be said on obligations of disclosure within Chapters 4 and 5. For present 
purposes it is recognised that the law of insurance is unlikely to provide any meaningful 
assistance even if some disclosure is required under a general doctrine of contractual 
good faith. The obligation of utmost good faith in insurance contracts, and particularly 
the obligation on the proposer, is concerned with absolute disclosure. The purpose of the 
obligation is sound. An intending insured is in possession of all of the relevant 
information for the bargain. Full disclosure is required to allow for an efficient market 
due to the extreme informational imbalance. Without disclosure, it would be necessary 
for the underwriter to make enquiries in relation to every risk presented to him or her.
178
 
Whilst in every general contractual negotiation there is bound to be inequality of 
knowledge, the informational imbalance will rarely be as extreme as in cases of 
insurance. Accordingly, it would be an illogical step for the definition of good faith under 
a universal doctrine to include an obligation to disclose all material information. The 
obligation of good faith in insurance law is therefore unlikely to provide any pragmatic 
guidance on the extent to which disclosure could be required in all contracts. Moreover, 
any comparison that might be drawn could dangerously distort the argument. In 
consequence, the meaning of good faith in insurance law must remain divorced from any 
attempt to formulate a general concept of contractual good faith. 
 
There is an additional problem associated with propounding an analogy between good 
faith in insurance law and good faith under the subject doctrine. As noted above, the duty 
of disclosure arises entirely outside the terms of the contract uberrimae fidei.
179
 The 
remedy for a breach of good faith in insurance law is not the same as those contemplated 
under the general doctrine. The juristic basis of the respective duties is completely 
distinct. Thus, caution must be exercised when comparing good faith in contracts 
uberrimae fidei with a universal obligation of good faith in contractual performance.  
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Perhaps one experience that can be drawn from the field of insurance law is that good 
faith may operate on an objective standard. Clearly it requires the insured to act 
reasonably. However, this analogy may also be dangerous. To label the duty of absolute 
disclosure as one of good faith may be inaccurate.
180
 In Manifest Shipping Lord Scott 
noted: 
 
It is very possible for the duty that pre-contract is owed by an assured to be 
broken by an act or omission which would not in ordinary language be described 
as a breach of good faith at all…[A]n honest failure to disclose something of 
which the assured was in fact unaware may constitute a breach of duty…The 
addition of the adjective "utmost" does not affect the point.
181
 
 
Thus, it has been recognised that the disclosure obligations within insurance law are 
based on a notion of strict liability.
182
 These observations reveal the fact that there is just 
as much debate within the field of insurance law as there is in the field of a general 
doctrine as to what the concept of good faith actually means and what standards of 
conduct it requires.   
 
It is therefore concluded that obligations of good faith within relationships which are 
uberrimae fide will not be of any pragmatic utility in terms of informing a 
conceptualisation of good faith under a general and universal common law doctrine. 
 
3.6 Operating Good Faith in Practice: 
 
3.6.1 What Certainty is Required? 
 
The foregoing analysis within this chapter has served to demonstrate that there is no 
universally accepted definition of good faith. Further, good faith tends to take on 
different meanings in different circumstances. 
 
                                                     
180
 See Campbell, above n 156, at 480. 
181
 [2003] 1 AC 469, at 511. 
182
 See Campbell, above n 156, at 480.  
 131 
Nonetheless, the fact that good faith may be difficult to define is not in itself sufficient 
reason to reject the introduction of the subject doctrine within New Zealand. Many 
principles in the law such as unconscionability are vague but workable.
183
 Often broad 
principles serve a beneficial organisational role.
184
 Accordingly, indeterminacy may 
require care in application of the doctrine rather than dismissal.  
 
Further, the struggle to achieve a precise definition of good faith cannot justify 
abandoning whatever precision may be possible.
185
 This is particularly relevant if a good 
faith doctrine were to be accepted by the judiciary. Good faith would no longer be 
sporadically utilised to give weight or moral persuasiveness to a conclusion reached. 
Instead it would be a principle assuming a fundamental determinative role. Good faith 
could be the central or sole determinant in resolving particular contractual disputes.
186
  
 
It has been contended within this chapter that good faith fundamentally encapsulates 
obligations of cooperation, honesty and reasonableness, having regard to the reasonable 
expectations of the parties.  
 
Some argue that attempts to give meaning to the broad concept of good faith by 
reformulating it in synonyms and different language is often of limited utility. In 
particular, the use of the concept of reasonableness to describe one aspect of the good 
faith obligation is suggested to be equally broad and equally vague.
187
 Supposedly, it will 
also produce an unduly broad discretion and idiosyncratic judicial process. 
 
With respect, these observations are not supported. It has been recognised throughout this 
chapter that concepts of cooperation, honesty and reasonableness are familiar to the 
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common law within New Zealand and are frequently applied in practice. To suggest that 
the judiciary is not competent to determine whether conduct is cooperative, honest and 
reasonable simply does not reflect the realities of modern judicial decision making. 
Indeed, save for established exceptions, when it comes to determining civil liability the 
law must refer to the standards of the reasonable person.
188
 It follows that the Court must 
equate itself with a fair, honest and reasonable individual in order to reach a decision.
189
 
 
Those who criticise definitions of good faith tend to focus too much on how good faith 
might apply in practice rather than the essential concept. Good faith can only be defined 
at its core. It is impossible to capture all of the possible applications of good faith ‘in a 
short snappy sentence.’
190
 Once this fact is accepted it becomes clear that a definition of 
good faith can only serve to describe the broad elements which comprise the good faith 
standard. It has been argued within this chapter that those elements fundamentally 
comprise cooperation, honesty and reasonableness. That is the extent of any definitional 
certainty that might be achieved. 
 
A definition of good faith cannot prescribe the necessary conduct required in each 
particular case to satisfy the good faith standard. This is the uncertainty inherent in the 
application of contractual good faith. The difficulty bears analogy to tort law where the 
degree of care required to satisfy the standard of care is infinitely variable.
191
 
Accordingly, an analysis is necessary of how the requisite conduct required to satisfy the 
good faith standard might be determined.  
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3.6.2 Determining the Necessary Conduct Required to Satisfy Good Faith Obligations: 
 
It is fundamental that the conduct required of the parties necessary to satisfy the good 
faith obligation will depend on the circumstances of the case.
192
 Even the most ardent of 
good faith proponents concede that good faith is incapable of being applied in the 
abstract.
193
 The relevant facts must be known. As such the application of good faith will 
never be a pure question of law.
194
 This led Einstein J to conclude in Aiton Australia Pty 
Ltd v Transfield Pty Ltd that because good faith is fact intensive, it is best assessed on a 
case by case basis.
195
 Such an individualised inquiry may not necessarily be amorphous 
or unmanageable.
196
 
 
However, it is desirable that the judiciary have some guiding principles under which the 
required conduct of the parties may be determined. In O’Neill v Phillips the House of 
Lords cautioned against the Court doing whatever an individual judge happens to believe 
is fair in the circumstances.
197
 The concept of good faith should be applied judicially and 
based on rational principles. The Court does not sit under a palm tree.
198
 Additionally, 
contracting parties are entitled to some indication as to the nature of the conduct expected 
of them. Without sufficient guidance, there will be no way of determining a pragmatic 
benchmark against which contracting parties and their advisers can judge their 
conduct.
199
 The commercial community will be detrimentally affected. Whilst one of the 
aims of contract law may well be to meet the reasonable expectations of contracting 
                                                     
192
 See generally Thomas, above n 9, at 394. It has been noted that the meaning of good faith will differ at 
different stages of the contracting process. See Baron, above n 79, at 417. 
193
 For a similar observation see Baron, above n 79, at 415.  
194
 Ibid.  
195
 (1999) 153 PLR 236, at 263. 
196
 See Finn, above n 44, at 383. 
197
 [1999] 2 All ER 961, at 966 per Lord Hoffmann. 
198
 Re J E Cade & Son Ltd [1992] BCLC 213, at 227 per Warner J. 
199
 See generally Andrew Stewart and Leanne McClurg, ‘Playing Your Cards Right: Obligations of 
Disclosure in Commercial Negotiations’ [2007] Australian Mining and Petroleum Law Association 
Yearbook 36.   
 134 
parties, arguably its most urgent duty is to make it possible for lawyers to give clear 
advice to contracting parties such that they can go about their contractual business within 
the bounds of the law. Accordingly, certain prospective guiding principles are explored 
below. 
 
The starting point for determining the requisite conduct to discharge good faith 
obligations must be the words of the contract itself. The more complete the contract and 
the more explicitly the contract sets out the manner in which the parties must behave, 
conceivably the less likely it is the parties intend rigorous good faith obligations to 
intrude. Good faith duties should therefore be commensurate with the express contractual 
obligations. It is essential that the intended purpose and tone of a particular contractual 
transaction is not to be eviscerated or usurped by an inappropriate formulation of good 
faith conduct.
200
 
 
Secondly, the Court should look to the classification of the contract. A contract requiring 
an ongoing relationship or which incorporates elements of trust may require more 
rigorous obligations to discharge the good faith standard. For example, a franchise 
agreement is liable to be characterised by more stringent duties of cooperation under the 
good faith doctrine than obligations of cooperation expected in a contract involving a 
straightforward one-off transaction.
201
 In this regard, the conduct expected of the parties 
under a good faith duty has been visualised as a spectrum or even a series of concentric 
circles.
202
 The further the particular contract is along the spectrum or the further away the 
contract lies from the centre circle, the more demanding the conduct required. For 
example, contracts between commercial parties may require less intense good faith 
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obligations than those demanded in consumer contracts.
203
 Moreover, it has been shown 
in the above discussion that the application of a duty of good faith in employment, 
partnership, joint venture and insurance is highly dependent on the general characteristics 
of contracts falling within those classifications.  
 
Thirdly, the Court should look past the express words and strict classification of the 
bargain itself. The entire background circumstances should be evaluated. This reflects the 
ever developing judicial desire to avoid divorcing a contract from the circumstances in 
which it was set and is being performed.
204
 The behaviour expected of the parties may 
therefore be dictated by matters such as the vulnerability of the contracting parties, the 
degree of trust entitled to be reposed in one another, any inequality of bargaining power 
and any informational imbalance.
205
 For example, commercial parties of equal resources 
interacting at arms length may be subject to considerably less stringent duties than a bank 
seeking to obtain or enforce a guarantee from an elderly widow.  
 
Ultimately it is only possible to speculate on what matters a court should consider in 
determining whether good faith obligations have been discharged. Further, these matters 
could only ever serve as a guide. It is unlikely that definitive criteria could, or would, be 
laid down. To introduce fixed rules would deprive the law of an important degree of 
flexibility which may be necessary for the successful application of a good faith 
doctrine.
206
 Accordingly, the Court is likely to be engaged in a balancing exercise when 
determining the appropriate behaviour required to satisfy the good faith principle in 
different circumstances.
207
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Having explained what factors the courts may look to in applying good faith in practice, 
it is necessary to consider what difficulties could be encountered if a good faith doctrine 
were put into action. The impact of those difficulties on the desirability of the subject 
doctrine within New Zealand also requires examination. Those potential problems are 
explored below. 
 
3.6.3 Practical Difficulties in Applying a Doctrine of Good Faith: 
 
Developed case law will be the only source of guidance for lawyers and contracting 
parties affected by the subject doctrine of good faith. A Supreme Court decision 
introducing the doctrine could no doubt provide some general principles to assist the 
lower courts. Nonetheless, there is no escaping the fact that the character of good faith 
conduct will be shaped entirely by judicial decisions on individual fact scenarios. 
Accordingly, it is unlikely that there will be any pragmatic certainty as to the application 
of the doctrine until such time as a sufficient body of case law has developed from which 
factual and legal analogy may be drawn. Even ardent proponents of good faith must 
concede that the application of good faith within New Zealand is likely to be 
unpredictable in the absence of a developed background of good faith jurisprudence.
208
  
 
Moreover, the development of the law of contractual good faith will not follow a similar 
process of evolution adopted by the courts in other areas of the law. For example, the 
creation of a novel duty of care in tort may be justified by analogy with established case 
authority. A judicial judgment is made but it is predicated on the coherent incremental 
development of the law.
209
 Judges would not have the initial benefit of decided authority 
from which to employ deductive and incremental reasoning if a good faith doctrine were 
to be introduced. Certainly it has been demonstrated in the above discussion that the 
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existing instances in which New Zealand law recognises an obligation of good faith is 
unlikely to be of much pragmatic guidance. 
 
This outcome is a significant deterrent to the introduction of a good faith doctrine. The    
practical effect of an introduction of a doctrine of good faith in New Zealand law cannot 
be underestimated. Conceivably there will be an explosion of litigation as the bounds of 
good faith duties are necessarily developed through case law. Indeed, this has been the 
experience in other common law jurisdictions incorporating good faith.
210
 Such litigation 
may be beneficial to ensure that a coherent body of case law does quickly develop to act 
as a guide for contracting parties, lawyers and judges. However, it may also have a 
negative economic impact. Many good faith allegations are liable to proceed to trial 
solely because of the initial lack of clarity. Further, and more worryingly, the uncertainty 
may encourage unmeritorious litigation. This may be a very real problem. The increasing 
incidence of vexatious litigation within New Zealand has been recognised.
211
 The product 
is uneconomic litigation and strain on the court system.  
 
Whilst these concerns about uncertainty may often be dismissed when it comes to more 
minor changes to the law, the same cannot be said about the subject doctrine which 
undoubtedly has the potential to fundamentally change the law of contract within New 
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Zealand. No doubt a doctrine of good faith would vastly expand the role of the courts in 
the supervision and regulation of contractual performance. 
 
Conceivably the uncertainty may also result in more caution on the part of contracting 
parties. Contractual negotiations and, consequently, contractual documents will become 
more detailed as the parties seek to avoid the problems associated with good faith. This 
may result in more expense and economic inefficiency. This issue is extensively explored 
in Chapter 5. Further, the doctrine is more likely to be contractually excluded if the 
commercial world and its legal advisors lack confidence in the meaning and application 
of good faith.    
 
The uncertainty is also liable to be exacerbated if the New Zealand courts were to 
implement a universal doctrine of contractual good faith but the appellate courts of 
comparable common law countries such as England, Australia and Canada elect not to. 
There is a need for New Zealand to maintain comity with its larger Commonwealth 
counterparts to some extent. There is an increasing recognition of the requirement to 
preserve the harmonisation of commercial law between legal jurisdictions. A decision 
which compromises this harmony may attract criticism from the business community.
212
 
These issues are further explored in Chapter 6. 
 
Thus, it may be prudent for the New Zealand judiciary to decline the introduction of a 
doctrine of contractual good faith unless the appellate courts of the larger common law 
jurisdictions were to endorse the doctrine. This would allow for the Supreme Court of 
New Zealand to make an informed decision as to whether a good faith doctrine is 
desirable and what characteristics it should assume. Further, consequent on the 
introduction of the doctrine in the larger common law countries, there would inevitably 
be even more good faith litigation than that which would arise in New Zealand. Judges in 
New Zealand would therefore have the benefit of being able to call on more extensive 
overseas precedent to comprehensively define a good faith standard and apply the 
doctrine. A pre-existing corpus of case law from comparable jurisdictions could also 
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provide some pragmatic guidance for legal practitioners advising clients on contractual 
matters. Accordingly, it is arguable that a good faith doctrine should not be introduced in 
New Zealand unless, and until, comparable common law countries were to accept the 
doctrine. 
 
Because of the inherent uncertainty associated with the necessary conduct required under 
the good faith doctrine, it is arguable that the development of existing common law 
contract principles would be a less hazardous and more judicious alternative. 
Conceivably the current piecemeal solutions could be extended gradually, step by step, 
and by analogy with established authority with a view to better responding to the 
reasonable expectations of contracting parties.
213
 Although this alternative would not 
achieve the unification and more direct approach that good faith proponents desire, it 
could minimise the identified risks relating to the uncertainty of good faith.  It is therefore 
questionable whether the more drastic and potentially dangerous step of a introducing a 
good faith doctrine is necessary when a more predictable and less controversial solution 
may suffice. Seemingly the good faith doctrine may be the paradigm case of ‘burning 
down the house to roast the pig.’
214
 This observation will be further explored in Chapter 
4. 
 
In the round, these arguments present a serious challenge to the desirability of the 
introduction of a general good faith doctrine within New Zealand at least for the time 
being. Serious consideration must be given to the risks identified above when it comes to 
balancing the arguments for and against a general duty.  
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3.7 Summary: 
 
This chapter has considered the difficulties associated with defining and applying the 
concept of good faith and how that impacts on the desirability of a universal doctrine 
within New Zealand. Clearly no utility can be derived by simply defining good faith with 
reference to bad faith. Good faith is best seen as synonymous with cooperation, honesty 
and reasonableness having regard to the reasonable expectations of the contract parties.  
 
The significant uncertainty associated with the good faith doctrine is determining the 
requisite degree of conduct required to meet the proffered definition on a case by case 
basis. An analysis of specific classes of contracts in which good faith obligations 
currently apply reveals both that the type and degree of conduct required to satisfy the 
good faith obligation varies significantly. Further, those applications are so highly 
dependent on the unique nature of the particular contractual relationship that they are 
unlikely to be of any significant benefit in terms of applying the subject doctrine.  
 
In reality, the specific conduct required of contracting parties in particular circumstances 
can only be defined with reference to general guiding principles, judicial impression and, 
over time, a development of case law. This outcome results in significant uncertainties 
for reasons identified.  Conceivably an alternative to the introduction of a doctrine of 
good faith might be to develop the existing rules and doctrines. To some extent, this may 
achieve the desired purposes of the doctrine whilst avoiding the obvious risks. Such a 
course of action is considered in the next chapter, which examines the relationship 
between good faith and the existing law.   
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Chapter 4 
 
The Relationship Between  
Good Faith and the Existing Law  
 
4.1 Chapter Introduction: 
 
There can be no doubt that the introduction of a judicial doctrine of contractual good faith 
within New Zealand would impact on existing legal, equitable and statutory principles. 
The function of this chapter is to explore the relationship between the existing law and a 
prospective doctrine of good faith.  
 
Part 4.2 evaluates what has been described as the neutral view.
1
 This school of thought is 
premised on the notion that good faith would generally produce the same legal outcomes 
as those under the existing law. It will be reasoned that this ideology tends towards a 
negative view in terms of the introduction of a universal good faith doctrine. Part 4.3 
considers the positive view, which advocates that a doctrine of good faith could assist a 
deserving plaintiff in circumstances where the existing law is unable to. Various cases 
will be examined which have been cited in support of this positive theory. Having then 
evaluated these general ideologies, Parts 4.4 to 4.9 will undertake a comparative analysis 
of selected existing legal, equitable and statutory rules relative to a doctrine of good faith. 
This comparative study will be utilised to determine whether a duty of good faith is likely 
to provide any additional benefits to the existing law. Further, it will demonstrate the 
likely effect that the introduction of the doctrine may have on the relevant legal, equitable 
and statutory rules currently prevailing in the field of contract law. Drawing on the 
foregoing discussion, Part 4.10 will provide a summary and make some observations as 
to the desirability of a universal doctrine of contractual good faith within New Zealand. 
                                                     
1
 See generally Roger Brownsword, ‘Positive, Negative, Neutral: the Reception of Good Faith in English 
Contract Law’ in Roger Brownsword, Norma Hird and Geraint Howells (eds), Good Faith in Contract 
(1999).  
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4.2 The Neutral View:  
 
4.2.1 What is the Neutral View? 
 
The neutral view of a good faith doctrine is based on the thesis that the existing legal and 
equitable doctrines within Anglo-Antipodean contract law achieve the same results that 
would be realised by a doctrine of good faith. The law has developed adequate piecemeal 
solutions to remedy unfairness
2
 as an alternative to a general obligation of good faith. 
Brownsword has described the view as follows: 
 
The paradigm of neutrality holds: (i) that there is a strict equivalence between a 
general doctrine of good faith and the piecemeal provisions of English law that 
regulate fair dealing (we can call this ‘the equivalence thesis’); and (ii) that it 
makes no difference whether English law operates with a general doctrine or with 
piecemeal provisions (we can call this ‘the indifference thesis’).
3
 
 
The neutralist approach is founded on the idea that the law within New Zealand and 
England effectively embodies a requirement of good faith albeit in substance rather than 
in name. This ideology is no doubt a widely held opinion.
4
 Even proponents of good faith 
make neutralist observations. For example, McKendrick, a good faith supporter, has 
conceded: 
 
Many, if not most rules of English contract law, conform with the requirements of 
good faith and cases which are dealt with in other systems under the rubric of 
good faith and fair dealing are analysed and resolved in a different way by the 
English courts, but the outcome is very often the same.
5
 
 
                                                     
2
 Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1988] 1 All ER 348, at 353 per Bingham 
LJ. 
3
 Brownsword, above n 1, at 22. 
4
 Ibid, at 21. 
5
 Ewan McKendrick, ‘Good Faith: A Matter of Principle?’ in Angelo Forte (ed), Good Faith in Contract 
and Property Law (1999), at 41.  
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In practice most neutralists would accept an approximate rather than a perfect 
equivalence between good faith and the existing law.
6
 However, it is difficult for a 
neutralist to assert that it makes no difference whether the status quo is preserved or a 
good faith doctrine is introduced. The incorporation of a good faith doctrine into New 
Zealand contract law is likely to have significant practical implications on the 
administration of the law. Indeed, it is submitted that a doctrine of good faith should not 
be introduced if a satisfactory equivalence between good faith and the existing law can be 
established. Referring to the terminology of Brownsword, ‘the indifference thesis’ does 
not realistically hold where ‘the equivalence thesis’ is realised. A number of reasons exist 
to support this observation. These are explored below. 
 
4.2.2 Neutrality – Tending Towards Negativity? 
 
If good faith is simply introducing a new cause of action which will produce no different 
outcome to that under those causes of action currently available, there is no benefit in 
incurring the transactions costs associated with introducing the subject doctrine. Ex 
hypothesi, the neutral view must take the negative view on this practical issue.
7
  
 
Likewise, it is unclear what the relationship would be between a doctrine of good faith 
and the existing piecemeal rules if the doctrine was implemented under equivalence 
                                                     
6
 A comparative study has been conducted by Zimmermann and Whittaker to test the veracity of the 
equivalence thesis. 30 different fact patterns were applied to the prevailing contract law of 14 European 
countries, some of which expressly adopt good faith and others, such as England and Scotland, which do 
not. It was found that ‘twenty of the thirty cases led either to the same result in all the systems or the same 
result in all the systems bar one or two.’ The authors concluded that ‘in some of our cases some of the legal 
systems under consideration do not need to resort to a general corrective principle such as good faith 
because they possess instead particular legal doctrines which do the job, whether or not they are considered 
related to any wider principle…The existence of various other legal doctrines which “do the job” of good 
faith lends support to the view that, at least to an extent and in certain respects, its use in a particular legal 
system is contingent on the presence of such other, more particular doctrines.’: Reinhard Zimmermann and 
Simon Whittaker, ‘Coming to Terms with Good Faith’ in Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker 
(eds), Good Faith in European Contract Law (2000), at 653, 683 and 684.  
7
 Brownsword, above n 1, at 22. 
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conditions. If good faith were to be introduced as a perceived supplement to the existing 
law, the result would be wasteful duplication. Good faith would be of no additional 
benefit to a wronged party seeking to bring a claim. Moreover, it is likely that the existing 
doctrines would become clouded by a general background standard of good faith.
8
 
Conceivably, litigants might concurrently plead a breach of the applicable existing 
doctrine and good faith. The latter may be erroneously perceived as a ‘safety net.’ In 
theory, reliance on good faith should not increase the chances of a plaintiff succeeding. 
 
Alternatively, under equivalence conditions the obligation of good faith may perfectly 
subsume the existing piecemeal doctrines rather than supplementing them. Existing 
contractual principles would be phased out as obsolete.  
 
It is contentious whether a general principle is more desirable than a body of discrete 
principles. It is extremely difficult to assess the organisational impact of the introduction 
of a unifying principle.
9
  
 
It has been suggested that the unification of the existing law under a general principle of 
good faith may enhance the efficient administration of contract law. A plaintiff could rely 
on one generalised cause of action rather than requiring him or her to fit within a rigid set 
of rules unique to a specific doctrine necessarily selected from a group of many. Some 
further contend that there is a tendency for contract law within the common law 
jurisdictions to break down into disjointed formalism. Often the underlying rationale of 
the distinct rules and their interconnection cannot be comprehended by practitioners and 
judges.
10
 Good faith proponents therefore believe that the subject doctrine would promote 
coherence in New Zealand contract law. 
 
                                                     
8
 Ibid. 
9
 McKendrick, above n 5, at 44. 
10
 Scott C Styles, ‘Good Faith: A Principled Matter’ in Forte (ed), above n 5, at 177-178. See also P S 
Atiyah, Essays on Contract (1986), at 337. 
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Nonetheless, it is doubted that a general principle of good faith would improve the 
administration of the law of contract in New Zealand. A universal doctrine of good faith 
is more likely to have a negative administrative impact rather than a positive effect. The 
prevailing approach to confine judicial discretion within narrow parameters generally 
allows the law to be applied in a consistent, predictable and therefore efficient manner.
11
 
The substitution of firm rules for a vague discretionary general standard increases the 
likelihood of litigation which is more complex, protracted and expensive.
12
 The incentive 
to appeal an adverse decision also strengthens. Moreover, it may be inappropriate to 
translate rules and concepts appearing under categories known to New Zealand lawyers 
and jurists into legal terminology with which they are largely unfamiliar.
13
 A general 
discretionary doctrine might lead to ‘well-meaning sloppiness of thought.’
14
  
 
It is evident that many New Zealand lawyers, and contract lawyers in particular, have an 
innate distrust of general principles.
15
 The prevailing mentality in Europe is quite distinct 
from that in New Zealand and England. On the Continent the system is perceived as 
being complete and free from gaps. In New Zealand lawyers must feel their way 
gradually from case to case.
16
 European civil law practitioners prefer generalisations 
whilst New Zealand lawyers favour the systematics.  
 
                                                     
11
 See James Davies, ‘Why a Common Law Duty of Contractual Good Faith is not Required’ (2002) 8 
Canterbury Law Review 529, at 537. It has further been suggested that orderly legal development will be 
imperiled by the dismantling of old principles without the substitution of a new coherent body of doctrine. 
See Sir Gerard Brennan, ‘Commercial Law and Morality’ (1989) 17 Melbourne University Law Review 
100, at 101-102. 
12
 See John Smillie, ‘Certainty and Civil Obligation’ (2000) 9 Otago Law Review 633, at 635. 
13
 See Daniel Friedman, ‘Good Faith and Remedies for Breach of Contract’ in Jack Beatson and Daniel 
Friedman (eds), Good Faith in Contract Law (1995), at 399. 
14
 Baylis v Bishop of London [1913] 1 Ch 127, at 140 per Scrutton LJ. 
15
 Similar observations are made in respect of English contract lawyers. See McKendrick, above n 5, at 46. 
16
 This is contended to be the prevailing perception of Continental lawyers towards the common law 
jurisdictions. See Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (3
rd
 ed, 1998), at 
69. 
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Attempts to formulate general principles in other areas of English contract law have been 
met with judicial disapproval. For example, the efforts of Lord Denning MR in Lloyd’s 
Bank Ltd v Bundy
17
 to introduce a general doctrine of inequality of bargaining power was 
firmly rejected by the House of Lords in National Westminster Bank plc v Morgan.
18
 
Lord Scarman suggested that it was the responsibility of the legislature to introduce such 
a doctrine.
19
 Parliament was the most appropriate body for imposing restrictions on the 
freedom of contract. Preference was also shown for judicial decision making based 
primarily on the particular facts of the case rather than applying some broadly defined 
general principle in the abstract.
20
 Accordingly, the adverse reception shown by common 
law judges to general contractual principles suggests that it is likely that the existing 
approach will be preferred over a universal doctrine of good faith if the equivalence 
thesis holds. 
 
Further, the presence of a general principle of good faith may allow judges to more 
readily engage in an unwarranted extension or manipulation of the remedies available 
under the existing law.
21
 The equivalence thesis and the neutral view are compromised if 
this occurs. Accordingly, a neutralist is likely to prefer the retention of the existing 
individual doctrines to an open-ended good faith principle. The latter may be open to 
judicial licence and abuse. 
 
Accordingly, there is a clear tendency for the neutral view to lean towards a negative 
view of a good faith doctrine. If equivalence between the existing law and good faith can 
be established, the introduction of a general doctrine of good faith within New Zealand is 
unlikely to be supportable. A universal doctrine of good faith should only be put in place 
if it will result in different and supportable pragmatic legal outcomes. This positive 
ideology is explored below. 
                                                     
17
 [1974] 3 All ER 757. 
18
 [1985] 1 All ER 821. 
19
 Ibid, at 830. 
20
 Ibid, at 831. 
21
 See generally McKendrick, above n 5, at 44; Styles, above n 10, at 178. 
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4.3 The Positive View: 
 
4.3.1 What is the Positive View? 
 
In the context of a doctrine of contractual good faith, the positive school of thought is 
founded on the contention that good faith would provide an appropriate remedy for a 
deserving plaintiff where the current law simply fails to, or is able to only by judges 
‘fictionalising’
22
 existing legal concepts and rules. This is the argument adopted by the 
majority of proponents of a universal doctrine of contractual good faith.  
 
In the modern debate, Raphael Powell was probably the first to espouse the positive 
stance. He famously argued that there ‘is still an area in which a man’s conduct, though 
lacking in good faith, does not involve legal consequences in English law.’
23
 Apparently 
there are abundant examples of instances in which the law has proved inadequate in 
serving the reasonable expectations of the commercial community.
24
 The treatment by the 
courts of heads of agreements, agreements to negotiate, and the general distaste for 
positive obligations such as disclosure of the whole truth have been proffered as 
examples.
25
  
 
It has been asserted by some who endorse the positive approach that a legal remedy has 
been unjustifiably denied in some instances as a result of a lack of good faith. However, 
in other scenarios the existing law has been distorted to accommodate a remedy. For want 
of a good faith doctrine, judges have resorted to contortions or subterfuges to give effect 
to their sense of justice in a particular case.
26
 
                                                     
22
 Robert S Summers, ‘“Good faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform 
Commercial Code’ (1968) 54 Virginia Law Review 195, at 198. 
23
 Raphael Powell, ‘Good Faith in Contracts’ (1956) 9 Current Legal Problems 16, at 28. 
24
 See generally Justice Edward Thomas, ‘Good Faith in Contract: A Non-Sceptical Commentary’ (2005) 
11 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 391, at 393. 
25
 Ibid. Preliminary agreements were examined in Chapter 2. Non-Disclosure is discussed below and in 
Chapter 5. 
26
 Powell, above n 23, at 26. 
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It would not be particularly surprising that this manipulation does occur in practice if the 
existing law is indeed perceived as inadequate. It is only natural for the judiciary to desire 
to achieve a fair result. A judge will think long and hard before reaching a conclusion 
which is not consistent with notions of good faith and fair dealing.
27
  Indeed, the 
necessity for common law judges to distort the existing law has been the subject of 
criticism by civil lawyers. One Continental lawyer has suggested that the mistrust of 
Anglo-Antipodean jurists for the general concept of good faith is matched only by the 
imagination which they utilise to twist and extend particular concepts to achieve the same 
results.
28
 
 
There is obvious detriment in manipulating the existing law to give effect to good faith. 
The result is likely to be inequity, unclarity or unpredictability.
29
 A doctrine of good faith 
is arguably more supportable if it would allow for more transparent decision making and 
prevent the unwarranted manipulation of existing legal and equitable rules. Finn endorses 
this argument: 
 
[W[ith good faith, as in other areas of the law, quite elementary and intuitive 
notions of fairness are at work…If at the end of the day we must rely upon the 
good sense, experience, and instinct for justice of those who ordain or apply a 
given standard, what we ought to expect is a methodology that reveals rather than 
conceals the basis for judgment.
30
  
 
Were good faith to be implemented as a transparent and express legal device as Finn 
suggests, it would have to be considered how good faith would interact with the current 
law. Conceivably good faith may subsume and exceed the reach of existing rules of law. 
Thus it is possible that existing doctrines may be rendered altogether nugatory. However, 
the alternative is that a doctrine of good faith would sit alongside the existing law. This is 
                                                     
27
 McKendrick, above n 5, at 46. 
28
 See Jacques-Henri Michel in the foreword to Jacques-Henri Michel et al, La Bonne Foi (1998), at x.  
29
 See Summers, above n 22, at 198. 
30
 Justice Paul Finn, ‘Good Faith and Fair Dealing: Australia’ (2005) 11 New Zealand Business Law 
Quarterly 378, at 382. 
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the more orthodox view. Good faith would fall into the hotchpotch of legal, equitable and 
statutory rules regulating contractual dealings. For example, good faith could be 
implanted without disturbing the classical grounds of invalidity such as force, fraud, 
mistake and undue influence.
31
 It has further been suggested that good faith may be 
called upon to extend existing principles. Brownsword opines: 
 
[I]f we imagine good faith as an umbrella principle, covering, unifying, and filling 
the gaps between a range of specific doctrines designed to secure fair dealing, 
then in hard cases (of the kind that supposedly make bad law) judges could appeal 
to the umbrella principle to justify a one-off decision, or to adumbrate some new 
principle of fairness, or to extend the range of an already recognised principle (for 
example extending the range of equitable estoppel into pre-contractual dealings, 
or extending the principle of duress to some forms of economic pressure, and so 
on).
32
  
 
Moreover, good faith may conceivably override some existing legal principles. 
Supposedly certain extant contract doctrine might impede rather than assist the amicable 
resolution of contractual disputes.
33
  The subject doctrine would therefore exert pressure 
upon rules which are incompatible with the principle of good faith.
34
 As a result, 
proponents believe that certain arbitrary and harsh requirements, particularly relating to 
implication, construction and variation, could be ameliorated or eliminated by a 
developed good faith rule.
35
 
 
                                                     
31
 See Thomas, above n 24, at 494. 
32
 Brownsword, above n 1, at 26-27. 
33
 See generally Finn, above n 30, at 387. 
34
 See Friedman, above n 13, at 399-400. 
35
 See generally Finn, above n 30, at 387. However, contrast the observations of Bigwood who observes 
that ‘it is not clear to me, however, that the law’s “covert tools” — the rules of interpretation and 
construction, unconscionability, the implied terms, offer and acceptance principles, and the like — are 
insufficiently malleable to achieve justice in “hard” cases. Perhaps we should be looking to exhaust the 
possibilities available in extant legal and equitable doctrine before looking for new solutions outside of it.’: 
Rick Bigwood, ‘Symposium Introduction: Confessions of a “Good Faith” Agnostic’ (2005) 11 New 
Zealand Business Law Quarterly 371, at 375. 
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In order to justify support for this positive view, it is necessary to consider whether the 
existing law is actually manifestly inadequate. The following section provides a critique 
of some of the noticeably varied case examples which have been cited as evidence of 
deficiencies in the existing law, which a doctrine of good faith may supposedly have 
rectified. Such an analysis can never be all-encompassing and it does not purport to be. 
However, the study may provide some insight into whether the positive stance can be 
endorsed. 
 
4.3.2 Case Examples – Is the Existing Law Deficient? 
 
In his pioneering article, Raphael Powell advanced the case of L’Estrange v F Graucob 
Ltd
36
 to support his thesis that the law of contract is deficient without good faith. Miss 
L’Estrange purchased a cigarette slot machine for use in her café. The machine did not 
work satisfactorily and she claimed damages on the basis of an implied warranty. 
However, at the time of purchase Miss L’Estrange had signed a form which stipulated 
that implied warranties were excluded. The clause was in small print which she did not 
read. The English Court of Appeal held that the vendor had not engaged in any 
misrepresentation and thus Miss L’Estrange was bound by the terms of the agreement 
despite not having read those terms.
37
 During the course of the judgment Maugham LJ 
stated: 
 
I regret the decision to which I have come, but I am bound by legal rules and 
cannot decide the case on other considerations.
38
 
 
Seemingly the law did not permit Maugham LJ to give effect to his Honour’s sense of 
justice and fairness in the case. Powell argued that a doctrine of good faith might have 
provided Miss L’Estrange with a remedy. Good faith could have compelled a party who 
                                                     
36
 [1934] 2 KB 394. 
37
 Ibid, at 404 per Scrutton LJ. 
38
 Ibid, at 405. 
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produces a printed form to call the attention of an intending signatory to the relevant 
clauses before signing the document.
39
  
 
However, it is debatable whether it would now be necessary to resort to a term of good 
faith to potentially achieve a different result. L’Estrange was decided some 75 years ago. 
The law has developed considerably since then. In Crocker v Sundance Northwest 
Resorts Ltd the Supreme Court of Canada held that a party to a written contract was not 
bound by a waiver because the clause was not drawn to his attention at the time of 
signing.
40
 He had not read the document and he was unaware of the existence of the term. 
Accordingly the law has, at least in Canada, endeavoured to achieve the outcome desired 
by Powell without any need to resort to a principle of good faith.  
 
Whilst the rule in L’Estrange has not necessarily been overridden in Australasia, it may 
be qualified in cases of particularly onerous clauses.
41
 In Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v 
Alphapharm Pty Ltd the High Court of Australia, although approving L’Estrange, 
recognised that in certain circumstances a contracting counterparty could not reasonably 
understand the signature of the other party to be evidence of assent by the signatory to the 
terms.
42
  
 
Moreover, within New Zealand other causes of action may be relied upon to negate the 
effect of an exclusion clause. For example, the Fair Trading Act 1986 (“FTA”) may 
                                                     
39
 Powell, above n 23, at 27. 
40
 (1989) 51 DLR (4
th
) 321, at 333 per Wilson J. See also Tilden Rent-a-Car v Clendenning (1978) 83 DLR 
(3d) 400.  
41
 See John Burrows, Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd, Law of Contract in New Zealand (3
rd
 ed, 2007), at 
198. 
42
 (2005) 211 ALR 342, at 358 per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ. It has been 
suggested that the approach in Toll is not inconsistent with good faith. Accordingly, notions of good faith 
do not give rise to an obligation to provide reasonable notice of the terms of the contract beyond the 
presentation of a document which the other party is free to read before signing it. See generally Elizabeth 
Peden and John Carter, ‘Incorporation of Terms by Signature: L’Estrange Rules!’ (2006) 21 Journal of 
Contract Law 96. 
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provide a remedy where an exclusion clause has been signed as a consequence of 
misleading or deceptive behaviour by the other party. Likewise, undue influence and 
unconscionability may provide relief in cases of victimisation.
43
 Also, the Consumer 
Guarantees Act 1993 would prohibit a seller from relying on a clause like that in 
L’Estrange purporting to exclude liability for the quality of the goods purchased by a 
consumer.
44
  
 
It is therefore evident that the law within New Zealand has developed, to some extent, to 
address the unfairness perceived by Powell. In any event it is questionable whether the 
result in L’Estrange should have been otherwise. To abandon the presumptive rule that a 
signature to a contract is evidence of assent to be bound by the terms therein would be 
liable to create confusion and uncertainty.
45
 If the law were to promote a different result 
under a doctrine of good faith, contracting parties would have an undesirable incentive to 
avoid reading contractual terms. The signatory would place unnecessary reliance upon 
the other party and a rule of good faith to protect his or her interests. This outcome is not 
to be welcomed, particularly in cases like L’Estrange where the purchaser was engaged 
in business and should have been expected to take steps to protect her own position.  
 
This view was apparently endorsed by Ronald Young J in Pure New Zealand Foods Ltd v 
Carter Holt Harvey Limited.
46
 An issue arose as to whether the plaintiff was bound by the 
terms of sale which included a clause limiting the liability of the defendant. His Honour 
held that that the plaintiff was so bound because it was aware that the signed acceptance 
of a quote also constituted acceptance of the standard terms of sale of the defendant. 
Whether the plaintiff ‘chose to read the [t]erms of [s]ale was entirely a matter for [it] but 
any failure to do so [was] not relevant to whether they were a term of the contract.’
47
 
                                                     
43
 See Burrows, Finn and Todd, above n 41, at 198. 
44
 Section 43 Consumer Guarantees Act 1993. 
45
 For a general discussion of the rule see Phillip Sharp, ‘Revisiting the Rule in L’Estrange v F Graucob 
Ltd’ (2005) 17 Bond Law Review 204. 
46
 (High Court, Wellington, CIV 2004-485-2747, 11 November 2008). Cf Nalder & Biddle (Nelson) Ltd v 
C & F Fishing Ltd (Court of Appeal, CA 145/05, 31 July 2006). 
47
 Ibid, at [59]. 
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There was no evidence to suggest that the exclusion clause was particularly harsh in a 
commercial contract. Accordingly, the defendant was not obliged to draw it to the 
specific attention of the plaintiff.
48
 Based on this logical rationale founded on contractual 
certainty, it is submitted that the judiciary would be unlikely to allow a good faith 
obligation to completely displace the rule in L’Estrange.  
 
Accordingly, the example proffered by Powell provides little support for the positive 
theory. The law has developed to the requisite extent to achieve what a good faith 
obligation should otherwise.   
 
The second case for consideration is the decision of the House of Lords in Union Eagle 
Ltd v Golden Achievement Ltd.
49
 Michael Bridge has recognised that the case might be 
perceived as supporting the argument for good faith.
50
 The appellant entered into a 
contract to purchase a flat in Hong Kong from the respondent. A 10 per cent deposit was 
paid. Time for settlement was of the essence. The appellant was 10 minutes late in 
tendering payment. The respondent purported to cancel the contract. The appellant sought 
specific performance of the agreement or relief against forfeiture of the deposit in the 
alternative. The Law Lords granted neither. 
 
Although the outcome may be perceived to be somewhat unfair, it must be questioned 
whether a doctrine of good faith could have, and should have, produced a different result. 
The respondent had simply relied upon the terms of the contract. The appellant was well 
aware of its obligations and it failed to comply with the agreement. To hold that an 
obligation of good faith would preclude the respondent from relying on its strict 
contractual rights would be a paradigm example of the subject doctrine being utilised to 
override and rewrite the terms of an agreement. Further, to depend on good faith to grant 
                                                     
48
 Ibid, at [68]-[69]. 
49
 [1997] 2 All ER 215. 
50
 See Michael Bridge, ‘Doubting Good Faith’ (2005) 11 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 426, at 442. 
For further academic comment regarding good faith and the Union Eagle decision see McKendrick, above 
n 5, at 56-58; Brownsword, above n 1, at 18-20. 
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relief would produce too much uncertainty. There would be no clarity as to how late the 
tender of settlement would have to be before the vendor could validly cancel. Thus, it is 
unlikely that a good faith doctrine would have compelled the House to reach a different 
conclusion. 
 
The outcome in Union Eagle was supported by the majority decision of the Supreme 
Court in Rick Dees Ltd v Larsen.
51
 Rick Dees contracted to purchase real estate from 
Larsen. By virtue of a settlement notice, the monies were to be transferred and 
confirmation of the same was to occur before 5pm on 5 March 2004. The funds were 
deposited direct into the trust account of Larsen’s solicitors no later than 4:54pm. 
However, confirmation was not made until 5:07pm because the fax machine of Larsen’s 
solicitors was engaged and the solicitor dealing with the transaction was unable to come 
to the telephone. In the meantime, Larsen’s solicitors sent a fax to Rick Dees’ solicitors at 
5:03pm purporting to cancel for failure to comply with the settlement notice. Rick Dees 
sued for specific performance.  
 
The majority
52
 held that the agreement had been validly cancelled. Rick Dees was 
obliged to provide Larsen with confirmation of payment before 5:00pm. No flexibility 
would be allowed because it would introduce a most undesirable element of 
uncertainty.
53
  
 
Again, it is questionable whether a good faith doctrine may have fettered the rights of 
Larsen and precluded him from cancelling. Elias CJ dissented. Her Honour found the 
argument relating to uncertainty to be ‘unpersuasive.’
54
 Larsen could readily have 
requested the bank into which the funds were paid, which acted as his agent, to provide 
confirmation that the funds were received in due time. Conceivably, Larsen would have 
made such an inquiry if he was acting in good faith. 
                                                     
51
 [2007] 3 NZLR 577.  
52
 Blanchard, McGrath, Gault and Tipping JJ. 
53
 [2007] 3 NZLR 577, at 588 per Blanchard J 
54
 Ibid, at 582. 
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To deny relief on the grounds that it would detract from a certain rule is likely to provoke 
objection from ardent good faith proponents.
55
 Nonetheless, it is submitted that the 
decision was correct and a doctrine of good faith should not have displaced the result. It 
has been contended that: 
 
[N]otice at 5.01 pm is deemed to be received the following day. Time lines are 
strict, and while many solicitors would have allowed the purchaser in this case 
some minutes leeway on the basis that what goes around often comes around, it is 
probably fair to say that many would have thought the finding for the vendor [ ] 
unfortunate for the purchaser rather than unfair.
56
  
 
Ultimately, there are sound reasons why the existing law declines to provide a remedy in 
circumstances similar to those in Union Eagle and Rick Dees. Accordingly, it is unlikely 
that good faith would be interpreted to produce a different result.  
 
The L’Estrange and Union Eagle cases are both examples where good faith proponents 
suggest that the outcome was incorrect. It is necessary to now consider some perceived 
examples where the result is contended to be correct but, for lack of a good faith doctrine, 
judges have had to manipulate the existing law.  
 
The first case to be considered supposedly falling within this category has been 
propounded by Wightman.
57
 It is the decision of the House of Lords in Scally v Southern 
Health and Social Services Board.
58
 It was held that the Board was obliged to inform the 
doctors which it employed of changes in rules about pension contributions. These 
changes required the doctors to exercise their rights within a certain timeframe or 
otherwise face less favourable terms. The obligation to notify was said to be founded on a 
                                                     
55
 See generally McKendrick, above n 5, at 57. 
56
 Thomas Gibbons, ‘Rick Dees Ltd v Larsen’ (2006) 12 Butterworths Conveyancing Bulletin 58. 
57
 John Wightman, ‘Good Faith and Pluralism in the Law of Contract’ in Brownsword, Hird and Howells 
(eds), above n 1, at 64. 
58
 [1991] 4 All ER 563. 
 156 
term implied in law.
59
 Lord Bridge devised intricate criteria to define the narrow class of 
contract for which the term would be implied. The class was described as follows: 
 
(1) the terms of the contract of employment have not been negotiated with the 
individual employee but result from negotiation with a representative body or are 
otherwise incorporated by reference; (2) a particular term of the contract makes 
available to the employee a valuable right contingent upon action being taken by 
him to avail himself of its benefit; (3) the employee cannot, in all the 
circumstances, reasonably be expected to be aware of the term unless it is drawn 
to his attention.
60
  
 
The judgment has been regarded by some as contrary to the clear trend to treat terms 
implied in law as attaching to broad categories of contract such as contracts of 
employment as a whole.
61
 Good faith proponents suggest that had a doctrine of good faith 
been in place, conceivably it may not have been necessary to manipulate the traditional 
tests for implied terms. 
 
However, these concerns can be readily appeased by recognising that within New 
Zealand there would have been no need to resort to the common law of implied terms to 
provide a remedy for the employee doctors in the Scally case. In accordance with the 
good faith obligations under the Employment Relations Act 2000 (“ER Act”), the Board 
would likely have been under a duty to advise its employees of the timeframe for 
exercising the contractual rights. This is consistent with the non-exhaustive definition of 
good faith under s 4(1A)(b) which requires communication between an employer and its 
employees. Thus there would have been no necessity to distort the existing law in New 
Zealand to arrive at the desired outcome in Scally. 
 
To further support his argument, Wightman put forward the case of Spring v Guardian 
Assurance plc.
62
 There the House of Lords again derived a narrow test for defining the 
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 Ibid, at 571 per Lord Bridge. 
60
 Ibid, at 571-572.  
61
 See Wightman, above n 57, at 64. 
62
 [1994] 3 All ER 129. 
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class of contract under which there would be a legally implied term. The term in question 
required an employer to take reasonable care in writing a reference for an employee.
63
 It 
has been suggested that this is another clear example of the necessity to distort the 
existing law of implied terms for want of a good faith rule. 
 
Again however, the ER Act would apply in this scenario, at least during the currency of 
the employment contract. Moreover, in Spring the employer was found to be under a duty 
of care in tort. The implied term added nothing to the tortious duty of care.
64
 Thus, there 
was no real need to engage in the alleged manipulation of the law of implied terms to 
achieve the result desired.  
 
It is therefore submitted that whilst the courts might occasionally make mistakes with the 
tools they possess, that ‘is no reason to change the toolbox.’
65
 The perceived 
manipulation of the law in Scally and Spring could have been avoided in New Zealand 
whilst still reaching the same outcome. Accordingly, the cases proffered by Wightman 
provide little support for the positive theory. 
 
The case of Rice (t/a Garden Guardian) v Great Yarmouth Borough Council
66
 has also 
been propounded as an example of the courts giving effect to good faith by contorting 
existing law.
67
 Rice entered into two contracts to provide leisure and ground management 
services to the Council for a period of four years. The Council purported to cancel the 
contracts seven months after their commencement. It had served numerous default 
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notices prior to the cancellation. These notices related to the quality and timeliness of the 
work required of Rice under the contracts. The Council relied upon a specific clause 
under the contracts to cancel. This stated that if Rice committed ‘a breach of any of [his] 
obligations under the [c]ontract’ then ‘the Council [could] terminate [Rice’s] employment 
under the [c]ontract by notice in writing having immediate effect.’ The English Court of 
Appeal upheld the finding of the trial judge that the cumulative breaches by Rice were 
not sufficiently serious to amount to a repudiatory breach.
68
 Therefore, the critical issue 
related to the proper interpretation of the termination clause. The Court held that it could 
not be applied literally so as to give the Council the right to terminate the contracts ‘at 
any time for any breach of any term.’
69
 Hale LJ opined that such an interpretation ‘flies in 
the face of commercial common sense.’
70
 Because the terms of the contracts could be 
broken in so many different ways with such varying consequences, it was deemed that 
the parties could not have intended that any breach would entitle the innocent party to 
cancel the contracts.
71
 Accordingly, the Council was found to have improperly cancelled 
the contracts because the breaches were not sufficiently serious. 
 
The decision is susceptible to scrutiny by both proponents and opponents of good faith. 
The former may argue that the Court was forced to invoke the guise of interpretation in 
order to override the ‘draconian’
72
 effect of a literal reading of the clause and to defend 
the desired outcome.  It was bound to give effect to good faith sub modo.
73
 On the 
contrary, opponents are liable to suggest that the Court had no justification to depart from 
the plain and ordinary meaning of the words such that the Council should have been 
entitled to cancel the contracts. The autonomy and clear intention of the parties was 
impermissibly undermined. 
 
                                                     
68
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There is an outward attractiveness in arming the judiciary with a good faith doctrine to 
deal with cases like Rice. Adopting good faith as a rule of construction would 
conceivably allow the courts to construe such clauses with reference to notions of good 
faith. Thus, the good faith device could be used to avoid the construction of a contractual 
clause which may give rise to an unjust result. An express doctrine of good faith might 
therefore provide a more robust and defensible justification to rationalise an outcome 
which is ostensibly contrary to the plain wording of the contract. 
 
Nonetheless, it is debatable whether the reasoning adopted in Rice did constitute a 
departure away from developed legal principles of contractual interpretation. In Pyne 
Gould Guinness Ltd v Montgomery Watson NZ Ltd the Court of Appeal recognised the 
‘necessity for a construction which accords with business common sense.’
74
 
Undoubtedly, ‘a clause does not lack commercial sense just because a judge does not like 
the look of it.’
75
 However, a literal reading of the termination clause in Rice must have 
offended commercial logic. To allow the Council to cancel for an insignificant breach of 
any term would all but permit it to terminate the contracts at will. Undoubtedly this 
would be an unacceptable position for Rice who had borrowed substantial sums of 
money, invested in equipment and considerably increased his workforce relying upon the 
continuance of the agreements.
76
 Critically, even the Council acknowledged these 
commercial considerations by conceding that the cancellation clause would not allow it to 
terminate for ‘trivial’
77
 breaches.  
 
Further, in Pyne Gould Guinness it was also recognised that there is a need for 
‘abundantly clear intention in event of [an] unreasonable result.’
78
 The intention in Rice 
was not as clear as the wording of the cancellation clause suggested. For example, the 
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contracts provided for the issuing of default notices. This apparently revealed an intention 
that the Council might give Rice the right to rectify certain breaches as an alternative to 
exercising the right of cancellation. Accordingly, there was some apparent justification to 
depart from a literal interpretation of the termination clause.  
 
It is therefore submitted that the decision in Rice was neither incorrect nor out of step 
with the law relating to contractual interpretation. The case is evidence of the move from 
a literal approach to a more purposive and commonsense construction of contracts.
79
 
Undoubtedly, the ‘best start to understanding a document is to read the words used, and 
to ascertain their natural and ordinary meaning in the context of the document as a 
whole.’
80
 However, recourse to evidence of surrounding circumstances is helpful to 
‘cross-check whether some or other modified meaning [is] intended.’
81
 Indeed, in Mount 
Joy Farms Ltd v Kiwi South Island Co-operative Dairies Ltd Hammond J recognised that 
the ‘day has long since passed in our Courts where words are to be given a purely literal 
meaning.’
82
 This modern approach to contractual interpretation is arguably evidence of 
the courts seeking to give better effect to the reasonable expectations of the contracting 
parties. The Rice decision therefore indicates that the Anglo-Antipodean common law has 
evolved in order to give effect to notions of good faith. 
 
Notably, if the facts in Rice were to arise in New Zealand the issue would fall to be 
decided under s 7(4)(a) of the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 (“CRA”). It would have to 
be determined whether the parties had expressly or impliedly agreed that the term which 
was breached was essential to the Council so as to justify cancellation. This would raise a 
question as to whether s 7(4)(a) could be satisfied by way of a stand-alone clause 
providing that every clause in the contract is essential. Conceivably such a clause would 
have to be so clearly worded so as to put the matter beyond doubt. Seemingly the clause 
in Rice was not sufficiently clear. Hale LJ recognised that the cancellation clause did not 
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expressly characterise the importance of any particular term nor expressly ‘indicate 
which terms are to be considered so important that any breach will justify termination.’
83
 
Accordingly, it is unlikely that the provisions of the CRA would have altered the result in 
Rice or the interpretation of the termination clause. Rights of cancellation for breach and 
the relationship between good faith and the CRA are considered in more detail later in 
this chapter. 
 
According to Thomas, the New Zealand judiciary has also engaged in subterfuge. 
Thomas suggests that, for lack of a good faith doctrine, the fiduciary principle has been 
stretched to cover factual scenarios that do not properly justify its application.
84
 The 
Court of Appeal decision in Liggett v Kensington
85
 (better known as the Goldcorp case) 
is put forward as an example. The decision requires analysis.  
 
The facts can be briefly stated. Various customers of Goldcorp Exchange Ltd contracted 
to purchase bullion for future delivery. No bullion was set aside or appropriated to the 
contract at the time of payment. Goldcorp did however represent to its customers that it 
had an adequate stock of bullion to meet its contractual commitments to its customers. 
This was untrue. Goldcorp only held enough stock to meet likely delivery demands. It 
was intended that more bullion would be acquired over time by virtue of deferred 
purchase contracts. No funds were set aside for this purpose. The purchase monies 
advanced by the customers were intermingled within the general company funds.  
Goldcorp was subsequently placed into liquidation. A floating charge held by the Bank of 
New Zealand crystallised. There were insufficient funds in the creditors’ pool to satisfy 
the unsecured creditors. The customers claimed to be entitled to a proprietary interest 
either in the available bullion or the monies paid.  
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The majority
86
 of the Court of Appeal held that Goldcorp was under a fiduciary duty to 
the non-allocated purchasers. This required that Goldcorp would hold sufficient bullion 
on behalf of the customers as represented. The purchase money was held on trust, the 
purpose of which was setting aside sufficient bullion to meet the customer’s claims. In 
consequence, the customers were entitled to a proprietary right in the bullion held by 
Goldcorp. 
 
The Privy Council unanimously rejected this reasoning. It was possible for contractual 
obligations to give rise to fiduciary relations but in the case at hand there could be no 
obligations beyond those which Goldcorp had assumed under the contracts of sale.
87
 The 
Court of Appeal had impermissibly stretched equitable fiduciary principles in an attempt 
to create a proprietary interest.  
 
Thomas suggests that, had a general doctrine of good faith been available, then the Court 
of Appeal would not necessarily have had to grasp at a fiduciary duty. His reasoning is as 
follows: 
 
If the law incorporated a developed doctrine of good faith, Goldcorp could have 
been held to have been in breach of the obligation to perform its contractual 
obligations with due regard to the legitimate interests of its customers. Of course, 
such a breach would not avail the customers unless the courts could also award a 
proprietary as well as a personal remedy for its breach. But that is another story.
88
 
 
With respect, the rationale adopted by Thomas is flawed and inadequate. The Goldcorp 
case cannot possibly substantiate an argument for contractual good faith. There was 
absolutely no doubt that Goldcorp was in breach of contract with its customers. It had 
failed to deliver the gold or title to the gold to the customers. Accordingly, each customer 
had a valid legal claim to recover the purchase monies and any associated loss for the 
failure to perform the contract. In this regard an obligation of contractual good faith 
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would not have provided any additional benefit in terms of a claim for breach of contract. 
In reality, the case turned on the competing interests of creditors. The breach of contract 
claim, which existed with or without good faith, was not sufficient to create a proprietary 
remedy. That is the reason why the Court of Appeal resorted to fiduciary duties and the 
principle of a constructive trust. Only the breach of an equitable duty was sufficient to 
create a proprietary remedy. Thus, whilst Thomas is clearly correct in noting that the 
Court of Appeal had impermissibly stretched the fiduciary principle, it is obvious that a 
claim for breach of good faith would not have been of any benefit to the Court. A good 
faith doctrine could not have produced the desired outcome.  
 
If the facts of Goldcorp were to arise today, the issue of the priority of the competing 
claims would in all likelihood have been determined under the Personal Property 
Securities Act 1999. Unless title to the bullion passed to the customers, the security 
interest held by the bank would prevail provided that security interest was registered.
89
 In 
some limited circumstances equity might intervene in similar factual situations on the 
finding of a Quistclose trust. This may have entitled the customers to recover the money 
on the basis that it was held on trust for the sole purpose of being applied to acquire the 
gold and transfer title to the customers. However, there was no evidence of such a trust in 
Goldcorp. The customers’ money was not held separately but was instead used in the 
business of the company. Despite the fact that the customers may have been ignorant that 
they were taking a risk by advancing the funds, they had failed to take appropriate steps 
to protect their own position. An obligation of good faith on Goldcorp would not have 
altered the outcome. More importantly, a contractual obligation of good faith could not 
have been utilised to determine the rights as between two innocent parties, namely the 
customers and the bank. 
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4.3.3 Précis: 
 
The positive view espouses that a good faith doctrine would rectify the deficiencies in the 
existing law of contract in New Zealand by providing a remedy where the current law is 
unable to or is only able to by distorting the prevailing law of contract. 
 
However, the analysis of the above cases has demonstrated that the existing law within 
New Zealand is not necessarily deficient as a result of a lack of good faith doctrine. The 
cases reveal that good faith either should not, or would not, produce a different result. 
Further, in cases where the reasoning adopted to reach a particular decision is dubious, 
there is no evidence to substantiate assertions that good faith would have been a better or 
more appropriate alternative legal device. The case examples examined therefore do not 
support the positive theory.       
 
The remainder of this chapter will engage in a comparative analysis of a doctrine of good 
faith relative to selected existing legal, equitable and statutory principles which appear to 
be of the most relevance to the subject doctrine. The study will serve a variety of 
functions. It will be utilised to further evaluate whether the equivalence theory or the 
positive theory prevails. Moreover, it is necessary to consider how a doctrine of good 
faith and the existing legal and equitable doctrines would be affected by the other and 
how they might interact if a good faith doctrine were to be incorporated into New 
Zealand law. 
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4.4 Good Faith, Misrepresentation, Pre-Contractual Non-Disclosure and the 
Fair Trading Act 1986: 
 
4.4.1 Misrepresentation: 
 
The common law of misrepresentation is concerned with the effect of pre-contractual 
statements.
90
 The remedies for misrepresentation are now principally dealt with by two 
statutes, namely the CRA and the FTA.  
 
In essence, a misrepresentation is an incorrect statement of fact during the course of 
negotiations by one party to a contract which induces the other to enter into the contract. 
The obligation on a negotiating party to avoid making incorrect statements bears some 
analogy to a prospective duty of good faith in the sense that both obligations require the 
negotiating party to observe standards of honesty and reasonableness. The law of 
misrepresentation may therefore be understood to incorporate various elements reflecting 
an unacknowledged, but implicit regard for good faith.
91
  
 
In the context of common law misrepresentation, the courts are concerned principally 
with the effect of the misstatement on the representee. Under ss 6 and 7 of the CRA, the 
state of mind of the representor is largely irrelevant. The misrepresentation may be either 
innocent or fraudulent. Thus, if good faith is to be perceived as a substitute for the law of 
misrepresentation, obligations of good faith would have to be based on an objective test. 
Good faith would have to be appraised independent of the subjective intentions of the 
defendant.  
 
Whilst similarities may be inferred between misrepresentation and a contractual doctrine 
of good faith, one area of potential divergence relates to non-disclosure of information 
during contractual negotiations. It is this issue which will principally be explored below. 
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4.4.2 Misrepresentation, Pre-Contractual Non-Disclosure and the Contractual Remedies 
Act 1979: 
 
As a general rule, mere silence during the course of pre-contractual negotiations does not 
constitute a misrepresentation.
92
 This rule holds even if it is obvious that the person is 
labouring under a wrong impression that would be remedied by disclosure.
93
 Tacit 
acquiescence in the self deception of another is not actionable. The rule exemplifies the 
principle of caveat emptor.  
 
However, it is possible that silence may amount to a misrepresentation in certain 
instances. The first exception is where what is said amounts to a half-truth. A remedy will 
lie where an incomplete statement is made which creates a misleading impression 
because of what is left unsaid.
94
 Secondly, there may be an obligation of disclosure where 
a true representation has been made but has subsequently been rendered false by changed 
circumstances.
95
 Thirdly, the silence of one party may be taken to be confirming a 
misrepresentation formed in the mind of the other party. This will occur in circumstances 
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where there is a failure to correct an incorrect statement made by the representee.
96
 
Fourthly, active concealment of facts and other fraudulent conduct will give rise to a 
legal remedy.  
 
Arguably these exceptions are evidence of the courts giving effect to notions of good 
faith and fair dealing. However, the exceptions are relatively well-established. There is 
no apparent necessity for their unification under a general doctrine of good faith. 
Moreover, the individual exceptions serve to define the boundaries of the common law of 
misrepresentation.  
 
However, the above exceptions generally indicate that a bare non-disclosure, that is, non-
disclosure unconnected with some positive statement, will not amount to a 
misrepresentation. Conceivably an obligation of good faith may provide a plaintiff with a 
remedy for a bare non-disclosure. In this respect, the existing law of misrepresentation 
may be perceived to be inadequate. This may lend support to the positive theory. 
 
Various and controversial opinions have been expressed as to the extent of disclosure that 
might be required under a doctrine of good faith. These views include disclosure of all 
material facts
97
, disclosure of facts affecting the contract price
98
, disclosure of facts which 
a man of ordinary moral sensibilities would reveal
99
 and disclosure of facts casually 
acquired.
100
 The alternative and restrictive approach is that the dictates of good faith 
permit negotiating parties to remain silent, particularly in an arms length transaction, 
except for the circumstances where the current law of misrepresentation requires 
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disclosure.
101
 Under this view good faith does not represent an abandonment of caveat 
emptor.  
 
The extent to which good faith obligations should require disclosure of information will 
be discussed further in Chapter 5, which approaches the issue from a law and economics 
perspective. Suffice to say however, there are serious jurisprudential impediments in 
associating a contractual doctrine of good faith with a positive requirement of disclosure 
in pre-contractual negotiations. These difficulties are explored below. 
 
In other areas of the law where bare non-disclosure gives rise to legal or equitable 
remedies, the omission is not perceived as a misrepresentation.
102
 For example, non-
disclosure in breach of the duty of utmost good faith in insurance contracts is sui generis, 
and unrelated to misrepresentation. Similarly, non-disclosure by a fiduciary is properly a 
breach of an equitable duty.
103
 It is distinct from a misrepresentation at common law.  
 
One of the reasons why non-disclosure should not be considered to be a 
misrepresentation is that it does not appropriately apply to s 6 of the CRA, the relevant 
part of which provides: 
 
(1)  If a party to a contract has been induced to enter into it by a 
misrepresentation, whether innocent or fraudulent, made to him by or on 
behalf of another party to that contract— 
(a)  He shall be entitled to damages from that other party in the same 
manner and to the same extent as if the representation were a term 
of the contract that has been broken;  
 
Clearly a non-disclosure may induce entry into a contract. However, it does not appear 
logical that a non-disclosure can be treated as if it were a term of the contract that has 
been broken. For example, suppose a vendor of goods omits to warn the purchaser of a 
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defect in the goods. In order to render the non-disclosure actionable as a 
misrepresentation under the wording of the CRA, the Court would have to concoct a term 
to the effect that the vendor represented that the goods were free from defects.
104
 Only 
then could the purchaser obtain damages for the difference between the value of the 
goods if they had not been defective and the actual value of the defective goods. This 
requires an untenable conversion of a non-disclosure into a positive statement. Indeed, 
Cartwright has aptly contended that non-disclosure cannot be transposed to an implied 
term (and therefore a term of the contract capable of being breached) even where a duty 
of disclosure may be owed: 
 
Given the general position [ ] that there is no general duty of disclosure between 
negotiating parties, it follows that there is no general implied contractual promise 
by each party to the other that material matters have been disclosed. Even where 
the contract [ ] has associated duties of disclosure in the formation of the contract, 
there is not thereby any implied contractual warranty that disclosure has been 
made.
105
 
 
Consistently, the English courts have taken the view that non-disclosure cannot constitute 
a misrepresentation under s 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967, which provides: 
 
Where a person has entered into a contract after a misrepresentation has been 
made to him by another party thereto and as a result thereof he has suffered loss, 
then, if the person making the misrepresentation would be liable to damages in 
respect thereof had the misrepresentation been made fraudulently, that person 
shall be so liable notwithstanding that the misrepresentation was not made 
fraudulently, unless he proves that he had reasonable ground to believe and did 
believe up to the time the contract was made the facts represented were true. 
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In Banque Keyser Ullmann SA v Skandia (UK) Insurance Co Ltd
106
 Slade LJ said that s 
2(1) requires that the misrepresentation be ‘made.’ Non-disclosure would not amount to 
the ‘making’ of a misrepresentation. If the legislature had intended that this form of 
silence could be treated as a misrepresentation then it would have expressly said so.
107
 
Thus, there could be no statutory liability for misrepresentation even if the defendant was 
under a duty of disclosure and breached that obligation.
108
 
 
However, the New Zealand position is not as clear as in England. In Scales Trading Ltd v 
Far Eastern Shipping Co Public Ltd
109
 the Court of Appeal considered the obligation on 
a bank to disclose to an intending guarantor any unusual aspects of the underlying 
relationship between the bank and the debtor. Although not making a final determination 
on the issue, the Court suggested that a failure to discharge the duty of disclosure could 
amount to a misrepresentation for the purposes of the CRA. McGechan J justified this 
conclusion on the assumption that the juridical foundation for vitiation on account of 
non-disclosure is on the basis of an ‘implied representation’ that nothing unusual exists in 
the relationship between the bank and the debtor.
110
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th
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The reasoning in Scales is difficult to reconcile with that in Banque Keyser. Notably, ss 6 
and 7 of the CRA, like the English equivalent, require the misrepresentation to be ‘made.’ 
This may necessitate actual representations thereby excluding implied representations. 
Further, whilst a contract of guarantee is not a contract uberrimae fidei and does not give 
rise to fiduciary obligations
111
, the duty of disclosure is generally thought to be sui 
generis. Accordingly, in Behan v Obelon Pty Ltd Samuels JA doubted whether ‘the duty 
to disclose was derived from some doctrine that silence may constitute 
misrepresentation.’
112
  
 
An additional problem with treating non-disclosure under a guarantee contract as a 
misrepresentation under the CRA is that the traditional remedies for non-disclosure are 
more confined than those offered under the CRA. Non-disclosure by the creditor only 
gives rise to an equitable right to a rescission of the contract and, perhaps, a restitutionary 
remedy in some instances.
113
 This is also the case in contracts uberrimae fidei. Non-
disclosure in contracts of insurance does not give rise to a right to damages.
114
 The 
omission does not amount to a breach of contract. It has therefore been contended that the 
proposition that a non-disclosure could amount to a misrepresentation under s 6 of the 
CRA so as to justify an award of damages ‘seems unlikely.’
115
 Indeed, it would be an 
anomalous result if a non-disclosure could be treated as a misrepresentation for the 
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purposes of s 7 of the CRA so as to warrant a cancellation of the contract but not a 
misrepresentation for the purposes of recovering damages under s 6. It is therefore 
submitted that the preferable approach is to altogether avoid treating a failure to 
discharge a duty of disclosure owed in particular classes of contractual relationship
116
 as 
a misrepresentation for the purposes of the CRA.
117
  
 
This conclusion has fundamental implications for a doctrine of contractual good faith. If a 
bare non-disclosure cannot qualify as a misrepresentation under the CRA, a failure to 
disclose in contravention of good faith cannot be treated as a de facto breach of contract. 
Remedies such as expectation damages under s 6 would not be available. However, as 
was recognised in Chapter 2, the subject doctrine is grounded in the common law of 
contract. Unlike obligations of disclosure visited in particular contractual relationships, 
the subject doctrine would not function as some equitable or ab extra cause of action 
independent of the express or implied terms of the agreement. Accordingly any action for 
breach of good faith should logically be pleaded on the basis of a breach of the concluded 
contract itself. The CRA is the mechanism through which such a claim must be made. 
The statutory instrument defines the extent to which pre-contractual misconduct can be 
                                                     
116
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treated as a breach of contract. In this regard the subject doctrine could not provide any 
additional relief for non-disclosure than that offered under the existing law of 
misrepresentation, as codified under the CRA. 
 
Accordingly, it is doubtful whether a good faith doctrine would be of any additional 
benefit to a plaintiff seeking to bring an action based on non-disclosure than those 
remedies available under the existing law. Conceivably the CRA would have to be 
amended to accommodate for both a misrepresentation and a bare non-disclosure. This 
would clearly permit the courts to treat a bad faith non-disclosure in the same manner as a 
contractual breach and thereby award contractual remedies, including damages. However, 
if the legislature were to put in place a specific remedy for non-disclosure under the 
CRA, there would apparently be little need for a plaintiff to resort to a general common 
law doctrine of good faith in the field of pre-contractual disclosure.
118
  
 
4.4.3 Pre-Contractual Non-Disclosure and the Fair Trading Act 1986: 
 
In some circumstances non-disclosure during pre-contractual negotiations may be 
actionable under the FTA. In this respect commonly held notions of good faith may 
equate more with the obligations under the FTA than those obligations under the 
common law of misrepresentation as codified under the CRA. 
 
The FTA has been in force now for approximately 20 years. Its application has spread 
like oil on the waters.
119
 It has become a staple of civil proceedings.
120
 The FTA creates 
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liabilities for various categories of misleading conduct. Section 9 is by far the most 
commonly invoked section due to its generality. It provides: 
 
No person shall, in trade, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is 
likely to mislead or deceive. 
 
An obvious caveat to s 9 is that the defendant must be engaged in trade. Unlike a general 
doctrine of contractual good faith, which would be applicable to all contracts, the FTA is 
limited to a specific class of dealings.
121
 However, the class is wide. For example, the 
FTA may apply to a vendor intending to develop residential land
122
, or the one-off sale of 
a capital asset
123
 or the disposition of property by trustees of a charitable organisation.
124
 
Section 9 was undoubtedly intended to cast its net widely.
125
 
 
A misrepresentation can clearly constitute misleading and deceptive conduct under s 9. 
Plaintiffs may prefer the directness and simplicity of the CRA over the FTA in cases of 
misrepresentation.
126
 However, a cursory examination of the number of recent cases in 
which both causes of action are concurrently pleaded or relied upon suggests that the 
FTA is becoming a popular alternative to the CRA.
127
 In cases involving half-truths and 
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non-disclosure, the FTA may well be preferred by plaintiffs. Critically, non-disclosure 
may more readily be actionable under the FTA than the CRA. Non-disclosure in itself 
may amount to misleading or deceptive conduct. The definition of ‘conduct’ under s 2 
includes an omission to act. Thus, a failure by a defendant to communicate certain factual 
matters will constitute part of his or her conduct. Any reticence will be a relevant 
circumstance of the case.
128
 
 
Despite the FTA having been in force for approximately 20 years, the majority of cases 
under s 9 involving silence relate to half-truths.
129
 The extent to which pure silence is 
capable of ever amounting to misleading and deceptive conduct under s 9 is essentially an 
untested matter.
130
 Further, there is little apparent judicial consensus on the issue. Thus, 
there is no surety that the FTA could serve as an adequate substitute for a good faith 
obligation of pre-contractual disclosure  
 
In the Court of Appeal decision of Unilever NZ Ltd v Cerebos Greggs Ltd Gault J sought 
to define what conduct would contravene s 9: 
 
What must be shown are misrepresentations by words or conduct or a 
combination of words or conduct…[S]ilence in particular cases can amount to a 
misrepresentation as can literal truth but in each case only when as a result there 
is affirmatively conveyed another meaning that is false.
131
  
 
These statements have been interpreted to mean that s 9 conduct must contain or convey 
a traditional misrepresentation.
132
 This proposition has subsequently received judicial 
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support.
133
 Indeed, non-disclosure unaccompanied by a positive representation or conduct 
would conceivably be incapable of ‘affirmatively’ conveying a false meaning. 
 
However, the comments of Gault J were subject to criticism by Kelly J in Heiber v 
Barfoot & Thompson Ltd.
134
 Drawing on Australian authority
135
, his Honour suggested 
that the test should be whether there is a reasonable expectation of disclosure.
136
 The 
observations relating to silence propounded by Gault J were said to be restrictive. 
Provided a defendant has information which, on an objective view, should be given to the 
plaintiff, an omission to do so could amount to misleading and deceptive conduct.
137
 
Thus, silence of itself could be actionable under s 9. This would apparently imply that 
there is no prerequisite for a misrepresentation. This approach was later endorsed by 
Priestly J in Guthrie v Taylor Parris Group Cossey Ltd where it was noted that the 
question is whether the circumstances of the transaction gives rise to a reasonable 
expectation that one party will volunteer information as to matters of importance to the 
other.
138
  
 
The test endorsed by Kelly J raises issues as to the circumstances in which a reasonable 
expectation of disclosure will arise. It has been observed that:  
 
The test of reasonable expectation of disclosure is inherently flexible, and for this 
reason the Courts have been reluctant to set out any principles for determining 
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when the test will be met, instead preferring to describe it as requiring a 
consideration of all the surrounding circumstances.
139
 
 
Relevant factors influencing whether disclosure is required have been suggested to 
include the commercial knowledge of the plaintiff, the relevance of the information to the 
underlying transaction and the negotiating tactics which each party may expect of the 
other.
140
 Logically there should be no obligation of disclosure where the facts to be 
disclosed are not known to a defendant.
141
 It is however arguable that there could be an 
exception to this rule where the facts ought to be known. This is consistent with the 
notion that the focus of s 9 is on the effect of the conduct rather than the state of mind of 
the defendant.
142
 Certainly, non-disclosure of a fact which ought to be known by the 
defendant that has the effect of failing to qualify a positive statement may be sufficient to 
attract liability.
143
 Ultimately it has been observed that some further judicial consideration 
of the issue ‘would be helpful.’
144
 
 
The reasonable expectation of disclosure test is arguably a similar test to that which may 
be required to discharge good faith conduct. Critically, absolute disclosure is not 
required. Instead the focus is on the particular circumstances of the case and what 
disclosure may objectively be expected. 
 
Notably, leading FTA commentators within New Zealand support a definitive 
abandonment of a misrepresentation prerequisite for misleading and deceptive conduct. 
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They prefer a reasonable expectation of disclosure approach.
145
 If this development were 
to occur then conceivably this could overcome the perceived deficiencies of the common 
law of misrepresentation to some extent. Moreover, the FTA may be a more appropriate 
mechanism for regulating pre-contractual conduct than the subject doctrine of contractual 
good faith in light of the jurisprudential limitations of the latter identified in Chapter 2.  
 
Clearly s 9 of the FTA could not serve as a perfect substitute for a general rule of good 
faith pre-contractual disclosure.
146
 There are limits to the breadth of the FTA. For 
example, if the defendant is not engaged in trade then there is no cause of action. 
Similarly, damages under s 9 are non-contractual. Current authority suggests that 
expectation loss cannot be claimed under the FTA as it is peculiar to contract law.
147
 
Non-disclosure may only give rise to reliance damages on a tort measure.  
 
However, the two heads of damage are not mutually exclusive
148
 and there is an 
increasing desire for a re-examination of the rule barring the recovery of expectation 
loss.
149
 Further, remedies for breach of the FTA are not confined to damages. A contract 
may be set aside ab initio in the event of non-disclosure.
150
 Thus, whilst the provisions of 
the FTA may not be a perfect substitute for a prospective cause of action based on a 
failure to disclose in breach of good faith, it may well serve as a meaningful alternative.  
                                                     
145
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4.4.4 Précis: 
 
The common law of misrepresentation and the requirements under the FTA implicitly 
require the observance of notions of good faith conduct. However, the law of 
misrepresentation, as codified under the CRA, does not currently provide a remedy for 
bare non-disclosure. The established categories of contract for which duties of disclosure 
are owed are not properly subject to the provisions of the CRA. However, the 
jurisprudential underpinnings of the prospective doctrine of good faith are distinct from 
existing sui generis obligations of disclosure owed in particular classes of contracts. As a 
result, remedies for breach of a universal common law doctrine of good faith arising from 
pre-contractual conduct, including the right to claim damages and cancel the contract, 
should be governed by the provisions of the CRA. Conceivably, the CRA would have to 
be amended to extend past misrepresentation and expressly provide for non-disclosure if 
a plaintiff is to have a remedy for a bare non-disclosure under the subject doctrine of 
good faith. That being the case, universal obligations of pre-contractual disclosure would 
best be developed through a legislative remedy thereby eschewing any necessity for 
recourse to the subject doctrine.   
 
There is scope for the test for misleading conduct under the FTA to be developed so as to 
clearly abandon any prerequisite for a misrepresentation. A reasonable expectation of 
disclosure approach could be definitively adopted. This would clearly render a bare non-
disclosure actionable. In this respect, the cause of action under the FTA may serve as a 
partial substitute to a rule of good faith pre-contractual disclosure.  
 
Therefore, on balance, it is doubtful whether the subject doctrine could provide any 
significant additional benefit to the developing mechanisms already in place to deal with 
pre-contractual silence and misrepresentations within New Zealand. As was recognised in 
Chapter 2, the subject doctrine is contractual in nature and its reach in regulating pre-
contractual conduct is likely to be limited. 
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4.5 Good Faith and Unconscionability: 
 
4.5.1 Unconscionable Bargains: 
 
The equitable jurisdiction to grant relief to set aside an unconscionable bargain was 
developed in England in the 19
th
 century. During the early stages of the evolution of the 
unconscionable bargain principle, the courts took the view that mere inadequacy of 
consideration was sufficient to create a presumption of unfairness capable of justifying 
relief.
151
 The doctrine has now been refined to focus less on the inadequacy of 
consideration and more on the conduct of the defendant. Broadly speaking, equity will 
intervene where an agreement has been obtained by one party taking advantage of the 
other in circumstances where the conscience of the stronger party is materially affected. 
Unconscionability is therefore a species of equitable fraud
152
, as is undue influence which 
falls within the broader principle of unconscionability.
153
 
 
In Attorney-General for England and Wales v R Tipping J, in the Court of Appeal, set out 
the circumstances giving rise to an unconscionable bargain: 
 
[F]or a bargain to be characterised as unconscionable [ ] there will necessarily be: 
(1) serious disadvantage on the part of the weaker party known to the stronger 
party; and (2) the exploitation of that disadvantage by the stronger party in 
circumstances amounting to actual or equitable fraud. Associated with (1) and (2) 
will usually, but not necessarily be: (3) some procedural impropriety, established 
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or presumed, and attributable to the stronger party; and (4) a substantial 
inadequacy of consideration.
154
   
 
Exploitation or victimisation by the stronger party can ‘consist of either active extortion 
of a benefit or the passive acceptance of a benefit in unconscionable circumstances.’
155
  
 
There is a potential link between the intervention of equity in unconscionable bargains 
and the notion of good faith. The idea that a party to a bargain has acted unconscionably 
tends to suggest that he or she has also acted in breach of good faith. Thus, it is reasoned 
that the prohibition on unconscionable bargains is one of the clearest examples of the role 
played by equity in introducing a good faith element into contract law.
156
 
 
In the context of unconscionable bargains it is notable that knowledge of the qualifying 
disability can be actual or constructive knowledge. In Nichols v Jessup Somers J 
suggested that a party may be regarded as unconscientious not only when he or she knew 
that the other was labouring under a special disability but also when he or she ought to 
have known that fact.
157
 His Honour went on to note: 
 
If the circumstances are such as fairly to lead a reasonable man to believe that 
another is under some serious disadvantage affecting his ability to protect himself 
he is bound to make inquiry and will be taken to know whatever such inquiry 
would have disclosed.
158
     
 
It has also been held that knowledge of an agent may be imputed to a principal for the 
purposes of assessing whether the principal had sufficient knowledge of the qualifying 
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disability.
159
 Therefore, the test for whether conduct is to be regarded as unconscionable 
is largely objective. It is the conscience of the reasonable man or woman which must be 
affected and not necessarily the conscience of the particular defendant.  
 
Bigwood has criticised this result. He suggests that exploitation of a disadvantage implies 
intentionality which must be assessed in light of what the stronger party actually knew at 
the relevant time rather than what a hypothetical person should have known.
160
 
Supposedly, carelessness is not sufficient to constitute victimisation in equity. As a result, 
Bigwood would exclude constructive and imputed knowledge from the assessment of the 
conduct of the defendant.
161
   
 
The debate in the field of unconscionable bargains as to whether an objective, subjective, 
or mixed standard of conduct is required is similar to that which is raised in the field of 
contractual good faith. Waddams has contrasted the prevailing objective test in the 
context of unconscionable bargains to a potential test under a doctrine of good faith.
162
 
He suggests that a claim for breach of good faith would require the plaintiff to establish 
misconduct or bad motive on the part of the defendant.
163
 Accordingly, the substitution of 
good faith for unconscionable bargain theory would tend to dilute the protection given to 
weaker parties.
164
 On this rationale, the introduction of a doctrine of good faith would 
limit the responsiveness of the law to unfair dealing. However, the argument appears to 
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lose force if it is accepted that an obligation of good faith, like the law of unconscionable 
bargains, encapsulates an objectively reasonable standard of conduct.  
 
Despite the apparent similarities between notions of good faith and unconscionability, it 
is submitted that there are fundamental differences between the law of unconscionable 
bargains and the subject doctrine of contractual good faith. 
 
The most obvious distinction is that the equitable jurisdiction to relieve against 
unconscionable bargains is intended to focus on the circumstances in which the bargain is 
made. The conduct of the stronger party in contractual negotiations and formation is 
being assessed. Thus, in Tri-Global (Aust) Pty Ltd v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance 
Society Ltd Spender J recognised that unconscionability is considered in the formation of 
an agreement and does not relate to its termination.
165
 The equitable doctrine ‘will not 
generally apply in relation to the conduct of parties in an on-going contractual 
relationship.’
166
 This can be contrasted with a doctrine of contractual good faith. As 
concluded in Chapter 2, a common law doctrine of good faith would not generally extend 
to the regulation of pre-contractual negotiations unless a contract comes into existence. 
Thus the equitable jurisdiction is concerned with pre-contractual conduct whereas a 
common law doctrine of good faith would be concerned primarily with contractual 
performance and enforcement.  
 
However, there has been a recent judicial attempt to allow a transaction to be set aside as 
unconscionable, even if the conscience of the stronger party is not affected strictly at the 
time of entering into the bargain. In Gustav & Co Ltd v Macfield Ltd
167
 the Court of 
Appeal held that the date for assessing whether the stronger party had the requisite 
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knowledge of the weaker party’s qualifying disability was not necessarily the date that 
the conditional contract was executed. It could extend to the date on which the contract 
was confirmed by the weaker party. Notably, the stronger party had no discretion whether 
or not to accept the confirmation.
168
 Notwithstanding, the Court suggested that it was 
sufficient that the stronger party might retain the benefit of the bargain unconscientiously, 
even if the bargain was not necessarily struck in unconscionable circumstances.
169
 The 
decision could perhaps be cited in support of a greater judicial willingness for the 
doctrine of unconscionability to be extended to contractual performance and 
enforcement. The notion of a broader principle of unconscionability will be discussed in 
more detail further below.  
 
However, the observations of the Court of Appeal were overruled on appeal to the 
Supreme Court.
170
 It was found that the relevant time for assessing knowledge of the 
qualifying disability is properly the time when the contract is made and not the time of 
confirmation. The Court rejected any possible policy grounds for keeping ‘flexible’ the 
equitable remedy to relieve against unconscionable bargains.
171
 Arguably, a doctrine of 
contractual good faith may have been a more suitable mechanism for the Court of Appeal 
to invoke to regulate the conduct of the stronger party during the currency of the contract. 
There would have been no need to compromise the traditional understanding of 
unconscionable bargain jurisprudence.  
 
Another fundamental distinction between unconscionable bargains and the subject 
doctrine of good faith is that the remedies would likely be distinct. An agreement deemed 
to have been made in unconscionable circumstances is voidable.
172
 The victim may 
affirm the contract or it may be set aside, in which case the plaintiff is entitled to a 
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declaration that it has been validly rescinded.
173
 It follows that a deserving plaintiff can 
also use the doctrine as a valid defence to an action for specific performance. However, a 
victim cannot claim damages. Similarly, proprietary remedies such as a constructive trust 
are generally unavailable.
174
 Thus the equitable remedies available for unconscionable 
conduct do not cater for the regulation of a continuing contractual relationship.
175
 On the 
other hand, the remedy for a plaintiff as a result of a breach of good faith must arise from 
the contract itself. Damages may be awarded or the contract may be cancelled if the 
breach is sufficiently serious. The agreement will not however be set aside ab initio.  
 
It is therefore suggested that the subject doctrine of good faith and the law relating to 
unconscionable bargains is distinct. In this regard, the equivalence thesis does not hold. 
Should a doctrine of contractual good faith be introduced, it would appear that the law 
relating to the equitable jurisdiction to set aside an unconscionable bargain would remain 
largely unaffected. Prima facie, a doctrine of contractual good faith would be unable to 
provide a remedy for the victim of an unconscionable bargain. Thus, there is no reason 
why the subject doctrine of good faith and the law of unconscionable bargains could not 
co-exist.  
 
Notably, the same conclusions can be drawn in respect of the equitable doctrine of undue 
influence. Whilst unconscionability and undue influence represent a concept of good 
faith
176
, they apply in the context of contractual negotiation or, in some instances, 
contractual variation
177
, and act to vitiate the agreement. In this regard they are distinct 
from an obligation of good faith in contractual performance. Accordingly, it is not 
proposed to embark on a further discussion of undue influence relative to a doctrine of 
good faith. 
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4.5.2 A Wider Principle of Unconscionability in Contract? 
 
A modern analysis of the principle of unconscionability cannot be confined to the 
equitable jurisdiction to set aside unconscionable bargains. In recent times the 
understanding of unconscionable conduct has sought to be expanded. It has been 
suggested that a broad underlying principle of unconscionability is potentially becoming 
a common theme, if not a unifying principle, of the law of contract.
178
 That contention, 
like proposals for a good faith doctrine, is met with concerns about self-interested 
competition and freedom of contract being sacrificed for altruism and vagueness.  
 
Nonetheless, the Australian courts appear to be welcoming of the expansion of the 
unconscionability doctrine. In Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella Sheller JA suggested that 
a court may interpret a contract in such a manner that a contracting party may not be 
permitted to exercise a contractual power where it would be unconscionable to do so in 
the circumstances.
179
 Similarly, in Stern v McArthur
180
 a majority
181
 of the High Court of 
Australia held that although a contract for the sale of land had been lawfully rescinded in 
accordance with the agreement, the vendors had insisted on their strict legal rights in 
unconscionable circumstances. The purchasers were entitled to relief against forfeiture 
and specific performance.  
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As a result, one Australian contract text has observed that the courts have increasingly 
utilised unconscionability as an ultimate basis of liability in disputes between contracting 
parties.
182
 It is further suggested that the law of Australia endorses the view that a party 
may not assert a contractual right, or deny a contractual obligation, if it would be 
unconscionable to do so.
183
 This implies that the doctrine of unconscionability might be 
extended not only to the formation of a bargain but also its performance and enforcement. 
Finn has observed this development in Australia:  
 
[T]he revitalisation of the unconscionable dealings doctrine and the more general 
elaboration of an unconscionability principle have paralleled growing judicial 
preparedness to scrutinise the propriety of conduct in contract formation and 
performance…
184
 
 
Inevitably, there would be an overlap in the application of a doctrine of good faith and a 
doctrine of unconscionability if the latter could be applied to contractual performance. 
Some commentators suggest that the developed equitable principle of unconscionability 
has occupied the position of an informing principle of good faith by default.
185
 
Accordingly it is reasoned that a broad concept of unconscionability is a practical 
manifestation of some notion of a duty of good faith.
186
 
 
It is certainly arguable that there are similarities in the meaning and application of good 
faith and unconscionability, particularly in light of the ongoing expansion of the latter. 
Whereas unconscionable dealing was previously thought of as conduct which shocked 
the conscience of the Court, there is now an inclination towards a less strict standard. 
This may embody synonyms such as unfairness, fair dealing and good faith.
187
 Similar to 
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good faith, unconscionability is better described than defined.
188
 Finn reasons that 
unconscionable conduct is conduct which is unfair to another where good faith can 
properly be expected by the other party.
189
 A contracting party who acts in disregard of 
the reasonable expectations of his or her contracting counterparty may be said to have 
acted unconscionably. Stapleton has equated good faith and unconscionability on the 
basis that the ‘principle of good faith restrains the deliberate pursuit of self-interest where 
this is judged unconscionable.’
190
 She goes on to recognise that a contracting party will 
act unconscionably where he or she acts dishonestly, goes back on his or her word, or 
exploits a position of dominance over a vulnerable contracting counterparty.
191
 The 
contended similarity between good faith and unconscionability is supported by the 
number of cases where the two principles have been concurrently pleaded in Australian 
cases.
192
 Ultimately it may be that, at least in Australia, unconscionability is perceived as 
a sufficient substitute for good faith thereby negating the need for a universal doctrine. 
Harland asserts: 
 
[T]he increasing emphasis [ ] on unconscionable or unconscientious conduct as an 
element of other doctrines of the law of contract results in an emphasis on ideas of 
justice and fair dealing that may ultimately differ little from standards of good 
faith more familiar in many other legal systems.
193
 
 
However, the enthusiasm in Australia for an expansion of the principle of 
unconscionability in contract law has not been reciprocated in England and New Zealand.  
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It is reasonable to suggest that a wider unconscionability principle has received some 
limited recognition in New Zealand. For example, under the Credit Contracts and 
Consumer Finance Act 2003, a party to a consumer credit contract may have it reopened 
in the event that another party seeks to exercise a power under the contract in an 
oppressive manner.
194
 Oppressive is defined to mean, inter alia, unconscionable.
195
 Thus 
it has been observed that ‘common law unconscionability looks to the formation of the 
contract rather than the performance of it and in this regard oppression is the wider 
doctrine.’
196
 Similarly the Disputes Tribunal
197
 and the Tenancy Tribunal
198
 is given 
jurisdiction to vary or set aside a contract where a power conferred by the agreement is 
sought to be exercised in an unconscionable manner.  
 
Despite these limited legislative concessions, there is strong authority to suggest that 
unconscionability will not acquire a more interventionist role in English and New 
Zealand contract law. In Allen v Flood Wills J suggested that contractual rights may be 
exercised in any manner, no matter how unconscionable: 
 
[A]ny right given by contract may be exercised against the giver by the person to 
whom it is granted, no matter how wicked, cruel or mean the motive may be 
which determines the enforcement of that right.
199
 
 
Likewise, in Bridge v Campbell Discount Co Ltd Lord Radcliffe observed that 
‘“[u]nconscionable” must not be taken to be a panacea for adjusting any contract between 
competent persons when it shows a rough edge to one side or the other.’
200
 Unless it can 
be shown that an agreement was reached through unconscionable means, the courts will 
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not entertain whether a term is fair in all the circumstances or is harsh and 
unconscionable.
201
 Thus, in Union Eagle Lord Hoffman opined: 
 
The principle that equity will restrain the enforcement of legal rights when it 
would be unconscionable to insist upon them has an attractive breadth. But the 
reasons why the courts have rejected such generalisations are founded not merely 
upon authority [ ] but also upon practical considerations of business. These are, in 
summary, that in many forms of transaction it is of great importance that if 
something happens for which the contract has made express provision, the parties 
should know with certainty that the terms of the contract will be enforced. The 
existence of an undefined discretion to refuse to enforce the contract on the 
ground that this would be 'unconscionable' is sufficient to create uncertainty. Even 
if it is most unlikely that a discretion to grant relief will be exercised, its mere 
existence enables litigation to be employed as a negotiating tactic. The realities of 
commercial life are that this may cause injustice which cannot be fully 
compensated by the ultimate decision in the case.
202
  
 
Accordingly, arguments that the vendor was acting unconscionably in seeking to enforce 
its strict contractual rights did not find sway with the House of Lords.  
 
Subsequent to the Union Eagle decision, the broader approach to unconscionability taken 
within the Australian cases has apparently been doubted by one New Zealand Court.
203
 
Likewise, in Gustav Tipping J suggested that a ‘supervening’ doctrine of 
unconscionability would risk undermining properly acquired contractual rights and would 
be detrimental to the security of contractual relationships.
204
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It is therefore reasonable to conclude that a broader principle of unconscionability is an 
improbable substitute for contractual good faith within New Zealand. Unconscionability 
is unlikely to be developed as a means to restrain the lawful exercise of contractual rights. 
It is submitted that the hostility towards the development is logical. Unconscionability is 
characterised by a disability or vulnerability. In an arms length transaction it is 
anomalous to suggest that a contracting party is vulnerable or under a disability merely 
because he or she is at the mercy of his or her contracting counter party in exercising 
rights conferred by their contractual terms. The undesirability of equitable intervention is 
manifest where both parties have freely agreed upon their respective contractual rights. 
Unless a plaintiff can establish some qualifying disability on which to justify a claim of 
unconscionability, it is proper that equity should not intervene. As McKay J recognised in 
Attorney-General v Equiticorp Industries Ltd (In Statutory Management), it is not enough 
for a party to cry equity and expect relief.
205
 Thus, whilst unconscionability may be an 
informing principle of specific doctrines such as promissory estoppel, undue influence 
and the jurisdiction to relieve against unconscionable bargains, unconscionability should 
not be applied in the abstract without the protection of the prescribed requirements and 
operative criteria applying to those specific doctrines.
206
 The equitable jurisdiction must 
be operated on a principled and restricted basis.  
 
Despite unconscionability not serving as a substitute for good faith, it is conceivable that 
the courts would not allow good faith to override the restrictions hitherto placed on the 
unconscionability doctrine. The law in England and New Zealand has favoured certainty. 
For example, a contracting party should be able to rely on the strict terms of the contract 
to terminate an agreement. Although the other party may have an action in restitution, he 
or she ordinarily cannot claim that the contract is wrongfully terminated. Good faith 
should not alter this result. It has been recognised that one of the ‘hallmarks of English 
common law is that it does not have a doctrine of abuse of rights: if one has a right to do 
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an act then, one can, in general, do it for whatever reason one wishes.’
207
 On this 
rationale, the hostility shown towards expanding unconscionability may also be reflected 
in a restricted application of good faith should a general doctrine be introduced.  Based 
on the prevailing judicial approach, the courts may well strive to avoid a situation where 
plaintiffs could succeed under a doctrine of good faith where they would fail under the 
equitable notion of unconscionability.
208
 
 
4.5.3 Précis: 
 
To summarise, the foregoing analysis has found that the equitable jurisdiction to set aside 
unconscionable bargains and a general doctrine of contractual good faith could co-exist 
and would have little impact on each other. That outcome neither opposes nor supports 
the introduction of a good faith obligation.  
 
At this stage, it is improbable that the principle of unconscionability will extend further 
into New Zealand contract law. Thus, unconscionability is unlikely to serve as a 
substitute for a doctrine of good faith in the context of the performance and termination 
of contracts. Although that may lend support to the positive theory, the resistance to 
unconscionability interfering with contractual performance and termination on the 
grounds of uncertainty may foreshadow a correspondingly restricted application of good 
faith should the subject doctrine be introduced. In this regard there is potential for the 
application of a good faith doctrine to be reduced to equate with existing legal 
methodology.   
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4.6 Good Faith and Estoppel: 
 
The doctrine of estoppel has undergone significant development in recent times. The 
doctrine is perceived as a means of enforcing a promise made without consideration.
209
 
There are now dicta within New Zealand to suggest that the various categories of 
estoppel previously recognised such as proprietary estoppel, promissory estoppel and 
estoppel by election or convention are now merged into one universal doctrine.
210
 
Further, in National Westminster Finance NZ Ltd v National Bank of NZ Tipping J 
suggested that the notion of unconscionability runs through all manifestations of 
estoppel.
211
 The doctrine exists to prevent a party from going back on his or her word 
where it would be unconscionable to do so. Certainly promissory estoppel is founded on 
a general principle of unconscionability given that it is grounded in equity.
212
  
 
According to Richardson J in Gillies v Keogh, there are three elements required to give 
rise to promissory estoppel.
213
 Firstly, an encouragement of a belief or expectation is 
needed. Secondly, there must be reliance on that belief or expectation.
214
 Thirdly, 
detriment must result from that reliance.
215
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The doctrine of estoppel is a paradigm example of the courts seeking to ensure good faith 
conduct. It protects against unfairness.
216
 A promisor who seeks to renege on his or her 
word, leaving the promisee to suffer the detrimental consequences, fails to exercise good 
faith behaviour. Thus, promissory estoppel reinforces good faith by giving effect to the 
reasonable expectations of the parties.
217
 Indeed, proponents of good faith suggest that 
the evolution of promissory estoppel evidences the inadequacy of classical contract law 
to meet the needs and expectations of contracting parties and the commercial 
community.
218
 
 
Despite the fact that notions of good faith are embodied in the principle of estoppel, it is 
evident that the subject doctrine would have little impact on the law of estoppel to the 
extent that estoppel may apply to parties without a pre-existing contractual arrangement. 
As was recognised in Chapter 2, a common law doctrine of good faith would apply only 
if a concluded contract comes into existence.  
 
The extent to which promissory estoppel can apply to pre-contractual conduct continues 
to divide the common law jurisdictions. In the United Kingdom it is still widely 
understood that the principle is limited to preventing the enforcement of existing 
rights.
219
 Accordingly, a pre-existing contractual relationship is required.  
                                                     
216
 See Justice Forrie Miller, ‘Equitable Estoppel’ in, The Law of Obligations – “Contract in Context” 
(New Zealand Law Society Intensive, 2007), at 51. 
217
 Tetley, above n 91, at 578. It has been argued that an estoppel is created where the promisee is entitled 
to expect good faith behaviour by the promisor. See Barbara Mescher, ‘Promise Enforcement by Common 
Law or Equity?’ (1990) 64 Australian Law Journal Reports 536, at 543. See also Sir Anthony Mason, 
above n 153, at 90; Woo Yee, ‘Protecting Parties’ Reasonable Expectations: A General Principle of Good 
Faith’ (2001) 1 Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 195, at 206. 
218
 See Thomas, above n 24, at 405. See also J F O’Connor, Good Faith in English Law (1990), at 20. Lord 
Steyn has contended that in ‘the absence of a generalised duty of good faith the specific and concrete rules 
of estoppel are needed to deal with demonstrated problems of unfairness.’: Justice Johan Steyn, ‘The Role 
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Contract Law: A Hair Shirt Philosophy?’ in Lord Steyn, Democracy 
Through the Law (2004), at 215. 
219
 Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215; The Proodos C [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 390; The Kanchenjunga [1990] 
1 Lloyd’s Rep 391; Baird Textile Holdings Ltd v Marks and Spencer plc [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 737. See 
 195 
 
However, the approach in Australasia is not so restricted. It is now clear that promissory 
estoppel can apply to parties who do not have a contractual relationship.
220
 The catalyst 
for this development was the decision of the High Court of Australia in Waltons Stores 
(Interstate) Ltd v Maher
221
 where an estoppel was found in an arrangement falling short 
of a legally binding contract. The plaintiff owned commercial premises. He arranged to 
demolish the existing buildings and rebuild custom-designed premises for lease to the 
defendant. Construction began but the defendant reneged on the arrangement some two 
months later. The Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to reliance damages. These 
would relieve against the detriment caused by relying on the understanding induced by 
the defendant.  
 
In cases analogous to Waltons, it is clear that a deserving plaintiff could not rely on a 
contractual claim for breach of good faith in lieu of an action for equitable estoppel. The 
subject doctrine would therefore be incapable of subsuming the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel within New Zealand. 
 
However, the situation may be different where the parties are in a pre-existing contractual 
arrangement. For example, a doctrine of contractual good faith may have had some 
application to the facts in Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd.
222
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The plaintiff promised to reduce the rental paid by the defendant for a block of flats on 
account of the adverse economic conditions presented by the Second World War. The 
defendant paid the reduced rental from 1940 to 1945. The plaintiff sued to recover the 
difference between the contractual rate and the reduced rate after the War ended. The 
promise was unsupported by consideration. Nonetheless, Denning J held that the 
expectation created by the plaintiff presented a valid defence for the defendant. It has 
subsequently been argued that a doctrine of contractual good faith could have been 
utilised as an alternative to estoppel. The defendant could have asserted that the plaintiff 
was seeking to enforce its contractual right in breach of good faith.
223
   
 
Despite the recent development of the estoppel doctrine, justifiable limits have been 
placed on its application. For example, the representation must be clear and 
unambiguous. In The Scaptrade
224
 the owner of a vessel lawfully cancelled the contract 
of hire on account of a monthly payment being four days late. The hirer argued that the 
owner should have been estopped from relying on its strict legal right because it had 
tolerated late payments on previous occasions. The English Court of Appeal found that 
there was no clear representation or promise that the owner would not rely on its strict 
rights.
225
 The claim for relief against forfeiture failed. It has since been noted that it will 
be difficult to establish an estoppel when the only representation asserted is by conduct 
rather than express words.
226
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Conceivably if a doctrine of good faith were applied to the facts in The Scarptrade, it 
could be argued that the contractual right to cancel was not exercised in good faith. The 
previous course of dealing may have been sufficient to justify the claim that the owners 
were not acting in good faith, notwithstanding that the hirer could not point to an 
unequivocal representation. If this were the case then a doctrine of good faith may render 
the requirements to establish an estoppel nugatory. A plaintiff bringing such a claim 
would inevitably rely on good faith rather than estoppel if the elements required to 
establish bad faith were less demanding than the various criteria required to make out an 
estoppel.   
 
Nonetheless, there is good reason to suspect that a good faith doctrine would not be 
permitted to subvert the estoppel criteria. It would be an unusual result for a defendant to 
be subject to a less demanding equitable duty than a related common law duty. Further, it 
was recognised above that the courts will not prevent legal rights from being relied upon 
on the grounds of some broad notion of unconscionability. By analogy it follows that the 
courts will be reluctant to utilise good faith as a means to prevent a contracting party 
from relying on a strict contractual right. Therefore, unless the criteria for estoppel can be 
made out such that equity will intervene, it is plausible that the courts will not prevent a 
party from relying on a contractual right even if judges were to be armed with a 
contractual good faith doctrine.  
 
Further, the courts have sought to limit the application of estoppel in order to avoid the 
doctrine of consideration from being unduly undermined. A good faith obligation 
unrestricted by criteria analogous to that associated with estoppel would potentially run 
roughshod over the requirement for consideration. As a result, estoppel may be more 
desirable than good faith due to its familiarity and reasonably clear bounds.
227
 In any 
event there are powerful arguments to suggest that the courts should be squarely 
addressing and reformulating the doctrine of consideration to remedy unfairness rather 
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than undermining it with equitable estoppel and notions of good faith.
228
 This 
development would serve to promote greater coherence and consistency and may abate 
the perceived need for a good faith doctrine. 
 
It is therefore submitted that the doctrine of estoppel would be unlikely to be affected by 
the introduction of a doctrine of contractual good faith in New Zealand, particularly in 
the application of estoppel to parties without a pre-existing contractual relationship. 
Further, there is little evidence to support the positive view when a doctrine of 
contractual good faith is compared against the developed doctrine of promissory estoppel 
in light of the general unwillingness of the courts in New Zealand to interfere with 
established contractual rights in the absence of clear circumstances giving rise to an 
equitable estoppel.     
 
4.7 Good Faith and the Exercise of Contractual Discretions: 
 
Many contractual provisions are framed in terms of affording a discretionary power to a 
particular contracting party. Often a contract will expressly require the power to be 
exercised ‘reasonably’ or ‘genuinely’. Absent such wording, conceivably a doctrine of 
good faith could be utilised to construe a contractual term conferring a discretion to be 
exercised in good faith.  
 
However, there is evidence to suggest that obligations akin to good faith are already 
being imposed on contractual parties exercising contractual discretions. The instances in 
which this may occur requires examination to determine whether a good faith doctrine 
would have any beneficial effect over and above the approach taken under the existing 
law. 
 
                                                     
228
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Before undertaking this analysis it should be noted that it is the exercise of a contractual 
power or discretion rather than the exercise of a contractual right which is being 
appraised. As discussed above, the courts are generally unwilling to place any fetter on a 
clear contractual right such as a right of cancellation under an agreement or a right arising 
at law to rescind or to claim damages.
229
 The courts will not examine the reasonableness 
of the exercise of a contractual right or whether it would be unconscionable to exercise 
the right in the particular circumstances.  
 
However, that reluctance is not evident when a court is asked to scrutinise the exercise of 
contractual discretions. Peden rationalises the distinction: 
 
It is clear that the courts want to impose some fetter on the exercise of 
discretions…It is uncontroversial that powers or discretions must be exercised 
according to their intended purpose, which can be construed from the particular 
context. In contrast, the exercise of contractual rights (as opposed to discretions or 
powers) arguably should be completely unfettered, as contracting parties are not 
obliged to enter contracts, and presumably they do so for some advantage, 
commercial or otherwise, accepting that certain rights are given to each side, 
which can be exercised when triggered.
230
  
 
Distinguishing between a contractual right and a power or discretion may not be a 
straightforward task. Discretionary powers are generally thought to postpone to a 
different time, and allocate to a single party, the distribution of a benefit under the 
contract.
231
 A contractual discretion may include, for example, an election to permit an 
assignment
232
 or select a port for delivery of goods
233
 or consent by an insurer to the 
settlement of litigation
234
 or variance by a mortgagee of an interest rate
235
 or the 
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distribution of commissions by an employer to employees.
236
 It has been argued that if 
discretions of this kind were subject to an unrestricted choice the outcome would be 
inconsistent with the foundation of a binding contract.
237
 The promise might be too 
uncertain to constitute good consideration and may indicate a lack of intention to create 
legal relations. Indeed, there are a number of cases supporting the notion that the exercise 
of contractual powers is not completely unrestrained. 
 
In Equitable Life Assurance Society v Hyman
238
 the House of Lords considered the 
exercise of a discretion to apportion the profits of a pension fund under retirement 
annuity contracts. It was held that the directors of the funds exercised their discretion in a 
way which subverted the basis of the retirement policies. Lord Cooke reasoned that no 
legal discretion, however widely worded, can be exercised for purposes contrary to those 
of the instrument under which it is conferred.
239
 His Lordship saw no difficulty in 
applying what is traditionally an administrative law principle to the exercise of a 
contractual discretion. It was further reasoned that a breach of the rule could result in a 
breach of contract, which would require rectification.
240
 Notably, Lord Steyn reached the 
same outcome in the case but did so by implying in a term in fact into the policy.
241
 
 
A restriction was also placed on a contractual discretion by the English Court of Appeal 
in Gan Insurance Co Ltd v Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd.
242
 It was held that the discretion 
of reinsurers to withhold approval to a compromise of claim or admission of liability by 
the insured had to be exercised in good faith after a consideration of the facts giving rise 
to the particular claim. The discretion could not be exercised with reference to 
considerations wholly extraneous to the subject-matter of the policy.
243
 The obligation 
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was found by way of construction. The requirement was derived from the nature and 
purpose of the relevant contractual terms.
244
 
 
In Paragon Finance plc v Staunton
245
 the English Court of Appeal was again quite 
willing to apply administrative law principles to the exercise of a contractual discretion. 
Thus, the discretion afforded to a mortgagee to vary interest rates was subject to an 
implied obligation that the rates of interest would not be set dishonestly, for an improper 
purpose, capriciously or arbitrarily.
246
 
 
The apparent willingness of the English courts to fetter the exercise of contractual 
discretion has received endorsement and support within New Zealand. In S P Bates & 
Associates Ltd v Woolworths (NZ) Ltd
247
 Fisher J held that a discretion given to a 
provider of technology services to monitor the information technology usage of its client 
did not give the provider the right to covertly rummage through communications in order 
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to use them against the client should the provider and the client later fall out.
248
 In the 
course of his judgment, Fisher J cited the observations of Leggett LJ in Abu Dhabi 
National Tanker Co v Product Star Shipping Ltd: 
 
Where A and B contract with each other to confer a discretion on A, that does not 
render B subject to A’s uninhibited whim. In my judgment, the authorities show 
that not only must the discretion be exercised honestly and in good faith, but 
having regard to the provisions of the contract by which it is conferred, it must not 
be exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably.
249
 
 
Similarly in Aztrazeneca Ltd v Pharmaceutical Management Agency
250
 Miller J held that 
an apparently unfettered power to make a calculation affecting the amount payable under 
a pharmaceutical contract was subject to a requirement of reasonableness in the exercise 
of the discretion. His Honour suggested that the obligation was found as a matter of 
construction although, if necessary, such a term could also be implied to give business 
efficacy to the contract.
251
   
 
Ultimately, whether a contractual discretion will be subject to an obligation of 
reasonableness or good faith will depend on the wording of the clause itself. The courts 
will not impose an additional obligation contrary to the intention of the contracting 
parties. For example, if the parties include in the contract a provision that the discretion 
can be exercised for any reason or at the ‘sole discretion’ of one party, this may exclude 
any obligation of reasonableness or requirement to have regard to the interests of the 
other contracting party.
252
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On balance, it is submitted that there is sufficient authority to assume that the exercise of 
unfettered contractual powers is likely, where necessary, to be subject to judicially 
imposed restraints.
253
 Further, these restraints have been implemented by explicitly 
drawing on the concept of good faith.
254
  
 
Judicial control of contractual discretions has been suggested to present a challenge to 
freedom of contract and party autonomy.
255
 However, this reasoning must be questioned. 
To find that contracting parties intend an unfettered contractual discretion to confer a 
right to exercise the discretion in a capricious or arbitrary manner is a strained and 
untenable interpretation.  
 
In light of the prevailing acceptance of a good faith or reasonableness obligation in the 
exercise of contractual discretions, it is submitted that a general doctrine of contractual 
good faith would be unlikely to be of any additional benefit in this field of contractual 
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performance. The equivalence thesis is satisfied. The point is well advanced by Kós in 
the context of the exercise of contractual powers: 
 
[T]here is a shapeless melange of cases dealing in broad terms with general 
obligations of good faith inter se the contracting parties. These inferred 
obligations, which frequently defy rational analysis (e.g. whether they arise in 
contract or in equity) or definition (e.g. how far they reach) [ ] are not needed in 
the present context, because contract law has developed its own effective 
mechanism to ensure good faith exercise of contractual discretions…
256
 
 
The willingness of the courts to fetter the exercise of contractual discretions, by 
importing obligations of reasonableness, honesty, good faith and administrative law 
principles, is evidence of the desire to give effect to the reasonable expectations of 
contracting parties. Thus, in the context of contractual discretions, the courts are 
essentially achieving the purpose of a general good faith doctrine without requiring its 
explicit recognition or incorporation into the law of contract within New Zealand.  
 
4.8 Good Faith, Penalty Provisions and Liquidated Damages: 
 
4.8.1 The Juristic Rationale for Sanctioning Penalty Clauses: 
 
Often parties to a contract may include a term stipulating that certain damages are 
payable in the event of breach. The particular clause may simply state the sum to be 
remitted. Alternatively, the term may provide a specific formula for calculating the 
quantum of damages. Such clauses may be commercially desirable and economically 
efficient. They provide certainty and save the expense of proving loss.
257
 Unlike an 
exclusion of liability clause, an agreed damages clause is likely to be of benefit to both 
                                                     
256
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parties.
258
 From a more general policy perspective, agreed damages clauses are of 
advantage to society as a whole because they reduce the incidence of litigation and the 
need to resort to the courts to resolve contractual issues.  
 
However, the law does not countenance agreed damages clauses which seek to penalise 
the party in breach rather than compensate the innocent party. As a general rule, punitive 
or exemplary damages are not appropriate in the field of contract law.
259
 This rule is 
sound for a number of reasons. Damages in contract are confined to compensating for 
pecuniary loss and, in some instances, non-pecuniary loss.
260
 The defendant is not to be 
punished further. A contract represents a private arrangement under which each party 
voluntarily assumes the risk of a breach by the other. Thus there is no justification to 
confer a windfall on the innocent party to a breach.  
 
Further, damages representing a penalty distort efficient breach. This dictates that a 
contract should be breached where the victim is paid compensatory damages and the 
other is made better off than if he or she performed. The result is Pareto efficient. No 
party is worse off and one is better off. A penalty clause increases the cost of breach and 
therefore diminishes the incidence of efficient breach.  
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Moreover, punishment is best confined to the criminal law which contains appropriate 
procedural safeguards.
261
 Despite exemplary damages being allowed in other areas of the 
civil law such as tort, there is justifiable argument to abandon punitive damages 
altogether in the civil law.
262
  
 
Ultimately, it follows that if the judiciary is not prepared to award punitive damages in 
contract, public policy dictates that contracting parties should be precluded from 
voluntarily agreeing to them.  
 
Accordingly, it is necessary for the courts to distinguish between an agreed damages 
clause which represents a genuine pre-estimate of contractual damages and a clause 
which is held over the other party in terrorem. The former represents liquidated damages. 
The latter constitutes a penalty. Thus, a penalty extends past indemnifying the promisee 
for the actual loss suffered if the promisor does not discharge his or her contractual 
obligations. Instead, it is held as a threat over the promisor in order to secure performance 
of the agreement.
263
 
 
The courts have traditionally intervened to regulate contracts involving penalty clauses. 
This results in a departure from the notion of freedom of contract. The juristic basis for 
this intervention is not entirely clear. The general approach of the courts is to regard a 
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penalty clause as void and ineffective.
264
 Consequently, the promisee is required to 
establish his or her claim for unliquidated damages.
265
 This solution is said to represent a 
common law approach.
266
 Alternatively, the courts may permit the promisee to enforce 
the agreed damages provision to the extent that it represents actual loss, but refuse to 
enforce any residual amount, being penal in nature and therefore unconscionable.
267
 This 
outcome is based on equitable principles. Historically it was thought that the intervention 
of the Court was founded on its equitable jurisdiction. However, the High Court of 
Australia has recognised that ‘the equitable jurisdiction to relieve against penalties [has] 
withered on the vine’
268
 because in most instances equity offers no additional remedy to 
that which the promisor may obtain at common law.
269
 Ultimately, the distinction 
between the two approaches may be semantic. 
 
The refusal to uphold penalty provisions is another clear example of the courts giving 
effect to general principles of good faith.
270
 A promisee who seeks to recover a penalty 
and a windfall fails to discharge good faith behaviour. In lieu of the existing jurisdiction 
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to relieve against penalty provisions, conceivably a common law doctrine of good faith 
could be invoked by a promisor to preclude a penalty provision from being enforced. 
Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that a doctrine of good faith would provide any additional 
benefit to a promisor than the remedy currently available under the existing law. 
 
However, it has been suggested that a doctrine of good faith could be utilised by the 
courts to determine whether a particular clause is a liquidated damages clause or a 
penalty provision.
271
 This proposition requires further consideration.  
 
4.8.2 Utilising Good Faith to Distinguish Between Penalties and Liquidated Damages: 
 
In Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd Lord Dunedin set out 
certain rules of guidance for determining whether a clause is a penalty: 
 
(a)  It will be held to be penalty if the sum stipulated for is extravagant and 
unconscionable in amount in comparison with the greatest loss that could 
conceivably be proved to have followed from the breach… 
 
(b)  It will be held to be a penalty if the breach consists only in not paying a 
sum of money, and the sum stipulated is a sum greater than the sum which 
ought to have been paid… 
 
(c)  There is a presumption (but no more) that it is penalty when "a single 
lump sum is made payable by way of compensation, on the occurrence of 
one or more or all of several events, some of which may occasion serious 
and others but trifling damage"… 
 
On the other hand: 
 
(d)  It is no obstacle to the sum stipulated being a genuine pre-estimate of 
damage, that the consequences of the breach are such as to make precise 
pre-estimation almost an impossibility. On the contrary, that is just the 
situation when it is probable that pre-estimated damage was the true 
bargain between the parties…
272
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What is therefore required is a genuine pre-estimate of loss or damage.
273
 The time for 
assessing whether the estimate is genuine is at the time of making the contract, not the 
time of the breach.
274
 
 
In Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd
275
 the High Court of Australia, whilst 
accepting that the dicta of Lord Dunedin continues to represent the law in Australia, 
suggested that it is not enough that the stipulated amount is lacking in proportion to the 
potential loss. Instead, it must be ‘out of all proportion.’
276
 However, this approach is 
open to criticism. It shifts the focus away from a genuine pre-estimate of loss towards the 
degree of accuracy.
277
 The latter is undoubtedly circumstantial evidence of the former. 
However, arguably it should not be determinative. For example, an estimate which is 
based on a wholly inappropriate formula might constitute a penalty even though the 
calculated sum may approximately equate with the loss. In other cases, the loss may be so 
easy to predict that any contractual figure above the amount that can be readily predicted 
may be considered penal, notwithstanding that it is not out of all proportion. In either 
instance the pre-estimated sum may not be determined reasonably and in good faith.
278
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Peden and Carter have therefore recognised the limitations of the dictum in Ringrow and 
the importance of good faith: 
 
One conclusion which might be drawn from Ringrow is that the out of all 
proportion test is applicable in all cases. However, in our view that conclusion is 
wrong. Because good faith is the underlying concept, and because determination 
of a sum which is not out of all proportion is not synonymous with a good faith 
assessment, there must be limitations on the test.
279
 
 
Accordingly, it appears logical that the estimate of loss embody a requisite degree of 
accuracy, but also be based on appropriate considerations. Thus, it is suggested that only 
good faith pre-estimations of damage should be effective to liquidate damages.
280
 The 
question is one of construction having regard to the intention of the parties.
281
 A good 
faith pre-estimation of damage may require the parties to have regard to the conventional 
measure of damage that would be applied by the courts in respect of the loss.
282
 The 
Court may need to look behind the figure stipulated to the suitability of the calculation 
used to arrive at the sum, particularly where there is no formula provided in the 
agreement. In this respect, the promisee may have incentive to adduce evidence of how 
the amount was arrived at, notwithstanding that the promisor bears the onus of showing 
that a clause is a penalty.
283
 It is therefore submitted that whether a particular clause 
represents liquidated damages or a penalty can be informed by evaluating whether it has 
been determined reasonably and in good faith.  
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Some commentators have suggested that an open recognition of unconscionability or 
good faith is required to rectify the perceived difficulties that ‘bedevil the law of penalty 
clauses.’
284
 One of those difficulties is the apparent anomaly between the willingness of 
the courts to strike down penalties payable on breach and the willingness to enforce 
clauses analogous to penalties which are payable on some other event. For example, a 
hirer under a hire purchase contract who defaults in breach may be relieved of the 
consequences of a ‘minimum payment’ clause requiring a fixed payment regardless of 
when the breach occurs. On the contrary, a hirer who determines the contract in 
accordance with an option in the agreement may have no claim to relief from payment of 
the stipulated amount because there has been no breach of contract. In Bridge v Campbell 
Discount Co Ltd Lord Denning described the granting of relief to a man who breaks his 
contract but not to a man who keeps it as an ‘absurd paradox.’
285
  
 
Accordingly, some have suggested that there needs to be a move away from rigid 
classifications of particular clauses to a focus on substantive fairness. It has been argued 
that the distinction between penalties and liquidated damages must be rejected in favour 
of a general good faith criterion for the enforceability of such clauses.
286
 
 
Nonetheless, it is submitted that there is no need for a general doctrine of good faith in 
the field of contractual penalties.
287
 The existing legal rules effectively embody an 
unexpressed requirement of good faith. There is no reason why the rules in Dunlop 
cannot continue to prevail and undergo judicious development if necessary. For example, 
the courts could extend the Dunlop principles to deal with concerns relating to the 
distinction between penalties payable on breach and those payable on some other event. 
Notwithstanding, there is a cogent argument to suggest that this should not occur given 
that the value of contractual undertakings is properly a matter for the parties rather than 
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 Waddams, above n 178, at 324. 
285
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the courts. Thus, in Export Credits Guarantee Department v Universal Oil Products 
Co
288
 the House of Lords declined to extend the jurisdiction to relieve against penalties to 
circumstances where the payment of money was required on the occurrence of a specified 
event rather than a breach. Lord Roskill recognised that it was not for the courts to relieve 
a contracting party from a commercially imprudent bargain.
289
 
 
Further, to abandon the defined guiding criteria in favour of a general doctrine of good 
faith might defeat the purpose of agreed damages clauses. Contracting parties may be left 
subject to too much judicial discretion. Conceivably, liquidated damages clauses would 
be regularly challenged by hopeful promisors. Contrary to the purpose of such clauses, 
the incidence of litigation would increase. Accordingly, whilst the distinction between 
penalties and liquidated damages may be informed by notions of good faith, the defined 
legal criteria should not be abandoned.   
 
4.8.3 Précis: 
 
The willingness of the courts to strike down penalty clauses is evidence of the courts 
sanctioning bad faith conduct. Further, the determination of whether a clause represents 
liquidated damages or a penalty can be explained with reference to good faith 
considerations. Nonetheless, it is submitted that a common law doctrine of good faith 
would be unlikely to be of any additional benefit to the existing law in this field of 
contract regulation. The existing law is adequate and is desirably certain. To discard the 
defined guiding criteria in favour of a general principle of good faith in determining 
whether an agreed damages clause can be enforced might result in uncertainty which 
would frustrate the purpose of liquidated damages clauses. 
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289
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4.9 Good Faith and Cancellation for Breach – Conditions, Warranties, 
Innominate Terms and the Contractual Remedies Act 1979: 
 
4.9.1 Conditions and Warranties: 
 
The common law traditionally treats contractual terms as falling into two distinct 
categories. The first category is a condition.
290
 The second is a warranty. A condition is 
seen as an essential term of the contract. A breach of a condition may be considered a 
substantial failure to perform the contract at all.
291
 Accordingly, a breach not only gives 
rise to an action for damages, but also a right to rescind the contract. A warranty on the 
other hand is a less important term of the contract. The term is collateral to the main 
contractual purpose.
292
 Breach of a warranty gives rise to an action in damages, but not a 
right to terminate.
293
  
 
The Court will look to the intention of the parties in determining whether a contractual 
term is a condition or a warranty.
294
 Each case depends upon a construction of the 
contract.
295
 Use of the word condition or warranty within a contract to describe a 
particular term will be presumptive but not definitive.
296
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 The word ‘condition’ in this context should not be confused with its more orthodox meaning that a 
condition is an external event upon which the obligations of the contracting parties depend. 
291
 Wallis Son & Wells v Pratt and Haynes [1910] 2 KB 1003. 
292
 For example, the definition of warranty under s 2(1) Sale of Goods Act 1908 provides that a warranty 
‘means an agreement with reference to goods which are the subject of a contract of sale, but collateral to 
the main purpose of such contract, the breach of which gives rise to a claim for damages, but not to a right 
to reject the goods and treat the contract as repudiated.’ 
293
 See Burrows, Finn and Todd, above n 41, at 186. 
294
 See Butterworths, Commercial Law in New Zealand, (at 19 June 2008), at [13.1]. 
295
 Section 13(2) Sale of Goods Act 1908. 
296
 Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd v Schuler AG [1973] 2 All ER 39. 
 214 
4.9.2 The Innominate Term – Giving Effect to Good Faith? 
 
The traditional distinction between conditions and warranties came under scrutiny in the 
mid to late 20
th
 century. The distinction is problematic because it focuses only on a 
classification of a particular term at the time of entering into the contract. No cognisance 
is taken of the seriousness and consequences of the breach of the term. This criticism was 
the catalyst for the celebrated judgment of Diplock LJ in Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd 
v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd where it was recognised: 
 
There are, however, many contractual undertakings of a more complex character 
which cannot be categorised as being "conditions" or "warranties"…Of such 
undertakings, all that can be predicated is that some breaches will, and others will 
not, give rise to an event which will deprive the party not in default of 
substantially the whole benefit which it was intended that he should obtain from 
the contract; and the legal consequences of a breach of such an undertaking, 
unless provided for expressly in the contract, depend on the nature of the event to 
which the breach gives rise and do not follow automatically from a prior 
classification of the undertaking as a "condition" or a "warranty".
297
 
 
Those terms contemplated by Diplock LJ which cannot be characterised as conditions or 
warranties have since become known as ‘innominate’ terms.
298
 Arguably, the desire to 
avoid the classical distinction between conditions and warranties is an attempt to 
introduce an element of good faith and fairness into contract law.
299
 The effect of the 
innominate term theory is to recognise that breach of a warranty may be sufficiently 
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serious to warrant termination.
300
 Alternatively, the theory endeavours to prevent a party 
from cancelling a contract for a trivial breach. Seemingly a party who attempts to rescind 
for an insignificant breach acts in contravention of good faith. The innominate term 
rationale therefore neutralises withdrawals in bad faith.
301
 Thus, Tetley recognises: 
 
The distinction between “warranties”, “conditions” and “innominate terms” is 
another way in which good faith is enforced in the common law of contract, by 
ensuring that relatively minor contractual breaches [ ] do not permit the injured 
party to be released from his contractual obligations, as if they were breaches of 
conditions.
302
  
  
Initially the Hong Kong Fir case was interpreted liberally. In a trio of cases
303
, the House 
of Lords demonstrated a general reluctance to find that a particular term was a condition. 
Perhaps the most exceptional case in that trio was Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd v 
Schuler AG.
304
 Notwithstanding that the parties had expressed a term relating to the 
frequency by which sales representatives were to visit customers to be a condition, the 
majority
305
 found that the clause could not be given that effect. The decision was 
rationalised on the basis that the term was not a condition when properly construed. 
However, this construction was arrived at by observing that a breach of the term could be 
so trivial that a right to cancel could not have been intended by the parties. It would 
produce an unreasonable result.
306
 Seemingly the Lords were really looking to the effect 
of the breach rather than the intention of the parties. Lord Wilberforce dissented. He 
opined that the words used indicated an intention for ‘aggressive, insistent punctuality 
and efficiency.’
307
 Thus, his Lordship reasoned that the clause was a condition. 
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Notwithstanding, the majority decision in Wickman suggested a clear desire to avoid an 
unfair outcome. Indeed, the cases around the time evidence an unwritten preference for 
innominate terms over conditions when construing contractual terms.
308
 
 
However, in Bunge Corp v Tradax SA
309
 the English Court of Appeal diluted the effect of 
the dicta of Diplock LJ. It was suggested that in some contracts certainty in the 
performance of a particular term is so essential that the term should be treated as a 
condition. A stipulation as to time in a mercantile contract would almost always be 
deemed to be a condition. Accordingly, notice of the readiness of the vessel given four 
days late was sufficient to warrant cancellation of the agreement by the innocent party.  
 
Thus, the right to cancel for breach remains unaffected where the parties have expressly 
agreed that a particular term is a condition or the law deems a particular stipulation to be 
a condition by virtue of the nature of the term and the class of contract in which it falls. 
The trivialness of the breach is irrelevant. Although the innominate term theory goes 
some way to ensuring good faith conduct, it does not go so far as to totally preclude a 
party for cancelling for minor breach. 
 
4.9.3 Codification Under the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 – A Limit on Good Faith? 
 
Although the distinction between conditions and warranties has been retained under the 
Sale of Goods Act 1908, the right to cancel a contract in New Zealand is now principally 
governed by the CRA. The ability to cancel on the grounds of breach is specifically 
provided for under ss 7(3) and 7(4), which state: 
 
(3)  Subject to this Act, but without prejudice to subsection (2) of this section, 
a party to a contract may cancel it if— 
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(a)  He has been induced to enter into it by a misrepresentation, 
whether innocent or fraudulent, made by or on behalf of another 
party to that contract; or 
(b)  A term in the contract is broken by another party to that contract; 
or 
(c)  It is clear that a term in the contract will be broken by another 
party to that contract. 
  
(4)  Where subsection (3)(a) or subsection (3)(b) or subsection (3)(c) of this 
section applies, a party may exercise the right to cancel if, and only if,— 
(a)  The parties have expressly or impliedly agreed that the truth of the 
representation or, as the case may require, the performance of the 
term is essential to him; or  
(b)  The effect of the misrepresentation or breach is, or, in the case of 
an anticipated breach, will be,— 
(i)  Substantially to reduce the benefit of the contract to the 
cancelling party; or 
(ii)  Substantially to increase the burden of the cancelling party 
under the contract; or 
(iii)  In relation to the cancelling party, to make the benefit or 
burden of the contract substantially different from that 
represented or contracted for. 
 
The effect of s 7 arguably embodies the considerations of fairness and good faith which 
Diplock LJ was apparently seeking to propound in Hong Kong Fir case.
310
 The right to 
cancel an agreement under the CRA is prima facie governed by the effect of the breach. 
Thus, the CRA takes a pragmatic approach. Parliament has recognised the reasonable 
expectations of both innocent and breaching parties by limiting the right of a contracting 
party to cancel for a trivial breach or, alternatively, by allowing cancellation for a 
substantial breach irrespective of the classification of the term.  
 
However, the effect of s 7(4)(a) is to retain the common law condition. This result may 
not be altogether satisfactory to proponents of good faith.
311
 It remains possible for a 
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party to cancel a contract if it has been agreed that performance of the term is essential, 
regardless of the seriousness or consequences of the breach. It might be argued that this 
outcome effectively sanctions behaviour by the non-breaching party in contravention of 
good faith. It is clear that the focus of the Court under s 7(4)(a) is on the intention of the 
parties at the time of entering into the contract. The Court will not take into account the 
consequences of the breach in determining essentiality.
312
 For example, in Rick Dees
313
, 
where time was agreed to be of the essence, the cancellation of the contract on the 
grounds that notice of tender was given seven minutes late was justified even though the 
vendor had apparently suffered no adverse consequences as a result of the breach.  
 
The retention of the common law condition on the ground of certainty has been subject to 
scrutiny by good faith proponents, particularly because it ignores the potential reasons for 
the cancellation. For example, some suggest that there is a lack of good faith where a 
cancellation for breach of a condition is not motivated by the negative consequences of 
the breach but instead by a prior movement in market prices.
314
 The excessive 
technicality of the condition allows a party to extricate himself or herself from a bad 
bargain.
315
 
 
However, there are logical reasons for focusing on the effect of the breach and the 
essentiality of the term, rather than on the motive for cancellation. Waddams recognises: 
 
There would [ ] be a practical problem in a rule that termination is permissible 
only if the motives of the party seeking to terminate are not self-interested, or if 
they do not include considerations extraneous to the breach itself…Such a rule, if 
it could even be seriously contemplated, would involve costly inquiries into the 
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state of mind of the party purporting to terminate, and would create perverse 
incentives.
316
 
 
In addition to the cogent arguments against examining contractual motives, it is 
submitted that it is highly unlikely that the introduction of a common law doctrine of 
good faith would act to fetter or limit the right of an innocent party to cancel a contract 
for breach. If the parties have plainly expressly or impliedly agreed that a particular term 
in a contract is ‘essential’ such that a breach, no matter how serious, gives rise to a right 
to cancel, then it is difficult to see how a construction of the contract based on good faith 
could limit that right.
317
 It is highly arguable that by agreeing that a particular term is a 
condition, that the parties did not intend the right to cancel for a breach of that term to be 
subject to an obligation of good faith. 
 
Further, s 7(1) of the CRA provides: 
 
(1)  Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, this section shall have 
effect in place of the rules of the common law and of equity governing the 
circumstances in which a party to a contract may rescind it, or treat it as 
discharged, for misrepresentation or repudiation or breach. 
 
Thus, the CRA would override a common law doctrine of good faith in so far as an 
obligation of good faith might place additional restrictions on the right of a contracting 
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party to cancel the contract for breach. In Vero Insurance New Zealand Ltd v Fleet 
Insurance & Risk Management Ltd Asher J recognised the inconsistency: 
 
When a contract is terminable for [ ] breach that would give rise to a right to 
cancel [ ] it is unlikely that a Court would limit that power by applying a 
requirement of good faith. That has never been such a restriction on the common 
law right to rescind or the Contractual Remedies Act right to cancel.
318
 
 
Accordingly, unless an obligation of contractual good faith were to be put in place by 
Parliament, a contracting party who cancelled the contract in accordance with the 
provisions of the CRA should have a valid defence to any claim for a breach of good 
faith. Indeed, the ability to rely on the CRA would be put in disarray if the result were 
any different. 
 
4.9.4 Précis: 
 
The advent of the theory of the innominate term is evidence of the courts seeking to give 
effect to notions of good faith in the context of cancellation for breach. Nonetheless, the 
judiciary remains willing to defer to the clearly expressed intentions of the parties over 
considerations of fairness. 
 
Within New Zealand, a doctrine of good faith would conceivably have little impact on 
the existing law relating to the right to cancel contracts for breach. A good faith doctrine 
would be confined to the considerations of good faith and fair dealing implicit in the 
CRA in the absence of further legislative intervention. 
 
4.10 Summary: 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that unless a doctrine of contractual good faith is to 
produce different legal outcomes to those under the existing law, then the introduction of 
the subject doctrine should not be supported. This conclusion is based on the potential for 
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the administration of the law in New Zealand to be detrimentally affected by the 
introduction of a general, unfamiliar and uncertain principle. Accordingly, a neutral or 
agnostic outlook of good faith should tend towards a negative view of the subject 
doctrine. 
 
The brief and select case analysis undertaken revealed little support for the positive view. 
It demonstrated that the law in New Zealand has, to some extent, developed to give effect 
to outcomes which proponents of good faith believe would be achieved under the subject 
doctrine. In other instances the case examples propounded by advocates simply do not 
lend support to the efficacy of a general good faith doctrine. 
 
The comparative study has evidenced that the relevant existing legal and equitable 
doctrines, particularly those relating to pre-contractual conduct, would be unlikely to be 
affected by the introduction of a universal doctrine of good faith. There is however little 
evidence to suggest that a doctrine of good faith would provide additional legal remedies 
for a plaintiff than those under the existing law. This result is explained by two 
fundamental reasons. Firstly, many of the existing piecemeal doctrines already embody 
notions of good faith, fairness and reasonableness or, at least, are capable of being 
developed to achieve this result. Secondly, to the extent that those doctrines may fall 
short of upholding notions of good faith conduct, there is normally a good reason 
premised either on contractual autonomy or contractual certainty. There is little evidence 
to suggest that the courts will depart from these considerations should good faith be 
introduced into New Zealand contract law by means of the subject doctrine. Accordingly, 
the doctrine is more likely to be reduced to equate with the existing law. Due to the 
administrative problems associated with good faith, this result suggests that an express 
universal doctrine of contractual good faith would be neither a necessary nor desirable 
addition to New Zealand law. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Economic Analysis of a Good Faith Doctrine  
 
5.1 Chapter Introduction: 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the subject doctrine of good faith from a law 
and economics perspective. Economic analysis of the law embodies the concept of 
efficiency. A legal rule is more desirable when it is efficient.1 Economic efficiency can be 
measured in terms of wealth or value. However, there are differing efficiency criterions. 
One measure of efficiency is achieving an allocation of resources which maximises net 
wealth or value. This methodology aggregates wealth across persons rather than treating 
them as individuals. The concept of Pareto efficiency on the other hand is more 
sympathetic to the interests of all affected persons. An allocation of resources is said to 
be Pareto efficient when no person can be made better off without making another worse 
off. Generally, a regime of contract law will be most efficient where the benefit of 
individual transactions is maximised and the associated costs are minimised.  
 
An examination of whether a universal obligation of good faith would be economically 
efficient requires a comparison between the current state of contract law within New 
Zealand and the envisaged system under a doctrine of good faith. Contract economics 
dictates that the subject doctrine could only be supported if it would result in more 
efficiency than the prevailing regime of contract law within New Zealand. 
 
Part 5.2 of this chapter gives a brief account of the importance of law and economics 
scholarship and its relevance to good faith. Part 5.3 identifies the primary contract 
economics view of good faith. The subject doctrine is seen as a potential deterrent to 
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107. 
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opportunistic behaviour. Therefore, the notion of opportunism is discussed. It is 
recognised that opportunistic conduct is likely to arise from two intrinsic phenomena of 
contracts being incompleteness and sequential performance. The importance of 
behavioural economics to good faith and the discouragement of opportunistic conduct is 
also considered. Part 5.4 endeavours to bring together the analysis of the above concepts 
in a transactions cost model of good faith. The model permits predictions to be made as 
to whether, and in what circumstances, a good faith doctrine in New Zealand would be 
more efficient than the prevailing law of contract. Part 5.5 evaluates the economic 
efficiency of two specific potential applications of the good faith doctrine. The first is 
pre-contractual disclosure and the second is quantity variations under requirements 
contracts and output agreements. Both applications have attracted considerable academic 
comment. Part 5.6 summarises the findings and the economic desirability of a good faith 
doctrine within New Zealand. 
 
5.2 The Relevance of Law and Economics Scholarship to Good Faith: 
 
5.2.1 Law and Economics Generally: 
 
There are two fundamental reasons why economic principles are relevant to the law. 
Firstly, economics is concerned with the allocation of scarce resources. The law is also 
necessarily involved in controlling the use of the resources of society. Indeed, if there 
were an infinite abundance of resources there would be no need for control and hence no 
need for law.2 Economic theory can therefore inform the manner in which the law should 
manage the use of limited resources. Secondly, economics focuses on behaviour. The law 
seeks to control behaviour by regulating conduct and imposing consequences for a failure 
to adhere to those regulations. Economic principles can be utilised to predict how rational 
individuals will respond to the law. As a result, the law can be formulated to create 
appropriate incentives to achieve desired economic outcomes.3 
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Law and economics scholarship underwent significant development in the latter part of 
the 20th century.4 It was not until around 1960 that attempts were made to apply 
economic analysis systematically to specific areas of the law.5 Whereas ‘old law and 
economics’ was concerned primarily with competition law, this wave of ‘new law and 
economics’ sought to examine the efficiency of legal rules in a wide variety of legal 
fields including property, tort, crimes and contract. Further progress was made during the 
1980s. This was characterised by a departure away from an abstract approach focusing 
solely on how the rational person should act. Social norms and behavioural 
considerations became more relevant. Law and economics scholars engaged in more 
rigorous empirical analysis. Efforts were made to test the validity and application of the 
rational actor model. This development has allowed law and economics scholarship to 
embrace a more sophisticated and realistic methodology.6 As a result is it possible to 
more precisely anticipate the effect of a legal rule. This is beneficial for society. 
McGuinness notes: 
 
Too often legal policy makers (principally judges and legislatures) justify the 
rules that they adopt solely in terms of their underlying objective. The real value 
of a particular rule to society is not what the policy maker wished the rule to 
achieve, but rather what it actually achieves or what it can be expected to achieve, 
given our understanding of human affairs in general. The standard of 
measurement is one of legal consequence not intent. One hope which the 
economic analysis of law offers is the ability to measure more accurately the real 
world effect of legal rules.7  
 
Law and economics study is perceived as immensely important within the United States.8 
America is the leader in the application of law and economic analysis to the common law. 
                                                     
4 See generally Steven Burton and Eric Andersen, Contractual Good Faith: Formation, Performance, 
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5 See generally Richard A Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (6th ed, 2003), at 24. 
6 See Sir Ivor Richardson, ‘Law and Economics – and Why New Zealand Needs It’ (2002) 8 New Zealand 
Business Law Quarterly 151, at 154. 
7 Kevin McGuinness, ‘Law and Economics – A Reply to Sir Anthony Mason CJ Aust’ (1994) 1 Deakin 
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Almost every major law school in the United States offers papers on the subject. Entire 
law reviews are devoted to the theory.9 Further, several highly regarded academics 
specialising in the field have gone on to take up judicial appointment on the United States 
Courts of Appeals.10  
 
By comparison, economic analysis of the law has not received significant attention within 
academic institutions in New Zealand. However, the school of thought is not completely 
foreign. Some law and economics papers are offered in New Zealand universities and 
work in the field has been published by New Zealand academics.11 Indeed, it is 
elementary that economic theory forms a central part of law making. Thus, economic 
implications of legal rules can be described as a fundamental common law value.12 
Economic considerations are invariably linked to legal fields such as trade practices law, 
company law, tax law, intellectual property law and contract law. The legislature has 
explicitly acknowledged the relevance of economic policy for some decades now.13 
Judges and lawyers have begun to follow suit. Many judicial decisions can be shown to 
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10 Frank Easterbrook, Richard A Posner and Gaudo Calabresi. 
11 See Sir Ivor Richardson, above n 6, at 158-159. Papers in the subject are offered by the economics 
departments at the University of Auckland, Massey University, the University of Waikato, Victoria 
University and the University of Canterbury. However, the only undergraduate paper offered by a law 
school in New Zealand is that offered at Victoria University. See < 
http://www.leanz.org.nz/SITE_Default/SITE_Education/Education.asp>, at 20 December 2008. See also 
Jason Varuhas, ‘The Economic Analysis of Law in New Zealand’ (2005), at 10-11 < 
http://www.leanz.org.nz/SITE_Default/SITE_papers/x-files/14202.pdf>, at 20 December 2008. In addition, 
the Law and Economics Association of New Zealand was founded in 1994 with the objectives of: 
‘Communicating and disseminating information in New Zealand about law and economics literature and 
research, and promoting its application to legal and public policy issues in New Zealand and overseas; 
Enhancing understanding of law and economics in New Zealand amongst legal, economic and other 
relevant professions, including academia, the private sector and government and; Fostering teaching, 
research, publication and education about law and economics in New Zealand.’: < 
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have an economic character, although not expressly recognising economic principles.14 
Further, some New Zealand judgments have overtly discussed economic theory. For 
example, the concept of ‘efficient breach’ was one reason to preclude awards of 
exemplary damages in contract.15 Similarly, ‘opportunity cost’ is a relevant consideration 
in determining an appropriate rate of rent under a lease.16 Likewise, a shareholder acting 
‘opportunistically’ in an attempt to receive more than the market value of his or her 
shares is likely to be denied a remedy under the Companies Act 1993.17 The concepts of 
‘marginal cost’ and ‘transaction costs’ are also now occurring more frequently in 
judgments.18 Sir Ivor Richardson has recently endorsed the ongoing development of law 
and economics scholarship within New Zealand: 
 
While economic analysis alone cannot dictate the results of judicial decisions, it 
has an important role to play in a very wide range of cases. I would hope that in 
the years to come we will see more use of rigorously argued and realistically 
grounded economic analysis – in the legislature, in and before the courts, and in 
the professional legal education arena – and also in the academic environment…19 
 
The increasing importance and prevalence of law and economics analysis is undeniable. 
It follows that judges and the legislature should have regard to the dictates of economic 
principle when formulating and developing the law.  
 
 
 
                                                     
14 See Posner, above n 5, at 25. 
15 Paper Reclaim Ltd v Aotearoa International Ltd [2006] 3 NZLR 188, at 221 per Chambers J. For further 
discussion of efficient breach see Todd Petroleum Mining Company Ltd v Shell (Petroleum Mining) 
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Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd [1996] Ch 269, at 304 per Millett LJ. 
16 General Distributors Ltd v Casata Ltd [2004] 2 NZLR 824, at 842 per France J; [2005] 3 NZLR 156 
(CA). 
17 Latimer Holdings Ltd v SEA Holdings NZ Ltd [2005] 2 NZLR 328, at 336 per Hammond J. 
18 Between 1982 and 2002, 44 judgments mentioned these economic principles. See Sir Ivor Richardson, 
above n 6, at 159. 
19 Ibid, at 173. 
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5.2.2 Limitations of Law and Economics: 
 
There are fundamental limitations to applying an economic analysis to formulate and 
assess legal principles. Despite an increasing recognition of irrational behaviour patterns, 
many economic principles proceed on the basis of the rational actor model. This assumes 
that individuals have a defined set of preferences and act in a manner that maximises the 
satisfaction of those preferences within a prescribed set of constraints. Individuals who 
adhere to such a pattern are presumed to be acting rationally. An individual will choose a 
course of action that maximises his or her utility. It has been argued that in some 
instances this model is too simplistic. Assumptions as to how a person will act do not 
always bear out in practice.20  
 
Nonetheless, law and economics academics have responded to this criticism. An 
economic model may contain assumptions or antecedent conditions that do not always 
hold in reality. However, the model may yield sufficiently accurate ‘results [ ] in the 
normal case, and tolerably reliable quantitative results’21 when gauged against the 
predictions of rival hypotheses. In other words, a model may still be satisfactorily precise 
despite the simplicity of the assumptions. After all, the focus is on the merits of the 
predictions rather than the merits of the assumptions. 
 
Another criticism of law and economics is that wealth maximisation and other efficiency 
criterions cannot be the only goal of the law.22 This reality is generally conceded by law 
and economics scholars. Efficiency has limitations as an ethical criterion for societal 
decision making.23 For example, the Kaldor-Hicks theory of efficiency whereby the result 
is economically desirable if the gain of one exceeds the loss of another is often criticised 
                                                     
20 See generally Michael Trebilcock, ‘The Value and Limits of Law and Economics’ in Megan Richardson 
and Gillian Hadfield (eds), The Second Wave of Law and Economics (1999).  
21 Richard A Posner, ‘Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law’ (1979) 46 University of Chicago Law 
Review 281, at 303. 
22 See Sir Ivor Richardson, above n 6, at 171.  
23 See Posner, above n 5, at 12. 
  
228 
as repugnant to justice and social policy.24 Accordingly, it is reasoned that economic 
efficiency is relevant but should not be the sole determinant when assessing the 
desirability of a legal rule.25 Indeed, it is highly unlikely that every common law rule and 
judicial decision will produce an efficient outcome.26 Notwithstanding, it is notable that 
legal outcomes regarded as efficient by economists and legal outcomes regarded as fair 
by lawyers may frequently coincide. 
 
5.2.3 Economics and Good Faith: 
 
Economic analysis is particularly important to the good faith debate despite the 
limitations identified above. Economics is highly relevant to contract law. Economics can 
be used to explain why individuals enter into contracts and how contract law can 
facilitate the operation of markets.27 Thus, economics will assist in determining the 
function of contractual good faith and its appropriate limits.  
 
The necessity to have regard to economics principles in the appraisal of a good faith 
doctrine is enhanced by the fact that a significant interest group is the commercial 
community. The manner in which contract law is framed may have a fundamental impact 
on commerce within New Zealand. This implies that efficiency and wealth maximisation 
are critical considerations in the development of contract law. In Austotel Pty Ltd v 
Franklins Selfserve Pty Ltd Kirby P recognised the importance of promoting efficiency in 
commercial dealings: 
 
                                                     
24 However, Posner questions whether Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is so at variance with the legal system. Ibid, 
at 26. 
25 Although, it has been postulated that contracting parties will move towards rejecting inefficient but ‘fair’ 
terms and will frame their contract accordingly. See Alan Schwartz, ‘Legal Contract Theories and 
Incomplete Contracts’ in Lars Werin and Hans Wijkander (eds), Contract Economics (1992), at 78. 
26 Posner, above n 5, at 12. 
27 Anthony T Kronman and Richard A Posner, ‘Introduction: Economic Theory and Contract Law’ in 
Anthony T Kronman and Richard A Posner (eds), The Economics of Contract Law (1978), at 1. 
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[C]ourts should be careful to conserve relief so that they do not, in commercial 
matters, substitute lawyerly conscience for the hard-headed decisions of business 
people…The wellsprings of the conduct of commercial people are self-evidently 
important for the efficient operation of the economy. Their actions typically 
depend on self-interest and profit-making not conscience or fairness.28 
 
Arguably, contract regulation is more apt for economic analysis as compared to other 
areas of the law which may invoke stronger moral and social considerations which are 
not particularly amenable to economic theory. Thus, contractual good faith is a prime 
candidate for an application of economic principles. Law makers in New Zealand should 
have close regard to the policy recommendations of the law and economics movement 
when evaluating the good faith argument.29 
 
Contractual good faith has not received significant attention from law and economics 
scholars despite the importance of contract economics. Good faith tends to be recognised 
incidentally in economics literature. Thus, the good faith issue has not been significantly 
informed by economic theory.30 Notably, there is no recognised literature emanating from 
New Zealand evaluating the economic efficiency of a doctrine of good faith. Most 
academic comment derives from the United States and Europe. This trend is inevitably a 
consequence of the greater popularity of law and economics scholarship on the Continent 
and in the United States. The fact that obligations of contractual good faith are explicitly 
imposed within those jurisdictions is also an explanatory factor. 
 
                                                     
28 (1989) 16 NSWLR 582, at 585-586. 
29 For similar comments from an Australian commentator see Arlen Duke, ‘A Universal Duty of Good 
Faith: An Economic Perspective’ (2007) 33 Monash University Law Review 182, at 202. The importance of 
economics to legal analysis has been recognised by John Smillie who notes that ‘voluntary exchange-
bargains promote the collective welfare of society as a whole creating and sustaining markets which tend to 
allocate scarce resources to those who value them most highly and can use them most productively. So 
contracting is good for us all, and citizens must be encouraged to pursue their goals and realise their 
choices by negotiating exchanges of binding promises. This view of the purpose of the law of contract 
explains why the classical common law rules place such a high value on certainty and predictability.’: John 
Smillie, ‘Certainty and Civil Obligation’ (2000) 9 Otago Law Review 633, at 639. 
30 Ibid, at 184. 
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Law and economics commentaries which are of relevance to the subject doctrine of good 
faith tend to be couched either in very general terms or, alternatively, in very specific 
terms. This is explained by the fact that very few articles focus explicitly on a doctrine of 
good faith. Some commentaries engage in a general analysis of how to efficiently frame 
contract law. Other dissertations analyse specific elements of contract law such as 
disclosure31, unconscionability32, mistake33 and frustration.34 Such particular doctrines 
are closely related to notions of good faith as was recognised in Chapter 4. An economic 
analysis of good faith can therefore be approached from a very general level in terms of 
assessing the efficiency implications of a general and universal doctrine. Conversely, the 
analysis may centre on specific applications of good faith. This chapter endeavours to 
provide an appraisal from both perspectives. The starting point is the general approach to 
good faith. This is reflected in the notion that good faith acts as a deterrent to 
opportunistic behaviour. 
 
                                                     
31 See for example Kimberly Krawiec and Kathryn Zeiler, ‘Common-Law Disclosure Duties and the Sin of 
Omission: Testing the Meta-Theories’ (2005) 91 Virginia Law Review 1795; Melvin Eisenberg, ‘Disclosure 
in Contract Law’ (2003) 91 California Law Review 1645. See below for a discussion of duties of 
disclosure. 
32 See for example Russell Korobkin, ‘Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability’ (2003) 70 University of Chicago Law Review 1203; Mark Klock, ‘Unconscionability 
and Price Discrimination’ (2001) 69 Tennessee Law Review 317; Megan Richardson, ‘The Utilitarian-
Economic Model of Contractual Obligation: Unconscionability at the Frontier’ (1995) 20 Melbourne 
University Law Review 481; Richard A Posner, ‘Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the 
Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom of Contract’ (1995) 24 
Journal of Legal Studies 283. 
33 See for example Eric Rasmussen and Ian Ayres, ‘Mutual and Unilateral Mistake in Contract Law’ (1993) 
22 Journal of Legal Studies 309; Janet K Smith and Richard Smith, ‘Contract Law, Mutual Mistake, and 
Incentives to Produce and Disclose Information’ (1990) 19 Journal of Legal Studies 467. 
34 See for example Andrew Kull, ‘Mistake, Frustration and the Windfall Principle of Contract Remedies’ 
(1991) 43 Hastings Law Journal 1; Alan O Sykes, ‘The Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability in a 
Second-Best World’ (1990) 19 Journal of Legal Studies 43; Michelle White, ‘Contract Breach and Contract 
Discharge Due to Impossibility: A Unified Theory’ (1988) 17 Journal of Legal Studies 353; Richard A 
Posner and Andrew Rosenfield, ‘Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic 
Analysis’ (1977) 6 Journal of Legal Studies 83. 
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5.3 Deterring Opportunism – An Economic View of Good Faith:    
 
From around the mid 1970s but predominantly during the 1980s, an economic approach 
to contract law was developed which focused on the need to deter opportunistic 
behaviour. This school of thought has subsequently been labeled as the ‘opportunism 
tradition.’35 The following section explains the concept of opportunism and its relevance 
to a universal doctrine of good faith. Prior to defining opportunism, it is necessary to 
identify and explain two basic economic principles relating to contracts. The first is that 
contracts are incomplete. The second is that contracts involve sequential performance. 
Opportunistic conduct may arise as a result of these phenomena. 
 
5.3.1 Contracts are Incomplete: 
 
It is elementary that all contracts are ontologically incomplete. A contract will never 
provide for every possible contingency that may arise. Contracts may be incomplete for a 
variety of reasons.36  
 
Firstly, contractual incompleteness may arise simply because of the ambiguity or 
vagueness of the words used. This may be ascribed to the inherent fallibility and 
imperfection of language.37  
 
Secondly, the parties may have unintentionally failed to address a particular issue. This 
inadvertence could arise because the parties simply neglected to provide for the particular 
contingency. Alternatively, the contingency may have been entirely unforeseeable prior 
to entering into the contract.  
 
                                                     
35 George M Cohen, ‘The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law’ (1992) 20 Hofstra Law 
Review 941, at 953. 
36 For a discussion of those reasons see generally Schwartz, above n 25, at 80. 
37 River Wear Commissioners v Adamson (1877) 2 App Cas 743, at 763 per Lord Blackburn. 
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Thirdly, a contract may be incomplete because the parties have specifically elected not to 
include a particular matter within their contract. This will generally result where parties 
make an economic decision not to include the contingency. A rational contracting party 
will not include a contingency where the cost of so doing exceeds the anticipated benefit 
of having the contingency within the contract. Indeed, it is in the interests of both parties 
to minimise the dead-weight losses involved in the formation of a more comprehensive 
agreement.38 Naturally the benefit of including the contingency will be a function of the 
estimated probability of the contingency arising and the severity of the consequences of 
the contingency. Thus, contractual specification for improbable and insignificant 
contingencies is less likely than those that have a high probability of occurring and which 
have a material effect.  
 
There are other rational explanations for incompleteness where the contingency is 
foreseen. For example, two parties may wish to conclude a bargain but cannot agree on 
some particular aspect which may be of less significance to the contractual exchange. 
Often the issue will be resolved by deliberately adopting language of equivocation so that 
the contract may be signed and its main objective achieved.39 The parties elect to defer to 
the courts should the words have to be called into operation.  
 
Further, a contingency may be foreseen but not addressed during negotiations for fear of 
putting the counterparty off the agreement. Negotiating agents operate under the same 
dilemma. A lawyer who ‘“wakes these sleeping dogs” by insisting that they be resolved 
may cost his client the bargain.’40 Thus, it is evident that the rational actor model can 
explain why particular contractual contingencies may be foreseen but not contractually 
provided for, or clearly provided for. 
                                                     
38 See Justice Edward Thomas, ‘Good Faith in Contract: A Non-Sceptical Commentary’ (2005) 11 New 
Zealand Business Law Quarterly 391, at 402. Dead-weight loss has been defined as ‘the reduction in total 
surplus that results from a market distortion.’: Joshua S Gans, Stephen P King and N Gregory Mankiw, 
Principles of Microeconomics (1999), at 481. 
39 Klienwort Benson Ltd v Malaysia Mining Corporation Berhad [1988] 1 WLR 799, at 806 per Hirst J 
quoting Staughton J. 
40 E Allan Farnsworth, ‘“Meaning” in the Law of Contract’ (1967) 76 Yale Law Journal 939, at 954. 
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A contract may also be incomplete as a result of information asymmetry. One party may 
possess information which if disclosed to the other would have resulted in a more 
complete or different agreement. Information may be asymmetric ex-ante, that is, before 
the agreement is reached, but becomes symmetric ex-post, that is, after the agreement is 
struck. This occurrence may often result in litigation based on misrepresentation or non-
disclosure. The plaintiff claims that the bargain was tainted as a result of the inequality of 
correct information. Alternatively, information may remain asymmetric ex-post and even 
after the performance and termination or expiration of the contract.  
 
Indeed, information asymmetry is central to the more modern school of thought that 
contracts can be endogenously incomplete.41 This reasoning departs from the traditional 
law and economics understanding that incompleteness is a consequence of high 
transactions costs. The theory of endogenous incompleteness recognises that transaction 
cost explanations account for less incompleteness than is observed.42 Even where 
transactions costs are zero, parties may not write complete contracts because they cannot 
observe relevant economic variables or cannot verify those variables to the courts, or 
because they prefer not to disclose relevant information about themselves.43  
 
Information asymmetry may lead to endogenous incompleteness where a market is 
characterised by heterogeneous participants.44 For example, a warranty offered by the 
seller of a car could increase in price depending on the propensity of the driver to operate 
the car in a manner likely to wear it out. However, such warranties do not usually 
distinguish between types of drivers and are therefore incomplete. The market is 
                                                     
41 See Alan Schwartz, ‘Incomplete Contracts’ in Peter Newman (ed), The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics and the Law (1998) vol 2, at 278; Robert Scott, ‘A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite 
Agreements’ (2003) 103 Columbia Law Review 1641, at 1642. 
42 Ibid, at 282. 
43 Ibid. Thus a contract can be said to be incomplete ‘if the parties would like to add contingent clauses, but 
are prevented from doing so by the fact that the state of nature cannot be verified…’: Oliver Hart and John 
Moore, ‘Foundations of Incomplete Contracts’ (1999) 66 Review of Economic Studies 115, at 134.  
44 Schwartz, above n 25, at 81. 
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characterised by pooling equilibria. Screening between different types of driver is 
infeasible despite the fact that the distribution of types of driver may be known. 
Aggressive drivers have incentive to conceal their type. Accordingly, a universal 
warranty price will be set with reference to the distribution of types of driver. Careful 
drivers will pay too much for the warranty, subsidising the aggressive drivers who pay 
too little.  
 
Contracting parties may also write a deliberately incomplete contract where self-
enforcement is effective and more efficient than legal enforcement. Contracts are likely 
to be self-enforcing where the reputation of the contracting parties is important or 
repeated interaction between the parties is required.45 In such cases, extra-legal factors 
will cause the parties to cooperatively renegotiate their agreement as contingencies 
arise.46 The parties prefer to leave their contract incomplete to allow scope for 
adjustment.  
 
For example, parties to an ongoing supply contract could fix the price and quantity 
without reference to changes in market price and demand. The agreement is 
                                                     
45 Although it has been suggested that endogenous incompleteness is not limited to these types of contracts. 
Scott notes that ‘the domain of self-enforcing contracts extends to environments in which a reputation for 
trustworthiness and the discipline of ongoing relationships are relatively weak forces. Intentionally 
incomplete contracts of the sort routinely dismissed by the courts have a common feature: The agreements 
are in simple form, clear in commitment, and structured to create opportunities for parties to reciprocate in 
ways that expand the contractual surplus.’: Scott, above n 41, at 1692-1693. For a discussion of 
circumstances in which self-enforcement is likely to be effective see Benjamin Klein, ‘Why Hold-Ups 
Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships’ (1996) 34 Economic Inquiry 444, at 449-
450. 
46 See generally Robert Scott, ‘Conflict and Co-Operation in Long Term Contracts’ (1987) 75 California 
Law Review 2005, at 2047. It has been recognised that contracts which ‘last for a long time, such as a 
contract between a coal mine and a power plant built next to it, are often written in a way that explicitly 
contemplates renegotiations when economic conditions change. The contracts are incomplete…The way 
the terms shape the course of renegotiation rather than their suitability to the conditions in which the parties 
find themselves may be what matters most.’: Douglas G Baird, Robert H Gertner and Randal C Picker, 
Game Theory and the Law (1998), at 112. 
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‘obligationally’47 and legally complete. It can be enforced by the courts. However, 
economists are likely to take a different view than lawyers. They would regard the 
contract as incomplete. It cannot adjust for future contingencies such as an escalating 
market price. In this instance the contracting parties might elect to contract using 
deliberately vague standards in order to facilitate subsequent adjustment. They may agree 
to negotiate the price in good faith rather than fixing the price.48 The contracting parties 
prefer negotiation as the mechanism to achieve ex-post efficiency and they indicate this 
to the Court employing discretionary language like good faith.49  
 
It is therefore apparent that contractual incompleteness will arise for a number of reasons. 
Plainly, it would be impossible to write complete contracts. Critically, it would also be 
economically inefficient to attempt to do so. Despite the fact that contracts are 
incomplete, most can operate without the need for recourse to the courts. Issues of 
incompleteness may not ever arise during the life of an agreement. Even if a dispute 
occurs, extra-legal mechanisms may be sufficient to resolve the problem. 
 
Nonetheless, within New Zealand legal measures have been put in place to deal with 
contractual incompleteness. Elaborate and comprehensive rules of construction have been 
developed. These are utilised to fill contractual gaps and elucidate the intention of 
                                                     
47 Schwartz, above n 41, at 278. 
48 It has been suggested that ‘if initial drafting costs are high, the parties [ ] might draft a simple contract 
with vague standards, i.e., “soft” terms that invite subsequent adjustment to take account of new facts on 
the ground. Thus, for example, the parties might agree to adjust in good faith the price term in the contract 
if subsequent events imposed significant hardship on one party or the other. By agreeing to good faith 
adjustment, the parties seek to ensure that their contract is efficient ex post and that the resulting surplus is 
shared in some manner between both of them.’: Robert Scott, ‘The Law and Economics of Incomplete 
Contracts’ (2006) 2 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 279, at 292. For further discussion of the 
distinction between the use of rules and standards when drafting contractual terms see Robert Scott and 
George G Triantis, ‘Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design’ (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 814.  
49 The Court may still have a role to play if the parties cannot successfully negotiate.  Parties who express 
their contractual obligations in general terms ‘rely on a court to assign outcomes based on the evidence 
presented at trial. A vague term (such as an obligation to make a good faith effort to deliver goods on a 
certain date) gives the court much more discretion than a precise or specific term.’: Ibid, at 289. 
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contracting parties. Where an agreement appears to be incomplete, the courts will work 
with the document to find the solution in the interstices of the contract.50 On occasions, 
the courts have supplemented contractual machinery to remedy contractual 
incompleteness and give effect to the bargain reached between the parties.51 The judiciary 
endeavours to facilitate a market exchange. Similarly, the courts will imply contractual 
terms in particular classes of contracts to prescribe the particular conduct required of 
parties. As was recognised in Chapter 3, obligations of good faith are implied into some 
contracts in order to address incompleteness.  
 
All of these measures can be rationalised through economic terms. The courts will strive 
to give effect to an agreement provided contractual intention is established. Ordinarily the 
exchange will enhance welfare. Rules of construction can also reduce ex-ante 
transactions costs. The parties will not be required to incur the expense of stipulating 
certain matters in contracts. They can be content in the knowledge that the courts will 
read those matters into the contract as a matter of law and convention. Moreover, where a 
dispute as to contractual interpretation arises, well-defined rules of construction should 
assist the parties in resolving their difficulties without the need to resort to costly 
litigation. Therefore, ex-post transactions costs are desirably reduced. Consequently, the 
value of the contractual surplus is maximised.  
 
5.3.2 Contractual Performance is Sequential: 
 
Most contracts are not only incomplete but also require sequential performance. This 
gives rise to a risk which is often labeled as ‘transactional insecurity.’52 Where one 
contracting party is required to perform his or her side of the bargain first, there is an 
inherent risk that the other may default or threaten to default on his or her obligations. As 
                                                     
50 See Gerard McMeel, The Construction of Contracts (2007), at 5. 
51 Money v Ven-Lu-Ree Ltd [1989] 3 NZLR 129. See also John Burrows, Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd, 
Law of Contract in New Zealand (3rd ed, 2007), at 87. 
52 Anthony T Kronman, ‘Contract Law and the State of Nature’ (1985) 1 Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organization 5, at 6. 
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a result, the performing party may be denied the benefit of the bargain. A simple loan 
contract is a paradigm example of transactional insecurity. A lender who advances an 
unsecured principal sum incurs the risk that the borrower may default. The lender may 
not receive repayment of the principal amount or the agreed interest or either. 
 
In respect of the loan scenario, the act of the lender advancing the principal sum to the 
borrower is a sunk investment. It is not possible for the lender to recover the advance 
unless the borrower has the money to perform his or her obligations. Not all contracts 
involving sequential performance will require a sunk or non-recoverable investment. The 
investment might be redeployed to an alternative use. For example, a vendor of real estate 
who commits to sell his or her property can resell to a third party should the purchaser 
default on his or her contractual obligations.  
 
Notwithstanding, alternative investments may be limited and inferior.53 Thus, a landlord 
who renovates premises for the specific purpose of accommodating the unique business 
activities of a tenant may be unable to find an alternative lessee should the existing tenant 
default. Additional investment may be required to reconvert the premises to render it 
more suitable for general use. In some instances, the transactions costs involved in 
redeployment of the investment may be so high as to be prohibitive.  
 
Accordingly, once an investment is made in a contract involving sequential performance 
there is often a fundamental transformation from a competitive market ex-ante to an 
uncompetitive or bilateral monopoly ex-post.54 This transformation creates incentive for a 
contracting party to take advantage of this monopoly. Exploitative behaviour becomes 
more profitable and more likely in instances of sunk or illiquid investments in contracts.55 
 
Contracting parties often recognise the risks posed by sequential performance and will 
take steps to protect themselves via their contractual terms. For example, a lender may 
                                                     
53 See Cohen, above n 35, at 955. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
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take some security over the assets of the borrower in order to guard against default. This 
protection may decrease the cost of credit that may otherwise be paid by the borrower if 
security were unavailable. Similarly, payments under a construction contract may be 
made by way of instalment based on the progress of the builder. However, as is 
recognised below, contractual mechanisms may be costly and ineffective in some 
instances. 
 
Having established that contracts are incomplete and involve sequential performance it is 
necessary to identify the meaning of opportunistic conduct and its relationship to good 
faith. It will be seen that incompleteness and sequential performance are catalysts for 
opportunism. 
 
5.3.3 What is Opportunism? 
  
Opportunism is now frequently mentioned in law and economics literature. Like good 
faith, it is difficult to find a universal definition for the concept.56 Economists tend to 
agree more on examples of opportunistic behaviour than a general conceptualisation. 
Nonetheless, certain definitions have been advanced.  
 
Some have suggested that opportunism is taking advantage of the vulnerability of 
another.57 This explanation is of limited pragmatic utility. As was outlined above, 
contracting parties are vulnerable to exploitation because contractual performance is 
sequential. Similarly, contracting parties are susceptible due to contractual 
incompleteness. One party may take advantage of the other where the contract does not 
specify for a particular contingency. The proffered definition therefore focuses on the 
conditions under which opportunistic behavior is likely to occur. It fails to prescribe a 
threshold for what conduct will be considered opportunistic.58 The other fundamental 
difficulty is that it remains unclear what ‘taking advantage’ actually means. Arguably it 
                                                     
56 Ibid, at 954.  
57 See Posner, above n 5, at 17. 
58 Cohen, above n 35, at 954. 
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suggests blatant exploitative conduct.59 Conceivably, opportunism can take on more 
subtle guises.  
 
Opportunistic behaviour has also been characterised as the advancement of self-interest 
with guile.60 Again this definition is impracticable. It imports a moralistic standard, 
which is inevitably subjective. It potentially requires a consideration of societal norms. 
Thus, the meaning of ‘guile’ is uncertain. The definition only serves to replace one 
ambiguous term with an equally vague synonym.  
 
Perhaps a more meaningful and economic definition of opportunistic behaviour is 
conduct which seeks to redistribute contractual benefits that have already been 
allocated.61 The opportunist attempts a reallocation of an already apportioned contractual 
pie.62 Certainly this conceptualisation does not involve moralistic perspectives. The test is 
ostensibly objective. A party acts opportunistically in altering contractual performance to 
capture for himself or herself an advantage not assigned to him or her by the agreement 
where this is done at the expense of the contracting counterparty.63 The definition focuses 
on ex-post outcomes. It applies to both contractual benefits and contractual costs. 
Accordingly, a party will act opportunistically when he or she seeks to recapture the 
opportunities forgone upon contracting. This includes circumstances where he or she 
refuses to pay the expected cost of performance.  
 
                                                     
59 Ibid, at 956. 
60 See Oliver E Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational 
Contracting (1985), at 47. 
61 See generally Steven Burton, ‘Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith’ 
(1980) 94 Harvard Law Review 369, at 373; Timothy Muris, ‘Opportunistic Behaviour and the Law of 
Contracts’ (1981) 65 Minnesota Law Review 521. 
62 Charles Goetz and Robert Scott, ‘Principles of Relational Contracts’ (1981) 6 Virginia Law Review 1089, 
at 1139. 
63 See Ejan Mackaay and Violette Leblanc, ‘The Law and Economics of Good Faith in the Civil Law of 
Contract’ (2003), at 10  
<https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/jspui/bitstream/1866/125/1/Article%20papyrus.pdf>, at 31 July 2008.  
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The definition has been subject to scrutiny. The idea of a forgone opportunity may only 
have meaning where the opportunity is known to the contracting party who gives it up by 
entering into the contract.64 The notion of bounded rationality dictates that parties 
negotiating a contract will not know of all of the options and alternatives open to them. 
There are inherent limits on cognition and the availability of information. Thus, an 
opportunity or contingency may arise during the period of contractual performance that 
may not have been foreseen or foreseeable by one or all of the parties. In this instance it 
may be unclear which party is entitled to the contractual surplus, or which party should 
bear the loss, attributable to the unanticipated contingency.  
 
For example, in Mutual Life Insurance Co of New York v Tailored Woman Inc65 the 
defendant operated a retail clothing store in premises leased from the plaintiff. The rental 
payable was a proportion of the profits of the store. An opportunity subsequently arose 
whereby the defendant acquired an existing clothing business in the same building. The 
defendant also leased these premises from the plaintiff but under a flat rental. A 
consequence of the acquisition was that customers were diverted from the existing 
business of the defendant to the newly acquired business. This decreased the rental 
payable by the defendant. The plaintiff sued claiming it was entitled to additional rent 
calculated as a proportion of the profits attributable to the diverted business. The plaintiff 
alleged a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The New York Court of 
Appeals recognised that the plaintiff ‘did not contemplate’ that the profits of the first 
business would be diminished.66 Nonetheless, it was held that the lack of foresight would 
not create rights or obligations. The defendant had not breached the obligation of fair 
dealing.  
 
                                                     
64 Sepe recognises the problem noting that to ‘be chosen or forgone [ ] an opportunity must first be 
known.’: Simone Sepe, ‘Good Faith and Contract Interpretation: A Law and Economics Perspective’ 
(2006), at 17 <www.cleis.unisi.it/site/files/042_Sepe.pdf>, at 29 February 2008. 
65 309 NY 248 (NY, 1953). The case has been discussed by Burton and Andersen, above n 4, at 55-57.  
66 Ibid, at 253 per Desmond J. 
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It is questionable whether the forgone opportunity methodology would have been of any 
utility in resolving the case. It would be meaningless to inquire whether the defendant 
had forgone the right to divert customers away from the first business. Upon entering the 
original lease, neither of the parties had anticipated that this possibility could arise. It was 
not contemplated that a similar business would be operated by the defendant in the same 
building. Dubroff recognises the limitations of the forgone opportunity approach where 
the opportunity is not foreseen by the parties: 
 
[W]hether forgone opportunities were recaptured can be determined only by 
interpreting the contract. The forgone opportunities assessment is no more or less 
than a conclusion that follows a judgment that the contract has been breached or 
has not been breached. It provides no assistance in determining whether the 
contract has been breached.67 
 
Thus, it is obviously extremely difficult to provide an exhaustive definition of 
opportunism despite its entrenched status in contract economics theory. Ultimately, three 
key factors are recognised as conditions for post-contractual opportunistic conduct.68 
Firstly, the opportunist act takes place ex-post. The concept does not relate to a pre-
contractual monopoly. Secondly, the victim of the opportunistic conduct must place some 
value or reliance on the performance of the contract which the opportunist can 
appropriate or use to extract some other benefit. Finally, the victim must have omitted to 
plan for the opportunistic behaviour, either negligently or on the basis of bounded 
rationality. These criteria imply that a party may still behave opportunistically even if he 
or she complies with the explicit terms of the agreement. In this scenario the opportunist 
may be acting outside of the reasonable expectations of the parties or the victim’s 
understanding of the contract.69         
 
                                                     
67 Harold Dubroff, ‘The Implied Covenant of Good Faith in Contract Interpretation and Gap Filling: 
Reviving a Revered Relic’ (2006) 80 St John’s Law Review 559, at 607.   
68 See Muris, above n 61, at 523-524.  
69 Ibid, at 521. 
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Opportunistic behaviour may take a variety of forms. The notion of shirking is an 
example of opportunistic behaviour.70 This occurs where a contracting party abstains 
from contribution but nonetheless shares in the spoils with the other contracting party or 
parties. Joint venture and partnership arrangements may be susceptible to shirking. For 
example, a partnership agreement may provide for an equal sharing of profits but not 
prescribe the input expected of each partner. A partner may contribute little leaving the 
other partners to assume the work not performed by the shirker. Nonetheless, the 
uncooperative partner is still entitled to an equal share in the surplus according to the 
agreement. Although the partner has not breached the contract he or she has certainly 
acted in contravention of the reasonable expectations of the parties. Arguably such 
behaviour breaches standards of good faith conduct. 
 
The risk of opportunism through shirking may be deterred in some instances with non-
legal mechanisms. In the case of the shirking partner, the risk of a bad reputation may be 
sufficient to prevent the opportunistic conduct.71 The partnership may be dissolved on the 
discovery of the misconduct of the shirking partner. He or she would be unlikely to find 
willing partners in the future should his or her reputation become public knowledge. 
Thus, the gains from short-term opportunism may not be worthwhile given the long-run 
effects. However, shirking becomes harder to detect and respond to where outputs 
involve a random component. For example, it may be difficult to measure the 
productivity of a sharefarmer under a sharemilking or sharecropping agreement where 
output is also subject to the vagaries of climate, disease and equipment breakdown. This 
phenomenon coupled with the fact that a sharefarmer cannot capture the full marginal 
                                                     
70 See Mackaay and Leblanc, above n 63, at 10. 
71 See generally Muris, above n 61, at 527. The need to maintain a good reputation extends past relational 
contracting. It has been recognised that even ‘in a community in which any particular pair of people meet 
rarely, it is still possible [ ] for an individual’s reputation in the group as a whole to serve as a bond for his 
good and honest behaviour towards each individual member.’: Paul R Milgrom, Douglass C North and 
Barry R Weingast, ‘The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, 
and the Champagne Fairs’ in Daniel B Klein (ed), Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good 
Conduct (1997), at 243. 
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product of his or her output if required to share part of it with the landowner creates 
incentive to shirk.72    
 
Opportunism is also subsumed in moral hazard. A party protected from risk may behave 
in a more opportunistic manner than if he or she was fully exposed to the risk. For 
example, a party who enjoys the benefit of insurance coverage may behave less carefully 
than promised or may exaggerate a claim.73 Such conduct, if unregulated and unpunished, 
will have the effect of redistributing wealth between contracting parties.  
 
Opportunism also manifests itself in hold out behaviour. This arises where the consent or 
performance of one contracting party is required in order for the contract to proceed. 
Consent or performance may be withheld in anticipation of securing additional benefits. 
Opportunistic hold out behaviour will therefore result from the phenomenon of sequential 
performance. As was noted above, such conduct is more likely where the contract 
requires transaction-specific investments which cannot be fully salvaged outside of the 
agreement.74 
 
A clear example of the hold out problem can be seen in the case of Atlas Express Ltd v 
Kafco (Importers and Distributors) Ltd.75 The plaintiff was a national road carrier. It 
entered into a contract to deliver cartons owned by the defendant, a small company which 
imported and distributed basketware. The defendant committed itself to using the services 
of the plaintiff. Soon after carriage began, the plaintiff sought to increase the minimum 
                                                     
72 For a comprehensive discussion of how to most efficiently structure arrangements analogous to 
sharecropping or sharemilking agreements under which one party owns the land and the other provides the 
labour see Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights (2nd ed, 1997), at 33-54. 
73 See generally Insurance Corporation of the Channel Islands Ltd v The Royal Hotel Ltd [1998] Lloyd’s 
Rep IR 151. 
74 See also G Richard Shell, ‘Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial Contracts: Toward 
a New Cause of Action’ (1991) 44 Vanderbilt Law Review 221, at 229; Benjamin Klein, Robert G 
Crawford and Armen A Alchian, ‘Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive 
Contracting Process’ (1978) 21 Journal of Law and Economics 297, at 228-229. 
75 [1989] 1 All ER 641. 
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amount payable by the defendant under the contract. The plaintiff knew that the 
defendant was heavily dependent on obtaining carriage to satisfy its contracts with 
retailers of the basketware. The plaintiff was also aware that the defendant would be 
unable to find an alternate carrier at short notice. Accordingly, the defendant succumbed 
to paying the additional amount. It was subsequently held that the defendant was not 
liable for the extra sum. Its consent has been obtained by economic duress. Clearly, the 
defendant had committed to the contract and the refusal by the plaintiff to carry out its 
contractual obligations was opportunistic behaviour arising from transactional insecurity. 
The conduct of the plaintiff was designed to extract more monies than the plaintiff was 
entitled to. 
 
The likelihood of an opportunistic threat of non-performance is also strongly linked to the 
ability of the victim to recover his or her actual damages and litigation costs. It is 
conceivable that the defendant in Atlas may not have recovered the full extent of its loss 
had it elected to sue for breach rather than pay the additional amount. Its future loss of 
reputation with the retailers had it failed to supply them in a timely fashion may not have 
been recoverable as damages.76 Further, the defendant would have been unlikely to 
recoup its full legal costs if it did issue proceedings in lieu of paying the additional 
amount.77 These factors often contribute to the willingness of the victim to yield to the 
demands of the opportunist rather than resort to the courts. 
 
However, in some instances contractual modification should be encouraged and cannot 
properly be classified as bad faith opportunistic conduct exploiting sequential 
performance. A change in circumstances may well mean that one contracting party will 
suffer a loss if the contract is performed. That party may rationally elect to breach rather 
than perform. The amount payable to settle the breach may be less than the losses 
incurred on performance. In such a situation contractual modification is to be encouraged. 
A reallocation of the anticipated entitlement under the original contract by way of a 
                                                     
76 As to remoteness of damage see Burrows, Finn and Todd, above n 51, at 687-710. 
77 Within New Zealand, indemnity costs are rarely awarded in High Court litigation. The criteria within 
r48(C)(4) High Court Rules must be satisfied. 
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contractual variation could render the modified contract ex-post efficient provided there 
is a surplus available for renegotiation. Parties could not commit to efficient performance 
if modifications of this nature were not permitted. The ex-ante value of contracting could 
be greatly reduced.78 The risks associated with committing to a contract would be 
significantly increased.  
 
An example of efficient modification can be seen in the case of Goebel v Linn.79 The 
plaintiff had promised to supply the defendant brewer with all of the ice the defendant 
may require. The price was fixed in the contract. A few months later it became apparent 
that the plaintiff would not be able to supply at the stipulated price. The ice ‘crop’ 
produced by the plaintiff had failed (presumably due to warm weather). The plaintiff was 
facing ruin. In consequence, it demanded a higher price from its customers, including the 
defendant. The defendant paid the additional amount. Its entire stock would have been 
spoiled if it was not supplied with ice for a period of more than two days. The Supreme 
Court of Michigan upheld the variation and found that there was no duress. It was 
determined that unexpected and extraordinary circumstances had arisen which rendered 
the contract worthless and justified the modification.80  
                                                     
78 See generally Jason Scott Johnston, ‘Default Rules/Mandatory Principles: A Game Theoretic Analysis of 
Good Faith and the Contract Modification Problem’ (1993) 3 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law 
Journal 335, at 341. 
79 47 Mich 489 (Mich, 1882). 
80 Ibid, at 493 per Cooley J. Occasionally an unforeseen ex-post contingency which raises performance 
costs may result in a claim under s 3(1) of the Frustrated Contracts Act 1944 that the contract has become 
impossible of performance or otherwise frustrated. Section 3 makes two significant changes to the common 
law. Firstly, it permits money prepaid to be recovered even if there is no total failure of consideration at the 
date of frustration. Secondly, it allows a party to a frustrated contract to claim compensation for steps taken 
towards performance which confer a benefit on the contracting counterparty. Ultimately however, 
unanticipated increases in performance costs will not lead to a finding of frustration unless it can be shown 
that there is ‘such a change in the significance of the obligation that the thing undertaken would, if 
performed, be a different thing from that contracted for.’: Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham UDC [1956] 2 
All ER 145, at 160 per Lord Radcliffe. The courts will not generally grant relief where performance has 
simply become more expensive or onerous. See J Arthur McInnis, ‘Frustration and Force Majeure in 
Building Contracts’ in Ewan McKendrick (ed), Force Majeure and Frustration of Contract (2nd ed, 1995), 
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The efficacy of the variation in Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd81 is 
less certain. The defendant was a builder and had agreed to refurbish 27 flats. It 
subcontracted carpentry work to the plaintiff. The plaintiff commenced work but it soon 
became apparent that he was in financial difficulty. This was apparently due to the fact 
that the contract price was too low. It was thought that the plaintiff would have breached 
the contract if additional payment was not made. The defendant therefore agreed to pay 
an additional sum. The plaintiff thereafter continued further work for a period of 
approximately two months on the faith of the promise. During that time the plaintiff 
substantially completed eight of the 27 flats. This was despite the fact that the defendant 
only made one payment of £1,500 during the period. This was a relatively small payment 
as compared to the original contract amount of £20,000 and the additional £10,300 which 
the defendant had promised to pay. Thus, it was questionable whether the plaintiff was in 
dire need of additional payment in order to perform the contract.   Nonetheless, the 
primary legal issue facing the English Court of Appeal was whether there was 
consideration for the promise made by the defendant. It was held that the modification 
was contractually enforceable. The defendant had received a benefit which amounted to 
good consideration. In particular, the defendant avoided breaching the head contract 
including incurring a penalty for delay. It also avoided the expense and trouble of finding 
alternative carpenters. Glidewell LJ expressed the legal position as follows: 
 
(i) if A has entered into a contract with B to do work for, or to supply goods or 
services to, B in return for payment by B and (ii) at some stage before A has 
completely performed his obligations under the contract B has reason to doubt 
whether A will, or will be able to, complete his side of the bargain and (iii) B 
thereupon promises A an additional payment in return for A's promise to perform 
                                                                                                                                                              
at 205-206. For case examples in which a contracting party was deemed to have assumed the cost risks of 
unforeseen contingencies such that claims of frustration failed see Tsakiroglou & Co Ltd v Noblee and 
Thorl GmbH [1961] 2 All ER 179; Palmco Shipping Co v Continental Ore Corp [1970] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 21; 
Wilkins & Davies Construction Ltd v Geraldine Borough [1958] NZLR 985. It has been observed that a 
duty to re-negotiate in good faith may be a logical alternative to the doctrine of frustration in such cases. 
See generally Burrows, Finn and Todd, above n 51, at 664-665. 
81 [1990] 1 All ER 512. 
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his contractual obligations on time and (iv) as a result of giving his promise B 
obtains in practice a benefit, or obviates a disbenefit, and (v) B's promise is not 
given as a result of economic duress or fraud on the part of A, then (vi) the benefit 
to B is capable of being consideration for B's promise, so that the promise will be 
legally binding.82 
 
The principle enunciated by Glidewell LJ has received judicial support in New Zealand.83 
Indeed, in Antons Trawling Co Ltd v Smith the Court of Appeal appeared to suggest that 
consideration may not always be necessary in respect of a contractual variation: 
 
The importance of consideration is as a valuable signal that the parties intend to 
be bound by their agreement, rather than an end in itself. Where the parties who 
have already made such intention clear by entering legal relations have acted upon 
an agreement to a variation, in the absence of policy reasons to the contrary they 
should be bound by their agreement.84 
 
The law and economics approach to contract variation is concerned less with the 
requirement for consideration and more on the reasons for the modification. In the 
opportunistic Atlas case, no circumstances arose which increased the cost of performance 
which could justify a price increase. Conversely, in Goebel the cost of performance did 
rise rendering the modification ex-post efficient. However, the willingness of the courts 
to uphold some contractual modifications creates a negative economic incentive. A 
contracting party may seek to induce the other to agree to a modification under a false 
threat of non-performance. The threat amounts to an extortionate bluff.85 Such behaviour 
                                                     
82 Ibid, at 521-522.  
83 See Attorney-General for England and Wales v R [2002] 2 NZLR 91, at 109 per Tipping J; Machirus 
Properties Ltd v Power Sport World (1987) Ltd (1999) 4 NZ ConvC 193,066. 
84 [2003] 2 NZLR 23, at 45-46 per Baragwanath J. See also Karen Scott, ‘From Sailors to Fisherman: 
Contractual Variation and the Abolition of the Pre-Existing Duty Rule in New Zealand’ (2005) 11 
Canterbury Law Review 201; Brian Coote, ‘Consideration and Variations: A Different Solution’ (2004) 
120 Law Quarterly Review 19; Duncan Webb, ‘Consideration and Variation’ [2003] New Zealand Law 
Journal 54. 
85 See Johnston, above n 78, at 341. Conceivably the legitimacy of the threat might be determined by the 
bona fides of the person making the threat such that good faith is a relevant consideration. See generally 
CTN Cash and Carry Ltd v Gallagher Ltd [1994] 4 All ER 714, at 719 per Sir Donald Nicholls VC; Huyton 
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is opportunistic and is designed to achieve a windfall under asymmetric information 
conditions. The facts of Williams might fall within this category. There was no evidence 
to suggest that the cost of performance to the plaintiff had increased. Further, he could 
apparently continue to carry out work without substantial payment. Thus, it is suggested 
that the courts must examine the evidence to determine whether the ‘modification was 
prompted by a change in circumstances that made performance of the original contract 
unprofitable for the party requesting the modification.’86 This inquiry should assist in 
assessing whether the party seeking the variation is acting in good faith. Whilst this may 
be the most desirable approach to enforcement, it may not be infallible. In particular, 
information relating to changed circumstances and the cost of performance may not be 
verifiable to a court.87  
                                                                                                                                                              
SA v Peter Cremer GmbH & Co [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 620. See also Nelson Enonchong, Duress, Undue 
Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (2006), at 18-20.  
86 Ibid, at 339-340. The facts of Williams also raise questions as to whether the plaintiff genuinely 
miscalculated the cost of the project from the outset and whether the defendant therefore acted 
opportunistically in accepting a low contract price. In these circumstances the plaintiff may have been able 
to seek relief for a unilateral mistake if he could establish that the defendant knew of the mistake ex-ante 
and failed to inform the plaintiff of the mistake. Indeed, the defendant’s surveyor deposed (at 524) that the 
defendant knew that the contract price was too low. The evidence is however somewhat equivocal as to 
whether this information was known to the defendant ex-ante. For relief on account of unilateral mistake in 
England see Raffles v Wichelhaus (1864) 2 H & C 906; Scriven Bros & Co v Hindley & Co [1913] 3 KB 
564; Hartog v Colin & Shields [1939] 3 All ER 566. See also Edwin Peel, The Law of Contract (12th ed, 
2007), at 332-349. Notably however, in March Construction Ltd v Christchurch City Council (1995) 5 
NZBLC 103,878 it was held that the Council was under no obligation to point out an error in the 
calculations of a tenderer which resulted in an abnormally low tender price. There was no relief available 
under the Contractual Mistakes Act 1977 because it was contractually agreed that the tenderer would be 
responsible for any mistakes. However, in the absence of such contractual agreement, the Contractual 
Mistakes Act 1977 may respond to opportunistic attempts by an invitor to knowingly take advantage of a 
miscalculation made by a tenderer. 
87 Thus, permitting contractual modification may be inefficient in some cases. It has been argued that 
immutable contracts (contracts which cannot be varied) are desirable where it is difficult for a contracting 
counterparty or a court to observe ‘a trading partner’s true costs of completing performance.’: Kevin E 
Davis, ‘The Demand for Immutable Contracts: Another Look at the Law and Economics of Contract 
Modifications’ (2006) 81 New York University Law Review 487, at 497. It may be efficient to prevent 
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Permitting contractual modification also gives rise to the risk of opportunism in the form 
of lowballing. Such bad faith behaviour is likely to occur in the context of tendering for 
construction contracts.88 An opportunistic tenderer may submit a deliberately low bid 
anticipating that the contract price can be renegotiated during the currency of the 
agreement when it would be costly for the invitor to replace the successful tenderer. Such 
a strategy may be optimal for a construction business and particularly one facing 
insolvency. Construction companies can be readily incorporated and dissolved, work can 
be subcontracted and the principals are generally insulated from personal liability. The 
potential payoff from lowballing may therefore exceed the potential losses. Indeed, in 
Pratt Contractors Ltd v Transit New Zealand Lord Hoffmann acknowledged suggestions 
of such behaviour on the part of the plaintiff whose bid, of the eight conforming tenders, 
was the lowest by nearly $1,000,000: 
 
Pratt's reputation in the New Zealand road-building industry (in which there are 
relatively few players) was not uncontroversial. It was thought by some to 
practise lowballing, that is to say, tendering a low price to obtain the contract in 
the expectation of being able to make a profit by aggressive claims for additional 
payments.89 
 
It was recognised in Chapter 2 that a public tendering process like that in Pratt gives rise 
to a preliminary contract under which the invitor is obliged to treat the tenderers equally 
and in good faith. In addition, the public body in Pratt was under a statutory duty to 
employ competitive pricing procedures.90 A public agency faces the difficult task of 
attempting to discharge these duties when confronted with a lowball tender. Although the 
                                                                                                                                                              
modifications in contracts involving sophisticated parties. Knowledge of the ability to vary a contract may 
lead contracting parties to act in a manner which reduces the potential aggregate surplus. This phenomenon 
is likely to be seen in owner-worker relationships where the remuneration of the worker is tied to the profits 
of the owner. See generally Christine Jolls, ‘Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on 
Contract Modification’ (1997) 26 Journal of Legal Studies 203.  
88 See generally Aleix Calveras, Juan-Jose Ganuza and Esther Hauk, ‘Wild Bids. Gambling for 
Resurrection in Procurement Contracts’ (2004) 26 Journal of Regulatory Economics 41.  
89 [2005] 2 NZLR 433, at 438 per Lord Hoffmann. 
90 Ibid, at 439. 
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tender may be the most competitively priced, it may turn out to cost the public body more 
in the long-run as a result of the necessity to make additional payments at a later date. 
 
Opportunistic lowballing may be controlled by an extra-legal mechanism in the form of a 
surety bond. This requires a third party to guarantee that the successful tenderer will 
perform the contract. In the case of a default both the tenderer and the surety are liable. 
Often the surety will have to satisfy the invitor that it has sufficient assets to back the 
bond issued. Such a mechanism has been employed in the context of public tendering 
within New Zealand. Indeed, in Pratt the nominated surety of the successful tenderer was 
required to execute an appropriate bond.91 Notwithstanding, the fact that a surety bond 
was required did not appear to allay the concerns of the defendant that the plaintiff had 
‘underestimated the project and would recover the costs through “claimsmanship.”’92 
 
Not all contractual breaches and defaults will amount to opportunism in the sense of a 
redistribution of wealth amongst the contracting parties. An efficient breach will not 
amount to opportunism. Conduct will not be opportunistic where a breaching party pays 
full compensation to the victim in the sum of the contractual surplus the victim expected 
and the breaching party puts his or her remaining contractual resources to a more wealth 
generating use. The result is Pareto superior than if the contract had been performed. No 
party is worse off and at least one party is better off. Additionally, a contract may be 
breached due to circumstances outside of the control of the parties. In this instance both 
parties may be worse off. There is no opportunism because there is no transfer of wealth.  
 
Having identified the characteristics of opportunistic conduct and some paradigm 
examples, it is necessary to consider the economic implications of opportunistic conduct. 
                                                     
91 Ibid, at 440. Recent studies have indicated that the optimal surety bond should be ‘increasing in the 
number of potential contractors, the support of the underlying uncertainty of the project, the bankruptcy 
costs; and decreasing in the level of solvency of the industry and the riskless interest rate.’: Calveras, 
Ganuza and Hauk, above n 88, at 62. 
92 [2002] 2 NZLR 313, at 321 per McGrath J. 
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It is universally accepted by contract economists that opportunistic behavior should be 
deterred. It has been argued that this is an essential function of contract law.93  
 
5.3.4 Why Should Opportunism be Discouraged? 
 
The law should not countenance opportunistic behaviour designed to deprive one 
contracting party of his or her expected economic surplus. Opportunistic behaviour is not 
inefficient per se. It merely occasions a redistribution of wealth. It is the consequences of 
opportunistic behaviour with which lawyers and economists should be concerned. A 
rational actor who fears that his or her contractual profits will be expropriated may not 
enter into a contract. Thus, a failure by the law to redress opportunistic behaviour may 
prevent an otherwise efficient and wealth maximising exchange.  
 
Additionally, contracting parties wary of opportunistic behaviour incur greater 
transactions costs. Negotiating parties will inevitably write longer and more complex 
contracts in an attempt to deter or preclude opportunism. More resources may also be 
expended to assess the background of a contracting counterparty in order to determine his 
or her propensity for opportunistic conduct. Other costly protective measures may include 
insistence on preliminary agreements, a requirement for simultaneous performance and a 
demand for the payment of a deposit.94   
 
Unnecessary transactions costs are undesirable. The resources expended do not produce a 
good or service which is mutually valued by the contracting parties. The net gains from 
contracting are not maximised. It is therefore clear that an efficient system of contract 
law should discourage opportunistic behaviour in order to minimise transaction costs.   
 
 
 
 
                                                     
93 See Posner, above n 5, at 26. 
94 See Shell, above n 74, at 226. 
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5.3.5 Preventing Opportunism with a Good Faith Doctrine: 
 
It is often contended that the prevention and punishment of opportunistic behaviour can 
be achieved through a good faith doctrine. Consequently, opportunistic conduct has been 
characterised as a breach of good faith.95 Good faith is the exact opposite of 
opportunism.96  
 
A common economic argument in favour of a contractual doctrine of good faith is that it 
would address opportunistic conduct and protect the entitlements of contracting parties 
whilst minimising transactions costs. Contracting parties could rely on good faith in lieu 
of contractually specifying for every conceivable opportunistic act.97 The argument was 
judicially advanced in the United States by Judge Posner in Market Street Associates Ltd 
Partnership v Frey: 
 
The concept of the duty of good faith like the concept of fiduciary duty is a stab at 
approximating the terms the parties would have negotiated had they foreseen the 
circumstances that have given rise to their dispute. The parties want to minimize 
the costs of performance. To the extent that a doctrine of good faith designed to 
do this by reducing defensive expenditures is a reasonable measure to this end, 
interpolating it into the contract advances the parties' joint goal…The office of the 
doctrine of good faith is to forbid the kinds of opportunistic behavior that a 
mutually dependent, cooperative relationship might enable in the absence of [such 
a] rule…98 
 
The primary argument for good faith is therefore directly related to contractual 
incompleteness. Indeed, there would be no requirement for contractual good faith if 
contracting parties were able to foresee all present and future contingencies and negotiate 
appropriate contractual provisions at no cost.99 Instead, it is anticipated that good faith 
                                                     
95 See Burton, above n 61, at 373; Goetz and Scott, above n 62, at 1139. 
96 Mackaay and Leblanc, above n 63, at 26. 
97 See generally Daniel Fischel, ‘The Economics of Lender Liability’ (1989) 99 Yale Law Journal 131, at 
141; Thomas, above n 38, at 402. 
98 941 F2d 588, at 596 (1991, US App). 
99 See Sepe, above n 64, at 24. 
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might remedy incompleteness. The doctrine would mimic the perfect market by 
incorporating into the contract those rights and obligations that the parties would have 
imposed ex-ante had the parties enjoyed complete knowledge and no transactions 
costs.100 Ultimately, good faith is perceived as a solution or partial solution to the trade-
off between transactions costs and opportunism arising from, inter alia, incompleteness. 
 
5.3.6 Opportunism, Good Faith and Behavioural Economics: 
 
Behavioural economics theories and studies should be taken into account when 
determining whether good faith is an appropriate regulator of opportunistic conduct. 
Behavioural economics facilitates a better understanding of economic decisions. This 
implies that the effect of a good faith doctrine should not be judged solely by responses 
predicted by the rational economic actor model unless it can be demonstrated that 
economic agents will respond to good faith in a rational way. Cognisance must be taken 
of actual human responses to the law.101 Contract economists should be concerned with 
real responses to a good faith doctrine rather than desired responses.  
 
The courts should seek to achieve a system of contract law which maximises incentive to 
behave cooperatively and minimises incentive to act opportunistically.102 It is elementary 
that cooperative behaviour is to be endorsed. Cooperation results in efficiency 
                                                     
100 Market St Associates Ltd Partnership v Frey, 941 F2d 588, at 596 per Judge Posner (1991, US App). 
101 See generally Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, ‘A Behavioural Approach to Law and 
Economics’ (1998) 50 Stanford Law Review 1471, at 1476. 
102 It has been recognised that the ‘more that contract doctrine provides a security against the risks of 
opportunism and exploitation to which co-operative dealing exposes a contractor, the more willing (other 
things being equal) contractors will be to deal in a way that optimises their interests (even though they are 
thereby exposed to risk). Thus, as good faith finds a place in the law, and as the contractual environment 
becomes more congenial to trust and risk-taking, it is possible that these reciprocal influences will work 
together to promote ever more co-operative thinking in both legal doctrine and contracting practice.’: Roger 
Brownsword, ‘Positive, Negative, Neutral: the Reception of Good Faith in English Contract Law’ in Roger 
Brownsword, Norma Hird and Geraint Howells (eds), Good Faith in Contract (1999), at 32. 
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improvements through comparative advantage which could not be achieved by economic 
actors operating individually.  
 
Traditional law and economics analysis generally assumes that individuals are self-
interested. However, recent behavioural studies have found that some individuals are also 
motivated by the desire to act in a reciprocally fair manner.103 Such behaviour is distinct 
from cooperative behaviour. Both self-interested individuals and those who act with 
reciprocity may act cooperatively. Self-interested parties may act in a cooperative manner 
if they believe that they will receive a benefit for so doing. However, reciprocally fair 
individuals are prepared to cooperate and incur costs to reward certain actions and punish 
other actions even if they do not expect to recoup this cost in the future.104  
 
Accordingly, individuals exhibit heterogeneous preferences. Empirical studies have 
sought to test what legal rules are likely to ‘crowd in’ or ‘crowd out’ reciprocal and 
opportunistic behaviour. Bohnet, Frey and Huck have demonstrated that reciprocal 
behaviour is crowded in under a contractual enforcement regime where legal interference 
is minimal (“Low Enforcement”).105 This preference for reciprocity is positively 
                                                     
103 A common experiment is an ultimatum game whereby participants assume the role of a proposer or a 
responder. The proposer is given a fixed sum of money and is asked to offer part of that sum to the 
responder. If the responder accepts he or she receives the amount offered. The proposer receives the 
balance. If the parties were purely motivated by self-interest then the responder would rationally accept any 
amount above zero. The proposer should recognise this to be the case and offer a low amount. Nonetheless, 
most studies reveal that the proposer offers between 40 and 50 per cent. There are almost no offers below 
20 per cent or above 50 per cent. See Ernst Fehr and Klaus M Schmidt, ‘A Theory of Fairness, Competition 
and Cooperation’ (1999) 114 Quarterly Journal of Economics 817, at 826. 
104 See Duke, above n 29, at 187. Reciprocal behaviour is generally thought to have a positive effect in the 
sense that reciprocity ‘may cause an increase in the set of enforceable contracts and may thus allow the 
achievement of nonnegligible efficiency gains.’: Ernst Fehr, Simon Gächter and Georg Kirchsteiger, 
‘Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence’ (1997) 65 Econometrica 833. 
105 See Iris Bohnet, Bruno S Frey and Steffen Huck, ‘More Order with Less Law: On Contract 
Enforcement, Trust and Crowding’ (1995) 95 American Political Science Review 131, at 132. The authors 
modeled an evolutionary game in which two contracting parties had the ability to produce a contractual 
surplus. Player One was required to decide whether to enter into a contract with Player Two but was 
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correlated to the time the group plays under the Low Enforcement regime. Those entering 
into contracts will be extremely cautious about the people with whom they deal. They 
will endeavour to select a non-opportunistic counterparty to ensure that expropriation of 
contractual benefits is unlikely to occur. This selection process may involve a detailed 
screening procedure to enhance the prospect of dealing with a non-exploitative and fair 
individual.   
 
Conversely, reciprocity is crowded out and self-interested norms prevail under a contract 
law system which imposes some restrictions on freedom of contract (“Medium 
Enforcement”).106 Contracting is more attractive under Medium Enforcement than under 
Low Enforcement because the expected pay-off is theoretically higher. However, 
interpersonal trust is replaced with institutional trust in contract laws.107 A decision 
whether to act opportunistically is dominated by the probability of the courts sanctioning 
the opportunistic conduct. There is less motivation to act in a reciprocal manner. Thus, 
the likelihood of external legal intervention is the prevailing determinant of contractual 
behaviour rather than intrinsic considerations. Ultimately, this produces a psychological 
effect which leads to the crowding out of cooperative behaviour and the crowding in of 
opportunistic dealing.108 
  
Alternatively, opportunistic behaviour is liable to be discouraged under a contract law 
state which significantly regulates contractual dealings (“High Enforcement”). The 
likelihood of an opportunistic actor being punished raises the opportunity cost of breach 
to such an extent that performance is encouraged.109 Cooperation is achieved through an 
external mechanism irrespective of the preference of individuals for reciprocally fair 
                                                                                                                                                              
unaware whether Player Two would perform. 154 subjects participated. The game was repeated several 
times with varying payoff probabilities designed to reflect different contract law conditions, namely low, 
medium, or high enforcement regimes.  
106 Ibid. 
107 Duke, above n 29, at 190. 
108 See generally Bruno S Frey and Reto Jegen, ‘Motivation Crowding Theory’ (2001) 15 Journal of 
Economic Surveys 589. 
109 Duke, above n 29, at 190. 
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behaviour.110 Stringent legal accountability reduces the risk of entering into a contractual 
transaction. This facilitates an atmosphere of confidence conducive to exchange.111 
 
The experimental study of Bohnet, Frey and Huck therefore suggests that the Low 
Enforcement or High Enforcement regimes should be preferred over Medium 
Enforcement to ensure that reciprocal and cooperative behaviour is promoted over 
opportunistic dealing. Transactions costs may dictate whether Low Enforcement or High 
Enforcement is to be preferred. Conceivably a Low Enforcement system could produce 
high transactions costs. Contracting parties may have to expend considerable resources to 
determine the bona fides of their contracting counterparties ex-ante. Also, the findings of 
Bohnet, Frey and Huck indicate that the incidence of contracting will be lower. 
Opportunistic actors may not be able to be readily identified and the requirement for 
screening may decrease the number of contracts entered into. Moreover, contracts 
concluded under a Low Enforcement regime would have to contain self-enforcing 
mechanisms. The costs associated with mistrust may therefore render contracting difficult 
and inefficient.112 Thus, one commentator has concluded that the notion of a Low 
Enforcement self-policing contract regime can be rejected as unrealistic and a High 
Enforcement regime is to be preferred.113 However, the likely transactions costs 
associated with a High Enforcement regime cannot be ignored. In particular, imposing 
stringent duties such as an obligation of good faith may compromise the predictability of 
contract law and may lead to higher litigation costs.114  
 
Nonetheless, Duke has contended that a doctrine of good faith is an appropriate means by 
which a High Enforcement system can be implemented: 
 
                                                     
110 Bohnet, Frey and Huck, above n 105, at 132. 
111 Shell, above n 74, at 223. 
112 Paul J Powers, ‘Defining the Undefinable: Good Faith and the United Nations Convention on the 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods’ (1999) 18 Journal of Law and Commerce 333, at 351. 
113 Duke, above n 29, at 196. 
114 Ibid, at 199. 
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Imposing an obligation to act in good faith is [ ] an effective way to ensure courts 
provide a performance-inducing high enforcement environment. Absent the 
implication of obligations of good faith, there is a chance that parties’ reasonable 
expectations about how the other party will perform the contract will be 
disappointed if contractual parties are permitted to escape honouring their 
contractual obligations by resorting to the black letter of their agreements. As 
contracts are inevitably incomplete and static in nature, contractual doctrines that 
give unqualified effect to the express terms of the agreement will generate a 
medium enforcement regime.115  
 
Duke therefore appears to suggest that a regime of contract law without a general 
obligation of good faith is likely to produce an inefficient Medium Enforcement scenario. 
However, it is debatable whether this is the case in New Zealand. As was demonstrated in 
Chapter 4, the outcomes produced under the prevailing contract law within New Zealand 
might not be significantly dissimilar to those outcomes which may result from a doctrine 
of good faith. Thus, it is not clear that an introduction of good faith would represent a 
move to a different category of enforcement regime than that currently applying in New 
Zealand. Nonetheless, it is clear that behavioural economic theories are a highly relevant 
determinant of the desirability of a good faith doctrine. Conceivably, such a legal 
obligation could serve as a motivator for cooperative contractual behaviour within New 
Zealand.  
 
5.3.7 Précis: 
 
The foregoing analysis has identified that arguments for the introduction of a universal 
doctrine of good faith are related to the need to deter opportunism and minimise 
transactions costs. The phenomena of incomplete contracts and sequential performance 
are the primary catalysts for opportunistic conduct. The importance of behavioural 
economics to the good faith debate has also been emphasised. It is necessary to achieve 
accurate predictions of anticipated responses to a good faith doctrine. Empirical research 
suggests that a good faith doctrine might promote reciprocal and cooperative behaviour 
thereby discouraging opportunistic conduct. The next section of this chapter endeavours 
to bring a number of these concepts together in a transactions cost model.  
                                                     
115 Ibid, at 197. 
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5.4 Transactions Cost Analysis of Good Faith: 
 
As a matter of general principle, the most cost-effective solution should be selected when 
choosing between different legal rules.116 Thus, a good faith doctrine should reduce the 
transactions costs currently incurred by contracting parties in New Zealand if it is to be 
supported. In order to determine whether this is the case, the transactions costs under a 
regime without good faith and a regime with good faith must be determined and then 
compared. It was identified in Chapter 3 that the application of a good faith doctrine 
would be uncertain within New Zealand. This is an essential factor which must be 
included in any transactions cost analysis of a universal doctrine of good faith. The 
logical starting point is the predicted transactions costs under the current state of contract 
law within New Zealand.  
 
5.4.1 Transactions Costs Without Good Faith: 
 
Let the total transactions costs incurred by contracting parties in respect of a particular 
contract be C .117 These total costs are made up of total specification costs, S , and the 
total costs arising from the incompleteness of the contract, I . 
 
S  comprises various expenses such as the cost of drafting the contract and the time taken 
to do so. It also includes the cost of discovering contingencies which can be addressed 
within the contract. Some of these costs are variable and some are fixed. For example, 
there may be a one-off fee to engage a lawyer to draw up a simple contract. This 
represents a fixed cost. However, the fee charged by the lawyer is likely to increase as the 
number of contingencies provided for in the contract increases. His or her time becomes 
more consumed with drafting the contract. This element is a variable cost. S  is therefore 
a function of n , being the number of contingencies specified in the contract. It is evident 
that S  is increasing in n  due to the presence of variable costs. It might be assumed that 
S  will increase at a decreasing rate for low levels of n . Economies of scale are realised 
                                                     
116 Fabre-Magnan, above n 1, at 107. 
117 The following model closely follows that formulated by Sepe, above n 64. 
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as variable costs are spread over fixed costs. However, S  may increase at an increasing 
rate for high levels of n . This reflects the fact that some contingencies may be highly 
costly to identify and accommodate in a contract. Contingencies which require complex 
contractual specification produce higher variable costs at the margin. Additionally, 
marginal costs of specification may differ depending on the nature of contracting parties. 
For example, an uninformed and inexperienced contracting party may face higher costs to 
discover, negotiate and write additional contingencies than a practiced and 
knowledgeable contracting party.  
 
I  includes the cost of opportunistic behaviour arising from contractual incompleteness. 
For example, an unqualified contractual power may be exercised in a manner designed to 
redistribute the anticipated contractual surplus from one party to the other. A contracting 
party may seek to expropriate the expected gains of the other where a contingency arises 
that is not specified within the contract. This risk would be included in I . Conceivably, 
I  will include the aggregate of the expected cost of each incidence of opportunistic 
behaviour multiplied by the anticipated probability of that specific opportunistic 
behaviour being carried out by the other contracting party. I  also encapsulates the costs 
of unspecified contingencies that may materialise which could render the contract no 
longer efficient. Thus, I must also reflect opportunity costs. I  is decreasing in n . The 
probability of opportunism decreases as the number of contingencies specified increases. 
Logically, the anticipated cost of opportunism falls as the risk of opportunism falls. 
 
The total costs without a good faith doctrine can be expressed as follows: 
 
( ) ( )nInSC +=  (1) 
 
The optimal number of contingencies which minimises C  is given by *n . To find *n  it 
is necessary to differentiate equation (1) with respect to n  and set the differential of C  
with respect to n  equal to zero: 
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Ultimately, *n  is found by solving equation (2) for n . Equation (2) reflects the fact that 
parties should specify for additional contingencies up to the point where the marginal 
cost of specification equals the marginal cost resulting from the incompleteness of the 
contract.  
 
5.4.2 Transactions Costs With Good Faith: 
 
Similar analysis can be applied to a contractual regime in New Zealand with good faith. 
Conceivably, there would be no change in the determinants of S  as a result of the 
introduction of the subject doctrine. The cost incurred by a party of identifying 
contingencies and contractually providing for them would correspond.  
 
However, logically there would be a change in I  as a result of good faith. The cost of 
contractual incompleteness under a good faith regime can be denoted by GFI . It is often 
assumed that GFI  is less than I  for the same number of contingencies. It is reasoned that 
there is an increased chance that the courts may intervene to prevent the redistribution of 
wealth from the victim to the opportunistic actor because a doctrine of good faith can 
regulate opportunistic behaviour not specified for in the contract.  
 
This reasoning is too simplistic. A doctrine of good faith also has negative implications. 
A contracting party who calculates that he or she will obtain the surplus arising from an 
unspecified contingency may be found to be in breach of good faith if he or she retains it 
at the expense of the other party. Moreover, the discretion given to the Court by virtue of 
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a good faith doctrine may result in the courts interfering with specified as well as 
unspecified contingencies. The Court may redistribute expected entitlements under the 
banner of an enforcement of good faith obligations. Therefore, GFI  must also be a 
function of the Court’s ‘error’, e . This latter component can be defined as the propensity 
of the Court to redistribute an anticipated entitlement on account of good faith.118 The 
findings in Chapter 3 suggest that e  will be determined by the inherent uncertainty in the 
prospective definition and application of good faith. As a result, good faith leads to 
greater uncertainty with respect to the entitlement of contracting parties.   
 
Thus, it is possible that the total transactions costs incurred by a party in respect of a 
particular agreement under a body of contract law incorporating a doctrine of good faith 
may be greater than the transactions costs without a good faith obligation even where the 
same number of contingencies is specified. The transactions costs incurred in the context 
of a system of contract law incorporating good faith,  GFC , can be stipulated as follows: 
 
( ) ( )enInSC GFGF ,+=  (3) 
 
The optimal number of contingencies which minimises GFC  is given by GFn* . To find 
GFn*  it is necessary to differentiate equation (3) with respect to n  and set the differential 
of GFC  with respect to n  equal to zero. The total derivative can be expressed as follows: 
 
                                                     
118 Theoretically a doctrine of good faith can be endorsed if ‘the courts are able in all cases to determine the 
efficient outcome (taking into account the effect of any rule on ex ante incentives in future, similar 
contracts)…The reality of generalist courts, however, is that they possess only limited competence in any 
one area. Put simply, courts make mistakes about efficient outcomes…[J]udicial competence is more or 
less limited because courts make errors more or less frequently in "observing" a contract variable or 
translating an observation into a conclusion about efficiency. In the incomplete contracting context, courts 
will display varying degrees of competence as they are more or less able to deduce efficient gap-filling 
terms.’: Gillian Hadfield, ‘Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete Contracts’ (1994) 23 
Journal of Legal Studies 159, at 162. 
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Thus, GFn*  is found by solving equation (4) for n . 
 
5.4.3 The Efficiency Criterion for Good Faith: 
 
Utilising the optimal number of contingencies determined from equations (2) and (4), 
equations (1) and (3) can be combined to derive an inequality stating when a good faith 
regime will be more efficient than the status quo in terms of reduced transactions costs: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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Now let ( ) ( ) InIenI GF =− *,* , and ( ) ( ) SnSnS GF =− ** . A universal doctrine of good 
faith will only be more efficient where: 
 
IS >  (5) 
 
Equation (5) mathematically represents the trade-off between savings on specification 
costs and the expected cost deriving from the uncertainty of good faith which leads to 
judicial mistake. These two components comprise the transactions cost efficiency 
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criterion for determining, in relation to a particular contract, whether good faith will be 
more efficient than a legal regime without good faith.  
 
It has been suggested that it is extremely difficult to determine whether recognition of a 
general duty of good faith would be economically efficient.119 It is hard to accurately 
quantify the allocable costs of running a legal system that administers a good faith 
doctrine.120 Nonetheless, the model permits some predictions to be made as to when good 
faith is likely to be efficient or inefficient.  
 
The size of e  is the primary efficiency determinant. The inequality contained within 
equation (5) is less likely to be satisfied as e  increases. Good faith will not be 
transactions cost efficient if the courts are readily prepared to redistribute contractual 
surplus. Inefficiency will result if the courts are perceived to be disturbing existing 
contractual rights. This amounts to judicial interference with attempts by contracting 
parties to specify for particular foreseen contingencies. The judiciary must therefore be 
aware of the negative economic consequences of rewriting the express terms of an 
agreement in the name of good faith. 
 
It is also material that GFn*  and therefore the amount of specification costs incurred, 
being ( )GFnS * , will be determined by an ex-ante assessment of e . Thus, anticipated 
court error is more relevant than actual court error. Logically, contracting parties will 
predict the incidence of perceived error from the quality of previous judicial decisions. It 
was recognised in Chapter 3 that incorrect trial decisions would be inevitable shortly after 
an introduction of good faith in New Zealand. There would be no corpus of precedent 
which judges can utilise. Good faith is therefore liable to be inefficient on its introduction 
but may become more efficient over time as the doctrine becomes more familiar to the 
New Zealand judiciary, legal advisors and contracting parties. Thus, the incidence of e  
may decrease over time. 
                                                     
119 See Robert S Summers, ‘The General Duty of Good Faith – Its Recognition and Conceptualization’ 
(1982) 67 Cornell Law Review 810, at 827. 
120 Ibid. 
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Ultimately, the efficiency criterion for good faith will be heavily influenced by the 
predictability of the good faith obligation and the confidence which contracting parties 
have in the ability of the New Zealand judiciary to reach correct outcomes. In this regard 
behavioural economics is highly relevant to the efficiency of a good faith doctrine.   
 
It is submitted that the prevalence of e  will depend largely upon the nature of the 
contracting parties and the nature of the transaction.  
 
There are a number of situations where good faith might be desirable. For example, e  
may be insignificant in respect of basic contracts which are of common occurrence. The 
courts are more likely to be familiar with such contracts and judicial interpretation is 
likely to be predictable. Contracting parties may therefore more readily rely on the courts 
to utilise good faith to fill the gaps in contractual specification. This implies that 
considerably fewer contingencies would need to be specified such that the specification 
costs savings, namely S , would be large.  
 
Often parties entering into such contracts will be unsophisticated and should rationally 
rely on good faith. These actors are likely to be under resourced and inexperienced. Due 
to cognitive limitation, the cost of specifying an additional contingency is inevitably high 
at the margin even for low levels of n . In some cases unsophisticated parties with 
sufficient resources may remain rationally ignorant and instead hire specialised agents to 
act on their behalf in the transaction. However, in other instances the costs of 
specification may be prohibitive. Unsophisticated parties may not be able to afford the 
services of lawyers, accountants and other advisors who might be consulted during 
contractual negotiations. Accordingly, specification for the optimal number of 
contingencies, ( )*nS , may not be able to be attained. In this scenario, ex-post reliance on 
good faith should be preferred to ex-ante contractual specification. Unsophisticated 
parties may be more willing to depend on good faith and thereby assume the risk of e  as 
an alternative to sustaining S . Ultimately, an unsophisticated party is more likely to be 
engaged in an uncomplicated and homogenous transaction such that the incidence of e  
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will tend to be insignificant. The reliance on good faith is therefore more prone to 
efficiency. 
 
Good faith is also likely to be favoured by unsophisticated individuals dealing with a 
commercial party. The weaker party will lack bargaining power both ex-ante and ex-post. 
Often there will be no ex-ante negotiations in this situation. The sophisticated 
commercial party may be a repeat player dealing through standard form contracts, the 
terms of which are accepted by the weaker party without any negotiation. The stronger 
party may spread costs over a number of these contracts.121  
 
Traditional economic theory suggests that standard form contract terms produce 
transaction costs savings and will be beneficial to unsophisticated consumers. It is 
hypothesised that provided a small proportion of consumers actually read and shop 
around for standard form contract clauses, then this should place enough pressure on 
firms to adopt efficient contractual terms. Informed consumers generate a form of 
notional market assent.122 Accordingly, these market forces might be sufficient to prevent 
opportunism without any need for reliance on a good faith doctrine. 
 
However, the efficiency of standard form terms has been challenged on the basis that 
because consumers are boundedly rational, they will not be aware of the content of form 
contracts and will not incorporate certain information into their contracting decisions. As 
a result, market pressures will not necessarily force businesses to provide efficient 
standard form terms.123 Accordingly, legislative or judicial intervention may be required 
in order to prevent opportunistic behaviour. For example, this has occurred in New 
                                                     
121 See Mackaay and Leblanc, above n 63, at 12.  
122 For a discussion of the law and economics literature supporting the efficiency of standard form terms 
see Jason Scott Johnston, ‘The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form Contracts 
Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers’ (2005) 104 Michigan Law Review 
857. 
123 See generally Korobkin, above n 32. For further discussion as to why standard form contracts may not 
produce optimal terms and prospective solutions see Victor P Goldberg, ‘Institutional Change and the 
Quasi-Invisible Hand’ in Kronman and Posner (eds), above n 27. 
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Zealand through the Credit Contracts and Consumer Finance Act 2003. This statutory 
instrument empowers the Court to intervene in a standard form consumer credit contract 
where, inter alia, the terms of the contract are deemed to be oppressive or the creditor 
seeks to exercise a contractual power in an oppressive manner. Conceivably these powers 
are similar to those which might be exercised under the banner of a good faith doctrine. 
Contract economists have suggested that the courts should be permitted to sanction a 
standard form contract under a doctrine of unconscionability or good faith where the term 
in question is not salient to most consumers such that ‘the market check on the seller 
overreaching is absent.’124    
 
Notably, the application of a doctrine of good faith may come at a cost to an 
unsophisticated party in the form of a less favourable contract price. A contracting party 
prepared to forgo any recourse to a good faith principle may conceivably obtain better 
consideration for his or her contract. In instances where notions of good faith are imposed 
as a compulsory measure, there may be some equalising differential in equilibrium. For 
example, the duties analogous to good faith imposed on a creditor under the Credit 
Contracts and Consumer Finance Act 2003 are likely to increase the cost of credit for a 
consumer. In equilibrium, informed consumers who might not necessarily need to rely on 
the protective provisions under the Act may pay too much for credit. They effectively 
subsidise the uninformed. 
 
Despite the price to pay for an unsophisticated party to rely on a good faith doctrine, the 
alternative risks are likely to outweigh this cost. A commercial party is likely to possess 
more information about the potential opportunities for opportunistic conduct than an 
unsophisticated party. Even if the weaker party could wield enough bargaining power to 
specify for contingencies, he or she may not have the resources to discover those 
contingencies. It is rational to rely on good faith in this scenario. Sepe emphasises the 
point: 
 
                                                     
124 Ibid, at 1207. 
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[N]ot including good faith basically legitimates parties to behave 
opportunistically at the occurrence of unspecified contingencies. Then, due to the 
large number of contingencies that are unforeseeable for an unsophisticated party, 
[he or she] is better off by choosing good faith and accepting that [his or her] 
counterparty might still behave opportunistically (anticipating the possibility of 
court error in the ex-post enforcement of the contract) than, by excluding good 
faith, giving the counterparty “the right” to do so.125 
 
A good faith obligation is therefore likely to be preferred by a weaker party where there 
is an inequality of bargaining power. Due to the relative weakness of the contracting 
party, I  is likely to far exceed GFI . 
 
It is therefore submitted that the inequality IS > , is most likely to be satisfied in 
homogenous contracts, low value transactions, consumer transactions, agreements 
involving unsophisticated parties and bargains in which there is a considerable inequality 
of bargaining power. In this context relative specification costs savings will be high, 
I will be greater than GFI  and the incidence of e  will be minimal.  
 
On the contrary, e  is likely to be greater in idiosyncratic contracts.126 These 
arrangements typically involve large contractual surpluses and are more likely to be 
entered into by sophisticated commercial parties. These players possess considerable 
economic, organisational and informational resources. They tend to be surrounded by 
informed and specialised negotiating agents. In consequence, sophisticated parties are 
readily able to foresee contingencies and assess contracting risks. 
 
Complex and unusual transactions will inevitably involve a vast number of contingencies. 
The courts are unlikely to be able to appropriately fill gaps in such contracts. It is 
therefore difficult to avoid express contractual specification such that the difference 
between ( )*nS  and ( )GFnS *  is likely to be minimal.  
 
                                                     
125 Sepe, above n 64, at 46.   
126 Ibid, at 51. 
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Such arrangements will also be characterised by information asymmetry as between the 
contracting parties and the judiciary if the parties resort to litigation. The Court may not 
be able to draw on previous experience or discern a common commercial or trade 
practice to assist in the interpretation of the contract. Further, the judiciary may be ill-
equipped to understand highly specialised and technical agreements. This implies that the 
incidence of e  is likely to be high.  
 
Accordingly, idiosyncratic and complex agreements are less suitable to be supplemented 
by a good faith obligation. GFI  is more prone to exceed I  due to the significance of e . 
All of these factors indicate that I  will tend to be greater than S . This implies that the 
contracting parties and the contracting parties alone should be responsible for allocating 
their respective contractual entitlements.  
 
Therefore, good faith is less likely to be efficient in complex contractual dealings 
between commercial parties.127 This holds where the parties are well-resourced and well-
informed. In this scenario it would be undesirable for the parties to be subjected to 
mandatory good faith obligations which may give rise to undesirable judicial 
intervention. The doctrine of freedom of contract should prevail in this scenario.  
 
5.4.4 Précis: 
 
The above analysis has sought to demonstrate that a universal doctrine of good faith in 
contract law will not always be more transactions cost efficient than a regime of contract 
without good faith. The proffered efficiency criterion suggests that sophisticated parties 
engaged in unique contracting scenarios are better to prescribe their own respective rights 
and obligations and not subject themselves to judicial interpretation of a good faith 
obligation. 
                                                     
127 It has been recognised that ‘an expansive obligation extends the responsibilities of commercial actors 
beyond bargained-for risk allocations, subjects bargains to inconsistent and uncertain enforcement, and 
does not produce offsetting benefits in commercial conduct.’: Clayton Gillette, ‘Limitations on the 
Obligation of Good Faith’ [1981] Duke Law Journal 619, at 620.  
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Consequently, the model purports to verify that it is not economically desirable to impose 
a mandatory obligation of good faith in all contractual relationships within New Zealand. 
Introducing good faith as a default rule may also be inappropriate. This presents a risk 
that parties would seek to contract out of good faith in circumstances where the 
obligation may be efficient. Contractual exclusion is particularly likely in the case of a 
self-interested sophisticated party dealing with an unsophisticated party.  
 
Conceivably, the better legal response is to target those contractual relationships in which 
good faith is more likely to enhance economic efficiency. These include homogenous 
contracts, consumer transactions, low-value transactions and transactions where there is a 
significant inequality of bargaining power. However, it is submitted that obligations akin 
to good faith are already imposed to some extent in these types of relationships via 
statute. For example, the Disputes Tribunals Act 1988 allows the Tribunal to consider 
notions of unconscionability and oppression in the exercise of contractual powers in low-
value exchanges, the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 affords contractual protection in 
consumer transactions, the Credit Contracts and Consumer Finance Act 2003 seeks to 
prevent overreaching by a sophisticated party over an unsophisticated party who may 
lack bargaining power and the Employment Relations Act 2000 expressly recognises 
obligations of good faith in a homogenous class of contracts. It was further demonstrated 
in Chapter 4 that the courts in New Zealand often give effect to unexpressed notions of 
good faith.  
 
Ultimately, any failure to attain economic efficiency is more appropriately remedied by 
addressing the application of contract doctrine to specific classes of contractual 
transactions rather than imposing a universal good faith doctrine. Although an important 
issue, it is outside the function of this chapter to extensively explore those categories of 
contractual relationship in which a good faith obligation may be extended to in the future. 
The thesis is fundamentally concerned with a general and universal doctrine of good faith 
rather than an obligation which would only relate to particular contractual relationships. 
The analysis has established that a universal doctrine is predisposed to inefficiency in 
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certain contractual interactions such that it is unlikely to be supportable from a law and 
economics perspective.   
 
5.5 The Efficiency of two Specific Applications of Good Faith: 
 
The foregoing discussion has applied a holistic approach to the law and economics issues 
relating to the subject doctrine of good faith. By contrast, this section examines two 
specific applications of a good faith obligation. This permits a more particular evaluation 
of the efficiency implications of a universal duty of good faith. Reference will be made to 
the parameters within the transaction costs model where appropriate.  
 
The first of these selected applications relates to pre-contractual disclosure. This area of 
the law has been discussed throughout the thesis. There is extensive law and economics 
literature pertaining to the issue. Accordingly, the economic scholarship should serve as a 
useful supplement to the legal analysis. Pre-contractual disclosure is therefore an 
appropriate application of good faith to examine. 
 
The second application of good faith which has been selected for consideration is 
quantity variations under output and requirements contracts. This has proved to be a 
contentious issue in the United States. By contrast, these contracts rarely feature in 
litigation in the Anglo-Commonwealth countries. In all likelihood this is due to the fact 
that those jurisdictions do not observe an obligation of good faith. It will be argued that 
the application good faith to these contracts is prone to inefficiency thereby supporting 
the contention that a universal doctrine is not economically desirable. 
 
5.5.1 Duties of Pre-Contractual Disclosure: 
 
The current law within New Zealand relating to pre-contractual disclosure was traversed 
in Chapter 4. That discussion highlighted the difficulties of extending the subject 
common law doctrine to regulate non-disclosure in a pre-contractual scenario. Setting 
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aside those jurisprudential limitations, law and economics may inform whether disclosure 
is desirable at the contractual bargaining stage under the auspices of good faith.  
 
It is elementary that competitive markets require full information to function efficiently. 
However, it does not follow that negotiating parties should be under a legal duty to 
disclose all information. That conclusion is too simplistic.128 On the contrary, it is a 
widely held view that a good faith duty requiring absolute disclosure would be 
economically inefficient.129 It would end arms length bargaining and would impede 
enterprise and commerce.130  
 
The economic rationale against complete disclosure focuses on socially valuable 
information. Productive or socially useful information is that which allows a resource to 
be put to a more beneficial use.131 It is economically desirable that information affecting 
the value of a resource reach the market as quickly as possible. This ensures allocative 
efficiency. Accordingly, individuals should not be discouraged from investing in the 
search for productive information. In most instances, an individual ought not therefore be 
forced to give away socially valuable information under a doctrine of good faith to his or 
her negotiating counterparty.132 This would limit the incentive to search for socially 
                                                     
128 See Miceli, above n 3, at 117. 
129 See Fabre-Magnan, above n 1, at 99. This outcome is contrary to the traditional views of many legal 
scholars in the United States who consider that all material facts should be disclosed. See generally W Page 
Keeton, ‘Fraud – Concealment and Non-Disclosure’ (1937) 15 Texas Law Review 1, at 31; Eric M Holmes, 
‘A Contextual Study of Commercial Good Faith: Good Faith Disclosure in Contract Formation’ (1978) 39 
University of Pittsburg Law Review 381, at 452; Friedrich Kessler and Edith Fine, ‘Culpa in Contrahendo, 
Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study’ (1964) 77 Harvard Law 
Review 401, at 444; Frona Powell, ‘The Seller’s Duty to Disclose in Sales of Commercial Property’ (1990) 
28 American Business Law Journal 245, at 274.  
130 Nicola Palmieri, ‘Good Faith Disclosures Required During Precontractual Negotiations’ (1993) 24 
Seaton Hall Law Review 70, at 179. 
131 Miceli, above n 3, at 121. 
132 But see Steven Shavell, ‘Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale’ (1994) 25 The RAND 
Journal of Economics 20 (discussed below n 137 and accompanying text). 
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beneficial information.133 The reasoning was explained by Judge Posner in United States 
v Dial with the use of a paradigm example: 
 
Liability is narrower for nondisclosure than for active misrepresentation, since the 
former sometimes serves a social purpose; for example, someone who bought 
land from another thinking that it had oil under it would not be required to 
disclose the fact to the owner, because society wants to encourage people to find 
out the true value of things, and it does this by allowing them to profit from their 
knowledge.134  
 
The hypothetical example mentioned by Posner actually bore out in the Australian case 
of Diversified Mineral Resources NL v CRA Exploration Pty Ltd.135 The plaintiff was the 
vendor of leases and mining claim applications pertaining to a tenement within 
Queensland. The defendant owned similar rights in adjacent tenements. It had expended 
considerable resources in the exploration of those tenements. The exploration indicated a 
valuable zinc ore deposit which was likely to extend into the land in which the plaintiff 
had an interest. The defendant offered to purchase the rights held by the plaintiff for the 
                                                     
133 See Anthony T Kronman, ‘Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts’ (1978) 7 
Journal of Legal Studies 1, at 13-14; Randy E Barnett, ‘Rational Bargaining Theory and Contract: Default 
Rules, Hypothetical Consent, the Duty to Disclose, and Fraud’ (1992) 15 Harvard Journal of Law and 
Public Policy 783, at 798. 
134 757 F2d 163, at 168 (1985, US App). See also Fox v Mackreth 2 Cox Eq Cas 320. In support of the 
principle of caveat emptor, it has been recognised by the Supreme Court of Canada that in ‘many if not 
most commercial negotiations, an advantageous bargaining position is derived from the industrious 
generation of information not possessed by the opposite party as opposed to its market position as here. 
Helpful information is often a by-product of one party expending resources on due diligence, research or 
other information gathering activities. It is apparent that successful negotiating is the product of that kind of 
industry…It would defeat the essence of negotiation and hobble the marketplace to extend a duty of care to 
the conduct of negotiations, and to label a party's failure to disclose its bottom line, its motives or its final 
position as negligent. Such a conclusion would of necessity force the disclosure of privately acquired 
information and the dissipation of any competitive advantage derived from it, all of which is incompatible 
with the activity of negotiating and bargaining.’: Martel Building Ltd v Canada [2000] 2 SCR 860, at [66]-
[67] per Iacobucci and Major JJ. See also John Cartwright, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure 
(2007), at 535.  
135 (1995) ATPR ¶41,381. 
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sum of A$3,000,000. The plaintiff accepted. However, the actual value was considerably 
more taking into account the exploration findings. The plaintiff subsequently sued on 
discovering the information which the defendant possessed at the time of contracting. 
The action failed. Whitlam J held that the standards of ordinary commercial behaviour 
did not require the defendant to inform the plaintiff of the discovery.136  
 
The decision is justified in economic terms. A duty of disclosure would diminish profits 
arising from the investment in exploration. The result would be less incentive to 
commission an optimal level of exploration. The Court was effectively assigning a 
property right in the information by eschewing a disclosure obligation.   
 
Recent studies have however indicated that it may be desirable in some instances for 
certain classes of sellers to be obliged to disclose productive information which they 
discover.137 Sellers may have a socially excessive motive to obtain information in the 
absence of such a legal requirement. A regime of voluntary disclosure of productive 
information could result in a situation where the best strategy for some sellers is to 
acquire and disclose information notwithstanding that the cost of acquisition exceeds the 
social benefit of the information. Such a strategy will be occasioned where buyers believe 
that a silent seller is attempting to conceal information unfavourable to the seller. Buyers 
will not be willing to pay for socially valuable information that a seller refuses to 
                                                     
136 Ibid, at 40,285. 
137 See Shavell, above n 132. For a worked numerical example demonstrating an optimal equilibrium under 
a legal regime requiring sellers to disclose known socially valuable information as compared to a regime 
allowing sellers to voluntarily disclose see Baird, Gertner and Picker, above n 46, at 103-106. Shavell 
however recognises that the same reasoning does not apply to buyers, who should be permitted to withhold 
productive information. He rationalises (at 21) that buyers should not be under any obligation to disclose 
productive information because ‘they will not be able to capture any increase in value due to information 
because sellers, being the holders of property rights, naturally enjoy the option of not selling and instead 
using valuable information themselves.’ The conclusions of Shavell suggest that an optimal law of good 
faith disclosure could have to distinguish between sellers and buyers in some instances so as to compel the 
disclosure of productive information by the former but not by the latter. Such a law may be extremely 
difficult to implement in practice. Difficulties associated with framing disclosure laws are discussed below. 
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disclose. However, a mandatory good faith obligation of disclosure of productive 
information discovered by sellers should change the beliefs of buyers. They infer that 
silent sellers are not necessarily withholding unfavourable information. Instead buyers 
may assume that sellers who can acquire productive information only at a cost above the 
social value of the information have not acquired the information at all. The best payoff 
strategy in this scenario for these high-cost sellers is to not acquire the information in the 
first place. Mandatory disclosure of known information by sellers should therefore 
efficiently deter sellers from acquiring information where the cost of acquisition exceeds 
the social benefit. Further, such a legal requirement is unlikely to prevent sellers from 
engaging in a socially desirable search for productive information. Eisenberg identifies 
the intrinsic incentives which sellers have to discover information: 
 
[A]n owner does not normally need special incentives to invest in information 
about her own property. Ownership already provides a sufficiently strong 
incentive for such an investment, because the information will maximize her 
utility while she owns the property, and allow her to set the correct price if she 
sells.138 
 
Productive information is distinguishable from purely distributive information. Non-
disclosure of either will usually result in a reallocation of wealth away from the 
individual labouring under asymmetric information. However, productive information 
leads to a more beneficial use ex-post. Redistributive information does not. Ex-post 
allocation of the resource is the same as its ex-ante allocation. Non-disclosure of non-
productive information can only serve to redistribute wealth.139 Therefore, the 
withholding of redistributive information is perceived to be solely an opportunistic 
bargaining device.140  
 
                                                     
138 Eisenberg, above n 31, at 1676. 
139 Miceli, above n 3, at 118. 
140 See Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (1988), at 259. 
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Non-disclosure of distributive information is evidenced in the case of Gloken Holdings 
Ltd v The CDE Co Ltd.141 The plaintiff purchased a hotel business from the first 
defendant relying on a turnover analysis supplied by the first defendant and its agent, the 
second defendant. However, the defendants omitted to disclose that the turnover figures 
were uncharacteristically high. The financial accounts reflected a period in which 
workers involved in a nearby construction project were temporarily lodged at the hotel. It 
soon became apparent to the plaintiff that the actual turnover was not as expected. It had 
paid too much for the hotel in consequence. The plaintiff sued. Hammond J found the 
defendants liable for misrepresentation under s 6(1) Contractual Remedies Act 1979, 
misleading and deceptive conduct under s 9 Fair Trading Act 1986 and tortious deceit. 
On an economic rationale, the effect of the non-disclosure or half-truth was to redistribute 
wealth from the plaintiff to the first defendant. The actual economic value of the hotel 
was unaltered ex-post.  
 
Economists often assert that contract law should compel the disclosure of purely 
distributive information.142 The law effectively permits opportunism if such information 
can be withheld. This produces social waste.143 Investment to discover unproductive 
information is encouraged. Similarly, costly defensive expenditures are made which 
reduce total contractual surplus.144 Individuals without full information must draft more 
protective measures into their contracts or seek out additional information. The S  
parameter within the transactions cost model, which includes the cost of discovery and 
disclosure, is unnecessarily increased. Further, the law should create incentives for the 
production and dissemination of information at the lowest cost145 so as to minimise C . 
                                                     
141 (1997) 8 TCLR 278. See also Hall v Warwick Todd Ltd (2000) 9 TCLR 448; Heiber v Barfoot & 
Thompson Ltd (1996) 5 NZBLC 99,384; Smythe v Bayleys Real Estate Ltd (1993) 5 TCLR 454; Wakelin v 
R H and E A Jackson Ltd (1984) 2 NZCPR 195. In some instances non-disclosure of apparently 
redistributive information has not attracted a legal remedy. See for example Bradford House v Leroy 
Fashion Group (1983) ATPR ¶40,387; Eighth SRJ Ltd v Merity [1997] NSW ConvR 56,380. 
142 See Miceli, above n 3, at 121. 
143 See Shavell, above n 132, at 21. 
144 See Posner, above n 5, at 111. 
145 See generally Hans-Bernd Schäfer and Claus Ott, The Economic Analysis of Civil Law (2004), at 377. 
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Redistributive information will often be possessed by the least cost avoider. For example, 
the owner of a car may become aware of an engine defect as a by-product of driving the 
car. The information is produced at less cost than if a potential buyer was to commission 
a report by a mechanic. Accordingly, intending vendors, sellers, lessors and licensors will 
often be least cost avoiders upon which legal obligations of disclosure should be visited.  
 
However, a good faith duty of disclosure determined solely by differentiating productive 
information from non-productive information would be inappropriate. An additional 
distinction is required between facts which are deliberately acquired and facts which are 
casually acquired.146 Information is deliberately acquired if its acquisition entails costs 
that would not otherwise have been incurred but for the likelihood of the information 
being produced.147 Facts which are obtained without incurring such costs are deemed to 
be casually acquired.  
 
It is generally contended that there is no economic reason to preclude disclosure of 
casually acquired information. Ipso facto, compelling an individual to disclose 
information obtained without expending resources will have no effect on his or her 
behaviour.148 The incidence of casually acquired information is not affected by disclosure 
laws. This result holds even if the information is productive. An individual who has 
expended no resources to obtain productive information need not be vested with a de 
facto property right in that information. 
  
The above analysis implies that legal good faith duties should generally compel 
disclosure of all information except that which has been deliberately acquired and which 
                                                     
146 Miceli, above n 3, at 122. 
147 Kronman, above n 133, at 13. 
148 Ibid, at 14. However, it has been contended that in some cases ‘there is a clear benefit in allowing 
buyers to use information they acquire accidentally…Allowing buyers to use their accidental knowledge 
can encourage the uncovering of resources, as well as the movement of those resources to those who value 
them most.’: Marc Ramsay, ‘The Buyer/Seller Asymmetry: Corrective Justice and Material Non-
Disclosure’ (2006) 56 University of Toronto Law Journal 115, at 125. 
  
277 
can be characterised as socially useful or productive.149 However, that outcome is entirely 
theoretical. There are economic factors which undermine the hypothesised utility of a 
good faith disclosure doctrine. Firstly, it is difficult to frame the duty of disclosure. 
Secondly, the market and existing regulations often provide an appropriate solution. 
Thirdly, it is dubious whether good faith disclosure obligations would materially reduce 
transactions costs. These three issues are explored below. 
 
Framing a good faith disclosure duty presents fundamental problems. Information cannot 
readily be alienated into distinct categories.150 For example, the owner of an artwork may 
be unaware that it has been painted by a famous artist. He or she may sell to an informed 
art expert for a price significantly below the value which the expert places on the 
painting. The information could be characterised as redistributive. The painting has 
always been genuine. Notionally, no new wealth has been discovered. Alternatively, the 
information could be characterised as productive. The additional wealth in the painting 
would not exist if the uninformed vendor retained it in his or her private gallery.151 It is 
                                                     
149 See generally Miceli, above n 3, at 121 and 122. But see Shavell, above n 132, who recognises the 
potential necessity for sellers to be compelled to disclose productive information. Further, it has been 
recognised that mixed outcomes might be expected in circumstances where facts are productive but 
casually acquired and circumstances where facts are redistributive but deliberately acquired. See Alex M 
Johnson, ‘An Economic Analysis of the Duty to Disclose Information: Lessons Learned From the Caveat 
Emptor Doctrine’ (2008) 45 San Diego Law Review 79, at 92. 
150 See Jules Coleman, Douglas Heckathorn and Steven Maser, ‘A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default 
Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law’ (1989) 12 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 
639, at 692. It is doubtful whether the proposed classifications correspond to decided cases in the United 
States. See S M Waddams, ‘Pre-Contractual Duties of Disclosure’ in Peter Cane and Jane Stapleton (eds), 
Essays for Patrick Atiyah (1991), at 250. 
151 The example is based on an actual French case which related to a painting by the French painter, 
Nicholas Poussin. For further discussion of the case see Fabre-Magnan, above n 1.  It has been observed 
that information which remains private is of no social value because it does not lead to any improvement in 
productive arrangements. See Jack Hirshleifer, ‘The Private and Social Value of Information and the 
Reward to Inventive Activity’ (1971) 61 American Economic Review 561, at 573. For a further analysis of 
a similar hypothetical example see Christopher T Wonnell, ‘The Structure of a General Theory of Non-
Disclosure’ (1991) 41 Case Western Reserve Law Review 329, at 342-343. 
  
278 
proper that ‘mixed’ facts which contain productive and redistributive elements need not 
be disclosed.152 The art expert in the above scenario should not be discouraged from 
revealing valuable paintings. However, most information can be rationalised to contain a 
productive component.153 Therefore, good faith disclosure might rarely oblige a 
prospective purchaser to divulge information. 
 
Distinguishing between facts which are casually acquired and those which are 
deliberately acquired is also complex. The requisite causal proximity between the 
investment and the information obtained is not clear. There are few conceivable instances 
where facts are obtained without attributable cost. Limited examples have been proffered. 
A businessperson who accidentally overhears valuable information whilst riding on a bus 
is suggested to have casually acquired the information.154 However, he or she may have 
invested in education which facilitates the interpretation of the information and its 
application to a beneficial use. The businessperson might also argue that he or she would 
stop diligently listening to the conversations of others or stop riding the bus altogether if 
the value of the information was prevented by some legal requirement from being 
exploited. Thus, it can be reasoned that information will be deliberately acquired in 
almost all cases.155 The courts are also likely to favour defendants on this issue. An in-
depth ex-post analysis of attenuated submissions as to why information is deliberately 
acquired is undesirable and unrealistic. Again, a duty of good faith disclosure could be of 
infrequent application.  
 
An additional framing difficulty exists in determining whether a duty of disclosure should 
apply only to information which is actually known. Alternatively, the obligation could 
                                                     
152 See Cooter and Ulen, above n 140, at 261. 
153 See Fabre-Magnan, above n 1, at 111; Coleman, Heckathorn and Maser, above n 150, at 693.  
154 Kronman, above n 133, at 13. 
155 See Fabre-Magnan, above n 1, at 109. Consequently, it has been noted that the greater the likelihood 
‘information will be deliberately produced rather than casually discovered, the more plausible the 
assumption becomes that a blanket rule permitting nondisclosure will have benefits that outweigh its 
costs.’: Anthony T Kronman, ‘Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts’ in Kronman 
and Posner (eds), above n 27, at 121. 
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extend to information which ought to be known. This dilemma is primarily applicable to 
the disclosure of unfavourable information. A requirement to disclose only known facts 
creates a disincentive to discover beneficial information. For example, the owner of a 
house has less incentive to discover latent defects during the period of his or her 
ownership. The vendor must disclose the information to an intending purchaser if it is 
known. This may decrease the price the owner receives for the house unless the 
negotiating purchaser was to personally discover the defect. However, the timely 
discovery of the defect might be economically desirable. The defect may be worsening 
over time. Cost savings on remedial work would be achieved by early detection. The law 
might avoid these consequences by deeming that good faith requires disclosure of 
constructive facts and that a reasonable person in the position of the vendor would have 
discovered the defect. The vendor has incentive to quickly discover and remedy the 
defect in a cost-effective fashion.  
 
However, requiring disclosure of matters which ought to be known would also pose 
serious difficulties. Overproduction of information would result156 thereby increasing 
( )GFnS * . A party obliged to disclose what he or she ought reasonably to know must 
make costly inquiries which may not produce any beneficial information. Further, 
irrelevant information might be disclosed. Accordingly, the New Zealand courts have 
previously taken the view that no liability can be found where a negotiating party has 
omitted to address or disclose a fact of which he or she is wholly unconscious.157  
 
Ultimately, it is evident that duties of disclosure distort market incentives to seek out 
information. Overproduction or underproduction of information is likely and is strongly 
linked to the manner in which the good faith duty is framed.158 
                                                     
156 The dangers of overinvestment in information have been emphasised. See generally Robert 
Birmingham, ‘The Duty to Disclose and the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Laidlaw v. Organ’ (1988) 29 William and 
Mary Law Review 249. See also Waddams, above n 150, at 251. 
157 Des Forges v Wright [1996] 2 NZLR 758, at 766 per Elias J; Ladstone Holdings Ltd v Leonora Holdings 
Ltd [2006] 1 NZLR 211, at 224-225 per Potter J. 
158 See Coleman, Heckathorn and Maser, above n 150, at 694. 
  
280 
 
The second challenge to the utility of good faith disclosure relates to the ability of the 
market and the pre-existing regulations within New Zealand to provide an appropriate 
solution. Opportunistic trading through the non-disclosure of redistributive information 
will be discouraged in a competitive market. A firm obtaining sales through non-
disclosure to customers will be exposed by competitors.159 It will lose reputation. Players 
in a long-term competitive market therefore have incentive to trade in a non-opportunistic 
manner. Trade associations and consumer protection organisations also serve a similar 
function. These bodies limit the incentives and payoffs for uneconomic non-disclosure. 
 
Further, the market may ensure that disclosure is not necessary. For example, competitive 
pressures compel sellers of goods and services to offer warranties. A warranty is more 
economically effective than disclosure in some instances.160 It is more cost-effective to 
include a contractual warranty rather than placing an onerous obligation on sellers to 
disclose the characteristics and potential defects of a good. The legislature has intervened 
where market competition is not sufficient to induce contractual warranties. Accordingly, 
warranties may be implied into a contract by statute.161  
 
Good faith disclosure has also sought to be justified on the basis that it places the onus of 
producing information on the least cost avoider. However, there may be no clear least 
cost avoider in some cases. Either party may have access to an efficient and cost-
equivalent information source where there is a separate market for information.162 For 
example, information held by a local body about a particular piece of real estate may be 
                                                     
159 See Posner, above n 5, at 112. 
160 Ibid, at 113. It has been recognised that ‘people may be able to make the benefits of possession 
relatively more secure by resorting first to their endogenous transaction resources rather than depending 
upon legal rules.’: Coleman, Heckathorn and Maser, above n 150, at 695. 
161 For example, the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 imposes mandatory guarantees as to: title; acceptable 
quality; fitness for purpose; compliance with a description; compliance with a sample; price; repairs and 
spare parts; reasonable care and skill and; time of completion. The Sale of Goods Act 1908 also imposes a 
default warranty of quality and fitness for purpose. 
162 See Smith and Smith, above n 33, at 487. 
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obtained at the same cost to the purchaser or the vendor.163 Market considerations dictate 
that the information will be obtained by the party whose allocative gain is sufficient to 
offset the cost.164 This will be the buyer of a property in most instances. He or she stands 
to lose the most if the information is unfavourable. 
 
The most fundamental limitation of a good faith disclosure duty is that it may not 
significantly reduce transactions costs within New Zealand. A rational negotiating party 
will continue to employ defensive measures rather than rely on his or her negotiating 
counterparty to disclose information under a good faith doctrine. The ex-post cost of 
litigating to recover for the adverse consequences of non-disclosure will almost 
inevitably exceed the ex-ante cost of producing the information. This is exacerbated by 
the fact that good faith disclosure litigation will be uncertain.165 A plaintiff would 
ordinarily have to establish that the defendant had actual knowledge of the relevant fact, 
that it was solely a redistributive fact and that the fact was casually acquired. These 
matters would be extremely difficult to prove as recognised above. All of these factors 
indicate that e  may be inherently significant and I  is unlikely to significantly exceed 
GFI . 
 
Reliance by a negotiating party on a good faith disclosure doctrine at an ex-ante stage 
presupposes that contracting parties know and understand the law. A negotiating party 
who places trust in his or her negotiating counterparty must assume that the counterparty 
knows that an obligation of disclosure exists and that he or she can differentiate between 
                                                     
163 For example, a Land Information Memorandum pertaining to a residential property may be obtained 
from the relevant local council at the same cost to either buyer or seller but standard form agreements for 
sale and purchase of real estate generally place this obligation on the buyer. See clause 8.2 Agreement for 
Sale and Purchase of Real Estate (8th ed, 2006) (approved by the Real Estate Institute of New Zealand Inc 
and the Auckland District Law Society). 
164 See Smith and Smith, above n 33, at 487.     
165 Notably, a rule ‘which calls for a case-by-case application of a disclosure requirement is likely [ ] to 
involve factual issues that will be difficult and expensive to resolve…[I]t is impossible to determine 
whether the buyer actually made a deliberate investment in acquiring information.’: Kronman, above n 155, 
at 120. 
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productive facts, distributive facts, casually acquired information and deliberately 
acquired information. This is not necessarily a reasonable assumption. Further, a 
negotiating party weighing up whether to disclose information will naturally be biased 
towards finding that information is productive and deliberately acquired, particularly 
given the uncertainties surrounding differentiating the concepts. Ultimately, each 
negotiating party knows that there is little behavioural motivation for the other to reveal 
facts which are adverse to his or her bargaining position. 
 
Similarly, the distinction between deliberately or casually acquired information and 
productive or solely redistributive information is largely irrelevant to a potential victim of 
non-disclosure at the ex-ante stage. The economic model dictates that silence will be 
permitted in some cases. This non-disclosure will redistribute wealth from the victim. 
Accordingly, there is still incentive to make defensive expenditures. A negotiating party 
cannot necessarily differentiate between productive, redistributive, deliberately acquired 
or casually acquired facts until those facts and the circumstances of their acquisition 
become known. This implies that a similar level of ex-ante expenditure is likely whether 
good faith operates or not. Specification costs savings, namely S , are not likely to 
meaningfully increase on account of a good faith obligation of disclosure.  
  
The above analysis has demonstrated that it would not be economically desirable for a 
doctrine of good faith to impose an obligation of complete pre-contractual disclosure. 
Good faith should not mandate an absolute abandonment of caveat emptor. Traditional 
economic reasoning implies that disclosure should generally be required in all cases 
except where information is deliberately acquired and can be classified as productive.166 
However, the utility of a doctrine of good faith disclosure has been challenged. The 
obligation may distort incentives to produce information. Often the market can obtain 
appropriate solutions without the intervention of good faith. Critically, there is no 
evidence to suggest that good faith disclosure would materially reduce transactions costs 
within New Zealand. Negotiating parties will continue to rely on private measures. 
                                                     
166 However, in some instances even disclosure of productive facts may be required. See above n 137 and 
accompanying text. 
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Accordingly, the theoretical benefits of good faith disclosure must be doubted. It is 
unlikely to enhance the IS >  inequality. 
 
5.5.2 Quantity Variations in Requirements and Outputs Contracts: 
 
A requirements contract is one in which a seller agrees to supply a specific good to a 
buyer in quantities which the buyer may require. Ordinarily the contract will stipulate a 
fixed price but leave open the quantity wholly to the discretion of the buyer. The needs of 
the buyer determine the quantity of goods which the seller must provide. The seller will 
usually be the exclusive supplier.167 Such contracts have been labeled as ‘solus 
agreements’ by the English courts.168  
 
Alternatively, an output contract is one in which the buyer agrees to purchase the entire 
output of the seller of a specific good. Again, the price is likely to be fixed but the 
quantity produced for sale is liable to fluctuate. 
 
Originally it was thought that open-quantity contracts were illusory and therefore 
unenforceable for lack of consideration.169 In the case of a requirements contract it was 
contended that there could be no binding promise because the buyer is under no duty to 
purchase the goods. However, this argument was dispelled by the Court of Common 
Pleas in The Great Northern Railway Company v Witham.170 The defendant had agreed to 
supply the plaintiff iron at a fixed price in such quantities that the plaintiff may order 
from time to time. The plaintiff requested supply but the defendant refused to deliver. 
The defendant argued that there was no consideration for the promise. Brett J disagreed. 
Although the agreement was effectively a unilateral contract, the act of the plaintiff 
                                                     
167 See Paulette Kendler Zisk, ‘Requirements Contracts, “More or Less” Under the Uniform Commercial 
Code’ (1980) 31 Rutgers Law Review 105, at 107. 
168 Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1967] 1 All ER 699, at 703 per Lord Reid. 
169 See Victor P Goldberg, Framing Contract Law (2006), at 101. 
170 (1873-74) LR 9 CP 16. See also John N Adams, ‘Consideration for Requirements Contracts’ (1978) 94 
Law Quarterly Review 73. 
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placing the order meant that the defendant was bound to perform.171 The question as to 
whether the defendant could absolve himself from further performance by giving notice 
was left open. Subsequent courts have sought to preclude premature cancellation by 
reasoning that there is an obligation on the buyer to order goods if they are required.172 
That obligation supposedly amounts to consideration to keep the offer open. Further, an 
undertaking from the buyer that he or she will order all requirements only from the seller 
is also capable of constituting consideration.173 
 
Solus agreements which absolutely restrict a buyer from purchasing goods from a party 
other than the contractual seller have been construed as a restraint of trade. The 
arrangement must be in the public interest. Some requirements contracts have been struck 
down as unreasonable. An example is seen in the case of Petrofina (Gt Britain) v 
Martin.174 Martin operated a petrol station. He contracted to purchase fuel only from 
Petrofina at a stipulated price. However, it soon became evident that the price was too 
high. Martin could not reach the level of sales required to break even. As a result, he 
rationally switched to purchasing fuel from an alternate supplier at a lower price. The 
Court refused to allow the action by Petrofina seeking to uphold the agreement. The 
contract was too onerous. It rendered the petrol station unsaleable, the contractual 
minimum period of 12 years was too long and the restriction on oil purchases was too 
great.175  
 
Nonetheless, requirements and output contracts provide obvious mutual benefits. The 
necessity to specify a fixed quantity ex-ante is avoided. Instead, quantity can be 
determined ex-post as new information becomes available. Thus, there is contractual 
flexibility which permits adaptation to changing circumstances. Surety of supply or 
                                                     
171 (1873-74) LR 9 CP 16, at 19-20. 
172 Re Gloucester Municipal Election Petition [1901] 1 KB 683.  
173 See Andrew Grubb and Michael Furmston (eds), The Law of Contract (1999), at 198.  
174 [1966] 1 All ER 126. See also Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1967] 1 All 
ER 699; Robinson v Golden Chips (Wholesale) Limited [1971] NZLR 257. 
175 Ibid, at 134 per Lord Denning MR. 
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demand is also achieved. Contracting costs are likely to decrease and the parties can 
allocate contractual risk to the party most suitable to bear those risks.176  
 
Open quantity agreements are susceptible to opportunistic conduct. The buyer has 
incentive to understate his or her requirements if the market price falls below the contract 
price. The buyer may seek alternate supply or perhaps avoid the solus agreement 
altogether. The seller incurs additional transactions costs in having to find an alternative 
buyer in this instance.  
 
Conversely, a buyer has an incentive to overstate his or her actual requirements in the 
event that a requirements contract price falls short of the market price. Surplus goods 
may be sold at a profit. In J L Kier & Co Ltd v Whitehead Iron & Steel Co Ltd Branson J 
sought to avoid this problem by construing the word requirement to mean that the buyer 
could only demand that amount of goods which was actually required in his or her 
business.177 The buyer could not buy to sell again.  
 
However, the buyer may be in the business of reselling in some cases. Further, he or she 
may wish to establish adequate stockpiles of goods. The distinction between whether the 
goods are or are not actually required may be elusive. Differentiating between 
opportunistic and non-opportunistic conduct may therefore be complicated.178   
 
Not all quantity changes responding to fluctuation in market prices can be classified as 
opportunistic conduct. Some alterations may be made for a legitimate purpose. The courts 
in the United States have distinguished opportunistic behaviour by imposing a good faith 
restriction on quantity variations. The obligation of good faith exists at common law179 
                                                     
176 See generally David Goddard, ‘Long-Term Contracts: A Law and Economics Perspective’ [1997] New 
Zealand Law Review 423, at 424. 
177 [1938] 1 All ER 591, at 594. 
178 See Fischel, above n 97, at 141. 
179 See Alphonse Squillante and John Fonseca, Williston on Sales (4th ed, 1973), at 390. An obligation to 
determine quantity reasonably and in good faith may also exist in Canada. See S M Waddams, The Law of 
Contracts (5th ed, 2005), at 357. 
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but is also set out under the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”). Section 2-306(1) states 
that the quantity demanded or supplied must occur in good faith. Additionally, the 
amount cannot be unreasonably disproportionate to any stated estimate. Essentially, the 
Court will examine whether there is a valid business reason that justifies a quantity 
variation. A party who seeks to manipulate the contract in light of market disparity will 
be deemed to be acting in bad faith.180 A buyer cannot use an ordering option to facilitate 
speculation on rising and falling markets.181 Thus, the stockpiling of goods in anticipation 
of changing prices is not good faith conduct.182 
 
These specific good faith obligations operating under American law have attracted 
considerable comment from contract and economics scholars.183 Obligations of good 
faith have proved to be a useful deterrent to opportunism in some cases. However, in 
other instances duties of good faith in open quantity contracts have arguably produced 
inefficient results. The manner in which the judiciary interprets good faith may give rise 
to inefficiency. There are various case examples within the United States which support 
this contention. 
 
In Feld v Henry S Levy & Sons Inc184 the defendant operated a wholesale bread baking 
business. As part of its ordinary business, the defendant generated waste product in the 
form of loaves of bread that were unsuitable for sale. This waste could however be 
                                                     
180 See Stacy Silkworth, ‘Quantity Variation in Open Quantity Contracts’ (1990) 51 University of 
Pittsburgh Law Review 235, at 236. 
181 See John N Adams, ‘The Economics of Good Faith in Contract’ (1995) 8 Journal of Contract Law 126, 
at 132. 
182 See E Allan Farnsworth, ‘Good Faith in Contract Performance’ in Beatson and Friedman (eds), above n 
1, at 159. 
183 See Victor P Goldberg, ‘Desperately Seeking Consideration: The Unfortunate Impact of U.C.C. S2-306 
on Contract Interpretation’ (2007) 68 Ohio State Law Journal 103; Victor P Goldberg, above n 169; Travis 
W McCallon, ‘Old Habits Die Hard: The Trouble With Ignoring S2-306 of the UCC’ (2004) 39 Tulsa Law 
Review 711; Mark P Gergen, ‘The Use of Open Terms in Contract’ (1992) 92 Columbia Law Review 997; 
Silkworth, above n 180; Muris, above n 61; Zisk, above n 167; John C Weistart, ‘Requirements and Output 
Contracts: Quantity Variations Under the UCC’ (1973) Duke Law Journal 599. 
184 37 NY 2d 466 (NY, 1975). 
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converted into toasted breadcrumbs. This was a saleable product. Accordingly, the 
plaintiff entered into an output contract with the defendant. The plaintiff agreed to 
purchase all of the toasted breadcrumbs that the defendant produced. The contract 
stipulated a fixed price and was for an initial term of one year with successive renewal 
periods of one year. It was terminable on six months notice by either party. The 
defendant commenced the production of the breadcrumbs. However, within a year it 
became evident that the operation was not profitable. The defendant ceased production 
and dismantled its toasting oven. The defendant thereafter used the space for a computer 
room. The plaintiff sued. It was alleged that the defendant had not given notice of 
termination and had ceased production in breach of good faith. The Court of Appeals of 
New York held that ‘since there was a contractual right of cancellation, good faith 
required continued production until cancellation, even if there be no profit.’185 
 
The decision can be criticised on a number of grounds. The defendant had not breached 
the express terms of the agreement. It was open to the defendant to cease production 
without giving notice of cancellation. The defendant was not required to produce a 
minimum amount. It was evident that the defendant was not meeting its variable costs at 
the contractual price.186 To suggest that the defendant was acting in bad faith by making a 
commercially rational election to shut down is not logical in economic terms. Ultimately, 
the effect of the judicial interpretation was to reallocate pre-agreed contractual risk 
which, according to the transaction costs model, is an undesirable effect of good faith 
embodied by the e  parameter. It cannot be said that the defendant was attempting to 
redistribute wealth between the contracting parties. Thus, the defendant was not acting 
opportunistically. It seems anomalous to suggest that the defendant had a contractual duty 
to stay in business to convert waste product for the benefit of the plaintiff.187 Certainly, 
there was no evidence to suggest that the continued production was Kaldor-Hicks 
efficient. It was not evident that the plaintiff was solely reliant on supply from the 
                                                     
185 Ibid, at 472 per Cooke J. 
186 See Goldberg, above n 169, at 118. 
187 Ibid, at 119. 
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defendant. Further, the cost to the defendant of continued production in the form of 
forgoing the use of the space as a computer room may have been significant. 
 
Another inefficient outcome resulting from the application of good faith might be seen in 
the case of Orange and Rockland Utilities Inc v Amerada Hess Corporation.188 The 
plaintiff operated a power generating plant. The defendant contracted to supply fuel at a 
fixed price to the plaintiff as might be required for power generation. The contract 
contained non-binding estimates of the amount of fuel that the plaintiff would require. 
The price of fuel rose significantly five months into the 10 year contract. This coincided 
with an increase in the quantity of fuel requested by the plaintiff. The amount demanded 
was more than 60 per cent above the contractual estimate at one point. The increased 
demand was primarily attributable to increased sales of electricity to the New York 
Power Pool. The plaintiff had also begun to favour the use of fuel over gas in its plant. 
However, the defendant refused to supply any additional fuel above 10 per cent of the 
estimated rate. The plaintiff was forced to purchase the additional fuel required on the 
market. It sued to recover the difference between the market price and the contract price. 
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York held that the plaintiff had not 
acted in good faith and that its requirements were unreasonably disproportionate to the 
contractual estimates.189     
 
The decision produced an economically questionable result. There was no doubt that the 
plaintiff would utilise the additional fuel to meet its output requirements. The inherent 
limit on quantity within the contract was the maximum amount of fuel that would be 
required if the plaintiff operated its plant at full capacity. The Court effectively placed a 
limit on the quantity short of the capacity of the plant. The plaintiff was deprived of the 
flexibility it had bargained for as a result. The Court converted the contract into a fixed 
quantity agreement. Goldberg notes that the Court ‘implicitly ruled that the seller had 
promised to run its plant at less than full capacity for the life of the agreement, never 
                                                     
188 397 NY S2d 814 (NY App Div, 1977). 
189 Ibid, at 819 and 822 per Margett J. 
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asking why on earth a party would make such an odd promise.’190 The problem would 
have been exacerbated had the buyer been unable to readily locate a suitable alternative 
supplier.  
 
Significant difficulties may also arise in cases where a new technology or substitute good 
becomes available. This may reduce the requirements of a purchaser. This problem arose 
in Southwest Natural Gas Co v Oklahoma Portland Cement Co.191 The defendant was a 
cement producing company. The plaintiff agreed to meet the natural gas requirements of 
the defendant for a term of 15 years. The defendant installed a new and technologically 
advanced boiler system in its factory during the currency of the contract. The new 
equipment partially heated the boilers by utilising the waste heat produced by the kilns in 
the factory. The need for natural gas as a fuel to heat the boilers dramatically decreased 
as a result. The plaintiff sued to enjoin the defendant from utilising the waste heat in its 
operations. It was claimed that the defendant was in breach of the requirements contract. 
The Court rightly held that the defendant had not acted in bad faith. It had exercised a 
prudent business judgment.192  
 
It would be most undesirable for an obligation of good faith in open quantity contracts to 
be utilised to prevent a contracting party from making use of new technology. The 
outcome would be to discourage productive investment. The Court must not find that a 
buyer promises to adapt inefficiently as new technology and information becomes 
available.193 Nonetheless, the Southwest case evidences that a good faith obligation has 
encouraged litigants to bring claims seeking this very outcome. 
 
The above case examples recognise the potential for inefficiency resulting from the Court 
interfering in open quantity contracts. On occasions judges have seen fit to utilise good 
faith to redistribute wealth that has already been allocated under the contract. 
                                                     
190 Goldberg, above n 169, at 134. 
191 102 F2d 630 (1939, US App). 
192 Ibid, at 633 per Judge Phillips. 
193 Goldberg, above n 169, at 114. 
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Consequently, a doctrine of good faith may itself be used as a weapon to facilitate 
opportunism. This is undesirable. A party to a requirements or output contract has an 
incentive to commence litigation. He or she speculates that the Court may rewrite the 
agreement in his or her favour. This incentive is exacerbated by the fact that there is 
likely to be asymmetric information as between the parties and the Court. It is therefore 
unhelpful for contracting parties to rely on an ex-post review by a court guided by 
uncertain language such as good faith. Such litigation inevitably increases the magnitude 
of e . As a result, it is suggested that there is a strong tendency for IS <  where good 
faith is applied to open quantity contracts. 
 
The party claiming a breach of good faith in the cases identified above could have taken 
adequate ex-ante protective steps. The contract price can be pegged to the market price. 
Similarly, floor or ceiling quantities can be stipulated thereby defining the extent of the 
risk assumed by each party. Conceivably, these contractual provisions could be achieved 
without significant additional specification costs. S  would be unlikely to increase 
materially. Accordingly, good faith may be an undesirable substitute for a definitive 
contractual allocation of risk. The argument is noted in general terms by Shell: 
 
[B]usiness parties that are concerned with specific forms of postcontractual 
opportunism may bargain explicitly to inhibit opportunistic conduct in their 
original contract, eliminating the need for noncontractual legal protection…[T]he 
creation of legal claims to deter opportunism may backfire and result in 
groundless lawsuits by parties who took known risks at the outset of a 
relationship, but became disappointed with the outcome of the transaction. In 
short, [ ] using the legal system to redress the [opportunism] problem could be 
worse than the danger itself.194 
 
Further, there is no reason why the contracting parties cannot negotiate ex-post to achieve 
a more suitable allocation of risk in light of changed circumstances. The parties will have 
incentive to renegotiate if the long-term business relationship is valued or non-
performance is imminent.  A requirements contract can be readily altered by a simple 
                                                     
194 Shell, above n 74, at 231-232. 
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deed of variation.195 Extra-legal incentives may therefore produce an appropriate 
outcome. Good faith would not provide any additional benefit in this scenario. 
 
Requirements and output contracts are prevalent within the commercial community.196 
They are perceived to be ordinary commercial contracts.197 Accordingly, it is unusual that 
most contract textbooks in New Zealand do not substantively consider such 
arrangements.198 The number of cases evaluating such contracts in the Commonwealth 
pales in comparison to the United States. This occurrence may be reflective of the fact 
that the Commonwealth courts are generally unwilling to interfere with clearly allocated 
contractual risk. The above analysis has sought to demonstrate that economically 
inefficient outcomes could ensue if this position were to change in the Commonwealth. 
Judicial interference with open quantity contracts would be an economically undesirable 
element of a good faith doctrine within New Zealand. 
 
5.6 Summary: 
 
This chapter has sought to identify the importance of economics scholarship to contract 
law and the good faith debate within New Zealand. The primary economic view of good 
faith it that it could function as a deterrent to opportunistic conduct. Opportunism is a 
recurring term utilised by contract economics scholars. However, it is difficult to derive a 
universal definition of the concept. Opportunistic behaviour certainly arises from the fact 
that contracts are incomplete and involve sequential performance.  
 
Behavioural economics must be taken into account in determining whether good faith 
would be an appropriate measure to counter opportunism. The desirability of good faith 
                                                     
195 Richard Austen-Baker, ‘A Relational Law of Contract?’ (2004) 20 Journal of Contract Law 125, at 137-
138. 
196 See Adams, above n 170, at 84. 
197 J L Kier & Co Ltd v Whitehead Iron & Steel Co Ltd [1938] 1 All ER 591 (see headnote). 
198 Similar observations have been made in respect of the English position. See Adams, above n 170, at 74.  
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must be appraised with reference to empirical evidence rather than desired results. Good 
faith should create behavioural incentives to cooperate and avoid opportunistic dealing. 
 
A good faith doctrine is generally perceived as a substitute for contractual specification 
thereby producing transactions cost savings. However, the uncertainty of good faith must 
also be factored into account. This reveals a trade-off between the savings on 
specification costs and the cost of increased uncertainty arising from reliance on good 
faith. The model outlined allows for predictions to be made as to when good faith could 
be efficient. The analysis evidenced that good faith would not promote economic 
efficiency in some instances. This result implies that a universal and mandatory 
obligation of good faith may not be desirable. A better approach would be to target those 
contractual dealings and relationships where good faith is likely to be transactions cost 
efficient. 
 
The difficulties associated with contractual good faith, as it applies to economic 
efficiency, were also identified in an analysis of two specific applications of the duty. A 
blanket rule of good faith disclosure in pre-contractual negotiations is undesirable. The 
utility of a good faith disclosure doctrine is doubted. It is debatable whether negotiating 
parties will repose sufficient trust in counterparties needed to achieve significant 
transactions costs savings. Similar difficulties were seen in judicial attempts to apply 
good faith to open quantity contracts. Often this results in an inefficient reallocation of 
contractual risk. The subject doctrine is an inappropriate substitute for a contractual 
specification by the parties in such instances. Applying both of these good faith 
applications to the transaction costs model certainly verifies that the good faith efficiency 
criterion is unlikely to be satisfied. 
 
A universal common law doctrine may not therefore be an appropriate means of 
maximising efficiency. Arguably, it is better to impose good faith or similar duties in 
those contractual relationships in which the dictates of efficiency require such 
obligations. Good faith should not be applied to contractual scenarios where it is not 
justified in economic terms. The prevailing piecemeal approach within New Zealand is 
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conceivably a better means of achieving economic efficiency than a universal doctrine of 
contractual good faith.  
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Chapter 6 
 
International Considerations  
 
6.1 Chapter Introduction: 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine international factors which affect the debate as 
to the desirability of a universal doctrine of contractual good faith within New Zealand. 
Good faith in contract enjoys a far more open recognition outside of New Zealand law. 
Thus, there is an abundance of international resources which can be considered when 
appraising the good faith issue in respect of New Zealand.  
 
Part 6.2 evaluates the argument for good faith based on the perceived need to harmonise 
the domestic law of contract in New Zealand with other overseas jurisdictions. The 
ostensible benefits of harmonisation and the existing pressures for this coordination of 
laws are explored. Part 6.3 describes the ability of contracting parties engaged in 
international exchange to select foreign jurisdictions as the governing law of their 
contract which expressly recognise good faith. Conceivably the case for adopting the 
subject doctrine within New Zealand is enhanced if contractors are prone to favouring 
jurisdictions which endorse good faith over jurisdictions which do not recognise a general 
good faith obligation. Part 6.4 analyses the United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods. This international trade instrument overtly acknowledges 
good faith. It applies by default to New Zealand parties dealing with overseas 
counterparties under qualifying contracts. The application of good faith under the 
Convention may be of utility in evaluating whether good faith is appropriate for domestic 
New Zealand contract law. Part 6.5 engages in a study of the contractual doctrine of good 
faith within the United States. The suitability of employing the American experience of 
good faith as an exemplar for New Zealand is discussed. Similarly, the outstanding issues 
pertaining to the good faith obligation within the Unites States are explored. Part 6.6 
summarises the foregoing findings.  
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6.2 Harmonisation of Law – A Justification for Good Faith? 
 
The international community is overwhelmingly disposed to the recognition of an 
obligation of good faith in contract.
1
 A common argument advanced in support of good 
faith is that New Zealand should achieve comity with other foreign jurisdictions which 
expressly acknowledge a good faith doctrine.
2
 However, compelling reasons are needed 
to bring New Zealand law into line with the jurisdictions endorsing good faith. Change 
merely for the sake of consistency is not a valid justification in itself.
3
 The assumed 
benefits of harmonisation must therefore be explored. 
 
6.2.1 Reasons for Harmonisation: 
 
The primary argument for harmonisation of law is to better facilitate trade. It is generally 
thought that cross-border trade is enhanced by the convergence of national laws which 
affect international commercial transactions.
4
 Harmonisation reduces legal risk. 
Commercial trades between states which adopt similar laws will inevitably be viewed as 
more certain by those involved in the transaction. This means that less defensive 
expenditure is required. Exchanges between countries with similar laws are therefore 
more wealth maximising and consequently more attractive. Thus, harmonisation of law 
minimises divergences between levels of legal protection which may cause businesses 
                                                     
1
 Justice Edward Thomas, ‘Good Faith in Contract: A Non-Sceptical Commentary’ (2005) 11 New Zealand 
Business Law Quarterly 391, at 406. 
2
 Ibid, at 407. See also Justice Paul Finn, ‘Good Faith and Fair Dealing: Australia’ (2005) 11 New Zealand 
Business Law Quarterly 378, at 388. 
3
 Ewan McKendrick, ‘Good Faith: A Matter of Principle?’ in Angelo Forte (ed), Good Faith in Contract 
and Property Law (1999), at 52. 
4
 See Arthur S Hartkamp, ‘Modernisation and Harmonisation of Contract Law: Objectives, Method and 
Scope’ (2003) 8 Uniform Law Review 81; Paul B Stephan, ‘The Futility of Unification and International 
Harmonization in International Commercial Law’ (1999) 39 Virginia Journal of International Law 743; 
Hugh Collins, ‘Good Faith in European Contract Law’ (1994) 14 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 229, at 
230. International trade has been described as the ‘raison d’être of harmonization.’: Hannu Honka, 
‘Harmonization of Contract Law Through International Trade: A Nordic Perspective’ (1996) 11 Tulane 
European and Civil Law Forum 111, at 113.  
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and consumers to confine their transactions to those regulated by the law of the home 
state.
5
 Accordingly, harmonisation of law promotes cooperation between contractors 
within different countries. 
 
Simply achieving harmonisation of law governing international trade may not be 
sufficient. Contract law regulating domestic contractual relationships may also need to be 
consistent between countries. This should facilitate foreign investment in businesses 
which trade on a domestic market. Similarly, foreign traders who enter into a national 
market will often be bound by the domestic laws of that forum. Indeed, empirical 
evidence confirms that capital investment is more likely to be attracted to a country 
where its economy is open to trade and domestic legal and regulatory institutions are 
stable and predictable.
6
 
 
International coordination of laws also enhances legal administration. Harmonisation 
gives lawyers and judges an improved common endowment of specialised knowledge.
7
 
Members of the legal fraternity within different states can more readily utilise 
information from transnational sources. Further, legal advice may be sought from more 
suppliers. This should increase competition in the marketplace for legal services.  
 
However, there are counter arguments which can be made in relation to harmonisation. It 
has been recognised that regulatory diversity might enhance economic competition 
between legal systems. Goods and services are likely to be more competitively priced in 
                                                     
5
 See Collins, above n 4, at 230. 
6
 For comprehensive empirical data see Charles I Jones, Introduction to Economic Growth (2
nd
 ed, 2002), at 
143. See also Michael Treblicock and Jing Leng, ‘The Role of Formal Contract Law and Enforcement in 
Economic Development’ (2006) 92 Virginia Law Review 1517; Amanda Perry, ‘Effective Legal Systems 
and Foreign Direct Investment: In Search of the Evidence’ (2000) 49 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 779. 
7
 Stephan, above n 4, at 750. It has been recognised that harmonisation can lead to a functional comparative 
methodology which can improve the quality of judicial decision making. See Klaus Peter Berger, 
‘Harmonisation of European Contract Law: The Influence of Comparative Law’ (2001) 50 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 877, at 889. 
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those domestic jurisdictions which impose fewer mandatory legal obligations and which 
promote contractual autonomy.
8
 Uniform laws would inhibit this potential for price 
competition. Similarly harmonised law could lead to a monopoly scenario which could 
limit efficient contractual regulation and the attainment of regulatory goals at the lowest 
possible cost.
9
  
 
Harmonisation may also result in more rigid and all-encompassing legal rules. It is feared 
that this might compromise flexibility. In consequence, contracting parties could have to 
engage in more negotiations under harmonised law to give effect to their intentions. This 
becomes counterproductive at some point.
10
 Harmonisation therefore generates a trade-
off in terms of flexibility. 
 
It has further been contended that the assumed foreign trade benefits arising from 
harmonisation are overstated.
11
 Certainly, the extent to which harmonisation has a 
positive effect on international exchange is unclear.
12
 It is difficult to empirically measure 
the advantages of harmonisation or prove that synchronisation of law would improve 
welfare.
13
 Notably, some suggest that international contractual disputes can be settled 
without impediment from the difficulties associated with uncoordinated laws. Resolution 
is often achieved with reference to the agreement which the parties themselves have 
negotiated against a background of law which they select.
14
 Thus, certain commentators 
opine that harmonised contract law is not necessary and is unlikely to produce any 
significant benefit. 
 
                                                     
8
 See Collins, above n 4, at 232. 
9
 See generally Joel P Trachtman, ‘International Regulatory Competition, Externalization, and Jurisdiction’ 
(1993) 34 Harvard International Law Journal 47, at 65. 
10
 See Stephan, above n 4, at 747. 
11
 Hartkamp, above n 4, at 82. 
12
 See E Allan Farnsworth, ‘Modernization and Harmonization of Contract Law: An American Perspective’ 
(2003) 8 Uniform Law Review 97, at 98. 
13
 Hartkamp, above n 4, at 82. 
14
 Ibid. 
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A further objection to harmonisation is that it is difficult to attain. Contract law is 
inherently complex. There are numerous divergences between countries in relation to the 
manner in which contracts are regulated. Thus, the time and effort required to synthesise 
domestic laws between countries could well outweigh the benefits. Further, the 
formulation of harmonised law inevitably requires compromise to reconcile inconsistent 
legal rules applying in different states. This compromise may often yield unclear and 
unpredictable results. Indeed, this has occurred in relation to the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. This issue will be explored 
later in this chapter.   
 
Despite these countervailing considerations, it appears the balance of opinion is that 
harmonisation is a desirable goal. The current pressure to achieve global harmonisation 
of law is significant. These pressures and the relevance to the good faith debate are 
explored below.  
 
6.2.2 Existing Pressures for Harmonisation: 
 
Pressure for harmonisation of contract law is stimulated by the current and ongoing 
phenomenon of globalisation. The number of countries engaged in extensive and 
sophisticated international trade is increasing. This has been facilitated by the advent of 
new technologies which have decreased the costs of international exchange. As a result, 
cross-border trade has become more desirable. These new technologies have also led to 
more knowledge based economies. These factors have fueled demand for full and free 
access to overseas markets.  
 
It is envisaged that open exchange can be facilitated by consistent laws regulating trade 
and which avoid imposing artificial barriers to liberal exchange.
15
 Justice Paul Finn, 
                                                     
15
 See Simon Fisher, ‘International Influences Affecting Australian Commercial Law’ (2000) 5 
International Trade and Business Law 43, at 47. It has further been observed that the ‘convergence of the 
ways business is being done in different countries and regions of the world is an almost automatic result of 
the globalization of deals and markets…In this context, the establishment of a legal environment that 
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speaking extra-curially, has suggested that the notion of globalisation and contractual 
good faith are strongly correlated: 
 
Such now are the dimensions of international trade, international capital flows, 
and of globalisation more generally, that the processes of transnationalisation and 
internationalisation of contract law seem to me to be inexorable and irreversible. 
The harmonisation of contract laws is a central endeavour in this. Good faith and 
fair dealing are emerging as foundation concepts in the developments that have 
occurred so far.
16
 
 
A corollary to the phenomenon of globalisation is the advent of more political and 
economic unions amongst states. These unions inevitably create pressure for 
harmonisation of laws. The European Union (“EU”) is perhaps the best example in 
respect of the good faith issue.  
 
The European Community has its origins in the European Coal and Steel Community, the 
European Atomic Energy Community and the European Economic Community. A 
Merger Treaty adopted in 1965 vested control of these communities in a single council, 
commission and Court.
17
 The subsequent signing of the Maastricht Treaty by Member 
States in 1993 was a significant step towards promoting economic, monetary and political 
union. The document propounded, inter alia, the concept of European citizenship, free 
movement of persons, free movement of capital, economic integration and common rules 
on competition, taxation and commercial policy.   
 
                                                                                                                                                              
ensures conditions such as equal protection of intellectual property rights or globally reliable enforcement 
of foreign judgments is one of many steps necessary to disburden cross-border business interaction. A 
reliable contractual fixation of the relationship between two or more parties doing business with each other 
poses a crucial condition for the success of any such transaction.’: Lars Meyer, ‘Soft Law for Solid 
Contracts? A Comparative Analysis of the Value of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts and the Principles of European Contract Law to the Process of Contract Law Harmonization’ 
(2006) 34 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 119, at 120. 
16
 Finn, above n 2, at 388. 
17
 See Justice Michael Kirby and Philip A Joseph, ‘Trans-Tasman Relations – Towards 2000 and Beyond’ 
in Philip A Joseph (ed), Essays on the Constitution (1995), at 145. 
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The EU has taken steps towards achieving harmonisation of contract laws. It was noted in 
Chapter 1 that experts from Member States have drafted the Principles of European 
Contract Law (“PECL”) under the sanction of the European Commission (“EC”). It is 
intended that the PECL might form a uniform code amongst Member States. The PECL 
contain duties of contractual good faith. This is consistent with the fact that the majority 
of the Continental European countries employ good faith obligations within their 
domestic civil law.  
 
In light of the potential for implementation of the PECL, there is a greater likelihood that 
the United Kingdom will, as a member of the EU, soon need to recognise universal good 
faith obligations within contract. Indeed, moves towards legal harmonisation within the 
EU have already led the United Kingdom to incorporate aspects of good faith into its 
domestic contract law. For example, this has occurred as a result of the EC Directive on 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (“the Directive”).
18
 A directive is issued by the EC 
and sets out a binding result to be achieved by Member States and the EU. However, each 
Member State is left to choose the form and method to give effect to a directive.
19
  
 
The purpose of the Directive is to provide a minimum level of consumer protection in 
consumer contracts.
20
 The Directive incorporates good faith within the definition of 
unfairness. The United Kingdom initially implemented the Directive through the Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994 which came into force on 1 July 1995. 
The 1994 Regulations were subsequently revoked and replaced by the Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (“UTCCR”) from 1 October 1999. The test for 
unfairness is set out in reg 5(1) which states: 
 
A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded 
as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant 
imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the 
detriment of the consumer. 
 
                                                     
18
 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993, OJEC L95/29. 
19
 See Fisher, above n 15, at 52. 
20
 See Andrew Grubb and Michael Furmston (eds), The Law of Contract (1999), at 536. 
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The pressure for harmonisation of laws arising from the EU has therefore required the 
United Kingdom to directly confront notions of good faith in contract. The House of 
Lords considered the good faith concept under the UTCCR in Director General of Fair 
Trading v First National Bank plc.
21
 Lord Bingham appeared to adopt a positive outlook 
towards contractual good faith: 
 
The member states have no common concept of fairness or good faith, and the 
directive does not purport to state the law of any single member state. It lays 
down a test to be applied, whatever their pre-existing law, by all member 
states…The requirement of good faith in this context is one of fair and open 
dealing. Openness requires that the terms should be expressed fully, clearly and 
legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or traps. Appropriate prominence should 
be given to terms which might operate disadvantageously to the customer…Good 
faith in this context is not an artificial or technical concept; nor, since Lord 
Mansfield was its champion, is it a concept wholly unfamiliar to British lawyers. 
It looks to good standards of commercial morality and practice.
22
  
 
EC interventions involving contractual good faith have been largely confined to 
consumer contracts to date.
23
 However, it has been asserted that the logic of 
harmonisation could equally apply to business contracts and especially standard form 
                                                     
21
 [2002] 1 All ER 97. See also The Office of Fair Trading v Foxtons Limited [2008] EWHC 1662; The 
Governors of the Peabody Trust v Reeve [2008] EWHC 1432; Heifer International Inc v Christiansen 
[2007] EWHC 3015; Picardi v Cuniberti [2002] EWHC 2923. 
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application outside of consumer contracts. For example, the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) 
Regulations 1993 (which give effect to the EC Directive on Commercial Agency (Council Directive 
86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986, OJEC L382)) requires commercial agents engaged in selling goods and 
their principals to act towards each other ‘dutifully and in good faith.’ Notwithstanding, it has been 
recognised that whilst ‘there have been important developments over the last several decades in terms of 
what may be called EU contract law, few of these developments have catered for the business community.’: 
Ole Lando, ‘Principles of European Contract Law and UNDROIT Principles: Moving From Harmonisation 
to Unification’ (2003) 8 Uniform Law Review 123, at 127.  
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business contracts.
24
 Accordingly, lawyers and scholars within the United Kingdom are 
well aware of the pressures for harmonisation and the implications it may have for good 
faith. McKendrick opines: 
 
Resistance to good faith and to the creation of an international or European 
contract law are likely to march hand in hand. But our ability to resist the 
incursion of good faith into English law is likely to be limited as a result of our 
membership with the European Union…In a global economy the pressure for an 
international or a European contract law is likely to increase and, in such a 
context, the traditional resistance of English law to the doctrine of good faith is 
unlikely to be able to withstand this onslaught. Sooner or later domestic 
objections are likely to give way to these international, largely economic, 
pressures.
25
 
 
Like the United Kingdom, New Zealand is also subject to pressure to harmonise its laws 
with foreign jurisdictions. Political and economic union is not presently a significant 
factor for New Zealand. However, New Zealand is involved in economic integration 
measures such as free trade areas. For example, the Australia-New Zealand Closer 
Economic Relations Trade Agreement (“CER”), which took effect retrospectively on 1 
January 1983, has the objective of realising a single market concept in relation to trade 
between Australia and New Zealand.
26
 CER embodies a commitment to harmonising 
Australian and New Zealand business laws. In Dominion Rent A Car Ltd v Budget Rent A 
Car Systems (1970) Ltd Cooke P emphasised the impact of such trade deals on the 
necessity for commonality of law between Australia and New Zealand: 
 
With regard to [ ] the European Economic Community, while similar legally-
enforceable rules are not in force between New Zealand and Australia, I think that 
the Courts of the two countries should be prepared as far as reasonably possible to 
recognise the progress that has been made towards a common market. From 1966 
there was a very substantial increase in two-way trade under the New Zealand-
Australia Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and this has been accelerated by the 
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25
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26
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CER…[T]hese Agreements [ ] are part of a background which should influence 
the development of the common law in Australasia.
27
 
 
It might be reasoned that the case for good faith within Australasia is not strong because 
neither the final appellate courts of New Zealand or Australia have recognised a universal 
good faith doctrine. New Zealand and Australia could therefore harmonise their contract 
laws without good faith. However, New Zealand subscribes to wider trade agreements 
whose signatories include states expressly acknowledging good faith. The concept of 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (“APEC”) is an example. APEC was established in 
1989. Its purpose is to reduce barriers to international trade and move towards an 
integrated regional market.
28
 Certain of the 21 members overtly employ good faith in 
contract law. The two most significant are the United States and China.
29
 
 
It is notable that many of the major trading partners of New Zealand recognise good faith 
as an element of their contract law. For example, the United States and the European 
Union comprised approximately 12 per cent and 16 per cent respectively of all of the 
merchandise exports and imports of New Zealand in 2007.
30
 China is also a rapidly 
expanding market for New Zealand. It was the fourth largest export destination for New 
Zealand in 2007. Imports from China rose by 18.7 per cent in the same year.  
 
Accordingly, it is arguable that there is a prima facie case for good faith in New Zealand 
based on the desire for harmonisation. As was noted above, the primary goal of 
coordinating laws is to facilitate trade. It is fundamental that the New Zealand economy 
is heavily dependent on international exchange. Thus, in Attorney-General v Mobil Oil 
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 [1987] 2 NZLR 395, at 407. 
28
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NZ Ltd Heron J recognised that international trade and associated commercial 
relationships are of critical importance within a small country such as New Zealand.
31
 
New Zealand should therefore strive to develop contract laws which promote foreign 
trade. Seemingly, this may now entail adoption of the subject doctrine. 
 
It appears that the New Zealand courts are well aware of the need to achieve consistency 
with foreign domestic law. For example, in Attorney-General v Dreux Holdings Ltd
32
 the 
Court of Appeal considered whether evidence of the conduct of parties after the making 
of a contract should be admissible to construe it. The Court cited the approach in the 
United States and Canada which both permit such evidence to be adduced. 
Notwithstanding that the issue was left open, the Court recognised that New Zealand 
domestic contract law should generally remain consistent with best international 
practice.
33
 The matter again arose in Gibbons Holdings Ltd v Wholesale Distributors 
Ltd
34
 where the Supreme Court determined that the subsequent joint conduct of the 
parties could be admissible in order to ascertain the mutual intention of the parties.
35
 
Tipping J repeated the views of the Court of Appeal in Dreux, noting that the finding 
accorded ‘with general international trade practice.’
36
 
 
It is also likely that the fate of good faith within New Zealand contract law will be 
strongly linked to the English approach. The pressures felt by England from the EU may 
well reverberate to Australasia. The law of contract within New Zealand has generally 
remained consistent with English law with the exception of certain legislative 
enactments. Undoubtedly there is a greater willingness for New Zealand courts to depart 
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 [1989] 2 NZLR 649, at 668. 
32
 (1996) 7 TCLR 617.  
33
 Ibid, at 627 per Blanchard J. See also David McLauchlan, ‘Subsequent Conduct and Contract 
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35
 Blanchard J reserved his Honour’s position on the issue. 
36
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from English authority which is regarded as unsound.
37
 Differences in local conditions 
have also been regarded as reason to part ways from English law.
38
 Notwithstanding, 
such divergences have not frequently been seen in New Zealand within the realm of 
contract law. Thus, in Yoshimoto v Canterbury Golf International Ltd Thomas J 
recognised that, being realistic, the law of contract in New Zealand is likely to remain the 
law of England.
39
 Accordingly, if England was to incorporate a common law doctrine of 
contractual good faith there would be a strong argument for the New Zealand courts to 
follow suit. It would be an odd result for the Antipodean Commonwealth countries to 
take a position inconsistent with the other legal jurisdictions of the developed world.  
 
However, it should be noted that good faith is more likely to be incorporated into English 
law by the legislature under EU influence rather than the courts. Were this to occur then 
seemingly the issue of whether New Zealand would also adopt good faith might properly 
be a matter for Parliament rather than the judiciary.       
 
Despite the identified influences tending towards harmonisation of law, it is arguable that 
such synchronisation may not necessarily entail importing an express doctrine of good 
faith within New Zealand law. Harmonisation of laws may assume differing degrees of 
intensity.
40
 Absolute replication of foreign law would constitute the most extreme form of 
harmonisation. However, it has been suggested that a degree of harmonisation can be 
achieved by less exacting means. Thus, harmonisation may entail achieving only 
‘approximation’ with foreign law.
41
 Accordingly, harmonisation of New Zealand law 
with Continental Europe and the United States may be attained by less drastic measures 
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than overtly recognising a doctrine of contractual good faith. Provided New Zealand law 
produces substantially the same outcomes which are achieved in jurisdictions recognising 
good faith, then this may be sufficient. The ends rather than the means is arguably the 
more critical factor. After all, the goal of harmonisation is not to achieve absolute 
uniformity but instead to reduce or eliminate identified impediments to international trade 
and investment. Ultimately however, it is unclear whether the anticipated benefits of 
harmonisation could be achieved without openly adopting a good faith doctrine in New 
Zealand.  
 
6.2.3 Précis:  
 
It is generally accepted that harmonisation of law between states is a desirable goal. New 
Zealand is particularly dependent on foreign trade and therefore needs to ensure that its 
domestic laws are such as to eliminate impediments to foreign exchange and investment. 
The phenomenon of globalisation and the advent of more political and economic unions 
and free trade arrangements have significantly increased the case for harmonisation of 
laws. Accordingly, England and the Commonwealth common law countries are now 
faced with strong pressures to endorse contractual good faith in order to achieve 
consistency with the majority of the legal jurisdictions in the developed world.   
 
6.3 Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts: 
 
Despite the Anglo-Antipodean common law countries not yet adopting a general good 
faith obligation, it is possible that parties engaged in international contracting from those 
jurisdictions may be subject to the laws of a state recognising good faith. Contracting 
parties might be favouring legal forums which endorse contractual good faith. The case 
for the adoption of the subject doctrine in domestic New Zealand law is conceivably 
enhanced if this occurs in practice. The following section will therefore discuss the ability 
of contracting parties to select jurisdictions recognising contractual good faith as the 
governing law of their contract. 
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6.3.1 Choice of Law Rules: 
 
Choice of law rules and conflict of laws is a complex and specialist field. It is not the 
function of this thesis to consider these matters in depth. The intention of the following 
analysis is to identify the extent to which contracting parties can elect to have their 
contract governed by a jurisdiction incorporating good faith and the circumstances in 
which foreign law will be deemed to apply by the courts.  
 
As a general rule, the common law courts allow contracting parties to choose an 
unrelated jurisdiction as the governing law of their contract. The principle was illustrated 
in Vita Food Products Inc v Unus Shipping Co Ltd (in Liquidation).
42
 Vita Food carried 
on business in New York. It was the consignee of a cargo of herrings to be carried from 
Newfoundland. The ship was owned by Unus and was registered in Nova Scotia. It ran 
ashore on route due to the negligence of the captain. The cargo was salved but delivered 
in a damaged condition to Vita Food which thereupon sued Unus for the loss. The bills of 
lading were expressed to be governed by English law. The Privy Council held that the 
words of the bills were to be given effect such that English law would apply. Lord Wright 
recognised that a court must look to the intention of the parties to determine the 
governing law. That intention could be ascertained from the words of the agreement and 
the surrounding circumstances.
43
 Their Lordships did however qualify this view by 
recognising that the choice of law must be bona fide, legal and there must be no reason to 
avoid the choice on the grounds of public policy.
44
 The fact that the parties had no 
apparent connection with English law was no reason to override the intention of the 
parties. It was recognised that contracting parties may reasonably desire that the familiar 
principles of English law apply. Indeed, their Lordships recognised that such an election 
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is commonplace.
45
 As a result, it was held that Unus was entitled to rely on the words of 
the bills which exempted it from liability due to loss from negligence. English law 
permitted such an exclusion. 
 
A similar approach to that taken in Vita Food has been adopted in New Zealand.
46
 The 
test that has traditionally been applied in New Zealand to identify the governing law of a 
contract is that outlined by Dicey and Morris: 
 
The term proper law of a contract means the system of law by which the parties 
intended the contract to be governed, or, where their intention is neither expressed 
nor to be inferred from the circumstances, the system of law with which the 
transaction has its closest and most real connection.
47
 
 
This approach accords closely with the 1980 Rome Convention which applies to Member 
States of the EU.
48
 Article 3(1) contemplates that contracting parties can chose a 
governing law. There is no qualification that the chosen law must be related to the 
contract. Article 4(1) requires application of the law of the country with which the 
contract is most closely connected in the event that the parties have not made a choice.  
                                                     
45
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6.3.2 Choice of Law and Good Faith: 
 
The choice of law rules within New Zealand therefore permit parties to an international 
contract to choose a governing legal system which employs the concept of good faith. 
Indeed, it is possible that contracting parties may select the foreign law for that particular 
reason.
49
 In consequence, a New Zealand court may potentially be required to apply 
foreign concepts of contractual good faith in order to give effect to the governing law 
which the contracting parties nominate.  
 
Apparently this situation has not yet arisen in New Zealand. It did however occur in an 
English court in The Eleftheria.
50
 The Greek defendants were the owners of the vessel. 
They entered into bills of lading with the plaintiffs, whose offices were stated to be in 
Hull, Newcastle upon Tyne and Liverpool. The defendants discharged the cargo of the 
plaintiffs in Rotterdam instead of the agreed destination of Hull. The defendants cited 
labour troubles at the Hull docks as the reason for its actions. The bills of lading 
permitted the defendants to unload at an alternative port if there were labour obstructions 
at the specified port. The plaintiffs were dissatisfied with the election made by the 
defendants and sued in an English court to recover the cost of on-carriage from 
Rotterdam to Hull. The defendants refused to pay and asserted that they had validly 
discharged the contract. The bills of lading expressly stated that the law of the country in 
which the carrier had its principal place of business would apply. This was Greece. 
Consequently, an issue arose as to whether the defendants had exercised their contractual 
right in accordance with art 281 of the Greek Civil Code, Astikos Kodix. This precludes 
the exercise of a contractual right if the exercise of that right would manifestly exceed the 
limits which are imposed by, inter alia, good faith. Brandon J accepted that an English 
court would be competent to resolve issues relating to good faith: 
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 See Elsabe Schoeman, ‘Good Faith in Conflict(s): The International Commercial Contract Dimension’ 
(2005) 11 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 446, at 450. 
50
 [1969] 1 Lloyd's Rep 237. For a discussion of the case see Lawrence Collins, ‘Arbitration Clauses and 
Forum Selecting Clauses in the Conflict of Laws: Some Recent Developments in England’ (1971) 2 
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 363, at 370-376. 
  
310 
 
I recognize that an English Court can, and often does, decide questions of foreign 
law on the basis of expert evidence from foreign lawyers. Nor do I regard such 
legal concepts as contractual good faith and morality as being so strange as to be 
beyond the capacity of an English Court to grasp and apply.
51
   
 
Despite making these observations, Brandon J granted a stay of proceedings in England 
recognising that the issue should be resolved by a Greek court. In support of this 
decision, his Honour took cognisance of the advantage which a foreign court has in 
determining and applying its own law. Moreover, a question of foreign law decided by an 
English court on expert evidence is a question of fact. Thus, any appeal relating to such 
issues would be on the basis of an error of fact rather than an error of law. Appellate 
courts are more reluctant to displace the factual findings of trial judges. Accordingly, it 
was most appropriate that the legal issues be determined in Greece in order to ensure that 
justice was done. Notwithstanding, the case evidences that common law courts may be 
required to apply general obligations of contractual good faith in certain circumstances. 
 
The New Zealand approach relating to proof of foreign law is similar to that outlined by 
Brandon J. In the event that contracting parties are to rely on a foreign concept of good 
faith within a New Zealand forum, that foreign law must be proved as a fact by way of 
expert evidence to the satisfaction of the judge.
52
 Where the foreign law is not adequately 
proved, a New Zealand court will generally resort to applying New Zealand law.
53
 
 
As a result of the prevailing choice of law rules within New Zealand, a domestic party to 
an international contract may elect to be bound by foreign jurisdictions imposing good 
faith obligations. Conceivably, the case for harmonisation and the adoption of contractual 
good faith within domestic law in Anglo-Antipodean countries is stronger if parties to 
international contracts favour jurisdictions with good faith over jurisdictions without 
good faith. If contracting parties are voluntarily choosing good faith then arguably its 
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express recognition is more warranted. It is outside the bounds of this thesis to undertake 
empirical analysis relating to this issue. Indeed, it would be difficult to isolate any trend 
to demonstrate that certain jurisdictions are favoured over others by contracting parties on 
account of the recognition or non-recognition of contractual good faith.  
 
It is however notable that parties engaged in cross-border exchange do continue to select 
jurisdictions which do not expressly recognise good faith. A glance at the English law 
reports reveals that many parties who have no connection with England select it as the 
governing law of their contract.
54
 A recent survey of 175 firms in eight Member States of 
the EU reveals that English law is likely to be chosen as the governing law of a contract 
approximately two and a half times more frequently than any other law.
55
 The fact that 
international trading parties continue to voluntarily select England as the governing 
jurisdiction may imply that the existence of contractual good faith is not a necessity for 
foreign exchange. Indeed, it has been suggested that London is a well-established 
commercial centre and the fact that commercial parties choose English law is evidence 
that it is suited to the regulation of commercial relationships.
56
  
 
Maintenance of the status quo, and therefore rejection of the subject doctrine, may be 
justified if contracting parties continue to opt for the English jurisdiction because of the 
quality of its substantive law. Commercial parties may favour England precisely because 
it does not give wide discretionary powers to courts and arbitrators via a good faith 
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principle.
57
 Indeed, it has been reasoned that predictability of legal outcome is more 
important than absolute justice in a commercial context.
58
 It is necessary that 
businessmen and businesswomen know where they stand. This is particularly so in 
international exchange transactions which inherently involve large sums of money and 
significant risk.
59
 Goode therefore opines: 
 
The last thing that we want to do is to drive business away by vague concepts of 
fairness which make judicial decisions unpredictable, and if that means that the 
outcome of disputes is sometimes hard on a party we regard that as an acceptable 
price to pay in the interest of the great majority of business litigants.
60
 
 
Accordingly, it might be reasoned that there is no justification for New Zealand or her 
larger Commonwealth counterparts to adopt good faith solely on the basis of achieving 
comity. The common law jurisdictions which do not subscribe to good faith have been 
perfectly able to compete in the international marketplace. Certainly, there is no proven 
statistical evidence to suggest that the common law countries would gain any significant 
benefit by adopting good faith. On the contrary, there are indications that English law 
continues to be regarded as a suitable forum for the regulation of commercial contracts. 
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England may lose this ostensible comparative advantage if it were to adopt contractual 
good faith. Commercial parties would have less incentive to select English law as the 
governing law of their contracts. 
  
6.3.3 Précis:  
 
Choice of law rules imply that New Zealand courts may be required to apply foreign 
concepts of contractual good faith. Parties may also voluntarily elect to have their 
contract governed by foreign principles of good faith. The argument for harmonisation 
becomes stronger if this were to frequently occur in New Zealand. There is however no 
demonstrable evidence to establish that jurisdictions recognising contractual good faith 
are favoured by contracting parties. If anything, England is a preferred jurisdiction for 
commercial parties and it might be inferred that this is because it does not endorse 
general discretionary principles such as good faith.  
 
6.4 Good Faith and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods: 
 
Some meaningful guidance for the good faith debate may conceivably be derived from 
international instruments in place recognising good faith and which parties can elect to 
govern their international contracts or which may govern their contracts by default. The 
treatment of such instruments by New Zealand parties may give an indication of the 
necessity for good faith in international trade and the likely response to contractual good 
faith within domestic law. This section will evaluate one of those instruments, namely the 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”).  
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6.4.1 Background to the CISG: 
 
Steps taken towards a unification of the law of international sales dates back to 1929.
61
 In 
that year, the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (“UNIDROIT”) 
appointed a committee to undertake preparatory studies. The work was subsequently 
interrupted by the Second World War. However, after numerous drafts, two conventions 
were eventually adopted at a conference at the Hague in 1964. The first was the Uniform 
Law of International Sale (“ULIS”). The second was the Uniform Law on the Formation 
of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (“ULFC”). Both entered into force in 
1972. 
 
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) was 
established in 1966.
62
 It was tasked with promoting the progressive harmonisation and 
unification of law in international trade. This required the coordination of the work of 
organisations active in the field. UNICITRAL soon discovered that the ULIS and ULFC 
did not have widespread support. In particular, the ULIS was perceived to be too long 
and too complicated.
63
 Although the United Kingdom ratified ULIS, the enabling 
mechanism required contracting parties to adopt ULIS as the governing law of their 
contract. There were no reported British cases where the parties had elected to do so.
64
 
Consequently, UNCITRAL tasked a working group to ascertain whether modifications 
might enhance the likelihood of the conventions being adopted. It submitted revised 
drafts in 1976 and the conventions were amalgamated in 1977.  
 
                                                     
61
 See Michael Joachim Bonell, ‘Introduction to the Convention’ in Cesare Massimo Bianca and Michael 
Joachim Bonell (eds), Commentary on the International Sales Law: The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention 
(1987), at 3. 
62
 Ibid, at 5. 
63
 There were forewarnings of these problems. See John Honnold, ‘The Uniform Law for the International 
Sale of Goods: The Hague Convention of 1964’ (1965) 30 Law and Contemporary Problems 326. 
64
 See Jacob S Ziegel, ‘The Future of the International Sales Convention from a Common Law Perspective’ 
(2000) 6 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 336, at 337. 
  
315 
The United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods was 
held in Vienna in April and March of 1980. It was attended by representatives of 62 
states and eight international organisations. The Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods was signed at the conference. The CISG is otherwise known 
as the Vienna Convention. It received the requisite 10 ratifications by 11 December 
1986
65
 and came into force in 1988. 
 
The purpose of the CISG is to implement a universal regime for international sales 
contracts. Its objective is to offer rules which are more suited to international trade rather 
than domestic trade.
66
 Accordingly, the CISG is intended to overcome divergences in 
domestic law that might otherwise act as an obstacle in the development of exchange 
between states.
67
 
 
The CISG has been adopted by approximately 70 countries.
68
 This figure includes most 
of the countries of the EU and a number of Eastern European countries. The North 
American Free Trade Area (“NAFTA”) states have implemented it, as have some South 
American countries. China, Singapore and Australia have also given effect to the CISG.  
 
New Zealand has followed the trend and has adopted the CISG through the Sale of Goods 
(United Nations) Convention Act 1994 (“SOGUNCA”). The SOGUNCA came into force 
on 1 October 1995 and gives the articles of the CISG the force of law in New Zealand.
69
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Further, the articles of the CISG effectively override domestic New Zealand law in 
relation to contracts to which the articles apply.
70
 
 
Article 1 provides that the provisions of the CISG will apply to a contract for the sale of 
goods where the parties have places of business in different states and those states have 
adopted the CISG or the rules of private international law lead to the application of the 
law of a state which has adopted the CISG.  
 
The CISG contains preliminary general provisions and articles relating to: the formation 
of the contract; obligations of the seller; obligations of the buyer; matters common to the 
obligations of the seller and the buyer and; preservation of goods. There are also 
concluding provisions. Article 2 precludes the application of the CISG to consumer 
contracts and contracts involving the sale of securities, ships, vessels, hovercraft, aircraft 
and electricity.  
 
Court decisions and arbitral awards relating to CISG are now being collected and 
disseminated as part of the case law on UNCITRAL texts (“CLOUT”). This phenomenon 
is reflective of the growth in infrastructure supporting the CISG since the late 1990s.
71
 
The decisions collated in CLOUT are intended to enable judges, arbitrators, lawyers and 
contracting parties to reach a common understanding of the interpretation and application 
of the CISG. The system therefore serves to facilitate international uniformity in the 
implementation of the CISG. There are now over 1000 abstracts of decisions and awards 
on CLOUT.
72
 Several hundred of these relate to the interpretation of the CISG.
73
 
Alternative case databases have also been developed. Arguably the most comprehensive 
and up to date is that database operated by the Pace University Law School.
74
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6.4.2 Good Faith and Interpretation of the CISG: 
 
Good faith appears within art 7 of the CISG which is part of the general provisions. This 
is the only reference to the concept within all of the CISG. Nonetheless, art 7 is of 
fundamental importance. The relevant part provides: 
 
(1)  In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its 
international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its 
application and the observance of good faith in international trade. 
 
The inclusion of a reference to good faith was one of the most challenging problems 
faced by the drafters of the CISG.
75
 The issue created a division of opinion largely 
between the civil law delegates and the common law delegates. The former apparently 
would have preferred a provision directly imposing an obligation on the parties to act in 
good faith.
76
 The latter were generally opposed to any explicit reference to good faith.
77
 
The finalised version of art 7(1) represents the compromise that was ultimately reached. 
 
Ironically, the interpretation provision has itself become the subject of debate as to its 
meaning. This is no surprise in light of its ambiguity. It seems relatively clear that 
reference to the international character of the CISG is intended to indicate that the articles 
should not be interpreted with reference to domestic law.
78
 Courts should avoid domestic 
preoccupations and must examine the manner in which courts in other jurisdictions 
interpret the articles.
79
 The ambiguity relating to art 7(1) is therefore centered primarily 
around the reference to good faith. There are essentially two competing schools of 
thought relating to the interpretation of the good faith provision. 
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One theory propounds that good faith should be narrowly construed. Good faith is a mere 
instrument for the interpretation of the CISG.
80
 To allow a duty of good faith in through 
the back door would be a pervasion of the compromise that was reached between the 
drafters.
81
 Thus, art 7(1) does not impose an obligation on the parties to act in good faith. 
This view was endorsed in the International Chamber of Commerce Arbitral Award No 
8611 of 1997 where it was recognised that because art 7(1) concerns only the 
interpretation of the CISG, ‘no collateral obligation may be derived from the promotion 
of good faith.’
82
 
 
The converse school of thought is that the principle of good faith must have a strong 
impact on the behaviour of the parties. It is not possible to interpret the articles of the 
CISG without affecting the manner in which the contracting parties are required to carry 
out their contract. Thus, the principle of good faith is not only directed towards judges 
and arbiters but also the parties to each individual contract of sale.
83
 Because good faith 
cannot exist in a vacuum, it must impose a standard of behaviour to be maintained 
throughout the life of the agreement.
84
 This approach is more synonymous with the 
attitude of civilian lawyers rather than lawyers practicing in common law jurisdictions. 
Whereas the common law draws a distinction between implied terms and interpretation, 
some Continental lawyers tend to treat these issues as one.
85
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The more expansive approach was adopted in Dulces Luisi SA de CV v Seoul 
International Co Ltd where it was said that the effect of art 7(1) is that ‘parties must act 
in good faith and deal fairly throughout their contractual relations.’
86
 However, the fact 
that parties must act in good faith cannot logically be perceived as a completely 
independent duty. No remedies flow from the good faith principle.
87
 Accordingly, a 
failure to act in good faith will only have practical significance if it leads to a conclusion 
that the specific articles of the CISG have been contravened. 
 
The competing schools of thought evidence the difficulty presented by universal law 
aimed at satisfying the conflicting requirements of different legal systems. In some 
instances the compromises required to redress divergences in domestic law between 
countries cannot realistically be codified.
88
 Article 7(1) is perhaps the paradigm example 
of this phenomenon. The drafters have sought refuge in vague and obfuscatory 
language.
89
  
 
Notably, a pragmatic solution was adopted by the drafters to resolve the conflict between 
the common law and civil law jurisdictions with respect to the availability of specific 
performance as a primary remedy for breach. Whereas the right to specific performance 
is endorsed in many civil law systems, the common law generally regards specific 
performance in the context of sale contracts as an exceptional remedy. Article 28 resolves 
this discrepancy by stating that a court is not obliged to award specific performance 
unless the Court would do so under its own law. The willingness of the drafters to resort 
to such a pragmatic article is understandable. Nonetheless, art 28 appears to completely 
undermine the tenet of uniformity which the CISG is designed to promote. A 
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corresponding provision whereby contracting parties would only be required to observe 
standards good faith if domestic law expressly required such an obligation would no 
doubt give rise to anomalous results.  
 
Ultimately, it appears that the more expansive approach to good faith will inevitably 
dominate. Even common law lawyers and opponents of good faith are willing to concede 
this point. Bridge notes: 
 
It can fairly be predicted that some national courts will interpret this provision 
more broadly than others. Some courts might be prepared to spell out a general 
duty of good faith from the remaining provisions of the CISG…There are 
difficulties of interpretation here. Given that an explicit standard of good faith and 
fair dealing was rejected by the conference delegates, does this mean that the 
standard itself was rejected as a general principle or only that express mention of 
the standard was rejected? The latter approach is likely to gain the ascendancy.
90
  
 
That conclusion is also enhanced by the relationship between the CISG and the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (“UNIDROIT Principles”). 
The UNIDROIT Principles were first published in May 1994. They set out relevant 
principles relating to the formation, validity, interpretation and performance of 
international contracts.
91
 The UNIDROIT Principles are proffered for use by contracting 
parties and arbitrators
92
 and apply to all categories of contract unlike the CISG which is 
confined to sales. Article 1.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles contains an express reference 
to a duty of good faith and fair dealing. Thus, an obligation of good faith may be 
imported into the CISG to the extent that the UNIDROIT principles may have a part to 
play in filling any gaps in the CISG. The UNIDROIT Principles may supplement the 
CISG due to the silence of the latter as to an express duty of good faith. This outcome is 
ostensibly supported by the recognition of good faith within art 7(1). 
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In addition to the uncertainty surrounding the effect of art 7(1), there is also significant 
disagreement as to the meaning of good faith. This ambiguity of meaning is a natural 
corollary of the fact that the principle of good faith differs greatly in content within 
different jurisdictions.
93
 It has been opined that the notion of good faith may not be 
applied according to standards adopted within different legal systems.
94
 Thus, in Dulces 
Luisi the deciding Mexican body recognised that ‘good faith must be interpreted 
internationally without resorting to its meaning under Mexican law.’
95
  
 
Alternatively, it has been argued that standards and meanings of good faith in domestic 
law may be taken into account but only ‘to the extent that they prove to be commonly 
accepted at a comparative level.’
96
 Accordingly, it is suggested that a litigant relying on 
good faith might have to establish that good faith would compel certain behaviour in his 
or her own country but also in the country where the counterparty has his or her place of 
business.
97
 This argument lacks persuasive force. Some states, such as New Zealand, 
have no general obligation of good faith in contracts. Therefore, the envisaged 
comparative investigation could not be undertaken and would be meaningless.  
 
Ultimately, it is not apparent where the drafters of the CISG intended the content of the 
good faith principle to be derived from. Some have resorted to construing good faith in 
light of the many references to reasonableness within the CISG.
98
 Conceivably a 
definition should have been included in the articles if the drafters were resolute that 
domestic law should not be used to derive a meaning. Accordingly, it has been 
recognised that if ‘it was the drafters’ belief that the concept of good faith should be 
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interpreted without resorting to domestic definitions, then they fell far short of achieving 
their intended aim.’
99
  
 
The overwhelming conclusion is that arbitrators are resorting to domestic understandings 
of good faith due to the lack of guidance under the CISG. It is certainly evident that the 
numerous international CISG decisions do not reveal a common underlying meaning and 
application of good faith.
100
 Consequently, the uniformity which the CISG seeks to 
achieve is compromised by the unclear reference to good faith.  
 
There is further debate as to whether the application of good faith standards can be 
contractually excluded. Article 6 of the CISG provides: 
 
The parties may exclude the application of this Convention or, subject to article 
12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions. 
 
Some have suggested that art 6 clearly permits the parties to contractually exclude any 
recourse to good faith when interpreting the CISG or any potential application of good 
faith in the performance of the contract.
101
 This is indicative that the dominant motif of 
the CISG is freedom of contract.
102
 Article 6 therefore permits businessmen and 
businesswomen to take appropriate contractual measures to counter the liberal approach 
to the interpretation of the CISG.
103
 
 
However, others contend that art 6 cannot be read literally.
104
 It is not competent for 
contracting parties to direct how art 7(1) is to be interpreted by courts and tribunals. 
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Consequently, art 7(1) should not be open to variation by the parties. Thus, the parties are 
bound to the interpretation in art 7 if the CISG applies to their contract. This affirms that 
the CISG is an autonomous body of law. To permit the parties to derogate from this law 
by deferring to domestic rules of interpretation would be inconsistent with the 
international character of the CISG.
105
  
 
Regardless of which approach is preferable, it is evident that there is no consensus as to 
the application of good faith under the CISG and its effect on contractual autonomy. 
 
6.4.3 The New Zealand Experience of the CISG and Implications for a Universal 
Doctrine of Good Faith: 
 
The CISG and the SOGUNCA have barely featured in any judicial decisions within New 
Zealand to date.
106
 Similarly, there are few cases recorded within CLOUT involving New 
Zealand parties.
107
 The degree of reference to international uniform law is pitiful by civil 
law standards.
108
  
 
There are certain inferences that can be drawn from the hitherto limited application of the 
CISG within New Zealand.
109
 Contracting parties and legal advisors may not be familiar 
with the CISG and therefore do not rely on it in litigation. Alternatively, New Zealand 
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parties may be deliberately excluding the application of the CISG, as is expressly 
permitted under art 6.
110
 It has also been suggested that New Zealand parties engaged in 
the international sale and purchase of goods are likely to have weaker bargaining power 
and are therefore more prone to acceding to the choice of the domestic law of the foreign 
counterparty rather than the uniform law under the CISG.
111
  
 
A lack of case law and apparent skepticism regarding the CISG is not confined to New 
Zealand. Distrust for the CISG is evident in many common law jurisdictions. The United 
Kingdom has not elected to adopt the CISG to date. Further, a number of large English 
bodies have anticipated the effects of the CISG and have excluded its application in their 
standard trading forms. Those excluding the application of the CISG include major oil 
companies and significant trade organisations.
112
 It has also been asserted that lawyers 
within the United States are frequently advising their clients to opt out of the application 
of the CISG.
113
 Approximately 10 years ago, there were relatively few instances where 
the CISG had been applied in contracts between United States and Canadian parties.
114
 
This was despite the fact that both states subscribe to the CISG and each is a significant 
trading partner to the other within a common trade area. Australia fares no better. There 
were fewer cases attributable to Australia than New Zealand listed on the Pace University 
Law School database as at May 2004.
115
 
 
Numerous reasons have been advanced for the ostensible declinature of contracting 
parties within the common law jurisdictions to embrace the CISG. Whilst systematic 
exclusion of the CISG is antithetical to the development of uniform international law, 
                                                     
110
 See Nottage, above n 71, at 835. 
111
 Ibid, at 836. 
112
 Bridge, above n 68, at 509. 
113
 Monica Kilian, ‘CISG and the Problem with Common Law Jurisdictions’ (2001) 10 Journal of 
Transnational Law and Policy 217, at 227. 
114
 Harry M Flechtner, ‘Another CISG Case in the U.S. Courts: Pitfalls for the Practitioner and the Potential 
for Regionalized Interpretations’ (1996) 15 Journal of Law and Commerce 127, at 134. 
115
 See Lutz, above n 74, at 714. 
  
325 
commercial parties may have convincing justifications for the exclusion.
116
 For example, 
the cost of familiarisation with the CISG may exceed any benefit that will be derived 
over selecting a specific and known national law.
117
 Similarly, the CISG does not govern 
the validity of the contract or the property effects of the contract. For example, the CISG 
cannot be utilised to determine the validity of a limitation of liability clause. This 
significantly restricts the utility of the CISG given that exclusion clauses are common in 
sales contracts.
118
 The CISG is more likely to be excluded altogether if it is of only 
piecemeal application. Moreover, there is no international tribunal to resolve conflicting 
interpretations of the provisions. This is likely to be a significant deterrent to those from a 
common law background who generally take a more restricted approach to statutory and 
contractual interpretation than civil law counterparts. As a result, the difficulties of 
interpreting principles such as good faith cannot be resolved in a uniform manner nor 
definitively adjudicated upon. Ziegel concludes: 
 
Given these weaknesses, the contracting parties may often find it more attractive 
to choose a municipal law with a well developed and balanced sales law to govern 
their contract, because it will provide greater certainty and because they hope the 
chosen law will be able to resolve all future disputes arising between the parties, 
procedural as well as substantive.
119
 
  
The lack of enthusiasm for the CISG apparent in New Zealand and other Commonwealth 
common law jurisdictions does not bode well for a doctrine of contractual good faith. The 
approach within New Zealand to date in relation to the CISG arguably indicates the 
reluctance of New Zealand contracting parties and legal advisors to accept unfamiliar and 
demonstrably uncertain contractual laws. Similar conclusions can be drawn in relation to 
the other Anglo-Antipodean common law countries. In particular, the declinature of the 
United Kingdom to adopt the CISG is said to be evidence of the hostility of members of 
the legal profession and the judiciary who are concerned that ratification may jeopardise 
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the role of London as a preeminent arbitration and litigation centre.
120
 The lack of clarity 
inherent in the CISG contrasts markedly with the perceived certainty associated with 
domestic English contract law. 
 
Accordingly, the hitherto unwelcoming approach to the CISG may be indicative of the 
likely reaction to the subject doctrine of good faith if it were to be introduced into 
domestic New Zealand law. If the lack of case law relating to the CISG is indeed 
explained by the fact that commercial parties are contracting out of the CISG due to its 
unfamiliarity, it seems reasonable to conclude that similar results might arise in respect of 
the subject doctrine of good faith which, as determined in Chapter 2, contracting parties 
would be at liberty to exclude. 
 
Further, the New Zealand courts have not previously been compelled to bring domestic 
law into line with the CISG. As was noted above, the courts are aware that domestic law 
should generally remain consistent with best international practice. Notwithstanding, 
uniformity with the CISG has not always been sought. For example, in Yoshimoto
121
 an 
issue arose in the Court of Appeal as to whether evidence of pre-contractual negotiations 
might be admitted to show that the words in the contract should bear a particular 
meaning. Thomas J expressly recognised the UNIDROIT Principles and art 8(3) of the 
CISG which provides: 
 
(3)  In determining the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable 
person would have had, due consideration is to be given to all relevant 
circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any practices which 
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the parties have established between themselves, usages and any 
subsequent conduct of the parties. 
 
However, his Honour declined to bring New Zealand domestic law into line with the 
CISG. It was reasoned that the Court of Appeal would not be permitted to do so by the 
Privy Council. Thus, New Zealand would continue to follow the English approach which 
demonstrated little readiness to permit latitude for the admission of evidence of 
negotiations as an aid to the interpretation of a contract.
122
 Although there has been some 
suggestion that this rule may be revisited in the future or has been relaxed
123
, the case 
demonstrates that the New Zealand judiciary does not regard the provisions of the CISG 
as a definitive standard for domestic law.  
 
It is therefore submitted that the existence of good faith within the CISG and related 
international instruments should not be perceived as a compelling reason to incorporate a 
doctrine of good faith within domestic law in New Zealand. In light of the evidence from 
the common law jurisdictions, it is still premature to consider good faith a meaningful 
and universal principle in international trade contracts.
124
 Accordingly, arguments for a 
universal doctrine of good faith based on the desire to achieve comity with international 
trade practice presently lack definitive force. Seemingly the province of good faith in 
international contract law should be settled and established before New Zealand seeks to 
compare it to domestic law. At present, good faith under the CISG is an unhelpful and 
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undesirable precedent on which to base or justify the subject doctrine of contractual good 
faith. 
 
6.4.4 Précis: 
 
The application and meaning of good faith within the CISG is inherently uncertain. 
Despite now having had legislative recognition for some 13 years, the CISG does not 
appear to have been embraced by commercial parties in New Zealand engaged in foreign 
exchange. This experience may portend the likely approach to good faith in domestic law 
should the subject doctrine be introduced. Because of the uncertainty surrounding the 
CISG and, in particular, the good faith element, it does not present a convincing case for 
a universal doctrine of contractual good faith in domestic New Zealand law. 
 
The CISG provides evidence of the extent of the acceptance of good faith within 
international commercial law. However, it is also necessary to consider how good faith 
operates in a domestic forum. Conceivably, the experience within the United States might 
act as a useful exemplar for the debate within New Zealand. Thus, the application of 
good faith within America is discussed in the following section.  
 
6.5 The United States Experience: 
 
The province of contractual good faith within the United States was briefly identified in 
Chapter 1. The following analysis considers whether the experience within America is of 
utility in evaluating the good faith debate within New Zealand. This requires a 
consideration of the suitability of comparing American contract law with New Zealand 
contract law.  
 
This section also highlights some of the current issues pertaining to good faith within the 
United States. The discussion is necessarily brief. The contentious matters are identified 
but prospective resolutions of the outstanding issues are not explored as such matters are 
not necessarily relevant to the conclusion of this thesis. The analysis is therefore 
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descriptive. Indeed, the literature engaging in an extensive appraisal of contractual good 
faith within the United States is voluminous.
125
 For present purposes it is sufficient to 
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ascertain the problems within America. These problems should reveal important lessons 
for those examining the merits of the subject doctrine within New Zealand. 
 
6.5.1 Is Contractual Good Faith in the United States an Appropriate Exemplar? 
 
Prima facie, contractual good faith within the United States may serve as a useful 
exemplar for New Zealand. The New Zealand system of law is more analogous to 
American law than Continental European law. America appears to occupy an 
intermediate position between the Anglo-Commonwealth common law countries and the 
Continental civilians.
126
 Certainly, America possesses by far the most developed good 
faith jurisprudence out of all the jurisdictions with common law origins. In the last 
several decades there have been over 10,000 cases mentioning the concept of contractual 
good faith within America.
127
  
 
The principle of good faith has also been in existence in the United States for a 
significant period of time. Obligations of contractual good faith were recognised by 
American common law jurists well before the first enactment of the Uniform Commercial 
Code (“UCC”) in 1954.
128
 For example, in the 1933 case of Kirke La Shelle Co v Paul 
Armstrong Co the New York Court of Appeals recognised that ‘in every contract there 
                                                                                                                                                              
of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith’ (1980) 94 Harvard Law Review 369; 
Robert S Summers, ‘“Good faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform 
Commercial Code’ (1968) 54 Virginia Law Review 195; E Allan Farnsworth, ‘Good Faith Performance and 
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Review 666. 
126
 See Farnsworth, above n 80, at 54. 
127
 See Dubroff, above n 125, at 561. It has further been noted that the ‘recognition and expansion of a 
pervasive duty of good faith has been possibly the single most significant doctrinal development in 
American contract law over the past fifty years.’: John A Sebert, ‘Rejection, Revocation, and Cure Under 
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Modest Proposals’ (1990) 84 Northwestern University 
Law Review 375, at 383. 
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 Pennsylvania adopted the Uniform Commercial Code in 1954. It subsequently underwent some 
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nd
 ed, 
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exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.’
129
 Indeed, it has been pointed 
out that the essentials of the modern doctrine of contractual good faith were established in 
a number of 19
th
 century cases.
130
 Thus, it can be said that good faith jurisprudence has 
been in existence in America for in excess of 100 years. 
 
Undoubtedly, the express recognition and widespread application of the doctrine of good 
faith was secured by the introduction of the UCC. The UCC was the product of a 
collaborative effort by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws and the American Law Institute. The underlying purpose and policy of the UCC is 
to create uniform law amongst the various state jurisdictions.
131
 It has now been fully 
enacted in every state except Louisiana, which has extensively modified the provisions 
on sales.
132
 
 
The UCC is divided into 11 substantive sections or articles including: general provisions; 
sales; leases; negotiable instruments; bank deposits and collections; funds transfers; 
letters of credit; bulk transfers; warehouse receipts (including bills of lading and other 
documents of title); investment securities and; secured transactions. The general 
provisions expressly recognise that every contract governed by the UCC contains ‘an 
obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement.’
133
 Specific duties of good 
faith are also recognised throughout the UCC. 
 
The other principal instrument under which contractual good faith is recognised in 
America is the Restatement (2d) of Contracts 1981 (“the Restatement”). The Restatement 
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is a document produced by the American Law Institute which seeks to reduce the mass of 
case law in America into a body of readily accessible rules.
134
 The first Restatement of 
Contracts was completed in 1932. This underwent revision commencing in 1952 and 
ultimately resulted in the publication of the Restatement in 1981.  
 
Like the UCC, the Restatement imposes a duty of good faith in performance and 
enforcement upon each contracting party. However, the Restatement does not have the 
force of legislation. It is distinct from the UCC in this respect. Nonetheless, the 
Restatement is likely to be highly persuasive in the state courts. A judge who declines to 
follow the Restatement will do so in the knowledge that it is written by those who are 
eminent specialists in the field of contract law and whose conclusions have been 
discussed and defended before able critics.
135
 
 
Thus, the doctrine of contractual good faith is widely recognised throughout the United 
States as a result of its common law, statutory and scholarly underpinnings. There are 
however certain caveats which must be recognised before accepting that the good faith 
doctrine in America is an appropriate exemplar for the New Zealand debate.  
 
The federal system of law in the United States is quite distinct from the system of law in 
New Zealand. In America certain powers to enact statute are vested in the state 
legislatures. Indeed, contract law is generally considered to be a matter for the individual 
states rather than the federal legislature.
136
 Accordingly, each of the states has the power 
to enact or vary the UCC. Uniformity is not guaranteed with 50 legislatures at work. 
Some states have been slow to enact revisions of the UCC and others have refused to 
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enact the revisions at all.
137
 Critically, state legislatures have differed on the appropriate 
general definition of good faith. This issue is discussed further below. 
 
New Zealand is not subject to this legislative division. Parliament has the power to enact 
contract statute applicable to all of New Zealand. Thus, contractual good faith might 
conceivably be of more consistent and uniform application than in America if it were to 
be introduced within New Zealand via statute. Equally however, the potential lack of 
legislative uniformity in America may inhibit the ability to formulate a definitive good 
faith obligation that might be imported into New Zealand law.  
 
The judicial system also differs between America and New Zealand. The jurisdiction of 
the United States Supreme Court is limited to cases where a substantial federal question 
is involved. This generally precludes the Supreme Court from hearing cases concerning 
contract law specific to a particular state. As a result, the United States Supreme Court 
plays a much smaller role in creating final rules of contract law than the New Zealand 
Supreme Court.
138
 In America there are effectively 50 courts of appeal dealing with 
issues pertaining to contractual good faith. This means that there is a significant 
propensity for conflicting common law contract rules and statutory interpretation within 
the United States. This phenomenon should not arise in New Zealand. The hierarchical 
court structure minimises and rectifies legal inconsistency.     
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Having regard to the identified constitutional characteristics of the United States, it would 
be dangerous to view contractual good faith as a uniform doctrine. Whilst the doctrine 
may be recognised throughout America, it certainly has not been applied consistently. 
This lack of uniformity may diminish the utility of drawing on the experience of 
contractual good faith within the United States in the debate for a general doctrine in 
New Zealand. In this respect, the constitutional differences may render America an 
imperfect exemplar for New Zealand. It is evident that there are a number of unresolved 
issues surrounding good faith in America which arise as a result of the unique system of 
contract law in the United States. Cognisance of these issues must be taken when 
appraising the good faith issue in New Zealand and they are therefore discussed below. 
 
6.5.2 Unresolved Good Faith Issues in the United States: 
 
(a) Is Good Faith a Subjective or Objective Standard? 
 
It was recognised within Chapter 3 that there is significant academic debate as to whether 
contractual good faith embodies a subjective or an objective standard of conduct. The 
American experience evidences that this issue is not a trivial matter of academic 
conjecture. The dilemma is real. The United States courts have frequently been perplexed 
as to whether good faith is to be judged solely by a subjective concept of honesty or also 
by some objective standard of reasonableness.
139
 The common law doctrine splinters 
when the courts discuss whether a guilty mind is a prerequisite for a breach of good faith 
claim.
140
 
 
Some courts have held that good faith only requires that a contracting party honestly 
believe that he or she is acting properly. The test has been referred to as that of ‘the pure 
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heart and the empty head.’
141
 This approach was applied in Daniels v Army National 
Bank.
142
 The plaintiffs engaged a contractor to build their home and obtained a loan from 
the defendant bank to do so. The plaintiffs were living abroad and were unable to 
supervise the construction of the home. The defendant was aware of this. The plaintiffs 
discovered that there were a number of construction defects in the house when they 
returned. However, the defendant distributed the balance of the loan to the contractor 
notwithstanding that the defendant was appraised of the defects. The contractor 
subsequently filed for bankruptcy. The plaintiffs sued the defendant on the basis of, inter 
alia, breach of the covenant of good faith within the lending contract. The defendant 
counterclaimed for default on the loan. The Supreme Court of Kansas recognised that 
Kansas courts imply a duty of good faith into every contract.
143
  However, it was noted 
that ‘the test of good faith is subjective and requires only honesty in fact.’
144
 The duty 
only meant that a contracting party could not intentionally or purposely prevent the other 
party from receiving the fruits of the contract. The defendant did not breach its duty of 
good faith by failing to inspect the house. Nor had it intentionally or purposely prevented 
the contractor from properly constructing the house. Accordingly, it was held that the 
defendant had not contravened the standard of good faith. Conceivably, the conduct of 
the defendant might have been subject to more stringent scrutiny if good faith required an 
element of reasonable conduct. A bank acting reasonably may have inspected the 
property before distributing the funds. 
 
Other American courts have insisted that good faith comprises an objective component. 
In Reid v Key Bank of Southern Maine Inc Judge Bownes recognised that the Maine 
courts would be likely to include an objective element within the concept of good faith.
145
 
Likewise, in Best v United States National Bank of Oregon the Oregon Supreme Court 
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observed that the purpose of the good faith doctrine is to prohibit improper behavior in 
the performance and enforcement of contracts.
146
 Whilst a party to a contract expects that 
the other will act honestly, the reasonable expectations of the parties need not be so 
limited.
147
  Accordingly, in Luedtke v Nabors Alaska Drilling Inc the Supreme Court of 
Alaska commented that good faith requires a focus on conduct which a reasonable person 
would regard as fair rather than the intent of the defendant.
148
   
 
The meaning of good faith under the UCC appears to be as confused as what it is under 
American common law. The original promulgation of the UCC defines the general 
obligation of good faith as ‘honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.’
149
 
This appears to suggest that good faith is confined only to a subjective analysis. 
However, that result has been criticised. It is argued that this leaves the duty of good faith 
so enfeebled that it can scarcely qualify as an overriding or super-eminent principle.
150
  
 
There are more specific definitions of good faith within the UCC which appear to 
incorporate an objective standard. For example, the UCC imposes a duty of good faith on 
a merchant which requires ‘honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing in the trade.’
151
 Similarly, the obligation of good faith applying 
to bank deposits and collections includes ‘the observance of reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing.’
152
 These definitions have found favour with a number of 
commentators who argue that the general definition under the UCC is too limited.
153
 
They contend that the more specific definitions properly import some objective standard 
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tied to commercial reasonableness.
154
 Without such a standard, no more than knowing 
and deliberate maliciousness, trickery and deceit would be forbidden.
155
 
 
In light of these criticisms, the UCC has subsequently been amended. The drafting 
committee charged with revising the general definitions decided that it was appropriate to 
adopt a broader definition of good faith.
156
 Thus, the revised general definition requires 
honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.
157
 
Now both the revised UCC and the Restatement (2d) of Contracts 1981 contain a 
definition of good faith which incorporates both subjective and objective elements.  
 
Notwithstanding, some state legislatures have declined to adopt the broader definition of 
good faith.
158
 Accordingly, the differences in the definition of good faith within the UCC 
are retained in certain states. It is therefore apparent that there remains little consensus as 
to the meaning of good faith between different states. Further, the definition of good faith 
differs between statutory and common law contexts. There is no uniformity. 
  
(b) Does Good Faith Create Independent Rights? 
 
In addition to the debate over meaning in America, it is unclear whether a claim for 
breach of good faith gives rise to a cause of action separate from an ordinary breach of 
contract claim.
159
 The narrower approach is that good faith merely serves as a means of 
interpreting the contract. Thus, good faith does not create independent rights separate 
from those created by the provisions of the contract. 
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The case law again reveals significant inconsistencies. Some courts have adopted a 
restrictive approach to the application of good faith. In Duquesne Light Co v 
Westinghouse Electric Co the Court suggested that the good faith duty should be used as 
an interpretive tool.
160
 The courts should not enforce an independent duty divorced from 
the specific clauses of the contract. Thus, the implied covenant of good faith is derivative 
in nature. It does not create new contract terms but ‘grows out of existing ones.’
161
 This 
approach was adopted in Northview Motors Inc v Chrysler Motors Corp where it was 
recognised that the duty of good faith cannot override the express terms of the contract 
because the duty cannot be separated from the existing terms.
162
 
 
Other courts appear to adopt a more liberal approach to the application of good faith. In 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Marvel Enters Inc the Court said that a claim for 
breach of good faith might be made where conduct by a defendant separate from a breach 
of the express terms frustrates the right of the plaintiff to the benefits due under the 
contract.
163
  
 
Indeed, in some cases the duty appears to give rise to obligations which are not directly 
referable to the contractual terms. The case of Vylene Enterprises Inc v Naugles Inc
164
 is 
a prime example. Vylene was a franchisee of Naugles. The parties entered into a 10 year 
contract under which Vylene assumed the operation of a restaurant, previously run by 
Naugles. One of the issues in the case concerned whether Naugles had breached the 
implied covenant of good faith by opening a competing franchise within the immediate 
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vicinity of the restaurant operated by Vylene. It was clear that the franchise agreement 
did not permit Vylene an exclusive territory. The Court observed that where there is no 
grant of an exclusive territory within a contract, none will be impliedly read into the 
contract.
165
 Notwithstanding, the Court was prepared to rule that Naugles had breached 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
166
 It did not trouble the Court that it could not 
link the breach of good faith to an existing express or implied contractual provision.  
 
There is no agreement as to which is the preferable approach, although the case law 
appears to tend towards precluding good faith from acting as an independent cause of 
action.
167
 It has been suggested that good faith should not create independent rights 
because the duty of good faith is ‘simply a rechristening of fundamental principles of 
contract law.’
168
 Notwithstanding, many of the uses to which good faith is put today in 
America appear to extend past traditional techniques of interpretation and gap filling.
169
 
 
Others vehemently oppose a restricted application of good faith. It is argued that if good 
faith is used merely as an aid to interpretation without creating free-standing rights, then 
it is stripped of its potency and its equitable elements.
170
 Good faith is reduced to a 
rhetorical device utilised to bolster judicial findings in underlying breach of contract 
claims. Thus, it serves only as an ‘analytical proxy’ for simple breach of contract.
171
 
 
(c) Is Good Faith an Issue of Fact or an Issue of Law?  
 
It has been observed that the American courts have reached different conclusions on 
whether and when the issue of good faith is one of fact for the jury or an issue of law to 
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be determined by the judge.
172
 The uncertainty is a corollary of the inability of the courts 
to agree on whether good faith is merely a device used to interpret express terms of an 
agreement or whether it has more wide ranging application.  
 
In Highmark Inc v Hospital Service Association of Northeastern Pennsylvania the 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania recognised that the proper interpretation of a contract is a 
question of law.
173
 Therefore, if good faith is a device for contractual interpretation it is 
properly a question to be resolved by the presiding judge.
174
 Thus, in Questar Pipeline Co 
v Grynberg the Court opined that an issue as to good faith should not be submitted to the 
jury where it arises in relation to contractual interpretation.
175
 The Court went further in 
Richard Short Oil Co Inc v Taxaco Inc appearing to hold that the issue of good faith is 
solely one of law for the judge:  
 
With regard to the standard for a directed verdict for a claim of violation of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, questions about what amounts to good 
faith or bad faith are questions of law for the court to decide.
176
 
 
Other cases evidence a greater willingness to refer good faith to the jury. Indeed, 
questions of intent and whether there has been a contractual breach have been regarded as 
questions of fact appropriate for a jury.
177
 Accordingly, in Guardian Alarm Co of 
Michigan v May the Court said that the question of whether a defendant has adhered to 
the duty of good faith should necessarily be appraised by a jury.
178
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The debate as to when good faith is an issue of law or an issue of fact would be relevant 
to New Zealand notwithstanding that jury trials are rare, if not non-existent, in 
contractual claims in the New Zealand High Court.
179
 The issue would still affect New 
Zealand litigants. For example, a right of appeal may be confined solely to issues of 
law.
180
 Similarly, appellate courts are generally less amenable to displacing findings of 
fact as compared to findings of law.
181
 Accordingly, it would be desirable to resolve the 
issue before adopting the doctrine within New Zealand. However, it appears that no clear 
answer can be derived from the United States. Indeed, the failure of the American courts 
to reconcile whether good faith is a legal or factual issue or a combination of both serves 
to illustrate the uncertainty surrounding the jurisprudential basis of the doctrine. 
 
(d) Is it Possible to Contract out of Good Faith? 
 
The American courts have again divided on the issue of whether and the extent to which 
obligations of good faith may excluded. In Carmichael v Adirondack Bottled Gas 
Corporation of Vermont the Supreme Court of Vermont held that the covenant of good 
faith is imposed by law and is not a contractual term that the parties are free to bargain in 
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and out as they see fit.
182
 This reasoning suggests that the common law doctrine 
represents a significant departure from the principle of freedom of contract. In order to 
support the view that the duty cannot be disclaimed, some jurists have asserted that the 
obligation of good faith is constructive rather than implied.
183
 This may reflect attempts 
to overcome the difficulty that a term will not ordinarily be implied if the parties have 
purported to exclude it. However, the distinction is not entirely clear. If contracting 
parties express an intention that the doctrine should not apply it is difficult to see how the 
contract can be construed to require good faith. 
 
Indeed, other courts have been less willing to undermine contractual autonomy. For 
example, in Eis v Meyer the Supreme Court of Connecticut declined to imply a covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing.
184
 The Court said that the imposition of a duty of good 
faith would be contrary to the express wording of the legal document. Accordingly, the 
doctrine was inapplicable.  
 
The position under the UCC was briefly explored in Chapter 2. Section 1-102(3) provides 
that the parties are not able to disclaim obligations of good faith under the UCC by 
agreement. Nonetheless, the parties may contractually stipulate the standards required to 
observe good faith provided such obligations are not manifestly unreasonable.  
 
The restriction on contracting out of UCC good faith obligations appears to contradict the 
demonstrable willingness of some American courts to defer to the intention of the 
contracting parties. Farnsworth notes: 
 
It is sometimes no simple matter to reconcile the mandatory character of the duty 
of good faith with the principle, often repeated by the courts, that there is no such 
duty if it would conflict with an express provision of the contract.
185
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For example, in Kahm & Nate’s Shoes No 2 Inc v First Bank of Whiting Judge 
Easterbrook said that principles of good faith ‘do not block the use of terms that actually 
appear in the contract.’
186
 Arguably this statement is incompatible with the provisions of 
the UCC. The mandatory application of good faith will indeed serve to ‘block’ any terms 
purporting to exclude the doctrine. 
 
Ultimately, one commentator has suggested that the UCC ‘waffles on the question of how 
much control parties have over the duty of good faith.’
187
 Others argue that good faith 
clearly has the effect of restricting party autonomy. Chivers contends: 
 
One notion of the doctrine is that it is a set of peremptory norms of appropriate 
behaviour…That is, instead of forming a part of the “background law”, the 
covenant stands at the “foreground” trumping even explicitly bargained-for terms 
in the same way doctrines of illegality or unconscionability stand in the 
foreground placing substantive limits on contractual freedom. This notion is 
conveyed, at least superficially, by the Code provision making good faith 
obligations non-disclaimable.
188
 
 
Thus, in some cases courts are prepared to impose obligations of good faith without 
reference to the actual intent of the parties. In others the courts appear to defer to the 
express words of the agreement. Ultimately, the extent to which the doctrine of 
contractual good faith can be used to override the intention of the parties is inherently 
unclear within the United States. 
 
6.5.3 Précis: 
 
The foregoing analysis has identified the limitations of drawing on the experience of the 
United States when appraising the good faith debate in New Zealand. The differences in 
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legal systems must be factored into account. In particular, the lack of completely uniform 
legislation or a universal final court to determine contractual issues within America 
inhibits comparisons of American and New Zealand contract law.  
 
The heavy reliance on codification under the UCC within America is also significant. 
New Zealand contract law is primarily common law based.
189
 There are fundamental 
difficulties in comparing the American doctrine under the UCC with the subject common 
law doctrine. For example, state legislatures in America have been able to preclude 
contracting parties from excluding the doctrine. It was recognised in Chapter 2 that New 
Zealand courts might not be able to impose such a restriction should a common law 
doctrine of contractual good faith be introduced.  
 
Critically, it can be seen from the experience within the United States that the application 
of the covenant of good faith is often laced with inconsistencies.
190
 The doctrine has 
provided work for many American lawyers who endeavour to untangle the case law.
191
 
The fact that America has been unable to resolve fundamental issues relating to the 
doctrine despite over a 100 years of good faith jurisprudence must be of concern to those 
engaged in the debate within New Zealand. It warrants close scrutiny of good faith. In 
Service Station Association Ltd v Berg Bennett & Associates Pty Ltd Gummow J 
emphasised the point: 
 
In the United States [ ] it has been said that the good faith performance doctrine 
may appear as a licence for the exercise of judicial or juror intuition in 
unpredictable and inconsistent applications, requiring repeated adjudication 
before an “operational standard” may be “articulated and evaluated”…[This] 
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serves to illustrate the caution necessary in accepting foreign importations, 
without prior scrutiny and comparison with the development of the law here.
192
 
 
It is recognised that the foregoing analysis has not extensively examined the perceived 
and actual benefits of the good faith doctrine in America. Nonetheless, the identified 
problems are alarming. Ultimately, it is submitted that the experience within the United 
States does not present a strong argument for the introduction of good faith within New 
Zealand. Certainly, American law might serve as a useful guide or caveat should the 
subject doctrine be incorporated within New Zealand law. However, the American 
experience does not advance any compelling evidence to support the introduction of the 
doctrine. It is perhaps apt that words of caution to Anglo-Commonwealth countries have 
emanated from American academics, including Hunter: 
 
[B]efore one suggests a wholesale adoption of the American version of good 
faith, one must understand that, at present, there remains considerable uncertainty 
about the full meaning of the concept. The American cases may provide useful 
examples and guides to the development of the concept of ‘good faith’ during the 
past century, but an observer must be aware of the shifting currents and the 
absence of a common understanding of the scope and content of the implied 
covenant.
193
 
 
Thus, extreme caution is warranted both in propounding the American experience as an 
argument for adopting good faith in New Zealand and utilising it to develop good faith 
jurisprudence. 
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6.6 Summary: 
 
The majority of developed legal jurisdictions expressly recognise a doctrine of 
contractual good faith. New Zealand is fundamentally dependent on international trade 
such that it is subject to constant pressure to achieve harmonisation with the laws of its 
major trading partners in order to minimise impediments to international exchange. The 
phenomenon of globalisation and worldwide recognition of the need for economic 
cooperation contributes to the need for harmonisation of domestic laws. The EU is a 
significant factor in England which is pushing it towards the recognition of contractual 
good faith. The likelihood of New Zealand adopting contractual good faith may be 
strongly correlated to whether England, its historical source of contract law, and 
Australia, its largest trading partner, embrace good faith.  
 
However, there are certain international considerations which militate against recognition 
of a doctrine of good faith in domestic New Zealand law. In particular, there is no 
demonstrable evidence to suggest that New Zealand and its larger Commonwealth 
counterparts have been prejudiced in the international trade arena by not recognising 
contractual good faith. Further, parties engaged in international trade are free to choose a 
jurisdiction to govern their contract which endorses good faith. Again, there is no proof to 
suggest that parties are rejecting jurisdictions which endorse the libertarian tradition and 
leave it up to the parties to embrace good faith. Indeed, there is evidence to the contrary. 
Certainly, good faith has had an unsettled application within international trade laws such 
as those embodied in the CISG. This does not bode well for a doctrine of good faith 
within New Zealand domestic law. Similar results can be seen in America. There are still 
unresolved issues and numerous contradictions within the case law despite the United 
States having recognised good faith for over a century. There is even legislative 
divergence between states with respect to good faith. Thus, it would be wrong to regard 
the experience within the United States as presenting a compelling argument for good 
faith. Ultimately, these factors do not inspire confidence for the subject doctrine of good 
faith within New Zealand.   
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Conclusion 
 
Good faith has been associated with contract law since Ancient Roman times. From its 
classical origins, the principle has developed through a range of legal sources including 
canon law, civil law, common law and equity. The majority of developed legal systems 
now overtly acknowledge a general principle of good faith in contract law. However, 
New Zealand and the Anglo-Antipodean common law countries have hitherto declined to 
expressly recognise an overarching doctrine of good faith in contract. Notwithstanding, 
the pressure for harmonisation of contract law brought about by the phenomenon of 
globalisation will inevitably require a reassessment of this position. An appraisal of 
whether there is a requirement for a universal doctrine of good faith in New Zealand 
contractual relationships is therefore a current and significant issue. 
 
This thesis has focused predominantly on a common law doctrine of good faith. The 
preferred methodology through which the doctrine could be incorporated into contract 
law is by way of a rule of construction. Contracts could be construed to require good faith 
conduct. However, there are inherent limits to the subject doctrine. Parties would 
inevitably be able to contractually exclude it. Further, it is unlikely to apply to pre-
contractual and non-contractual conduct. A claim for breach of good faith would 
necessarily have to be pleaded as a breach of contract. Although this thesis has not 
focused on a statutory rule, these factors suggest that a legislative doctrine rather than a 
judicial doctrine might be preferred if good faith is to have the wide ranging effect 
proponents desire.  
 
It was noted in the introduction that determination of the thesis is necessarily a balancing 
exercise. The competing arguments for and against good faith have been weighed up. It 
will have become readily apparent throughout this manuscript that the negative 
arguments have been found to displace the views of proponents of good faith. 
 
It is anticipated that a good faith doctrine would be of uncertain application in New 
Zealand. Whilst good faith may embody obligations of cooperation, honesty and 
 348 
reasonable behaviour, determining the conduct required in the particular circumstances of 
each case to meet the good faith standard would be inherently uncertain. There is no 
apparent justification to introduce this unpredictability into the law of contract. 
Proponents of good faith fail to establish that existing contract law within New Zealand 
does not adequately give effect to the reasonable expectations of contracting parties. On 
the contrary, it is clear that much of the prevailing law of contract embodies unexpressed 
notions of good faith. Further, there is a strong likelihood that the courts would not allow 
good faith to undermine the certitude of existing contract law. In consequence, the 
doctrine might not produce any different substantive legal outcomes and would only 
confuse the administration of the law. 
 
Good faith obligations may enhance economic efficiency through transactions cost 
savings. However, there is a trade-off in terms of certainty. A doctrine of good faith is 
therefore unlikely to be efficient in all circumstances, particularly where it is used as a 
mandate for the courts to rewrite a contract. The preferable approach is to impose 
obligations consonant with good faith in those classes of contractual relationship in which 
efficiency is likely to be enhanced. This is already achieved to some extent through 
legislative and judicial intervention and is best progressed through incremental and 
specific development rather than a blanket rule of good faith.   
 
Finally, the need to accord with widespread international practice does not present a 
compelling argument for good faith within domestic law. The principle is of vague 
application in the international trade arena. There is no meaningful evidence to suggest 
that New Zealand foreign trade is impaired due to the declinature of the New Zealand 
courts to embrace a universal obligation of good faith. Quite the opposite, England may 
be preferred as a litigation centre by international commercial parties precisely because it 
does not recognise discretionary principles such as good faith. It may therefore be 
desirable for New Zealand to continue to follow the Commonwealth approach. The 
American experience also confirms the skepticism towards the general doctrine. 
Constitutional and legal differences between the United States and New Zealand render it 
 349 
an imperfect exemplar. Nonetheless, the fundamental unresolved issues pertaining to 
good faith within America does not inspire confidence in the utility of the doctrine. 
 
These conclusions should not be construed as suggesting that obligations of good faith do 
not have a place in contractual relationships within New Zealand. It has been recognised 
throughout this thesis that good faith is a valuable principle whether it is embedded in 
certain contractual rules or implied as a term in particular categories of contract. It has 
also been noted that there is potential for development. For example, good faith may 
serve a useful future role in areas such as agreements to negotiate, process contracts, 
regulating the exercise of contractual discretions, contractual variations and 
distinguishing between liquidated damages and penalty clauses. There is scope for further 
research to ascertain those areas of contract law in which good faith may be appropriately 
deployed in the future.   
 
Ultimately however, the ‘piecemeal’ approach to contract law which is synonymous with 
Anglo-Commonwealth common law countries is preferred to a general, unfamiliar and 
uncertain doctrine of good faith. Where necessary, incremental development of the 
common law, equitable and statutory rules regulating contractual dealings should be 
advocated over a reformulation of the law of contract in New Zealand based on a general 
principle of good faith. Thus, it is concluded that there is no requirement for a universal 
doctrine of good faith in New Zealand contractual relationships.    
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